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Chapter 1. Introduction. A Dimensions Approach to Technology 
Regulation 
Morag Goodwin 
Tilburg Institute for Law, Technology, and Society (TILT), Tilburg 
University 
 
1.1. Introduction: a Multi-dimensional Analysis 
From the first use of a stone as a hammer, the invention of the wheel 
or prehistoric man’s ability to create fire, the extraordinary creative 
abilities of our species have needed controlling. The use of tools to 
adapt and control our environment, while the driving force of our 
species, has always presented human beings with the possibility of 
harming others, ourselves, or the broader environment within which we 
live. This endless creative and simultaneously destructive curiosity has 
always needed some form of regulatory control for the safety and 
benefit of both individuals and the community as a whole. These 
regulatory efforts seek a balance between encouraging and curbing 
innovation, requiring periodic adjustment where that balance tips too 
far in the permissive direction and we are reminded again of the 
destructive potential of our inquisitiveness; or it tips too far the other 
way and our playful inventiveness is stifled by unchecked fears. In 
recent years, the pace and range of technological change ” a still 
accelerating phenomenon ” has constituted a sort of ‘permanent 
revolution’, in which constant technological innovation and conversion 
across a wide spectrum of technologies has left our ability to adapt 
always one step behind. Regulatory efforts thus face an enormous 
challenge in keeping pace with technological developments and in 
finding an optimal balance between protection and creativity. While the 
complexities of technology regulation have long been noted, research 
into in this area as a comprehensive field of study worthy of its own 
disciplinary tent is a recent phenomenon; and one we are, un-
surprisingly, still struggling to fully grasp.   
The papers in this volume are an attempt to chart the nature of 
these complexities and to analyse regulatory responses to them. They 
are the result of an international conference organised by the Tilburg 
Institute for Law, Technology, and Society (TILT) in Tilburg, the 
Netherlands, on 10-11 December 2008. The conference title, ‘TILTing 
Perspectives on regulating technologies’, not only reflected TILT’s 
ambition to bring together a wide range of international scholars that 




regulation; it also conveyed the aim of the conference to address the 
challenges of technology regulation from alternative perspectives that 
have the potential to alter the angle from which we look at the field. 
These perspectives include those affected by disciplinary boundaries, 
by national background and by research interests. 
The conference was organised as an open tent, in which speakers 
were invited from a range of different traditional disciplines ” including 
law, ethics, politics, sociology, philosophy, management, policy and 
communication studies, science and technology studies, science 
proper and information security ” from a range of national 
backgrounds, and without a preconceived overarching theme. What we 
most wanted to know from the conference participants was what their 
current preoccupations were; what aspect of the regulation of 
technology they found particularly challenging at present; and how they 
saw those challenges evolving as the technological revolution 
continues apace. The papers included here were selected to represent 
the range and depth of the themes that emerged from our discussions 
over those two days in Tilburg.  
Through the open nature of the call for papers and the enthusiastic 
yet broad response, a number of themes emerged. These included a 
concern about the impact on individual fundamental values; a 
continuing preoccupation with risk and uncertainty, implicitly or 
explicitly paying heed to the well-known Collingridge dilemma 
(Collingridge, 1980);1 a focus on the particular regulatory challenges in 
the area of nanotechnology and varying calls for sophisticated 
regulatory responses; reflection upon the broader societal implications 
of new technologies; as well as the way in which the technology-human 
dynamic may be changing human nature, making it necessary to re-
consider what it is to be human. 
The nature and form of this wide range of overlapping concerns, 
reflections and analyses have led us to visualise the contours of this 
emerging research discipline through the imagery of multi-dimensional 
space. In the final paper of this volume, Bert-Jaap Koops uses a 
metaphor borrowed from theoretical physics to present the discipline 
of technology regulation as a space that contains ten dimensions 
(Chapter 15, in this volume). In doing so, he attempts to provide a field 
manual to help us find our bearings in a multi-dimensional field and to 
guide us through it. Even where a ten-dimensional space is beyond 
                                                     
1 This refers to the insight that the potential benefits of a new technology are widely 
accepted before enough is known about future consequences or potential risks to 
regulate the technology from the outset, while by the time enough is known about the 
consequences and possible harms to enable regulating it, vested interests in the success 






many of our imaginations, the analytical device of dimensions allows 
us, as Koops highlights, to gather our bearings and see more clearly 
where we are and what influences the determination of our positioning 
relative to others. Moreover, once we know better where we stand, we 
can move forward with more confidence into areas of the field that are 
yet to be explored, mapped and studied, and thus enhance our 
understanding of technology regulation qua discipline. As Brownsword 
and Somsen have recently noted, our regulatory intelligence remains 
primitive (Brownsword and Somsen, 2009:32); the final contribution of 
this conference, then, is to try and find new ways of understanding the 
emerging discipline of technology regulation as a way of beginning to 
think smart about regulatory possibilities.  
Thus, in order to explore further this innovative approach to 
mapping the field of technology regulation research, we have decided 
to group the selected papers according to certain of the dimensions 
that Koops identifies. The aim is to better understand where we stand 
now, in order to be able to determine the research agendas of the 
future. For this purpose, we have been guided by the papers 
themselves and have identified the four dimensions of technology type, 
innovation, time and regulation type as best describing the authors’ 
preoccupations and the way in which they approach what they identify 
as the most pressing challenges. Of course, each contribution is firmly 
grounded in the overall space and therefore touches upon many other 
dimensions, but the categorisation here serves well to draw out the 
scope of particular dimensions. While much remains to be worked out 
in arguing for a multi-dimensional approach, the organisation of this 
volume represents a first attempt to see how a dimensional tilt may 
contribute to our understanding of the emerging discipline of 
technology regulation. 
This volume is grouped into four sections. The most obvious way to 
begin thinking about technology regulation is by reference to the 
technology type. Thus at the most fundamental level, we can divide 
technologies up according to the substance upon which they are based; 
for example, technologies of anorganic (‘dead’) matter (e.g., chemical 
substances), technologies of organic (‘living’) matter (e.g., 
biotechnologies), hybrids of these (e.g., nanomedicine), and 
technologies of information. The technology type will, to a certain 
extent, determine the type of regulatory challenges and where those 
challenges are located in other dimensions. For example, ICT is not 
only or even primarily located by reference to the hardware of the ICT 
machinery but by cyberspace, and thus by the dimension of place. 
Moreover, the regulatory response to a particular technology type may 
determine the response to a new technology based upon the similarity 





feed the approach to nano-based medical applications. The increasing 
tendency towards technological convergence, rather than rendering the 
dimension of technology type redundant, in fact invests it with a new 
importance: to understand the challenges posed by convergence, we 
need to grasp the relevance of technology type in all its dimensionality.  
The second section is devoted to the dimension of innovation. 
Efforts to define the regulatory challenge posed by technology 
frequently refer to ‘new technologies’. This is because new technology 
types, such as nanotechnologies or neuro-technologies, ask interesting 
new types of questions of regulators; however, ‘old technologies’ can 
also produce innovations that require regulatory intervention. 
Moreover, as suggested above, the regulator should not simply seek to 
respond to innovation but encourage it, or at the very least, seek not to 
stifle it. The challenge of creating a balance between stimulating 
creativity and controlling danger is located primarily within this 
dimension. 
The third part of the book considers a perhaps underappreciated 
dimension of the regulatory landscape: time. Time, in relation to 
technology regulation, most obviously refers to the development cycle 
of technology: from fundamental science to applied science, and from 
product development to marketing and widespread usage. Different 
stages of the development cycle pose different regulatory challenges. 
Yet the time/knowledge disconnect coined by the Collingridge dilemma 
entails that technology and efforts to regulate it move at different 
speeds through time ” a problem that is becoming more acute as 
innovation cycles get shorter. Technological innovation is thus 
accelerating away from the regulator. However, beyond consideration 
of the speed of innovation, focusing on the multiple elements of time 
can help us to grasp better the nub of a regulatory problem or see more 
clearly the ethical issues at stake, such as with the future non-existence 
” the missed life ” of an embryo not selected for implantation. 
The final section focuses on the dimension of the type of regulatory 
response. Moving beyond a narrow definition of regulation as law 
means that this dimension has multiple aspects. It contains not only 
different regulatory modes or tools but also the actors wielding them 
across the various levels and networks of governance (including the 
virtual), as well as those at whom the instruments are targeted. In 
particular, it also incorporates the differing ethical and cultural 
perspectives of various actors, both flexible and entrenched, and 
attempts to locate the interaction between the process and substance 
of a regulatory response. Moreover, this dimension also includes the 
use of technology as a tool of regulation itself (techno-regulation). 
Regulatory response is already relatively well plotted in comparison to 





characterisation of techno-regulation as ‘code as law’ (e.g. Dommering 
and Asscher, 2006; Brownsword and Yeung, 2008; for the original, 
Lessig, 1999a: chapter 7; Lessig, 1999b) ” however, the interaction 
between the multiple aspects of this dimension have not yet begun to 
be mapped adequately. Moreover, the further refinement of aspects of 
regulation type, as discussed by Koops, adds yet another layer to the 
complexity of our regulatory toolkit. 
 
1.2. The Dimension of Technology Type 
The three papers in the first section of this collection have been placed 
here in order to show different technology types and the way in which 
the properties of the technology itself determine the regulatory 
response. In the case of the first paper ” a joint contribution by Esther 
Versluis, Tessa Fox, Anique Hommels and Marjolein van Asselt ” the 
authors consider in detail the EU Seveso regime for the regulation of 
chemical hazard. The authors detail the particular hazards represented 
by industrial chemical production, both in terms of scale ” the 
potential, when something goes wrong, for large-scale catastrophes 
such as Bhopal ” and in relation to the nature of a chemical plant, in 
which the processing, storing and transport of dangerous substances 
works to inhibit risk, thus allowing risks to multiply. What these 
authors suggest is that the regulators in the form of the Seveso regime 
have misunderstood the nature of the risk at issue because they have 
misunderstood the nature of the technology. Whilst Seveso regulates 
on the basis of simple or singular risks (‘the positivistic risk 
paradigm’), the chemical industry involves an interplay of multiple risk 
factors that are heterogeneous in relation to both place and time. This 
creates a complexity that the current regulatory response is not well 
equipped to deal with. 
In reaching this conclusion, the authors provide a helpful overview 
of the development of the Seveso regime and the reasons for this 
regulation as well as a clear analysis of the content of the regulatory 
instruments that makes up the regime. To link this analysis to Dutch 
implementation of the Seveso regime, the authors conducted a series 
of in-depth interviews with actors on both sides of the chemical 
regulatory divide in the Netherlands. What these interviews strongly 
showed was that both sets of actors within the Seveso regime 
predominantly view risk from the classical positivistic model of risk as 
calculable and controllable, rather than as uncertain. This finding led 
the authors to conclude that the current Seveso regime has not learnt 
the right lessons from previous disasters and is not merely uncertainty-





given the nature of the technology and thus the potential for accidents 
to cause great harm in a single moment.  
In the following paper, Jen Hendry and Kay Goodall consider the 
regulatory implications of a different technology, that of ICT. By 
focusing on the global phenomenon of Facebook, they consider the 
regulatory difficulties of privacy protection in an online world. The 
unique aspect of ICT ” the fact that its most interesting properties 
reside not in the material aspect of the technology, as with chemicals, 
but in the virtual world they give rise to ” has created unique regulatory 
problems. Regulators are struggling to adapt their tools to the altered 
reality of time, place and society that marks the virtual world. Hendry 
and Goodall approach this issue from the relationship perspective not 
of peer-to-peer interaction but that of provider-to-user. They take as a 
case study the Terms of Use that every user must sign up to in order to 
create a profile on Facebook and, in doing so, bring to light the 
staggering license that this grants to the provider. While content 
ownership remains with the user, the sweeping scope of the license 
grants Facebook the right to do whatever they like with the content for 
any reason they chose, even where it belongs to a former user, i.e. 
someone that has since closed their profile.  
In taking this focus, they draw out the acute problems of regulating 
for privacy by comparing the attempt by some users to achieve privacy-
related goals under different legal systems. In particular, the Terms of 
Use raise interesting questions of jurisdiction, asserting as they do 
that, without regard to existing principles on the conflict of laws, the 
law of the State of California applies to any and all disputes arising 
from using the Facebook site. Hendry and Goodall examine whether 
such a clause and that granting the provider the licence to use all user 
content would stand up in court on either side of the Atlantic, 
particularly given such questions as the age at which one can consent 
to a binding agreement. What their analysis reveals is the difficulty of 
seeking to protect privacy with the traditional tools of intellectual 
property and contract. The particular problems that arise relate to the 
discrepancy between concepts such as ‘author’ or ‘owner’ within 
different jurisdictions; and the difficulty in selecting a legal location in 
which disgruntled cyberspace users can challenge the overreaching 
licence conditions of the networking site or appeal to privacy protection 
rights. As with the previous paper, Hendry and Goodall suggest that 
the regulatory response has not yet grasped the challenges the 
particular technology poses, in this case, to fundamental rights. 
An entirely different set of regulatory issues is raised by Bärbel 
Dorbeck-Jung in her contribution. Dorbeck-Jung’s paper examines the 
particular regulatory challenges posed by nano-technologies, what she 





uncertainty of the risks posed by nano-medical products, she reasons 
her way to regulatory suggestions by means of comparing technologies 
and their regulatory frameworks. Her starting point is the EU’s medical 
product regulatory regime and in particular the Advanced Therapy 
Medicinal Products Regulation. By comparing the governability 
problems of nano-medical products with the regime already in place, 
Dorbeck-Jung is able to highlight the regulatory gaps in relation to the 
particular problems of nano-based medicine; and, moreover, to 
suggest, where sufficient comparability exists, how the successes of 
regulation in relation to one technology can be applied to another. 
Moreover, the results of her analysis clearly influence her approach to 
bridging the uncertainty gap. Dorbeck-Jung argues that balancing the 
level of uncertainty inherent to nanotechnology with the extraordinarily 
high anticipation of the gains from nanotech in the medical field is only 
achievable by a form of hybrid regulation.  
At the European level, hybrid regulation of nanotechnology takes the 
form of co-regulation and soft-law methods. These formats are 
understood as allowing for greater reflexivity and experimentation and 
thus as being better able to cope with uncertainty. Dorbeck-Jung goes 
on to lay out a number of questions that hybrid regulation must answer 
in order to be effective and legitimate, rotating around a number of 
core principles that she identifies as central to European regulatory 
ambitions, namely openness, accountability, proportionality, 
subsidiarity, coherence and vigilance (which could perhaps otherwise 
be expressed as precaution). The paper concludes, however, on an 
important cautionary note amongst the various calls for softer, de facto 
or hybrid forms of regulation; her case study of EU regulation of nano-
medical products strongly suggests the need for centralising product 
knowledge, particularly in situations of de-centralised or hybrid 
regulation. This warning about the weaknesses of regulatory de-
centralisation is picked up by subsequent papers, notably that by 
Gammel, Lösch and Nordmann in the following section.  
It is worth noting, although it is perhaps apparent, that Dorbeck-
Jung’s contribution could be approached in this volume equally from 
the position of regulatory type; her notion of hybridity sees her tapping 
into a broader and more-established stream of work on hybrid or 
network governance methods at the global level. However what this 
paper nicely shows for our organisational purpose is that examining the 
interaction of technology and regulation from the dimension of 
technology type can also allow for comparison between the successes 
and failures of ‘old’ technologies or at least those technologies that are 
further along in the product cycle and where the risks are better 





technology type need not automatically lead to the uniqueness of 
different types of technology as the starting point of analysis. 
 
1.3. The Dimension of Innovation 
The second section of the proceedings opens with an impassioned plea 
from Wolfgang van den Daele to defend the liberal regime of 
innovation from populist fears of technological development. In the 
paper, Van den Daele charts the history of resistance to technological 
developments whilst making a strong case that it is a central tenet of 
liberalism that the benefits of technological progress outweigh the 
creative destruction that is inevitably part of conceptions of progress. 
In supporting liberalism’s belief in the benefits of science, Van den 
Daele takes on the challenge that the precautionary principle poses to 
this regime. The precautionary principle, he argues, is too often used to 
plug the regulatory gap created by a lack of full scientific certainty. For 
Van den Daele, such a radical interpretation of the precautionary 
principle shifts risk assessment away from experts and bases itself 
instead upon popular perceptions of risk, leaving little room, he argues, 
for the right to innovate or for the freedom to act as long as it does not 
harm others.  
Van den Daele’s response to those who would wield human dignity 
as a trump card to prevent developments offending their moral 
sentiments, and to those who wish to see innovation made subject to 
public planning rather than left to market forces, is a plea for 
precaution with principle and for the recognition of the right of private 
innovation within a reflexive society. This proposal links back into an 
issue that was raised in the context of the conference, but that for 
reasons of space could not be developed in the present volume, 
concerning the responsibility of innovators and scientists for their own 
innovations.2 While Van den Daele notes that the quest for responsible 
innovation should not leave the task of regulation entirely to 
innovators, he advocates an approach that has much in common with 
the de facto hybrid regulatory regimes that have sprung up in relation 
to nanotechnology, in which public and private actors co-operate to 
avoid the worst of the destructive forces of technological creativity. He 
ends, however, with a useful corrective to the fears and the related 
                                                     
2 On the first day, David Richard Koepsell addressed this point explicitly in a paper 
entitled, ‘On genies and bottles: scientists’ moral responsibility and dangerous 
technology’, in which he argued strongly that scientists themselves must take moral 
responsibility for the work they do, using examples such as the decision to continuing 
work to develop more lethal versions of the smallpox virus rather than destroy it once 
and for all. Arie Rip’s paper, included in this volume, also reflects upon the individual 





demands for further regulation that dominates our present relationship 
with technology: whether a new technology is worthwhile pursuing is 
ultimately a question of private freedom.   
The second paper in this section approaches the dimension of 
innovation from a very practical perspective. The contribution by 
Maurice Schellekens focuses on issues relating to the patenting of 
nanotechnology and in particular the need to find an intellectual 
property regime capable of balancing the uncertainty of risk with 
innovation in this field. In place of Van den Daele’s defence of a right to 
private innovation, Schellekens warns of the danger of over-patenting in 
the area of nano developments, reflecting upon the harms that would 
result and suggesting moderate reforms to the patent system in order 
to prevent this from occurring. Similar to Dorbeck-Jung’s reasoning, 
Schellekens bases his expectation that nanotechnology is likely to suffer 
from over-patenting on the parallels between this new technology and 
the somewhat older field of bio-technology. The evidence that patents 
are being granted on simple nano-particles, the building blocks of the 
technology, is similar to the conferring of patents upon individual 
genetic markers, according to Schellekens. Also similar is the way in 
which nanotechnology cuts across industries, with applications in a 
wide range of applied fields. As Schellekens nicely highlights, the cross-
cutting nature of the technology is likely to entail not only that patent 
applicants are unaware of related developments in different fields, but 
also that patent assessors may be equally ignorant when deciding 
whether to grant or deny a patent, the likely result being patents that 
significantly overlap. Over-patenting in such a new and uncertain 
technology will stifle innovation as innovators struggle to pay the many 
multiple licenses that will be necessary to conduct basic research in the 
field. Given the anticipated benefits of nano-applications, avoiding such 
a scenario should be a top priority for regulators at every level. The call 
here, then, is for a balance between patents as a spur for innovation 
and the stifling of basic innovation from which we all stand to benefit, 
between private gains and broader public interest. 
The third and final paper placed within the dimension of innovation 
also focuses on nanotechnology. Stefan Gammel, Andreas Lösch and 
Alfred Nordmann, a team of researchers working at Darmstadt 
University, continue upon the theme of innovation and nano-
technology, picking up on Schellekens’ concerns in an attempt to 
design a model of regulation that allows for continuing innovation in 
the field with a commitment to social well-being. The authors start 
from the premise that huge uncertainties about the risks of nano-
technologies as a consequence of a lack of knowledge surrounding the 
potential toxicity of the technology and any subsequent products entails 





regulatory possibility at present. As subsequent contributions detail 
(notably that by Van Calster, Bowman and D’Silva, and by Rip), the 
authors note that the classical regulatory model has been replaced by 
soft regulatory tools, such as observation, voluntary codes of conduct 
and stakeholder discussions. However, in contrast to the optimism of 
later contributions and of Dorbeck-Jung, the authors of this German-
based study found that these softer forms of regulation not only could 
not meet the challenges of regulation alone ” a point unlikely to be 
disputed by Van Calster, Bowman and D’Silva or Rip and one also 
highlighted by Dorbeck-Jung ” but that, further, they do not satisfy the 
basic needs of regulation, which they understand to be public 
oversight, transparency and legal certainty.  
In place of a drift towards softer regulatory forms in the absence of 
being able to opt for a more classical state-based model, Gammel, 
Lösch and Nordmann call for a reflexive adjudication procedure. This 
procedure is to take the form of a collective learning process, whereby 
existing regulation is subject to open and public critical scrutiny 
overseen by a special institution, which they provisionally term the 
‘scanning probe agency’. This agency is conceived as a ‘learning 
community’, under the auspices of which experts from all relevant 
sections of society would be drawn and brought together. Their role 
would be to investigate and judge nanotech products and processes of 
development and to present those findings to the public. The 
remainder of the paper is dedicated to outlining the tasks and working 
methods of such an agency. 
Firstly, the authors highlight the large number and wide variety of 
products that are placed under the heading of nano-products; the 
uncertain and necessarily discursive nature of the heading ‘nano-
technology’ itself demands a reflexive investigatory process. Secondly, 
the nature of nano-particles means that the traditional method of 
regulation ” that of standardised testing of components ” will not be 
successful in this context. Rather, the potential risks of a product will 
need to be monitored throughout the product’s life cycle, and the 
public need to be made aware of the considerable uncertainty that is 
thus inherent to any licensing procedure as innovation continues to 
outrun our ability to comprehend the risks entailed. Further, the 
integration of nanotechnology in a wide variety of products means that 
calculations of risk will need to take into account the possible inter-
action between products, variations in individual usage, etc., i.e. the 
multi-faceted nature of innovation procedures. Finally, given the wide 
range of possible applications for nanotechnology across the scientific 
spectrum, regulators need to avoid the danger of a fragmentation in 
perspective, so that in one context, a nanotech product is viewed from 





tional health standpoint. A dedicated agency, so the authors argue, 
would be able to develop the necessary integrated and multi-dimen-
sional approach to understanding the risks of innovation in this field.  
 
1.4. The Dimension of Time 
The third section focusing on the relevance of the time dimension to 
the relationship between technology and regulation opens with a 
contribution by Colin Gavaghan. In his paper, Gavaghan examines the 
2008 UK Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act updating existing 
embryo regulation against a concern for the obligations we owe to 
future individuals and the issue of identity that such questions raise. 
While the legislation has produced a predictably polarised response 
thus far, Gavaghan ignores this debate to focus on the ethical concerns 
surrounding Section 14(4)(9) of the 2008 Act that requires that 
embryos known to have a significant risk of ‘serious physical or mental 
disability’ must not be selected over those that do not. While ostensibly 
straightforward ” what kind of parent would opt for a child with serious 
disabilities over one without when faced with the choice? ” Gavaghan 
shows that the intuitive response misses the ethical question that lies 
at the heart of this clause, that of the best interests of the not-selected 
embryo, the child not created. As he succinctly highlights, the issue is 
not one of improving the life of a child by opting not to allow it to be 
born with serious physical or mental disabilities but of replacing one 
potential child ” a disabled child ” with another potential, healthier 
child. Gavaghan’s paper examines philosophical efforts to justify this 
choice and shows up the ethical inconsistencies attached to the 
common focus on the obligations of parents towards a ‘generic child’. 
Instead, as Gavaghan notes, each embryo is a potenital individual and 
the parents’ decision of non-selection does not offer it a better, 
healthier future but destruction. In this way, by focusing on the issue of 
time and our (mis)understanding of future (non-)existence, Gavaghan 
brings the ethical dilemma of the Act’s disability clause sharply into 
focus and ultimately calls its legitimacy into question. 
The second paper in this section focuses not on how we 
misunderstand future possibilities by focusing on immediate concerns 
but highlights the way in which we take time, and in particular the time 
for comprehension and reflection, for granted. In an intriguing 
contribution, Mireille Hildebrandt reflects upon the tandem 
development of the legal system in the Western world with the advent 
of the printing press. She argues that the dissemination of law as 
written word has allowed not only for the foundation of the modern 
state, in enabling a ruler to extend her, most frequently his, jurisdiction 





instrumental to the development of rule by law and the rule of law. 
Central to Hildebrandt’s thesis is the work of Paul Ricoeur and his 
claim that distantiation is inherent to script, that is that the written 
word allows for distance in both time and space due to the need for 
interpretation. As the law is written down and disseminated, the author 
loses control over its meaning, opening up that meaning for discussion 
and alternative interpretations. The possibility of multiple interpre-
tations builds hesitation and space for reflection into our appreciation 
and application of the law.  
Hildebrandt’s view of law as being at a crossroads ” her concerns 
for the future ” relate to the increasing use of Web 2.0 technologies by 
‘digital natives’, i.e. those who were born into a world of parallel 
processing that characterises the era of real-time computing. She fears 
that the speed and instant nature of communication are replacing 
delay, which, while positive in a number of aspects, simultaneously 
removes the opportunity for the critical assessment of information. As 
such, the younger generation are not developing the skills associated 
with linear sequencing and Hildebrandt sees in this development a 
dramatic challenge to law as we know it. In particular, the removal of 
distance and the necessary interpretation that accompanies it poses a 
very real threat to values fundamental to the ‘old’ or ‘current’ legal 
order, such as the protection of privacy, the principle of non-
discrimination and the architecture of due process.  
Further illuminating the relevance of time in the regulation of 
technology, the final paper in this section, although sub-titled ‘the 
challenges of contemporary technosciences’, speaks to a future-
immediate world in which science will be all-pervasive. This paper by 
Hub Zwart explores the concept of pervasive science and the challenge 
that this represents not only for governance efforts but also for the 
possibility of individual self-management and our understandings of 
what it means to be human. As such, the concept of pervasive science 
poses a huge challenge to common understandings of humanity, 
nature and the purpose of society. Zwart develops the notion of 
pervasive science from Goethe’s famous statement about nature; for 
Zwart, similar to Goethe’s conception of the force of nature, 
contemporary techno-sciences surround us, interact with us, with each 
other, cannot be separated from us, and yet we have no power over 
them. This apparently terrifying view of the future thus characterises 
techno-science as pervasive, not only in their interaction with humans 
but also in their interaction with each other. Zwart notes that it is no 
longer possible to maintain the old compartmentalisations ” such as 
between pure and applied science, between different branches of 
science, between nature and technology, etc. ” in the face of the 





consequence, Zwart suggests, of biomesis, in which man-made 
systems are inserted into ‘natural’ systems in such a way that the 
artificial elements become embedded, challenging our conceptions of 
artificial and natural. This Faustus-like ambition to transcend nature, to 
improve upon it, will take us down a path in which we begin to blur the 
divide between nature and man-made and in which the distinction 
between Self and technology itself becomes more than a little hazy. In 
this paper, Zwart presents concrete examples of fields and applications 
where this is likely to occur in the future and notes both the 
opportunities and dangers that these avenues present society and our 
attempt to make sense of the technological revolution. The tone of this 
paper suggests that there is no going backwards, no stopping the role 
of science in our lives and its potential to alter human nature itself. 
 
1.5. The Dimension of Regulation Type 
The four papers in the final section of the volume have been placed 
together to be viewed through the prism of regulation type because 
they represent different regulatory perspectives, providing alternate 
insights into the regulatory tools available, as well as the pros and cons 
of different approaches to technology problems.  
The first paper is a joint effort by Maastricht-based colleagues, 
Marjolein van Asselt, Ellen Vos and Tessa Fox. It focuses on the 
process of regulation and the crucial importance of the influence and 
attitude of individual actors in determining a regulatory outcome, in 
particular the role of the European Court of Justice in interpreting and 
applying policy-type recommendations. This paper builds upon the 
earlier work of Van Asselt and Vos on what they have termed the 
‘uncertainty paradox’ in the field of risk. They see this paradox of 
uncertainty ” a term for situations in which uncertainty is acknow-
ledged but where science is presented, by policy-makers and judicial 
actors, as capable of providing certainty ” as particularly pertinent to 
new technologies.  
In responding to the challenge posed by the Collingridge dilemma, 
the authors identify a need to focus more closely on the attitudes of 
actors involved in the processes of risk assessment and risk 
management. By examining four cases of technological regulation at 
the European level ” namely the Pfizer case and three cases from the 
saga of EU GMO regulation ” they detect a distinction between 
attitudes that are normally labelled simply as either risk adverse or non-
risk adverse. Instead, Van Asselt, Vos and Fox develop the notion of 
uncertainty intolerance and show that where, in the Pfizer case, crucial 
actors are both risk adverse and uncertainty intolerant, in the GMO 





What the authors discover by contrasting these cases is that what is 
often considered to be risk aversion is, as in the case of GMOs, risk 
intolerance, i.e. an unwillingness to consider the possibility of 
uncertainty. Moreover, what their analysis shows is that an attitude of 
uncertainty intolerance held by a critical actor in the process of either 
risk assessment or risk management is what made uncertainty 
intolerance the dominant feature of regulatory efforts in all four cases. 
This study suggests that the psychological attitudes of the main actors 
towards uncertainty play a critical role in the design and 
implementation of technological regulation, and, as such, is an area in 
which much more research is needed. 
The second paper reviews the suitability of EU legislative 
instruments in the area of nanotechnologies. The collaborative paper, 
based upon the first year of a four-year research project at the Catholic 
University of Leuven, examines the regulatory framework at the 
European level across three separate industries ” cosmetics, medical 
applications and food contact materials ” to determine the extent to 
which regulation is problematic and the ways in which the regulatory 
regimes in each case determine, assess and manage risk. In doing so, 
Geert van Calster, Diana Bowman and Joel D’Silva pick up on some of 
the concerns raised by Van Asselt, Vos and Fox, namely that the very 
novelty of this new technology and the considerable array of potential 
benefits it offers has persuaded governments and industry to allow 
experimentation across the manufacturing chain despite the new and 
unpredictable risks attached to such a new and untested technology.  
By means of case-studies, the authors identify a regulatory gap 
caused by a lack of scientific data on the mid- to long-term effects of 
products containing nano-particles. Further, this lack of scientific 
information has, according to the authors, been used to avoid taking 
any clear regulatory steps, with the European Commission opting 
instead for an incremental approach of amending existing instruments. 
The result, according to Van Calster, Bowman and D’Silva, is that 
regulatory authorities at both the national and the EU level have turned 
to softer instruments to respond to the particular challenges of 
regulating nanotechnology. Where national authorities have generally 
focused on the possibilities of voluntary reporting schemes and similar 
programmes, the European Commission has been slightly more 
innovative. In place of voluntary reporting, the Commission has, in 
consultation with a variety of partners selected from across industry, 
academia and civil society, developed voluntary Codes of Conduct, i.e. 
not simply self-monitoring but self-regulation. While, as the authors are 
quick to highlight, the effectiveness of such systems of self-regulation 
are yet to be determined, self-regulation as a supplementary framework 





promising. The next phase of the Leuven project is to move beyond an 
academic consideration of the regulatory frameworks in the three areas 
of cosmetics, medical products and food contact materials and to 
identify benchmark criteria for regulatory nanotechnology ” a step 
further towards reducing our uncertainty about nanotechnology 
regulation and one that is therefore eagerly awaited.   
A focus on the utility of self-regulation in areas of high uncertainty is 
picked up by the following paper in this section. The contribution by 
Arie Rip, a veteran of the field of Science and Technology Studies, 
highlights the extent to which, in the absence of legislators taking the 
lead, de facto governance mechanisms are in fact springing up in the 
area of nanotechnology at all levels of governance. Given the structural 
uncertainties highlighted by others, what surprises Rip is the extent to 
which nanotechnology is already being governed, albeit without any 
particular actor with a clear agenda being responsible for such 
activities. Rip’s contribution is thus concerned with charting the extent 
and nature of, and the interactions between, the various actions that 
are currently functioning as de facto governance arrangements in the 
field of nanotechnology. Here he provides necessary clarity to the 
emerging pathways of interactions of and between soft regulatory 
forms, and charts, by means of a helpful diagram, the development of 
these forms over time.  
The second and broader part of Rip’s paper takes elements raised in 
the preceding paper further and is concerned with considering how and 
when de facto governance arrangements are successful in achieving 
regulatory goals. In particular he examines the interaction between 
‘top-down’ or traditional ‘command and control’ forms of regulation 
and the de facto arrangements he elucidated in the first part. As part of 
this discussion, Rip draws out a strand of debate that was present at a 
number of points in the conference, both in papers presented and 
attendant discussions, and which is drawn out by Van den Daele and 
Schellekens in their contributions: that of individual responsibility for 
technological development. Rip highlights the emphasis on responsible 
development in codes of conduct for nanotech innovation on both 
sides of the Atlantic. Ultimately the paper identifies a shift away from 
traditional governance forms and traces the outline of a new pattern 
emerging. Although this pattern is yet to crystallise, Rip pinpoints a key 
element of this overarching configuration: the discourse of anticipatory 
governance. This discourse anticipates from an early stage of 
technological development the eventual social embedding of the new 
technology, possible interactions between various actors within the 
governance process as well as responsibilities in what is by definition a 





the sphere of nanotechnology might contain the beginnings of an 
intelligent response to the Collingridge dilemma.  
The final paper in this section moves away from consideration of 
self-regulation and presents instead an institutional angle. The 
contribution by Nicolle Zeegers presents a considered attempt to 
incorporate apparently incompatible moral and religious values within 
regulation ” in this case, legislation at the national level. As with 
Gavaghan’s contribution, Zeegers focuses on the 2008 UK Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act; however, Zeegers examines the 
processes and discussions leading up to the Act, and in particular to 
the debate within Parliament as to whether to prohibit human-animal 
hybrid embryos, and within the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Agency concerning the definition of an embryo, and whether human-
animal hybrids fell within it.  
Zeegers explicitly takes the communicative approach as her 
normative starting point, noting at the outset that according 
communicative processes a central position in the formulation of 
legislation in such a sensitive area would allow for a plurality of 
perspectives and understandings of what constitutes an embryo to be 
incorporated. However, by analysing the UK debate, she concludes that 
the integration of alternative perspectives concerning the use of hybrid 
embryos in research was prevented by various power relations in the 
communicative process, with concerns about human-animal hybrids 
simply being put aside at the crucial moment of decision. What this 
paper ultimately does is highlight the unwillingness of the dominant 
(scientific) perspective to take minority views in this debate seriously 
and raises again the issue of the legitimacy of regulation and of those 
values that we label as ‘fundamental’ in the face of the plurality of 
ethical standpoints in contemporary societies. 
 
1.6. The Multi-dimensional Discipline of Technology Regulation? 
The final paper in the volume provides the core idea around which this 
volume has been organised, namely the vision of the discipline of 
technology regulation as a multi-dimensional space. The paper by Bert-
Jaap Koops is both visionary and practical. Moreover, it assists us in 
plotting the complexity of the relationships and interactions between 
technology, society, politics, institutions, creativity, fear and social 
relationships. Although we have been able in this volume to group 
papers only according to one dimension, Koops’s innovative approach 
is intended to allow us to plot complexity by reference to any number or 
all of the dimensions he elaborates. All of the papers brought together 
here could easily have been placed under other dimensional headings, 





findings to the fore, enriching our understanding of individual 
contributions within the broader field. Without ruling out the possibility 
of a better mapping device being possible tomorrow, for now we hope 
to show you what a map of the discipline based upon dimensionality 
might look like and why it may be a useful way in which to unravel and 
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Chapter 2. Calculable Risks? An Analysis of the European Seveso 
Regime 
Esther Versluis, Marjolein van Asselt, Tessa Fox and Anique Hommels 
Maastricht University, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences 
 
Abstract 
The chemical sector is confronted with risks pertaining to accidents 
involving dangerous substances. At the European level, a set of 
regulations ” the Seveso regime ” aims at controlling such risks. This 
paper explores how this regime is put into practice, by analyzing the 
local practices of enforcement by Dutch inspectors and compliance by 
Dutch chemical companies. These empirical insights demonstrate that 
the classical ‘positivistic risk paradigm’ ” which presents risks as 
calculable, controllable and reducible ” seems to dominate in the 
Seveso regime. The analysis in this paper shows that this can lead to 
‘uncertainty blindness’ ” a regulatory regime where only yesterday’s 
accidents are managed and salient future risks are potentially 
overlooked. We suggest that both regulators and regulatees should 
start accepting the possibility of uncertain risks, which implies a 
cultural change in the current regulatory regime. 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Regulation plays an important role in controlling risks. This also holds 
for risks associated with the chemical industry. Industrial risks are 
complex because within a chemical plant, the processing, storing and 
transport of dangerous substances involve risks, hereby creating 
accumulation and interplay of many risk factors. The chemical sector is 
confronted with the possibility of accidents involving dangerous 
substances. Past accidents in the chemical industry in, amongst others, 
Bhopal, Mexico City and Seveso have led to attempts in the European 
Union (EU) to control such major-accident hazards. A set of two EU 
directives and three amendments ” together defined as the ‘Seveso 
regime’ ” aims to regulate the chemical industry in order to prevent 
accidents. In the history of the Seveso regime, it is clear that each time 
a major accident happened, the rules were redefined and sharpened. It 
is thus assumed by the regulators that tight(er) regulation is the best 
way to regulate risks in the chemical industry.  
In this paper we explore the local practices of Dutch companies and 





two groups of actors involved in this regulatory regime ” the regulators 
and the regulatees ” perceive the risks at stake? Based on in-depth 
interviews with both parties, we will demonstrate that the classical 
‘positivistic risk paradigm’ which presents risks as calculable, 
controllable and reducible seems to dominate within the Seveso 
regulatory regime. The Seveso definition of risk suggests a focus on 
simple, calculable risks at the expense of risks that are uncertain. This 
impression of ‘uncertainty intolerance’ is supported by the very detailed 
and complex character of the regulation, which breathes the pretence of 
full control and absolute safety. Two rounds of semi-structured 
interviews (n=17)1 with Dutch inspectors and chemical companies 
provide insight into the way in which risks are perceived and regulated. 
Our analysis shows that the current Seveso regime ” to put it 
somewhat provocatively ” ‘lags behind’ new academic insights, and 
could even be labeled as ‘uncertainty blind’. This paper concludes by 
stating that we are in need of a more reflexive regime in which 
regulators stimulate uncertainty tolerance.  
 
2.2. The Seveso Regime  
The explosion of a chemical plant in Flixborough (United Kingdom) in 
1974 led to 28 fatalities. The next year, a naphtha cracker exploded in 
Beek (The Netherlands), killing 14 employees. A year later, two 
accidents occurred in Italy: one in Manfredonia and one in Seveso 
where a vapour cloud containing lethal dioxins escaped from a 
chemical plant and resulted in 2,000 people having to be treated for 
dioxin poisoning. While most member states of the European Union at 
that time had their national systems to regulate such risks, the quick 
succession of these accidents on European territory suggested a need 
for international action due to the ‘dread, novelty nature and 
uncontrollability of the hazard’ at stake (Arcuri, 2005: 207).  
After three years of negotiations, the Seveso Directive was adopted 
in 1982. Further accidents led to amendments that broadened the 
scope of this first directive: the 1987 Bhopal (India) accident which 
caused more than 2,500 deaths led to a first amendment, and the 1988 
accident in Basel (Switzerland) which caused major pollution of the 
Rhine triggered a second amendment. Research into registered 
accidents led to the ‘recognition that approximately 85% of over 300 
accidents reported under Seveso I have shown some deficiencies in the 
management system’ (Porter and Wettig, 1999: 3). Therefore, a second 
                                                     
1 The first round of interviews took place in 2000 (n=11; see Versluis, 2003); the second 
round took place in 2008 (n=6). Interviews are referred to via ‘#’ and the interview 




(replacing) Seveso directive was introduced that changed the scope 
from identifying a list of named substances and regulating individual 
technical installations2 to focusing on the management systems of 
entire establishments.3 The latest amendment to the directive stems 
from 2003; it was introduced after the accident with the fireworks 
storage facility in Enschede (The Netherlands) in 2000 and the 




Figure 2.1: Timeline of accidents and EU regulation 
 
Every change in the Seveso regime is a response to a major accident 
(see Figure 2.1). Each time, the rules have been redefined and 
sharpened. It is thus assumed by the regulators that tight(er) 
regulation is the best way to regulate risks in the chemical industry. It is 
to be realized, however, that each accident revealed a new risk, i.e. a 
possible hazard neither considered nor known from previous 
experience. As a representative of a chemical company stated: ‘in case 
something new happens you get new insights’ (# 5). Instead of 
anticipating a broad range of both known and imaginable new risks, the 
                                                     
2 An installation is a ‘technical unit within an establishment in which dangerous 
substances are produced, used, handled or stored’ (Directive 96/82/EC, article 3). 
3 An establishment is the ‘whole area under the control of an operator where dangerous 





regulators mainly seem to manage yesterday’s accidents rather than 
tomorrow’s risks.  
Under this European Seveso regime, chemical companies that 
house a certain threshold of listed chemical substances (e.g. 
ammonium nitrate, hydrogen, or chlorine), are considered to be 
‘Seveso establishments’. They are required, firstly, to prevent major 
accidents from happening and, secondly, in case accidents do happen, 
to control the consequences for man and the environment. Seveso 
companies have to draw up, among other things, a ‘major accident 
prevention policy’ via a ‘safety report’ and internal and external 
‘emergency plans’. Furthermore, they have to control ‘domino effects’ 
in areas where Seveso companies are located close together, such as 
industry parks, and they have to alert all people liable to be affected by 
a major accident. Member state governments are to ensure that the 
risks regulated under this regime are taken into account in national 
land-use planning legislation, and they are to set up ‘competent 
authorities’ responsible for inspecting the regulatees. All in all, the 
directive asks for a considerable number of required activities from 
both regulators and regulatees. In this paper, we will especially analyze 
the regulation of risks via the safety report requirements (Directive 
96/82/EC, article 9).  
The Seveso regime makes use of European directives. As a directive 
is binding in the results to be achieved rather than in the means, all 27 
EU member states first have to transpose such a directive into national 
legislation. Member states, in other words, have the opportunity to 
make the rather vague European requirements more explicit at the 
national level. As the Seveso directives are so-called minimum 
directives,4 they furthermore allow member states to add additional 
requirements while transposing. How the risks are regulated precisely, 
in other words, is to a large extent up to the member states. EU 
directives only come to life in the enforcement and compliance 
practices at the local level. Nevertheless, the Seveso regime obviously 
does set the context for the local practices.  
 
2.3. The Seveso Regime and the Positivistic Risk Paradigm 
In the Seveso directive, risk is defined as the ‘likelihood of a specific 
effect occurring within a specified period or in specified circumstances’ 
(Directive 96/82/EC, article 3). The definition of risk in the Seveso 
regime resonates with the classic definition of risk as a function of 
                                                     
4 Directives not based on articles 114-118 regarding the approximation of laws (Treaty 





probability (= likelihood) and effect, which was inspired by the work of 
the economist Knight (1921). He argued that it is possible and 
necessary to distinguish sharply uncertainty from risk. He views risks 
as the calculable, hence controllable, islands in the sea of uncertainty 
(Nowotny et al., 2001). Langlois and Cosgel (1993: 3) argue that 
‘Knight's distinction between risk and uncertainty has been taken to 
differentiate between the measurability/unmeasurability of probability’. 
In this paradigm ” also referred to as the ‘positivistic risk paradigm’ 
(Van Asselt, 2000; Krayer von Kraus et al., 2005) ” risk is used to refer 
to hazards that are known and calculable from previous experience. 
Risks are thus presented as calculable and controllable.  
This dichotomy is still the dominant way of looking at risk. However, 
an increasing number of authors (see, for example, Vercelli, 1995; 
Gezondheidsraad 1995, 1996; Nowotny et al., 2001; Van Asselt and 
Vos, 2006; Renn 2006; Renn and Walker, 2008) argue that uncertainty 
and risk cannot as easily be distinguished as the positivistic risk 
paradigm assumes. Some risks are simple, in the sense of certain 
enough to be calculated as a function of probability and effect. In those 
cases, due to past experience and the associated availability of 
statistical data, probability can be estimated and a measure of effect 
can be derived. Simple risks are calculable and relatively easy to 
manage. Existing risk assessment tools and risk management 
approaches suffice.  
However, many risks are not that simple. Risk refers to potential 
events with consequences that one or more actors evaluated as 
negative. In many cases such events and/or consequences are highly 
uncertain, because they consider new hazards or involve situations with 
structural changes compared to the past. In the latter case, the 
available statistics are of limited value to estimate probability and 
effect, as the historical data no longer do justice to current and future 
situations. Furthermore, many risks are complex, which also 
contributes to uncertainty. They involve a multitude of effects, of which 
some may extend into the long term, that cannot be easily assessed 
and compared; nor can measures of effect, if available, easily be added. 
Risks may also involve complex causalities, non-linear relationships as 
well as interactions between effects. Uncertainties about the relevant 
phenomena and the underlying multi-causal relationships may render it 
difficult, if not impossible, to determine what may happen. Such risks 
are thus not, or at best only partly, calculable, because the probability of 
occurrence or the damage cannot be estimated, and even the potential 
hazard and the relevant causalities may not be established, although 
there are suspicions of danger.  
Van Asselt and Vos (2006) used the notion of ‘uncertain risks’ to 





uncertain risks pertain to uncertain situations, which may result in one 
or more effects that are valued negatively or considered unacceptable 
by at least one, but possibly more, societal actors. Renn (2006; see also 
Renn and Walker, 2008) proposes to further differentiate between 
uncertain risks, complex risks and ambiguous risks. However, as 
argued in Van Asselt (2000), complexity goes hand in glove with 
fundamental uncertainty. Although not all uncertain risks are 
necessarily complex, all complex risks involve uncertainty. Ambiguous 
risks refer to situations in which 'value judgements [about risks] (…) 
differ from one individual to another' (Renn and Walker, 2008: 38-40); 
this usually occurs in multi-actor settings. However, we would like to 
argue that this is not an independent category. Both simple risks and 
uncertain, complex risks may be laden with ambiguity, but ambiguous 
risks are either simple or uncertain. We would like to argue that the 
most important distinction is the difference between simple risks on 
the one hand, and uncertain risks on the other. The further 
differentiation into complex and ambiguous risks can be integrated in 
such a scheme (see figure 2.2). 
Figure 2.2: Types of risk 
 
In the positivistic Knightian risk paradigm, uncertain, complex and/or 
ambiguous risks are overlooked. However, the occurrence of new 
hazards demonstrates the need for expanding the conceptualization of 
risk. The most important reason to recognize different types of risk is 
that different types of risk require fundamentally different assessment, 
management and communication approaches (e.g. Wynne, 2001; 
Lofstedt, 2005; Van Asselt and Vos, 2006; Renn, 2006; WRR, 2008). 
The Seveso definition of risk as the ‘likelihood of a specific [adverse] 




However, we would like to argue that major accident risks are often 
uncertain, complex and ambiguous (see also WRR, 2008). Risks in the 
chemical industry do not concern singular risks, but involve 
accumulation and interplay of different but correlated risk factors, as 
well as multiple, heterogeneous and long-term effects. For example, 
within a chemical plant, not only the processing installations, but also 
the storing facilities and transport involve interdependent risks, which 
need to be addressed both separately and in relation to each other. 
Furthermore, uncertainties about the underlying processes and the 
complex multi-causal relationships between causes and effects may 
render it difficult, if not impossible, to determine what may happen. 
Many actors with different perspectives (for instance, emphasizing 
either environmental risks, health risks or economic benefits) have a 
stake in the regulation of major accident risks in the chemical industry. 
For example, one of the interviewed companies has a pit below a 
weighbridge that can accommodate the complete contents of a tank-
lorry. Sometimes a bit of rainwater falls into the pit:  
‘We have a level meter with a little pump connected to it, that 
automatically pumps away the water after it has reached a certain level. 
The environmental inspector argued that the pump should not work 
automatically because you cannot be certain what kind of liquid is in the 
pit. But the fire inspector said that it is important that the pump always 
works automatically as the risk of an overflow of liquids is too high. So 
these are contradictory advices’ (# 2).  
The Seveso directive, furthermore, involves the local, regional, national 
and European level. Inspection teams illustrated this by saying:  
‘You have to deal with politicians at the national and provincial level. 
However, my colleagues of the other inspection teams and industry 
also have their bosses at these levels. Thus overall, you have to deal 
with several political levels which complicates matters, especially when 
they have different priorities’ (# 3).  
In our interviews, spokesmen from both the inspection and industry 
indicated that these actors do not necessarily have contradictory goals, 
but the reality of the Seveso regime is a complex combination of 
different policy fields and of actors at different levels. This situation 
aggravates the problem that major accident risks are not simple and 
calculable. When uncertain risks, which are often also complex and/or 
ambiguous, are not considered, unprecedented accidents happen by 
surprise. The Seveso definition of risk suggests that this risk regime 
adheres to the positivistic risk paradigm, which implies a focus on 
simple, calculable risks at the expense of risks that are uncertain. Close 
reading of the safety report requirements provides some further 





Annex II of the Seveso II directive specifies the minimum data to be 
included in a safety report. Considering the fact that safety reports 
produced by the chemical industry are on average 400 pages long 
(Versluis, 2003: 130), this one-page annex is extremely ambiguous in 
defining the criteria. A safety report should, amongst others, contain a 
‘detailed description of the possible major-accident scenarios and their 
probability or the conditions under which they occur including a 
summary of the events which may play a role in triggering each of these 
scenarios’ (Directive 96/82/EC, Annex II). It is not specified, however, 
what a scenario is, what is meant by a detailed description, or what 
types of events are referred to. A further problem is more fundamental. 
In the context of risk management, scenarios are coherent descriptions 
of alternative hypothetical futures as an effort to capture a wide range 
of possible future developments and circumstances. It is possible to 
reason about conditions under which they may occur or the events that 
may trigger a scenario to unfold; however, establishing a scenario’s 
probability, i.e. likelihood of occurrence, is difficult if not impossible. 
Generally speaking, there are two ways to arrive at probability 
estimates: 1) statistics about previous accidents are used to estimate 
how often such accidents occur, which is used as a basis to forecast the 
likelihood of such an accident in the future (this is referred to as the 
frequentist approach), and 2) probability is interpreted as a subjective 
degree of belief, which implies that expert judgements are used (this is 
referred to as the Bayesian approach). Especially when scenarios 
feature conditions or events not experienced before, the frequentist 
approach is not applicable; then, the question is how to value experts’ 
degrees of belief, as research on foresight (see, for example, Van 
Notten, 2005) has indicated that it is difficult, also for experts, to take 
unprecedented scenarios seriously. In such cases, probability is solely a 
reflection of our experience with past accidents, and does not 
necessarily inform about future risks. The series of accidents that 
inspired the Seveso regime demonstrate that unprecedented scenarios 
do happen in practice, notwithstanding low probabilities.  
In the positivistic risk paradigms, risks only existed when they have 
manifested themselves. This stimulates reactive risk regulation. So the 
history of the Seveso regime, i.e. changes the regulatory regime after an 
accident that has demonstrated the reality of a risk, provides further 
support for the idea that the positivistic risk paradigm frames this 
regime. The regulators aim to learn lessons from new accidents. 
However, it can be argued that an important lesson which can be 
drawn from the series of major accidents, i.e. the need to question the 
positivistic risk paradigm and to recognize uncertain risks, is not (yet) 





2.4. The Dutch Regulatory Practice  
So far, we have examined the Seveso regime from a risk perspective 
through close reading of the directives and amendments. In the second 
part of this paper, we will investigate the practice of the Seveso regime. 
Informed by two rounds of interviews, we discuss Dutch regulatory 
practice.  
 
2.4.1. Conceptualization of Risk 
As the Seveso directive is the basis for regulation in member states, it 
should not come as a surprise that we encountered the positivistic risk 
definition also in the interviews with both the regulators and the 
regulatees: 
‘There are two sides to risk: chance and effect. In case of large effects 
within a scenario, you will work on chance calculations’ (# 3; regulator).  
‘First they [risks] are quantified and then classified’ (# 4; regulatee).  
Recently, a further distinction has been introduced in Dutch regulation 
and inspection procedures. Risks are classified as controllable risks or 
as so-called ‘leftover risks’ (In Dutch: rest-risico’s). ‘Leftover risks’ can 
be calculated, but they are either difficult to control pro-actively or 
pertain to too expensive, exceptional situations. One of the 
interviewees described leftover risks as follows: 
‘Leftover risks are an articulation of the fact that you know upfront that 
a certain disaster with a very small calculated chance of occurring 
cannot be prevented. It is a theoretical model, but there is a risk that 
you tolerate’ (# 1).  
What does this category of leftover risks, and the ways in which it is 
described, tell about the underlying risk assumptions? Different 
characteristics are ascribed to leftover risks. They are calculable, but 
difficult to manage or it is undesirable to manage them, because the 
costs of managing are either too high or disproportional compared to 
the (calculated) probability. So these risks are tolerated, in the sense 
that no risk management measures are taken to prevent or mitigate 
these leftover risks. With the notion ‘leftover’, it is communicated that 
these risks are unimportant from a risk-management point of view. The 
recognition of limits to controllability are also visible in the following 
interview quote: 
‘We can control the normal risks that derive from operating a chemical 
factory. But we do not control all risks; when a plane crashes, there is 
nothing I can do’ (# 4; see also 5). 
Although it is recognised that there are limits to controllability, neither 





regard to tolerability, which is a normative notion, are considered. By 
presenting uncontrollable risks as ‘leftover’ and/or exceptional 
scenarios, this category is marginalized. In terms of our typology of 
risks, notwithstanding the distinction between controllable and leftover 
risk, which is a slight departure from the positivistic risk paradigm, 
major accident risks are still treated as calculable, simple risks.  
So, we conclude that also in the Dutch practice, uncertainty is not 
acknowledged in the framing of risk. Risks are presented as calculable 
and as a function of probability and effect. Nevertheless, in a single 
interview, some uncertainty awareness could be sensed. For example: 
‘With some QRA [quantitative risk analysis] methods your calculations 
will be outdated because of the improvements that have been carried 
out, which makes your value unreliable’ (# 3).  
Here it is recognised that past data do not do justice to present and 
new circumstances, which have structurally changed compared to the 




As stated, the European Seveso regime works with directives, thereby 
leaving considerable freedom for the member state to shape the 
regulatory process. The Netherlands has used this opportunity. 
Transposition of the Seveso II Directive in the Netherlands took place 
via one act of primary legislation (‘wet’), five acts of secondary 
legislation (‘besluit’) and one alternative instrument (‘circulaire’).5 In 
comparison to other member states, this resulted in a relatively strict 
and detailed interpretation of the Seveso rules on paper in the 
transposition phase (Versluis, 2003). Especially in relation to the safety 
report, the Netherlands has used the right to add additional 
requirements. Dutch companies are required to conduct a Quantitative 
Risk Analysis. In such an analysis, the risks should be calculated of a 
loss of containment from an installation to reach beyond the fence of 
an establishment and damage the external environment and people 
outside. The Dutch government set a fixed amount referred to as the 
maximum acceptable risk. If the calculated risks are higher, the 
company will have to take more precautionary measures, or install 
more ‘lines of defense’ or ‘layers of protection’ as phrased in the 
                                                     
5 Without taking formatting differences into account, the Dutch transposition has used 
comparatively much ‘paper’. While the directive itself consists of 21 pages, the Spanish 
transposition was arranged in 14 pages, the German in 53, the British in 62 and the 




Seveso regime.6 So, in the Dutch transposition, the calculability of risks 
gets even more emphasis. It does not consider the option that risks 
cannot be calculated and compared with a fixed number in a 
straightforward manner. One of the inspectors defended this 
positivistic framing in the following way:    
‘Companies need to depart from the assumption that you can identify 
and control the risks, otherwise you cannot normally operate a 
company’ (# 6).  
This can be considered a seminal example of uncertainty intolerance 
(see Van Asselt and Vos, 2006, 2008, for other examples of uncertainty 
intolerance in the context of risk regulation). Uncertainty is presented 
as a threat and is, in the same breath, waved aside. 
At the same time, however, the notion of risk is not literally used in 
the Dutch legislation due to differences in points of view between two 
of the three ministries involved.7 Whereas ‘risk’ is quantitatively 
measurable for the environmental ministry, it is a qualitative concept 
for the social affairs ministry (Versluis, 2003). So, we could argue that 
in the context of Seveso, the environmental ministry adheres to the 
positivistic risk paradigm, while the social affairs ministry questions it. 
The dispute was ‘solved’ in two ways: 1) use of the notion of ‘risk’ was 
circumvented, and 2) companies were asked to produce both 
quantitative risk analyses and detailed descriptions of scenarios. 
However, adding the explicit requirement of a Quantitative Risk 
Analysis actually reinforces the perception that all major accident risks 
are quantifiable.  
 
2.4.3 Enforcement 
As the Seveso regime combines a series of aims, more than one 
inspectorate is involved in its enforcement. While preventing major 
accidents is the primary aim, mitigating the consequences of accidents 
which nevertheless occur is crucial as well. The nature of the harm the 
directive tries to prevent ” i.e. consequences for the environment, 
employees of companies and people in the neighbourhood ” influences 
the inspectorates involved: the environmental inspectorate, the labor 
inspectorate and the fire brigade. Teams of these three agencies 
(usually 3 to 6 people) together assess submitted safety reports. In the 
first years, assessing the safety reports was very time-consuming. The 
main reason for this was the Dutch interpretation of the directive. 
                                                     
6 These lines or layers serve to prevent an initiating event (e.g. loss of cooling) from 
developing into an incident (typically a release of a dangerous substance).  
7 Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment and Ministry of Social 






Whereas the directive states that member states have to organize 
inspections to check whether operators can demonstrate that they have 
taken the appropriate measures to prevent major accidents (Directive 
96/82/EC, article 18), the Dutch transposition added the requirement 
that the inspectors should also test the ‘acceptability’ of the measures. 
In other words, instead of ‘just’ assessing the safety reports, the 
inspectors had to approve the safety measures inscribed in the reports. 
For many inspectors this proved problematic due to potential problems 
with accountability (# 1, 3). As safety reports piled up at desks of 
inspectorates, it was quickly decided that the Dutch legislation should 
be changed in this respect. Now inspectors only have to assess the 
‘completeness’ (‘are the relevant topics documented?’) and ‘suitability’ 
(‘are the described measures sufficiently in line with the current 
technical and scientific knowledge and suitable for the situation?’). The 
fact that the inspectors felt uncomfortable with the responsibility for 
the safety measures may also be read as a sign that they realized that in 
the positivistic Seveso regime, uncertain risks are overlooked and that 
the safety measures inspired by previous accidents do not guarantee 
that new accidents will not happen or will be mitigated adequately. So, 
they did not agree with the pretence of control which would have been 
further strengthened by their stamp of approval.  
 
2.4.4 Risk Calculations 
The framing of risk in the Seveso regime and in the Dutch regulatory 
approach shapes the compliance practices among the regulatees. The 
decision by the Dutch government to add the requirement to conduct a 
Quantitative Risk Analysis determines how companies address risks. 
Dutch ‘Seveso companies’, generally speaking, calculate risks by using 
matrices that categorize potential hazards in terms of probability (i.e. 
ranging from ‘occurs frequently’ to ‘hardly ever occurs’) and calculate 
the possible number of fatalities or injuries (i.e. effects). These risk 
calculations serve as a foundation for exploring precautionary (also 
referred to as ‘pro-active’), preventive and/or mitigating possibilities. 
The bow-tie approach used by one of the companies (see Figure 2.3) 
illustrates this approach to risk assessment and risk management. Not 
surprisingly, taking into account the risk framings inscribed in the 
Seveso regime and the Dutch transposition, the underlying framing of 
risk as a function of probability and effect and as a quantifiable variable 
can be qualified as positivistic. Again limits to controllability are 
recognised in the use of the so-called ‘ALARP principle’. ALARP stands 
for As Low as Reasonably Practicable, which refers to an evaluation in 













































Figure 2.3: Example of a ‘bow-tie’ 
 
Not only companies favor a quantitative approach. One of the 
companies used brainstorming with all relevant experts to identify 
which scenarios are most probable as a way to assess risks. Although 
they did accept the probability framing, their more qualitative approach 
was considered too subjective, according to our interviewee (# 4). It 
was one of the reasons that the safety report was rejected four times: 
‘They found our approach not sufficiently objective, too much "natural 
wit". Only when we started working with matrices scoring chance and 
effects for all scenarios, they found the approach acceptable’ (# 4).  
Overall we can thus state that despite certain exceptions ” e.g. the risk 
notion of the social affairs ministry and the above mentioned use of the 
ALARP principle ” the positivistic risk paradigm dominates the Dutch 
practice under the Seveso regime.  
 
2.5. Conclusions and Recommendations 
Our analysis has shown that the Seveso regime is strongly rooted in the 
positivistic risk paradigm: risks are presented as calculable and 
controllable. Major accident risks seem to be considered simple. The 
possibility of uncertain risks is overlooked, although the series of 





unprecedented scenarios, hence uncertain risks, do materialize. 
Although in Dutch practice some limits to controllability are 
recognised, the framing is still overly positivistic. Risks are calculable 
and should be calculated. In other risk regulatory settings, Van Asselt 
and Vos (2006; 2008) observed an uncertainty paradox: uncertainty 
about the risks concerned is acknowledged, but nevertheless the role of 
science and expertise is framed in terms of providing certainty. In the 
Seveso practice, however, generally speaking uncertainty is not even 
broadly acknowledged. Where Van Asselt and Vos (2006; 2008) 
observed how in uncertainty paradox situations, uncertainty awareness 
goes hand in glove with uncertainty intolerance, it seems no 
exaggeration to qualify the Seveso regime as ‘uncertainty blind’. We 
have shown that this uncertainty-blind risk regime is rooted in the ‘old’ 
positivistic risk paradigm. To put it somewhat provocatively: the 
current Seveso regime ‘lags behind’ new academic insights. Is this a 
problem from a governance point of view? 
Major accidents in the chemical industry, whether Bhopal or 
Enschede, demonstrate that notwithstanding the lessons learned from 
previous major accidents, unprecedented scenarios continued to take 
place in which uncertain risks materialize. It is quite unlikely that from 
now on managing yesterday’s accidents guarantees that salient future 
risks are identified and controlled. Uncertainty blindness implies that 
neither regulators nor regulatees, let alone the public, prepare for 
accidents that have not happened in the past but may happen in the 
future. The famous risk sociologist Ulrich Beck (1986) provocatively 
coined the notion of ‘organized irresponsibility’ to describe a state of 
affairs in which society is unprepared for inevitable surprises, 
notwithstanding all institutions and procedures in place and the 
pretence of certainty and control. It is a too cheap shot to conclude that 
the Seveso regime is currently in a state of organized irresponsibility, 
but our analysis suggests that it is important to point out that the 
current institutions and procedures tend to suggest that all major 
accident risks are controlled, while uncertain risks are actually not 
attended to. A new major accident is not only a problem in terms of 
casualties, long-term health effects, environmental impacts, 
infrastructural damage and economic costs, but it also demonstrates 
that not all major accident risks are controlled, notwithstanding all the 
institutions and procedures in place. That fact may decrease trust in 
both the regulators and the regulatees. Lack of trust renders it even 
more difficult to organize responsible risk governance (Löfstedt, 2005).  
So what would we recommend? We advise the actors involved in the 
Seveso regime to accept the possibility of uncertain risks and to accept 
that treating them as simple risks is like using a saw to hammer a nail. 




tools. With regard to uncertain risks, assessment implies sensitizing 
relevant actors for unprecedented scenarios. This is not a matter of 
methodology, but a matter of culture. The current approach invites that 
rules are taken for granted in a too dogmatic fashion (compare WRR, 
2008). The challenge is to develop a more reflexive regime, in which the 
aim is not to comply with rules, but to organize safety. Alertness with 
regard to unprecedented scenarios may result in preventing or 
adequately mitigating accidents that have not happened before. One of 
our interviewees (# 1) used the notion of ‘safety culture’. The current 
regime focuses on chemical risks per se, but it seems sensible to put 
more emphasis on assessing companies’ safety cultures (see Vaughan, 
1996). Key questions in such a vein would be: How is the company 
dealing with simple risks? Is the company uncertainty tolerant? How 
does the company reason about uncertain risks? What kinds of 
scenarios are considered? How is this reasoning translated in terms of 
measures, management systems and culture? The role of inspectors 
with regard to uncertain risks would then shift from evaluating whether 
the assessment is complete, to suggesting examples of uncertainties 
and unprecedented scenarios in order to evaluate how the company 
‘digests’ such uncertainties and how they propose to deal with 
situations sketched in the scenarios. The role of the regulator would 
shift from trying to code all lessons from previous accidents in new 
rules to developing ways to stimulate uncertainty tolerance among the 
regulatees as well as the general public, and to finding ways to 
communicate about uncertain risks with the broader public. The latter 
is more easily said then done, but that does not imply it is not worth 
trying. To continue affairs as before runs the risk of deteriorating into 
the trap of organized irresponsibility. That is an uncertain governance 
risk, but one worth considering.  
 
 
Annex I – Interviews 
Interviews 2008 
# 1. 13-03-2008 Environmental inspector, Rotterdam harbor    area 
# 2. 17-03-2008 Chemical company, Rotterdam harbor area 
# 3. 18-03-2008 Senior inspector & teamleader Labor     Inspectorate 
(joint interview), Limburg region 
# 4. 18-03-2008 Chemical company, Limburg region 
# 5. 01-04-2008 Chemical company, Limburg region  
# 6. 22-05-2008 Team meeting, inspectors Labor Inspectorate    and 






# 7. 16-12-1999 Environmental inspector, Labor inspector,  
 representative fire  brigade (joint interview),    Rotterdam harbor 
area 
# 8. 10-01-2000 Representative headquarter Labor     inspectorate, 
Rotterdam harbor area 
# 9. 10-01-2000 Two Labor inspectors (joint interview),     Rotterdam 
harbor area 
# 10. 03-02-2000 Representative Dutch Association for the   Chemical 
Industry  (VNCI), Leidschendam  
# 11. 04-02-2000 Representative fire brigade, Brabant region 
# 12. 07-02-2000 Representative Ministry of Housing, Spatial  
 Planning and the Environment, The Hague 
# 13. 16-02-2000 Representative Ministry of the Interior and   
 Kingdom Relations,  The Hague  
# 14. 05-06-2000 Chemical company, Limburg region 
# 15. 07-06-2000 Chemical company, Rotterdam harbor area 
# 16. 08-06-2000 Chemical company, Rotterdam harbor area 
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Chapter 3. Facebook and the Commercialisation of Personal 
Information: Some Questions of Provider-to-User Privacy 
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Most of the debate about online social networking sites, such as 
Facebook, has thus far revolved around questions of privacy and access 
to personal information. Users of such services, should they choose to 
exercise them, have a myriad of privacy options that allow them to 
restrict access to their own personal information posted online, and the 
privacy policies of such sites are abundantly clear that the making of 
such choices is the responsibility of the users themselves. However, 
due to the focus resting upon these peer-to-peer privacy questions, 
those relating to the service provider-to-user relationship have been 
overlooked. This paper seeks to highlight some of the more subtle 
privacy issues of (what we will call) the ‘Facebook debate’ in terms of 
two main considerations: the access to and the control of personal 
information on the part of the provider. 
 
3.1. Introduction1 
Online social networking sites have been around since the mid-to-late 
1990s,2 but only in the past few years has the ‘craze’ really entered the 
mainstream3 in the shape of MySpace, Friendster, Bebo, Hi5 and, 
particularly, Facebook.4 Some sites have a specific intended purpose, 
                                                     
1 This paper was presented at the TILTing Perspectives on Regulating Technologies 
conference, hosted by the Tilburg Institute for Law, Technology, and Society, Tilburg 
University, Netherlands, in December 2008. An earlier version of this paper was 
presented at the BILETA Annual Conference on ‘Law Shaping Technology, Technology 
Shaping the Law’, held at Glasgow’s Caledonian University in March 2008. Our thanks 
go to Elaine Sutherland, Fraser Davidson, Rosa Greaves, Alison Green, Richard Jones, 
Elizabeth Crawford and Janeen Carruthers for their suggestions and comments. Any 
errors, of course, remain our own.  
2 Early examples include Classmates.com, which started in 1995 and focused on 
connecting former school friends, and SixDegrees.com, which started in 1997 but closed 
in 2000 after ‘struggling to find a purpose for its concept’ of forming indirect ties. See 
Janelle Brown, ‘Six degrees to nowhere’, 21 September 1998, http://archive.salon.com/ 
21st/reviews /1998/09/21review.html (accessed 26 February 2010).  
3 Nicole Martin, ‘Debrett’s guide to online etiquette’, Telegraph, 13 June 2008, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/digitallife/main.jhtml?xml=/connected/2008/06/12/ 
dldebretts.xml (accessed 26 February 2010).  
4 See http://www.myspace.com; http://www.friendster.com; http://www.bebo.com; 
http://www.Hi5.com; http://www.facebook.com (accessed 26 February 2010).  




such as dating or job searches, but all of them have online 
communication and social interaction as their basic aim, and most 
share certain core features: users create a ‘profile’, which takes the 
form of a template that can be completed with personal information, 
including photographs, videos, preferences and opinions, and this 
profile can be perused or linked to by other users on the network, be 
they friends, former classmates, colleagues, or even perfect strangers. 
The personal information on a user’s profile is all voluntarily 
‘uploaded’, usually in terms of category-based representations of 
general interests, such as a person’s musical or sporting preferences, 
but also personal details such as sexual orientation, religious and 
political views, and personal data like birthdates, phone numbers and 
addresses.  
Due to the personal nature of this information, concerns have been 
raised regarding privacy, and many of the online social networking 
(OSN) sites listed above provide privacy controls so that users can 
choose both who can see their profile5 and how much any category of 
‘friend’ can access within that profile. However, although these privacy 
controls are useful in terms of restricting the access to a personal 
profile by other users of the social network sites (i.e. peer-to-peer 
access), there are few, if any, restrictions upon the service provider, 
namely the sites themselves, regarding the private information of the 
service users.  
Much of the literature on this topic revolves around questions of 
peer-to-peer privacy and attempts to understand certain behavioural 
forms of information revelation, and it is not our intention here to enter 
into either of those debates. Rather, our focus is on the frequently 
overlooked issue of the service provider-to-user relationship, and the 
privacy questions arising from it. Instead of being purely about access 
to personal information, therefore, we look at the subsequent use and 
control of the information posted on a social networking site such as 
Facebook6 by the site provider itself.  
  
                                                     
5 Such as the ‘request’ and ‘confirm’ functions ” a user wishing to be ‘friends’ with 
another user, i.e. wishing to be granted access to that individual’s profile, must first 
request it and wait for confirmation. The recipient must either confirm or ignore this 
request, with access only being granted in the event of the former. Obviously this system 
depends upon the personal privacy settings of each user ” requesting access is only an 
issue if it has been previously restricted in some way. 
6 There are differences across the various sites and so, for the sake of clarity, this 





3.2. Access and Control 
The two issues of access and control are closely interrelated, especially 
in today’s digital age, when duplicates are often a simple mouse-click 
away and dissemination of these is equally straightforward. The 
Internet, more than any other medium, provides a means of putting 
information directly into the public domain: instead of students and 
young people setting up pirate radio stations and crying ‘reclaim the 
airwaves’ in an attempt to be heard, the current youth generation are 
able, like no other before them, to disseminate information by means 
of social networking sites, blogs, and personal homepages. However, 
once information has been posted online and thus made public, it then 
becomes difficult for the owner or poster to control ” a situation that 
has resulted in such Internet phenomena as the Star Wars Kid7 and the 
‘Numa Numa’ Dance’s Gary Brolsma,8 neither of whom were 
particularly happy about their unexpected infamy.  
Although such phenomena are rare, and neither of the 
abovementioned examples had any privacy restrictions on these videos, 
it is evidently important to consider how and to what extent infor-
mation being posted can be controlled by the owner and/or poster, and 
that questions relating to controlling the dissemination of information 
will inevitably involve considerations of access to that information. This 
intertwining of access and control means that concerns quickly shift 
from being purely about privacy to also being about (i) property, 
specifically intellectual property, and (ii) exploitation of private 
information, personal preferences and online activities by, for example, 
highly-targeted advertising.9 This paper will, firstly, look at both of these 
examples of commoditisation of essentially private user-content and 
                                                     
7 The Star Wars Kid, otherwise known as Ghyslain Raza, earned his moniker when a 
2002 video he had filmed of himself swinging a golf club around his head as if it were a 
lightsabre(in the style of Darth Maul from the Star Wars movie) was ‘shared’ by a friend 
of his on the Kazaa peer-to-peer network. It was then adapted to include music and 
sound effects and, as of November 27, 2006, it was estimated to have been viewed 900 
million times, making it the most popular viral video on the Internet. See 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/entertainment/6187554.stm (accessed 26 February 2010). 
8 In 2004, Brolsma filmed himself on a webcam although dancing exuberantly to the 
pop song ‘Dragostea din tei’ as performed by Moldovan pop band O-Zone. With 700 
million views, it comes second only to the Star Wars Kid (above). See ibid. 
9 This distinction follows that discussed by Corien Prins, who suggests that the two are 
conceptually separate: ‘At first sight, privacy and property seem mutually exclusive 
concepts. [...] Some, however, argue that privacy protection on the one hand and 
personal data protection on the other have evolved into two highly distinct concepts’. 
See C. Prins, ‘When Personal Data, Behaviour & Virtual Identities Become A 
Commodity: Would A Property Rights Approach Matter?’, 3 SCRIPT-ed (2006) 270-303 
at 275. 




information, then outline some of the legal problems that exist as a 
result of the broad licence signed by each user on joining Facebook, 
before finally suggesting some possible solutions. 
 
3.3. User Content and Intellectual Property 
What does the Facebook privacy policy and its terms and conditions 
have to do with considerations of intellectual property? Before 
attempting to answer this question, it is necessary, first of all, to 
establish what an intellectual property right means, and in what 
relevant situations such a right will arise.  
An intellectual property right can be defined as a right: (i) that can 
be treated as property; (ii) to control particular uses; (iii) of a specific 
type of intangible asset; and are normally characterised by (i) only 
being granted when the intangible asset can be attributed to an 
individual creator or group of creators, and (ii) being enforceable by 
both the civil and criminal law.10 The legal right created gives the owner 
of the intellectual property ‘an open-ended set of use-privileges, control 
powers and powers of transmission’.11 It is this notion of control of the 
asset that is so important in the instance of online posting, mainly due 
to the fact that a Facebook user relinquishes control of information and 
‘content’ posted on their profile or on the site in general (i.e. on the 
profile pages of others, on group pages, and on various applications12). 
The next section will explore in detail what can probably be referred to 
as the most commonly experienced and widely recognised issue 
relating to controlling personal information posted online ” specifically, 
photographs.13  
 
                                                     
10 M. Spence (2007), Intellectual Property, Clarendon, OUP: Oxford, 12-13. 
11  Ibid, 15. 
12  The term ‘application’ applies to additional, normally (third-party) user-created, 
programmes that run off the site platform.  At the time of writing, there were over 
500,000 applications available on the Facebook website, ranging from ones that allow 
users to add music, videos, literary and popular culture preferences to their profiles, to 
ones that pinpoint a user’s geographical location, allow filesharing or promote certain 
causes. The specific privacy implications of ‘adding’ an application to your profile are 
also not straightforward ” a user must deliberately re-set their privacy options, as the 
default setting is to ‘public’ access. 
13 Groups existing within the Facebook network, such as ‘My photos are MINE! NOT 
Facebook's! Change the Terms and conditions!’ and ‘Facebook: Do not sell my private 
pictures! Change your terms of use, NOW!’ show that users are well aware of the 
implications of the Terms & Conditions. See: http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid= 






3.4. Facebook Photos: Why All the Fuss?14 
A friend of ours is camera-shy, and constantly protests that he does not 
want any pictures of himself ‘posted’ online,15 no matter they are only 
accessible by friends and friends of friends. Justifications for posting 
photos tend to follow along the lines of ‘relax, it’s only friends who can 
see it’, or ‘it’s a group picture, I can’t take you out of it’, and even ‘well, 
I won’t tag you and then it won’t show up on your profile page, only on 
mine’.16 Our dissatisfied and increasingly disgruntled friend points out 
that he is not a Facebook user and thus is not aware of pictures of him 
being posted, let alone which ones and by whom, and also that it 
matters little whether they are on one person’s profile page or another 
” they are available and accessible online either way. That he has never 
given any permission for either his name or image to be used is a 
source of frustration for him, as he feels that he has no control of 
either. Imagine his horror, then, if he were to read the ’Statement of 
Rights and Responsibilities’ that his friends are agreeing to when they 
post pictures on the Facebook site. According to these, by posting their 
‘Content’ to any part of the site, users effectively grant to Facebook: 
a non-exclusive, transferable, sub-licensable, royalty-free, worldwide 
license to use any IP content that you post on or in connection with 
Facebook ("IP License").17  
‘Use’ is far from the mere hosting that the uninformed reader might 
foresee.  Only near the very end of the Statement might the reader 
discover that it means ‘use, copy, publicly perform or display, 
distribute, modify, translate, and create derivative works of’ and as we 
will see it would be an unusually unsociable user if all their content was 
kept so close to their chest that Facebook alone would have the right of 
‘use’.  
In response to complaints in an earlier version of these terms which 
stated that the licence was ‘perpetual’ and ‘irrevocable’18, Facebook 
adds that the ‘IP License ends when you delete your IP content or your 
account unless your content has been shared with others, and they 
                                                     
14  Photographs are by far the clearest example, which is why it has been selected here. 
However, text-based content such as poems, short stories, academic work ” in short, 
anything ‘post-able’ to which copyright could apply ” would also come under this ambit. 
15  ‘Posted online’ means uploaded to the internet. 
16  To ‘tag’ someone is to put their name on their image in a photograph, which has the 
effect of creating a direct link between the photograph and that person’s profile page, 
assuming that they are a user of the site.  
17  Facebook’s Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, version last revised 21 
December 2009. 
18  Facebook’s previous Terms of Use (accessed 7 June 2008). 




have not deleted it.’  This sounds comforting if the reader is unaware 
that the default option they will be given, of ‘deactivating’ their account, 
is not the same as deleting it.  The reader is likely also to be unaware 
that ‘sharing with others’ does not refer only to the information they 
thought they had made publicly available ” of which again, more later.   
Furthermore, Facebook’s previous Terms of Use stated that: 
[Facebook reserves] the right, at our sole discretion, to change, modify, 
add, or delete portions of these Terms of Use at any time without 
further notice. If we do this, we will post the changes to these Terms of 
Use on this page and will indicate at the top of this page the date these 
terms were last revised. Your continued use of the Service or the Site 
after any such changes constitutes your acceptance of the new Terms of 
Use. 
This last part was particularly interesting given the US decision in 
Douglas v US District Court19 that a service provider cannot change the 
terms of its service contract merely by posting a revised contract on its 
website. It may be that Douglas can be distinguished on the grounds 
that the core activity of Facebook users involves accessing the website; 
however, the Court of Appeals did observe that ‘[p]arties to a contract 
have no obligation to check the terms on a periodic basis to learn 
whether they have been changed by the other side.’20 Furthermore, 
Lemley has argued that US courts have tended not to enforce similarly 
restrictive ‘browse-wrap’ licences (in software marketing) against the 
consumer unless that consumer is a ‘sophisticated economic entity’.21  
The new version seems not much better for the user, though: 
We can change this Statement if we provide you notice (by posting the 
change on the Facebook Site Governance Page) and an opportunity to 
comment To get notice of any future changes to this Statement, visit 
our Facebook Site Governance Page and become a fan. 
[but it bafflingly adds:] 
We can make changes for legal or administrative reasons upon notice 
without opportunity to comment. 
Douglas aside, though, the implication of the Statement is that user 
Content, be it photographs, pictures, written notes, stories or any other 
personal information, is available to Facebook or its application 
                                                     
19  Douglas v US District Court, 495 F.3d. 1062 (9th Cir. 2007). Following appeal to the 
US Supreme Court, certiorari was denied: Talk America, Inc. v Douglas, 128 S.Ct. 1472 
(2008). 
20  Douglas v US District court, ibid., 1066.  
21  Mark A. Lemley ‘Terms of Use’ 91 Minnesota Law Review (2006-2007), 460, 462-463. 
See also Dale Clapperton and Stephen Corones ‘Unfair terms in ‘clickwrap’ and other 





developers to use in any way they choose, even for commercial 
purposes. As we will show, exercising a supposed privacy option does 
not fully protect against this. To put this in the strongest light, there is 
the very real (albeit unlikely) possibility that our camera-shy friend 
could be walking down the high street one day and discover his own 
face staring back at him from an advertising billboard.22 His first post-
tantrum reaction would certainly be to confront the friend whose 
photograph it was, but to no avail ” under this Statement, Facebook 
does not even have to ask the user’s permission before making use of 
any posted Content which has not specifically been protected by means 
of the user manually overriding the publicity default. Indeed, the above-
quoted licence is so comprehensive that it effectively undermines the 
following assertion in the Statement, which provides that: 
You own all of the content and information you post on Facebook, and 
you can control how it is shared ...23 
This provision regarding ownership is, in essence, almost entirely 
worthless due to the scope of the licence ” although the user may own 
all of the Content they post on the site, Facebook does not, in fact, 
need to own the information because they are licensed to utilise it in 
whichever way they choose, regardless of ownership. It is like 
borrowing your parents’ car ” at no point do you ever claim to own it, 
but that does not really matter when you are driving around town.  
There are two separate issues relating to both privacy and property that 
should be considered here. These are probably best distinguished in 
terms of active and passive posting; the former being when a user 
posts a picture that they (alone) own, the latter being when a picture is 
posted that shows another person or group of people, to which the 
user does not have exclusive rights. In the Intellectual Property help 
section, a Facebook user is told that they ‘may only upload content to 
the Facebook website if you are certain that you have the legal right to 
do so. If you are not certain that you are legally authorised to use the 
content you have uploaded to our website, you should remove it 
immediately.’24 This gives rise to considerations of copyright, for who 
owns and has the right to distribute photos? Is it the photographer? 
                                                     
22  This may sound farfetched, but cases such as that of Alison Chang, a 15-year-old who 
saw a photo of herself, initially posted on Flickr, on an Australian Virgin Mobile 
advertisement, suggest that ‘corporate photonapping’ is a very real danger. See Monica 
Hesse ‘Hey, Isn’t That…’ (9 January 2008) Washington Post and also: 
http://www.theregister. co.uk/2007/09/24/creative_commons_deception/ (accessed 26 
February 2010). 
23  Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 17. 
24 http://www.facebook.com/album.php?aid=14347&id=635057322&saved 
#!/help/?page=439 




The subject or subjects? What about the artist, designer, or employer? 
All of the above? The answer is not especially straightforward, even 
leaving jurisdictional concerns aside for the moment.25  
In the UK and in terms of photographs26 taken after 1 August 1989, 
generally the ‘author’ of a photograph is the first owner of copyright,27 
meaning that you are the owner of the copyright of any photos you 
take. However, this may not be the case if someone else decided on the 
specifics of the photograph, such as the exposure or angle, for 
example, or even if the people either taking or designing the photo were 
simply employed to do so ” in this situation the employer would be the 
first owner. If there happens to be more than one person involved in 
taking, making and designing the photo, and those contributions are 
indistinct, then each person will be both a joint author and thus a joint 
owner of copyright, meaning that any usage must be unanimously 
agreed to.28 This is complicated all the more by provisions on ‘fair 
dealing’,29 which allow photographs to be used without permission 
providing that they are being used for specific purposes, including: 
non-commercial research and private study,30 criticism and review, and 
where there is sufficient acknowledgement. 
These copyright concerns appear to be moot, however, considering 
that the approach taken by Facebook here is one that, first of all and as 
noted above, never makes any claim to having ownership and thus any 
restricted rights over the photograph but rather relies upon the licence 
granted by the user and, secondly, rests all responsibility of actually 
                                                     
25 A notoriously complex area of law, the international copyright system can 
nonetheless be said to have three main rules of thumb: (i) the law of the country of 
origin of the work is likely to be relevant when determining ownership of copyright or 
authorship; (ii) the law where the infringement takes place is likely to be relevant to 
questions regarding the infringement, and; (iii) which courts will deal with the resolution 
of any international dispute will be determined with reference to international 
conventions on jurisdiction. As yet there are no dedicated rules governing cyberspace. 
See S. Stokes, Digital Copyright: Law & Practice (Oxford, Portland: Hart Publishing 
2005), 7 and, for more detail, P. Goldstein, International Copyright: Principles, Law & 
Practice (New York: OUP 2007). 
26  The Copyright, Designs & Patents Act (CDPA) 1988, s. 4(2) defines a photograph as 
‘a recording of light or other radiation on any medium on which an image is produced or 
from which an image may by any means be produced, and which is not part of a film’. 
27  Copyright, it should be noted here, simply protects against copying and dealing in 
illegal copies. 
28  Intellectual Property Office, http://www.ipo.gov.uk/copy/c-applies/c-photo/c-photo-
ownpost89.htm (accessed 30 January 2008).  
29  These ‘fair dealing’ provisions are a UK exception (Art. 5) from EC Directive 
2001/29/EC on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in 
the information society of 22 May 2001. The US defence of ‘fair use’ is much broader in 
scope, as it is not limited to specific purposes; see s. 107, US Copyright Act 1976.  





ascertaining copyright ownership with the user.31 The user is told on 
the Intellectual Property page: 
‘[j]ust because you have recorded content onto your own recording 
device, this does not necessarily mean that you own the copyright to 
that material or that you are authorised to use it. Disclaiming 
ownership of that content cannot protect you from infringing on the 
true owner's copyright. If you have any question whatsoever as to 
whether you are legally authorised to post any content, consult an 
attorney before uploading it to the Facebook website’. 
A later question-and-answer states:  
‘How does Facebook prevent users from uploading material that is 
copyright infringing? 
The material uploaded to the Facebook website is uploaded by our 
users. Our Terms of Use prohibit users from posting content that 
violates another party's intellectual property rights. We encourage our 
users to report instances of copyright infringement using the 
procedures outlined in our How to Report Claims of Intellectual 
Property Infringement page, and we terminate the accounts of repeat 
infringers in appropriate circumstances.’ 
By requiring the user to accept their right to post the photograph in 
advance of doing so, Facebook thus effectively side-step any potential 
liability for copyright violations, although, as third party rights in 
copyright are not affected by the Statement, if the user is not the 
copyright owner then their implicit licensing of Facebook would mean 
little were the true copyright owner to bring suit.32 Nevertheless, a 
peeved ‘friend’ whose picture has been posted by another user (passive 
posting) appears to have no direct recourse against Facebook, even if 
they subsequently have used, copied, publicly displayed or distributed it 
” the only option for the aggrieved party would be to take up the matter 
at the source, namely the original infringement. What remains unclear 
is whether or not ‘corporate photonapping’ as in the case of Alison 
Chang33 would be actionable if the photograph used had been posted 
on Facebook, although the outcome of this hypothetical situation 
                                                     
31  The Facebook Statement further says: ‘If anyone brings a claim against us related to 
your actions, content or information on Facebook, you will indemnify and hold us 
harmless from and against all damages, losses, and expenses of any kind (including 
reasonable legal fees and costs) related to such claim.’ 
32  An important issue in this respect is whether the User in fact has the right to grant 
that licence ” despite the requirement of ‘ticking the box’ it is evident that many Users 
simply do this as a matter of course, regardless of whether they have this right or not. If 
it transpires that the User does not have the authority, then any subsequent use of the 
material by Facebook may constitute an infringement, with the possibility of the User 
being secondarily liable for Facebook’s infringement.  
33  As discussed above, see supra note 20. 




would surely turn on the extent of Facebook’s own involvement in the 
transaction: if the corporation had unilaterally copied and then used a 
posted photograph for commercial purposes without the express 
permission of either Facebook or the copyright owner, then this would 
appear to be an infringement.  
Perhaps the most interesting observation here is that it is the users 
and the bloggers ” ‘communit[ies] typically associated with piracy’ ” 
who are now ‘rallying in support of copyright’.34 As Lawrence Lessig 
observes, ‘average individuals are increasingly thinking of themselves 
as artists, whose work has value ” or at least deserves respect’35 and, 
although we would agree with this assertion, we would also argue that 
the Facebook debate is still less a commercial than a privacy concern in 
this respect. Commercial considerations come much more to the fore 
when the focus shifts from questions of (intellectual) property to those 
of personal information and private data. 
 
3.5. ‘Facebook Ads’ – The Conundrum of Targeted Advertising 
Targeted advertising is not a new phenomenon and is, indeed, one of 
the reasons that free-to-use websites such as Facebook, Google and 
MSN’s Hotmail have become so lucrative. Users of Google’s web-
based Gmail service may have had the rather creepy experience of 
noticing that the little adverts beside their email seem coincidentally 
similar to the content of their emails. This is not coincidental: Google 
actually scans the text of all emails and links it to commercial 
advertisements, which in turn have text links displayed beside the 
user’s inbox. This process takes place automatically and no data ” not 
even aggregate data on the number of advertisements shown in Gmail 
” is relayed back to the advertiser.36 Facebook takes a similar approach 
with the imaginatively-named ‘Facebook Ads’, a facility launched in 
November 2007,37 and whose tripartite approach provides businesses 
with a simply staggering insight into what users and their ‘friends’ are 
interested in and are buying.  
The sort of personal data provided freely by users is a hugely valuable 
resource for commercial profiling. Facebook’s standard page layout 
encourages users to upload details of their favourite books, music, 
hobbies and interests, their political and religious affiliations, their 
family and relationship status, their employment circumstances, date 
of birth, address and other contact details, their connections with other 
                                                     
34  Lawrence Lessig, quoted by Monica Hesse, see supra note 20. 
35  Ibid. 
36  http://mail.google.com/mail/help/intl/en/privacy.html (accessed 26 February 2010). 





Facebook users (who are also profiled in this manner), and much else; 
the structure of the pages even facilitates this self-categorising by 
providing a pre-set selection of categories. The value of this pre-
categorised data for marketing analysis is obvious, and Facebook 
allows marketers to access much of it so they can create ‘SocialAds’38 
targeted to the individual user.  
This situation is made even more intriguing when we consider that 
one of Facebook’s core ‘principles’ is ‘ownership and control of 
information’.39  Its introductory ‘guide to privacy on Facebook’ 
announces that ‘You should have control over what you share. (...) 
Your privacy settings should be simple and easy to understand.’40  Its 
Privacy Policy begins by avowing that ‘We want to earn your trust by 
being transparent about how Facebook works.41 The underlying 
message here is that you, the user, should be able to control who has 
access to your information, which in turn suggests that you control 
what will be done with said information. These controls take the form 
of optional privacy restrictions that each user can set to their own 
desired levels: for example, a user can opt to have their profile 
completely visible to all other users (standing somewhere in the region 
of 300 million worldwide visiting the Site each month42), to those who 
are in the same networks, or to just their ‘friends’ (although note that 
even this is not full cloaking43), with the further option of hiding certain 
information from some friends by only granting them access to your 
‘limited profile’.  
However, and this appears to be the crucial point, these privacy 
controls only apply to other users and not to Facebook itself. Any 
control that the user has only relates to the access they grant (or do not 
grant) to other users in a peer-to-peer relationship, although the 
relationship of service provider-to-user stays out of the limelight. The 
conscious frame is the individual ‘other’. Indeed, when Facebook rolled 
out its Social Ads, what it was telling its potential advertisers reads 
rather differently from what it was telling its users ” for example: 
                                                     
38  http://www.facebook.com/business/?socialads (accessed 26 February 2010). 
39  Facebook Principles, accessed 26 February 2010.  
40  http://www.facebook.com/privacy/explanation.php (accessed 26 February 2010). 
41  Facebook’s Privacy Policy, version 9 December 2009. 
42  Eric Eldon, http://www.insidefacebook.com/2009/09/15/facebook-reaches-300-mil 
lion-monthly-active-users/ (accessed 26 February 2010).  Note that by this Facebook 
means ‘monthly uniques’, that is, individuals distinguished by unique identifiers such as 
IP code. 
43  Facebook’s Privacy Policy, supra note 39: ‘Certain categories of information such as 
your name, profile photo, list of friends and pages you are a fan of, gender, and 
networks you belong to are considered publicly available, and therefore do not have 
privacy settings.’ 




With Facebook Insights, you have access to data on activity, fan 
demographics, ad performance, and trends. With this information, you 
are better equipped to improve your custom content on Facebook and 
adjust your ad targeting. (...) Facebook's robust database of authentic 
demographic information provides you with a deep understanding of 
exactly who is engaging with your business and how. (...) Facebook 
Insights helps you learn more about your target audience.44 
Much more disturbing from a privacy perspective, however, are the 
third-party applications that are given access to user data through the 
Facebook platform. A host of quirky and humorous applications are 
available to Facebook users and are part of the charm of socialising on 
the site. Users can display clips of their favourite films to friends, send 
imaginary drinks, take part in jokey quizzes, place virtual bets ” the 
options are as wide as the developers’ imaginations, and the 
applications are hugely popular. The default for signing up, however, is 
that users often give the application access to all their personal data, 
even if the individual’s profile is otherwise set as ‘private’. They may not 
be able to add the application if they refuse. In a 2007 survey of the top 
150 applications, researcher Adrienne Felt found that 90.7% were being 
given more access to information than they needed to provide their 
service.45 For a chilling list of what information the user gives away 
without explicitly being asked, see Facebook’s own page giving some 
insight into the security gaping hole of its Platform ‘service’.46 
It comes as no surprise that in 2008 Facebook announced plans to 
develop an e-commerce facility to allow financial transactions to take 
place through the applications.47 The site now enables apparently trivial 
financial transactions through a virtual currency called ‘Facebook 
credits’ such as the buying of virtual flowers for a nominal sum as 
‘gifts’ for friends.  These credits can be bought in the real currency of 
dollars and can for instance be paid for by being added to a mobile 
phone bill.  Thus there already exists the (code) facility to enable 
companies with access to target information such as this, to sell easily 
to users at the point of use.48 
                                                     
44  See cached page at: http://web.archive.org/web/20080213223005/http://www.face 
book.com/business/?insights, stored on 13 February 2008. 
45  http://www.cs.virginia.edu/felt/privacy/ (accessed 26 February 2010).  
46  http://developers.facebook.com/about_platform.php (accessed 26 February 2010). 
47 http://blog.washingtonpost.com/posttech/2008/06/ecommerce_on_facebook.html 
?nav=rss_blog (accessed 26 February 2010).  
48 The much-criticised Beacon application, which was applied to some accounts without 
the users’ explicit consent, and which advertised to their Friends what purchases they 
had made on partner sites such as Amazon, was an obvious precursor of this sort of 





As we mentioned above, the casual reader of the Facebook 
Statement and guide to privacy may gain the misleading impression 
that their privacy is secure.  The reader must turn to the full privacy 
policy to uncover the disturbing news that ‘[t]his privacy policy covers 
all of Facebook. It does not, however, apply to entities that Facebook 
does not own or control, such as Facebook-enhanced applications and 
websites’ and it is only on more in-depth perusal of these documents 
that the reader can discover that Facebook may draw on any 
information in their user profile for the use of third parties; that 
Facebook may also use user information that it has gleaned from other 
sources, such as newspapers, blogs or instant messaging programs; 
and that Facebook may share the user’s ‘customer information’ with 
other companies in connection with the user’s use of a store or service 
that the company also happens to provide on Facebook. The Privacy 
Policy maintains that ‘sensitive’ information is encrypted; however, by 
this it means data such as credit card details, and not date of birth, 
sexual orientation or religious beliefs, which, although more mundane, 
are most certainly deemed ‘sensitive’ under the UK Data Protection Act 
1998 and the European data protection directive (95/46/EC).49  
Facebook’s approach to privacy last year became the subject of a 
complaint to the Canadian Privacy Commissioner,50 much of which was 
upheld.51 A Canadian legal clinic based at the University of Ottawa 
argued that Facebook is violating several principles of the Personal 
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act. Although not 
singling out Facebook as the sole miscreant among social networking 
sites, the clinic chose it for this first complaint because of its 
popularity.52 The Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic 
(CIPPIC) focused among other things on the typical defaults in user 
agreements for downloading third-party applications. CIPPIC also 
maintained that Facebook ‘misrepresents itself as solely a social 
networking site’,53 failing to make it clear to users the purposes for 
which Facebook allows third-party developers to access personal 
information. 
                                                                                                                  
action against Facebook: see Lane et al v Facebook, Inc. et al, Case No. 5:08-CV-03845-
RS. 
49  See s. 2 and Schedule 3 Data Protection Act 1998; also see the Data Protection 
(Processing of Sensitive Personal Data) Order 2000, SI 2000/417. 
50  http://www.cippic.ca/uploads/CIPPICFacebookComplaint_29May08.pdf  
(accessed 26 February 2010).  
51  http://www.priv.gc.ca/cf-dc/2009/2009_008_0716_e.cfm  
(accessed 26 February 2010).  
52  http://www.cippic.ca/uploads/NewsRelease_30May08.pdf  
(accessed 26 February 2010).  
53  See p. 31 of the complaint, supra note 50. See also pp. 19-20. 




The report from the Canadian Office of the Privacy Commissioner54 
made many criticisms of Facebook’s policies, but one criticism is worth 
quoting in full: 
‘Another consent-related concern that I have is the fact that no specific 
consent is sought from users for the disclosure of their personal 
information to applications when their friends and fellow network 
members add applications. Facebook maintains that, through its 
privacy settings, users have an extensive ability to choose whether or 
not they will interact with any particular Facebook application and to 
block any particular application and opt-out of all Facebook applications 
in a simple way. However true this statement may be in theory, I would 
note that users’ ‚ability to choose‛ would depend on their being 
knowledgeable about developers’ practice of accessing and using third-
party information when friends add applications. I would also note that 
the only way users can control the exposure of their personal 
information to application developers when their friends and fellow 
network members add applications is either to opt out of all 
applications altogether or to block specific applications. Moreover, the 
latter option would effectively require them to guess which of the more 
than 350,000 applications their friends and fellow network members are 
likely to add.  
I do not consider it appropriate for Facebook to put on users the onus 
of informing themselves and opting out of the disclosure of their 
personal information when friends and fellow network members add 
applications. Nor do I believe that the practice meets the reasonable 
expectations of users.’55 
 
3.6. Cyberspace and Problems of Legal Challenge 
In the early days of Facebook the legal reader might have wondered 
whether there really was an enforceable contract, particularly under 
English law. What economic exchange was taking place? With the 
advent of e-commerce on Facebook allied to the dispersal of personal 
data to third-party developers, the value of the licence of the user’s 
intellectual property rights has become more obvious. Perhaps, then, 
such legal protections as the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, the 
Unfair Contract Terms Directive,56 the Data Protection Act 1998 (the 
                                                     
54  Elizabeth Denham, Assistant Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Report of Findings 
into the Complaint Filed by the Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic 
(CIPPIC) against Facebook Inc. under the Personal Information Protection and 
Electronic Documents Act, 2009.  
55  Ibid., paragraphs 308-309. 






1998 Act) or the data protection directives57 will come into play at this 
point. A standard form contract that leads users into a relationship 
from which it is extremely difficult to extract themselves may be in 
practice both unreasonable and in breach of the fifth data protection 
principle on keeping data longer than is necessary58 ” indeed, the UK 
Information Commissioner investigated just such a complaint against 
Facebook as regards the difficulty (at the time of complaint) of 
removing personal data from an established account.59  
One can also question the very need for Facebook to retain in-depth 
user data for any length of time. Under the second and third data 
protection principles, personal data can be obtained only for specified 
purposes and should not exceed what is needed for those purposes.60 
Although the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 mandates 
that communications data be retained, it only requires this of the 
Internet Service Provider (ISP) and not of a social network provider.61 In 
addition, a ‘data subject’ under the 1998 Act (which would certainly 
cover a Facebook user)62 has the right under s. 10 to object to and 
prevent the processing of information held about them if it is likely to 
cause them substantial damage or distress. They also have the right 
under s. 7 to know what data is held on them, which would mean that, 
if a user leaves Facebook, they would have the right to be informed as 
to exactly what data remained, even in archives. In a similar vein, and 
considering that the right to share sensitive data requires explicit and 
informed consent, the default opt-out system provided by Facebook 
would fall short of this requirement, especially where subsequent 
actions by the user can have the effect of overriding the user’s prior 
selection of an overall ‘privacy’ setting. However, a platform site such 
                                                     
57  See the Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC) and the Directive on privacy and 
electronic communications (2002/58/EC). 
58  ‘Personal data processed for any purpose or purposes shall not be kept for longer 
than is necessary for that purpose or those purposes.’ Part I of Schedule 1, Data 
Protection Act 1998. 
59  http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/7196803.stm (accessed 26 February 2010). 
See also infra, section 3.7. 
60  ‘2. Personal data shall be obtained only for one or more specified and lawful 
purposes, and shall not be further processed in any manner incompatible with that 
purpose or those purposes.  
3. Personal data shall be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purpose 
or purposes for which they are processed.’ Part I of Schedule 1, Data Protection Act 
1998. 
61  Facebook only really need to keep records that meet the standards required to serve 
the normal purposes of the ordinary criminal law. The licence will be discussed in the 
next section. 
62  See s. 1(1) of the 1998 Act, which defines a ‘data subject’ as simply ‘an individual 
who is the subject of personal data’. 




as Facebook is able to upload all user data onto servers in the United 
States, thus bypassing British and EU data protection provisions 
(although we should emphasise that Facebook itself does in fact have a 
London office at present and has signed up to both the EU Safe Harbor 
Privacy Framework and TRUSTe dispute resolution).63 And although a 
user may assume that they are governed by the law of their local 
jurisdiction, including rules regarding parity and fairness in contract, 
Facebook’s Statement requires them to consent to quite another 
arrangement: 
You will resolve any claim, cause of action or dispute ("claim") you have 
with us arising out of or relating to this Statement or Facebook 
exclusively in a state or federal court located in Santa Clara County. The 
laws of the State of California will govern this Statement, as well as any 
claim that might arise between you and us, without regard to conflict of 
law provisions. You agree to submit to the personal jurisdiction of the 
courts located in Santa Clara County, California for the purpose of 
litigating all such claims.  
This in practice is a significant improvement on the previous Terms of 
Use, which bound the User to the laws of Delaware, a much less 
amenable jurisdiction. However, it nonetheless raises several 
questions, the foremost of which relates to the very validity of such a 
licence.64 In the UK, Regulation 9 of the Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts Regulations 199965 prohibits exclusion by choice of law 
clause. Regulation 5(1) provides that ‘[a] contractual term which has 
not been individually negotiated shall be regarded as unfair if, contrary 
to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in 
the parties' rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the 
detriment of the consumer.’ The Regulations cover a wider range of 
unfair clauses than the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 does and 
although Facebook’s service is not typical of those envisaged by the 
drafters, it is a service with commercial implications and, as we later 
discuss, Facebook has recently announced plans to develop e-
                                                     
63  The ‘Safe Harbour’ agreement between the US and the UK was intended to provide a 
framework for firms in the face of different private sector data protection standards 
between the two areas. For more on this see, for example, A. Busch, ‘From Safe Harbour 
to the Rough Sea? Privacy Disputes Across the Atlantic’ (2006) 3 SCRIPTed (4) 304-321. 
64  Compulsory arbitration clauses are always treated as unfair, and exclusive 
jurisdiction clauses are likely to be treated as unfair, where they are governed by the 
Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999. For discussion of US case law 
on the question of mandatory arbitration clauses and exclusive choice of law in 
electronic contracts, see Dale Clapperton and Stephen Corones, ‘Unfair terms in 
‘clickwrap’ and other electronic contracts’, 35 Australian Business Law Review (2007), 
152. 





commerce through its third-party applications.66 Schedule 2 provides a 
non-exhaustive list of terms which may be regarded as unfair; among 
these at paragraph 1(q) is ‘excluding or hindering the consumer's right 
to take legal action or exercise any other legal remedy’.  
The Rome I Regulation67 came into force across the EU at the end of 
2009. If a case is raised in the UK or another member state of the 
European Union, Rome I applies. Again, there may be a question over 
whether the user’s agreement with Facebook can in fact be regarded as 
a ‘consumer contract’ within the scope of the Regulation,68 but the 
future of e-commerce makes this matter critical. Article 3 provides that 
the parties may choose the law applying to the contract. Article 8 
provides that the existence and validity of the contract or any term of it 
is to be decided by the law which would govern it if it were valid. 
However, under Article 3(2),‘[t]he fact that the parties have chosen a 
foreign law, whether or not accompanied by the choice of a foreign 
tribunal, shall not, where all the other elements relevant to the situation 
at the time of the choice are connected with one country only, prejudice 
the application of rules of the law at the country which cannot be 
derogated from by contract’. It could however be difficult for a typical 
Facebook user to show that all the other elements relevant were 
‘connected with one country only.’  
It is also unclear as to whether the Facebook ‘agreement’ overrides 
protection given in other jurisdictions, even to the extent of also 
overriding constitutional protections.69 Similarly, is it also applicable to 
those who are below the age at which they can give irrevocable 
consent? This question is pertinent because Facebook explicitly permits 
persons of 13 or over to register as users. In the UK full capacity to 
contract is not attained till the age of 16 in Scotland and 18 in most of 
the rest of the UK,70 and majority as regards contract is not attained 
                                                     
66  Also consider here the Consumer Protection (Distance Selling) Regulations 2000 and 
the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002.  
67  Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 
June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I). Thanks to Elizabeth 
Crawford and Janeen Carruthers for drawing our attention to this instrument. 
68  This is defined in Art. 5(1) as ‘a contract the object of which is the supply of goods or 
services to a person (‘the consumer’) for a purpose which can be regarded as being 
outside his trade or profession, or a contract for the provision of credit for that object’. 
69  Given that most constitutional protections exist vis-a-vis the state rather than private 
corporations, in most circumstances these rights will be inapplicable anyway, but 
consider here, for example, the protection of the visual image under German intellectual 
property law and the constitutional law governing the dignity of the person. 
70  See the Age of Legal Capacity Act 1991, s. 1, in Scotland; and the Family Law Reform 
Act 1969, s. 1, in England. Below that age, the position is governed by common law and 
incidentally the Minors Contract Act 1987; minors can only contract in limited 
circumstances. These include contracting for ‘necessaries’ (Nash v Inman [1908] 2 KB 




before 18 in California, thus making it unclear how minors can make a 
binding assignation licensing their intellectual property rights (some in 
perpetuity) to Facebook and its developers in this way, even setting 
aside the conflict of laws question. As yet there is no definitive answer 
to any of these questions of jurisdiction; there has been speculation 
that Facebook’s broad licence is an underhand way of bypassing EU 
and UK legislation, but there is no clear evidence of this. What is 
obvious, however, is that Facebook adds to the already lengthy 
jurisdictional challenges posed by cyberspace. 
 
3.7. Limiting the Licence? 
As has been illustrated so far, many of the concerns raised and legal 
questions posed by Facebook stem from the breadth of the licence 
agreed to by users at the point they join the social network. In this 
section we question whether such an expansive licence is, in fact, 
required and consider this in terms of both the lasting effects and 
scope of the licence. 
 
3.7.1. ‘You can check out any time you like…’ 
As if a ‘non-exclusive, transferable, sub-licensable, royalty-free, 
worldwide licence’ was not enough, Facebook’s Statement also 
announces that deleted content will be kept in back-up copies for a 
reasonable period of time.71 This means, essentially, that even if a user 
chooses to leave Facebook, there is no guarantee that their information 
will be deleted; on the contrary, this implies that it will be deliberately 
kept, with ‘reasonable’ left undefined. Even with this considered, 
leaving Facebook was until recently much easier said than done. Before 
February 2008, if a user did opt for the drastic solution of trying to 
reassert full control over their property and ending the licence, they 
found that they had simply ‘deactivated’ the account, which, in fact, 
deletes nothing: all the information is archived in case the user decides 
to reactivate the account in future. A user who wanted all their data to 
be destroyed had to delete it themselves, every last bit of it, item by 
item. This can be no easy task for a previously active user, who may 
have thousands of items on their own and others’ pages, and even then 
there was no guarantee that all contact details had finally been 
removed. For example, a Facebook user called Nipon Das went through 
this painstaking process and removed all the data on his profile, but 
                                                                                                                  
1), which is a concept broader than the ordinary meaning of the words would imply. See 
also the Age of Majority Act 1969 (Northern Ireland) as regards reaching full age in 
Northern Ireland. 





then reported that a journalist was nevertheless able to contact him 
through his empty profile.72 The UK Information Commissioner 
negotiated with Facebook following a complaint about a similar case in 
which a British user had to contact the press before Facebook finally 
deleted his account.73 Somewhat ironically one user, Steven Mansour, 
set up a Facebook group on ‘How to leave Facebook’.74 The company 
has now simplified the process,75 but information on the procedure is 
only accessible through its help pages and the default - which is all that 
appears to be on offer, unless one searches for the alternative - is 
‘deactivating’.  Many will not realise that this leaves all their data where 
it was - indefinitely. Facebook states that the data will then be 
inaccessible to other Facebook users76 but as we have seen, other 
individual users are only one hole in the leaky tub.  Meanwhile, all the 
data posted by other users ” such as photographs, for example ” of 
course remains in place.77 
Why make it so difficult for users to leave and to delete their 
information? It is reasonable to build in some delay for the protection 
of the user against ill-considered deletion of an account, or malicious 
deletion by others. This does not however justify the extent of the 
barriers Facebook had erected and have only reluctantly begun to 
remove. Rather, Facebook can make the case that they need 
comprehensive licences and exemptions ” even at the point at which 
the contract otherwise ends ” because the commercial value of the 
sites rests in their number of users. If the owners of Facebook wish to 
sell, the site is worth little unless all the users and all of their personal 
data can be transferred to the buyer without the need to obtain the 
individual consent of millions of users. No doubt it also helps if 
inactive ‘deactivated’ accounts can remain part of the user tally, thus 
                                                     
72 http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/02/11/business/11facebook.php  
(accessed 26 February 2010). 
73  House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, 2nd Report of Session 2008”
09, Surveillance: Citizens and the 
State Volume I: Report, London: Stationery Office 2009, para. 42. 
74  http://www.stevenmansour.com (accessed 26 February 2010); see also the link to 
the group: ‘How to permanently delete your facebook account’, run by Magnus Wallin. 
75  https://ssl.facebook.com/help/contact.php?show_form=delete_account  
(accessed 26 February 2010). 
76  http://www.facebook.com/help/?page=842 (accessed 26 February 2010). 
77  Facebook were not alone in placing obstacles in the path of those who wish to leave: 
MySpace and Friendster were notorious for their practice of requiring users to confirm 
repeatedly that they want to leave permanently before they were offered an opportunity 
to delete the account. It is more straightforward to close a Bebo account, although we 
experimented with this and found that it took several days for the profile to become 
inaccessible through a search. 




inflating the value of the enterprise.78 Certainly, a broad licence is a 
potentially immense asset, but it is arguable that Facebook would be 
able to provide a similar service without it; it is the fact that it chooses 
not to that, more than anything, marks Facebook out as a 
fundamentally commercial enterprise. 
 
3.7.2. Possible Alternatives 
We argue that Facebook would be able to provide the service it does 
without such a broad licence, without such broad sharing of data with 
marketers, and without lengthy retention of sensitive personal data 
after a person has requested that their account and all record of it be 
deleted. The issues raised here are both technical and commercial.  
From a technical perspective, it should certainly be possible for all 
data uploaded by an individual to be tagged with a unique identifier so 
that there could be saturation deletion of all a user’s content (live and 
archive copy) when they delete the account, with the exception of 
material that was never theirs, such as any photos uploaded by another 
user. Even here however, if the picture has been tagged with the first 
user’s Facebook ID, it should not be difficult to monitor this and 
include it in a total deletion.79 Users could also be given the facility to 
‘lock’ data so that it cannot be electronically copied by other users (one 
only need think of Acrobat Reader, where information can be read but 
not edited).80 It would, of course, be difficult to prevent copying 
through print-screen options, but this would nevertheless make it more 
difficult for users to cut, paste and print another user’s personal 
information as they choose. Furthermore, although Facebook may 
argue that it needs the broad licence for commercial purposes, in order 
to maximise the value of the site, this fails to justify the relative lack of 
partial opt-outs. Under an opt-out system, users could offer a broad 
licence to sell, but not to use, all of their personal data or just some ” 
again, this would return a great deal of control to the user. 
As we have seen, then, several avenues of legal complaint could be 
pursued, and Facebook could be persuaded to offer better, more 
                                                     
78  Personal data changes ownership by means of company activities such as merger-
acquisitions and reorganisations. See S. Gauthronet, ‚The Future of Personal Data in 
the Framework of Company Reorganisations‛, conference publication, 23rd 
International Conference of Data Protection Commissioners, Paris - September 2001. 
79  Such as the ‘random number system’ proposed by Phorm ” in that case it is 
designed to facilitate anonymity, but it could arguably be utilised in the opposite way. 
For more on Phorm see section 8 below or www.phorm.com. 
80  For more on technological means of upholding property rights, see, for example, the 
discussion of ‘technologies of identity’ in P.E. Agre’s article ‘Beyond The Mirror World: 
Privacy & the Representational Practices of Computing’, in P.E. Agre & M. Rotenberg 





flexible privacy opt-outs. Perhaps, though, offering such options 
provides a fanciful protection rather than a real one. At the very 
simplest, the privacy option would have to be the default, but this 
would not reflect the variety of privacy choices different users would 
wish to make.  Chris Peterson has argued instead that the solution lies 
in a more intuitive privacy architecture in which the way users’ 
information is dispersed resembles the way in which they would protect 
their privacy among real-life, visible audiences.81 In a prescient study 
published in 2005, Alessandro Acquisti and Ralph Gross82 found that 
student Facebook users at their own university, Carnegie Mellon, 
permitted an astonishing amount of sensitive personal data to be made 
public. Whether this was due to Facebook’s misleading references to its 
‘core principle’ of privacy, simply because of a lack of awareness, or 
because they did not much care,83 students at the university actually 
used very few of the privacy options that Facebook already provides. 
The authors, simply by dint of being in that university ‘network’ on 
Facebook, were able to download 4540 profiles of the network’s users, 
the vast majority of whom had concealed none of their data from the 
network. The findings of this study suggest that, even were Facebook to 
offer greater service provider-to-user or third-party-to-user protection, it 
is unlikely that such opt-out would be widely used. 
 
3.8. Online Social Networking in the Future 
It has been our intention in this paper to draw attention to some of the 
issues associated with online social networking and, particularly, the 
Facebook platform. Two main issues have been identified as regards 
the provider-to-user relationship, namely the ‘privacy policy’ issues of 
individuals’ personal information in terms of the broad licence, and 
those relating to advertising targeted at potential consumers on the 
strength of information gleaned from uploaded personal information. 
While the fundamental concern of each of these issues is one of 
privacy, it would appear, however, that both the social attitudes 
towards and the legal treatment of these issues is very different, much 
                                                     
81  ‘Saving Face: The Privacy Architecture of Facebook’, 2009, 
http://works.bepress.com/ cpeterson/1/ (accessed 26 February 2010).  
82  A. Acquisti and R. Gross, Imagined Communities: Awareness, Information Sharing, 
and Privacy on the Facebook, 2006, http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/~acquisti/papers/ 
acquisti-gross-facebook-privacy-PET-final.pdf (accessed 26 February 2010). 
83  Acquisti and Gross, ibid., speculate that people tend to give truthful answers on 
Facebook because they are interacting with their friends, namely people who already 
know their name, birth date, sexual preferences and so on. This is very different from 
other, open-access sites such as MySpace, where there is much more incentive to create 
a fictional self or multiple identities.  




of which could be said to stem from the position Facebook has in the 
wider context of online and technological advances.  
Targeted advertising, for example, is not something that is specific 
to Facebook alone ” on the contrary, Facebook is merely one locus out 
of many, and not even the largest one at that ” the corollary of which is 
that they are simply part of the wider continuum of commercial digital 
data capture and use. This ‘continuum’ is becoming increasingly 
subject to regulation: the recently announced Internet Advertising 
Bureau UK (IABUK) Good Practice Principles of online behavioural 
advertising (OBA) can be cited as an example of industry self-
regulation,84 while another interesting development is the arrival on the 
scene of companies such as NebuAd in the US and Phorm in the UK, 
who are respectively promoting an alternative to what they term the 
recognised ‘orthodoxy’ of ‘store and retrieve’.  
On the other hand, the privacy policy issues are far less well-
developed in terms of, specifically, their legal character, not least to the 
extent that it is actually still unclear whether or not this is an area that 
should be covered by legal provisions as such. For example, should the 
law force Facebook and other OSN sites to improve upon or even 
simply clarify their privacy policies, and ” if so ” how could this be 
effected? Would a mere display of a clear notice on the behalf of the 
provider be sufficient in providing the users with this information? 
Also, and perhaps most controversially, do the users actually care 
about this to any real extent? While the users and the Bloggers are 
‘rallying in support of copyright’ in order to protect their work, as was 
discussed above, can it really be said that there is the same attachment 
to one’s personal data? Is its ‘gathering’ and storage perceived as being 
a simple consequence of participation in OSN communities, a price 
that users are willing to pay for the privilege?85 If there were to exist 
                                                     
84  The drafting of these principles has been undertaken in collaboration with the 
American Association of Advertising Agencies (AAAA) and the Direct Marketing 
Association (DMA), along with many of the bigger players in the industry,  although this 
list does not, it should be noted, include Facebook. These Good Practice Principles, 
which are due to come into force in the UK on 4 September 2009 are intended to be 
used by ‘businesses that collect and use data for behavioural advertising’ and are ‘[t]hey 
are based upon offering users notice about data collection, choice as to whether to 
participate and education about behavioural advertising and its benefits.’ For further 
details see http://www.iabuk.net/en/1/behaviouraladvertisinggoodpractice.html  
(accessed 26 February 2010). 
85  One possible ‘sweetener’ could be that the individual gleans some benefit from 
inputting their personal data and related online practices, over and above that of simple 
utilisation of the platform; as Corien Prins states: ‘Individuals make deals for the 
disclosure, collection, use and re-use of their personal data [and] in certain situations 
receive some form of compensation [...] and thus ‘exploit’ and ‘sell’ their habits, user-





some form of legal recourse for a complaint of this nature, would such 
a complaint be forthcoming?  
With online social networking still being in its comparative infancy, 
it is impossible to provide answers to these and similar questions with 
any degree of certainty, although we would tentatively suggest that 
much of the development of the law in this area will depend upon 
which of the many differing social attitudes towards online privacy ends 
up eventually prevailing. With these different attitudes being spread 
across various sectors of society (most notably age-group),86 however, 
it is far from clear whether it is possible that a genuine consensus be 
achieved. Indeed, in terms of access and control of personal 
information posted online, it appears that an exploration into what is in 
fact considered to be private is required before the law can make much 
of an attempt to regulate OSN providers such as Facebook.   
                                                     
86  ‘In the past ten years a new set of values has sneaked in (...), erecting another barrier 
between young and old. (...) [T]he older generation has responded with a disgusted, 
dismissive squawk: Kids today. They have no sense of shame. They have no sense of 
privacy. They are show-offs, fame whores, pornographic little loons who post their 
diaries, their phone numbers, their stupid poetry ” for God’s sake, their dirty photos! ” 
online.’ And the opposite perspective: ‘More young people are putting more personal 
information out in public than any older person ever would ” and yet they seem 
mysteriously healthy and normal, save for an entirely different definition of privacy. From 
their perspective, it’s the extreme caution of the earlier generation that’s the narcissistic 
thing.’ See Emily Nussbaum’s New Yorker Magazine article, 12 February 2007: 
http://nymag.com/news/features/27341/ and Vicky Allan’s related article in Sunday 
Herald, April 4, 2009: http://www.sundayherald.com /search/display.var.2499891.0. 
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Abstract 
Nanomedicine is an area of nanotechnology that raises high 
expectations due to to its potential in diagnostics, drug development 
and delivery, and other health-related applications. This paper 
discusses the lessons for the regulation of nanomedical products that 
the European Union’s medical product regulation can teach. Specific 
attention is paid to the Advanced Therapy Medicinal Products 
Regulation. The paper assumes that nanomedical product regulation 
requires a sophisticated hybrid regulation approach. The evaluation of 
the European medicinal products regulation leads to four specific 
lessons for nanomedical product governance. Another, more general 
lesson is that the centralisation of product safety, quality and efficacy 
knowledge and the coordination of vigilance information are essential 
to cope with the uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity of risk problems 
associated with nanoproducts.  
 
4.1. Introduction 
Nanotechnological development poses new challenges to regulatory 
risk governance. It seems to add a new dimension to the uncertainty, 
complexity and ambiguity of risk problems that technology regulation 
usually has to cope with. This is the unpredictability of technological 
development (Dupuy, 2007; Randles, 2008). Due to the knowledge 
gaps related to nanotechnological risks, specific legislation cannot yet 
be created. This does not mean, however, that public policy can wait 
and see. Even in the case of deficient evidence, public responsibility 
goes beyond a laissez-faire approach to risk regulation (European 
Commission (EC), 2004; EC, 2006). It requires precautionary regulatory 
action when basic values like human dignity, health, safety, 
environment, property, and privacy are at risk (EC 2000; Fisher 2007). 
In the current debates on regulating nanotechnologies, scholars and 
policy makers seem to agree that combining various regulatory 
methods is the most appropriate approach to cope with the 
governability problems of nanotechnological development (EC 2004; 
Bowman and Hodge 2007; Marchant et al. 2008). A basic expectation is 
that public regulation can benefit from joint policy- and rule-making 




activities to come to grips with the nanotechnological governability 
problems. 
This paper explores how nanomedical regulation can cope with its 
governability problems.1 It assumes that nanomedical product 
regulation requires a sophisticated hybrid regulation approach. 
Nanomedicine is an area of nanotechnology that raises high 
expectations with regard to its potential in diagnostics, drug develop-
ment and delivery, and other health-related applications. This paper 
discusses the lessons for the regulation of nanomedicinal products that 
the European Union’s (EU) medical products regulation can teach. 
Specific attention will be paid to the Advanced Therapy Medicinal 
Products (ATMP) Regulation (1394/2007/EC), which merges gene, cell, 
and tissue engineering therapies into one regulation. This is a 
particularly interesting example of hybrid regulation, which aspires to 
satisfy a wide range of stakeholder interests as well as to integrate 
some components of the EU’s medical devices regulation into its drugs 
regulatory mode. This paper explores what can be learned from the 
ATMP Regulation to cope with effectiveness and legitimacy problems of 
nanomedical regulation. To set the stage I will start with an overview of 
the specific governability problems of nanomedical products. Then I 
will discuss responses to these regulatory challenges. I will focus on 
prudent regulatory hybridisation. In the current public governance 
debate, hybridisation of governance modes, methods and instruments 
is regarded as a particularly promising regulatory approach (Trubek and 
Trubek, 2005; Trubek et al., 2006; Halpern, 2008). In the next step, the 
prudent potential of the ATMP Regulation will be analysed in the 
context of the EU’s medical products regulation system. Finally, I will 
deal with the lessons that can be learned from this case.  
 
4.2. Specific Governability Problems of Nanomedical Products 
4.2.1. Regulatory Gaps Related to Nanomedical Products 
Nanomedicine is defined as ‚the science and technology of diagnosing, 
treating and preventing disease and traumatic injury, of relieving pain, 
and of preserving and improving human health, using molecular tools 
and molecular knowledge of the human body‛ (European Science 
Foundation, 2005). Currently, research efforts are particularly intensive 
with regard to new methods and tools for diagnostics (e.g., ‘lab-on-a-
chip’ devices, biosensors), screening and imaging (e.g., smaller, more 
efficient and cheaper cameras for whole body imaging), as well as to 
                                                     
1  Following Van Kersbergen & Van Waarden (2004, 156), we understand by 





drug development (nano-pharmaceuticals) and delivery (e.g., ‘targeted 
nanocarriers’), and gene therapy (Dutch Health Council, 2006; 
European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies (EGE), 
2007). Furthermore, research is underway into applications in fields 
such as disinfection (nanoparticles of silver), tissue engineering (e.g., 
nanostructure scaffolds for tissue replacement) and medical implants. 
Although nanomedicine is in its infancy, it is advancing rapidly. A few 
products are already on the market, other products are almost ready for 
clinical use. For instance, diagnostic techniques for the rapid detection 
of leukaemia based on nanotechnologies and nano-pharmaceuticals 
are already available (EGE, 2007: 17). According to a Working Group of 
the European Medicines Agency (EMeA), the majority of current 
commercial applications of nanotechnology to medicines is geared 
towards drug delivery to enable new modes of action, as well as better 
targeting and bioavailability of existing medicinal substances (EMeA, 
2007).  
As nanomedical structures are multifunctional, the lines between 
medicinal products, medical devices and biologic products may 
become increasingly blurred and new modes of action may be created. 
Since nanomedical applications are characterised by combinations of 
modes of action on the human body (‘hybrid’ or ‘borderline’ 
products2), they may fall either in none or in one or more regimes of 
the EU’s medical products regulation system (drugs, medical devices 
and biologic products regulation). When two or three medical 
regulation regimes are applicable, questions arise whether one of these 
regimes is a lex specialis and whether hybrid nanomedical products 
need a new regulatory regime. When future nanomedical applications 
create new modes of action or modify the existing ones, the current EU 
medical products regulation system may not be sufficient. For instance, 
diagnostic systems based on nanotechnologies may require the 
adaptation of EU medical devices regulation, but this novelty may also 
call for a new regulatory regime. Hence, governability problems are 
raised by uncertainties about regulatory gaps. They are also induced by 
specific problems of effective and legitimate nanomedical regulation.  
 
                                                     
2  See, for borderline issues in relation to human tissue-engineered products, Kent et 
al. 2006, p. 45.  




4.2.2. Problems of Effective and Legitimate Nanomedical Product 
Regulation3 
Regulatory effectiveness depends on the degree to which determined 
policy objectives are achieved by the use of certain regulatory 
instruments (Opschoor and Turner, 1994: 11). Basic objectives of 
public technology regulation are risk management, the facilitation of 
commercial transactions, and the generation of public trust in 
technological products (Van Waarden, 1996; Franzius, 2001; Vogel, 
2001; Kent et al., 2006; Newell, 2002; Dorbeck-Jung, 2007). More 
specifically, public nanomedical product regulation aims at providing 
for the safety, quality, and efficacy of these products, as well as at 
facilitating beneficial medical technology product innovation. Generally, 
effectiveness problems refer to regulatory implementation and 
compliance deficiencies, as well as to other unexpected effects that 
inhibit policy goal achievement. In product regulation, specific 
effectiveness problems arise when consumers reject beneficial 
products because they do not trust regulatory controls.  
Trying to meet the objectives of technology regulation, public 
regulators encounter difficulties to cope with conflicts of stakeholder 
interests, as well as with contradictory requirements of effective and 
legitimate regulation. Conflicts between recognised interests are the 
consequence of potential contradictory jobs of public regulation. For 
instance, interest conflicts may arise where the promotion of 
technology is inhibited by certain protective measures of regulatory risk 
management, or, vice versa, where regulatory facilitation of product 
development puts health, safety, and privacy rights at risk. Patients and 
industries have an interest in the quick marketing of safe and effective 
nanomedical products: patients for improving their health, and industry 
for the sake of profit-making (including credibility profits). As safety 
and efficacy management may take a considerable amount of time, and 
as it is accompanied by high research and development costs, safety 
and efficacy interests may potentially conflict with promotion concerns. 
For small and middle-sized enterprises, research and development 
costs represent a significantly larger proportion of their spending than 
they do for the big players. Public regulators are required to strike a 
balance between stakeholders’ interests. 
Legitimacy problems arise when public regulators do not follow the 
principles of good governance and when the goals of these principles 
are not achieved. By legitimacy we refer to the acceptability of 
regulation (Dorbeck-Jung, 2008). In the EU the legitimacy of regulation 
                                                     
3  The normative requirements of public regulation also include efficiency. In this 





is about meeting the principles of openness, democratic decision-
making and participation, accountability, proportionality, subsidiarity 
and coherence of regulation.4 In nanomedical product regulation, 
legitimacy problems may arise when unelected experts contribute to 
regulatory decision-making.  
Regarding the knowledge gaps related to coming nanomedical 
applications, complex risk problems, potential regulatory gaps and 
potential effectiveness and legitimacy problems, we speak of ‘wicked’ 
governability problems that are highly resistant to regulatory solutions.5  
 
4.3. Responses to Governability Problems: Prudent Hybridisation 
4.3.1. Expected Advantages of Hybrid Regulation 
In our introduction we assumed that governability problems induced by 
nanomedical products may be reduced by regulatory hybridisation. By 
hybridisation we understand more or less loosely coupled 
combinations of governance modes, methods and tools.6 Regulatory 
gaps may be bridged by combining or integrating regulatory modes, 
                                                     
4  These requirements are mentioned in the White Paper on European Governance (EC, 
2001). See also the discussion of good governance principles in relation to 
pharmaceutical governance in Dorbeck-Jung and Oude Vrielink, 2007. 
5  The terminology of wicked problems was originally proposed in 1973 by H.W.J. Rittel 
and M.M. Webber, both urban planners at the University of California, Berkeley, USA. In 
a landmark article, the authors observed that there is a whole realm of social planning 
problems that cannot be successfully treated with traditional linear, analytical 
approaches. They called these issues ‘wicked’ problems and contrasted them with 
‘tame’ problems. Currently, the terminology is applied to policy problems that are 
difficult to clearly define, socially complex and multi-causal, that have unforeseeable 
consequences and cannot be solved (Australian Public Service Commission, retrieved 
from http://www.apsc.gov.au/publications 07/wickedproblems2.htm,  
(accessed 26 February 2010).  
6  In a more ambitious approach, hybridisation is understood as an integration of 
different modes, methods and tools that generates new governance forms (Brandsen et 
al. 2006). In view of the aim of this paper, a more modest approach seems appropriate. 
With regard to governance modes we focus on combinations of hierarchic and non-
hierarchic regulation. These combinations are located on a continuum, starting with 
hierarchic modes and ending up with non-hierarchic governance modes. In relation to 
governance methods we concentrate on co-regulation. In public governance, co-
regulation is about dispersing public regulatory authority within joint regulatory 
activities (Börzel and Risse 2005). Forms of co-regulation are joining public and private 
controls, engaging a multiplicity of actors in public regulation, and combining levels of 
regulation, for example, central and local. With regard to governance tools we focus on 
combinations within law, that is to say hard and soft law. Hard law refers to rules of 
conduct which have legally binding force, i.e., legislation. By soft law we understand 
rules of conduct which in principle have no legally binding force, but which nevertheless 
have effects in legal practice (Synder 1995). Examples of soft law are public and private 
action plans related to nanotechnology, codes of conduct, best practices and standards.  




methods and instruments of the various EU medical products 
regulation regimes. Regulatory hybridisation seems to be an 
appropriate approach to respond to the regulatory needs of hybrid 
nanomedical products. Hybrid governance modes, methods and 
instruments seem to be better equipped to cope with the 
unpredictability, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity of 
nanotechnological development and its risk problems than ‘pure’ 
governance forms (Van Calster, 2006; Dorbeck-Jung and Van Amerom, 
2008; Kearns and Rip, 2008). Co-regulation and soft law allow for 
reflective learning processes, experimentation and adjustment of 
regulation in response to new insights into nanotechnological risks. 
Initiatives of public engagement and stakeholder dialogue are said to 
support the acceptance of nanoproducts.  
In the new public governance literature, governance hybridisation is 
regarded as a means to enhance the effectiveness, efficiency and 
legitimacy of regulation (Teubner, 1997; Gunningham et al., 1998; 
Pierre and Peters, 2000; Mayntz, 2002; Trubek and Trubek, 2005; De 
Búrca and Scott, 2006; Trubek et al., 2006; Heritier and Lehmkuhl, 
2008; Halpern, 2008). It is an attempt to improve regulation by means 
of satisfying a large number of involved interests in order to increase 
decision-making capacity (Hey et al., 2007). Regulatory hybridisation is 
intended to create win-win situations in which public and private 
interests are attained (Gunningham et al., 1998). It is expected to 
create mutual trust and understanding and to enhance regulatory 
quality, including compliance rates and the social legitimation of 
regulation (Garcia Martinez et al., 2007). Alliances of hard and soft law 
are used to combine the advantages of both instruments. This is to say 
that these instruments are connected to provide for openness, 
flexibility, simplicity and low negotiation costs (‘soft law’s beneficial 
capacities’), but also for binding force, predictability, stability, due 
process, accountability, and transparency (‘hard law’s beneficial 
capacities’). According to empirical studies, the hybridisation of 
regulatory instruments can be more advantageous than the use of only 
one particular ‘pure’ type of regulation if certain conditions are met 
(Halpern, 2008). This seems to be the case when regulators have to 
cope with ‘wicked’ governability problems (Dorbeck et al., 2009). 
 
4.3.2. Prudent Hybridisation 
In order to tackle the ‘wicked’ governability problems we mentioned 
above, public regulators have to make competent normative decisions 
in concrete regulatory situations. This is the aspiration of prudent 
regulation (Selznick, 1992; Dupuy & Grinbaum, 2004; Dupuy, 2007; 





regulation takes into account general insights of how to achieve 
legitimate and effective technology regulation. It also draws on specific 
experiences with hybrid regulation. In this section we deal with the 
general and specific requirements of prudent regulation. 
With regard to legitimacy principles, we referred above to the 
European criteria of good governance (EC 2001): openness, democratic 
decision-making and participation, accountability, proportionality, 
subsidiarity and coherence of regulation. Openness includes the 
transparency of regulation, learning from successes and failures of 
other regulation, flexibility and ongoing review of regulation. Tra-
ditionally, democratic decision-making refers to public regulation based 
on decisions of parliament. Democratic decision-making is closely 
related to the principle of legality (‘public action that affects 
constitutional rights must be based on law, and public regulators 
regulate under the conditions of law’). When public regulation is 
combined with private regulation for the sake of enhancing 
effectiveness, regulatory hybridisation is taking place in the ‘shadow’ of 
public authority. Public regulators are required to establish a legal 
frame related to the whole nanoproduct cycle (including pre-marketing, 
approval, manufacturing, marketing and post-marketing controls7) in 
order to safeguard constitutionally recognised rights. In case of low 
regulatory performance of non-governmental regulators, more specific 
legislation, public enforcement actions and law suits may be needed. In 
joint public-private regulatory activities, comprehensive participation of 
stakeholders (including patients, doctors, manufacturers, and member 
states) is required to compensate for the lack of democratic decision-
making. Participation of stakeholders is also important to enhance the 
acceptance of nanomedical products. Accountability is closely related 
to the ideals of openness. Both principles require the transparency of 
decision-making. Accountability calls for clear formulation and 
adequate distribution of the actors’ responsibilities. To prevent 
regulatory capture (‘biased interest recognition’) impartiality and 
independence of decision-makers are required. Where public and 
private stakeholders closely collaborate in regulation, special attention 
should be paid to accountability controls. Proportionality refers to the 
accommodation of interests. More specifically, this principle means 
that nanomedical regulatory action must be in proportion to risk 
problems. Furthermore, it requires unbiased balancing of (conflicting) 
protection and technology promotion interests. In EU governance 
                                                     
7  The terminology of ‘regulatory product cycle’ refers to regulatory controls regarding 
the stages of pre-marketing, approval, manufacturing, marketing, and post-marketing of 
medical products (see Kaufer 1990). 




policy, subsidiarity refers to the regulatory sovereignty of the member 
states. This principle is particularly important in regulatory fields like 
health care, where the member states still have more regulatory 
competencies than the Community.8 Where EU regulation does not 
permit member states to follow their own political morality (for 
example, to set higher or lower safety standards), national sovereignty 
may be affected. Coherence involves the continuity of regulatory 
systems. Legitimacy problems may arise when new nanomedical 
regulation does not fit within the approaches used in the EU medical 
products regulation system. Regulatory coherence is fostered by the 
stability of a regulation system.  
The effectiveness of nanomedical product regulation may be 
enhanced by grounding regulatory design in empirical knowledge of 
compliance successes in other examples of technology regulation. To 
improve its effectiveness, legislation should leave room for private 
regulation, soft law, and regulations at other government levels. 
Legislation should provide for flexibility, experimentation and 
continuous review according to increasing knowledge about 
nanotechnological risks and regulatory effects. To cope with the 
uncertainties of nanomedical applications and their impact, vigilance 
provisions are regarded as an important regulatory measure (Lösch et 
al., 2008; Randles, 2008). Accordingly, continual monitoring of 
nanomedical development and collaboration with technology 
assessment studies seem to be essential for prudent technology 
regulation. When new insights into risk problems and technical 
progress become available, existing regulation must be open to review 
and modification.  
To sum up, basic questions for assessing effective and legitimate 
(prudent) hybridisation of nano(medical) regulation are:  
1. Does public regulation provide for a general public regulation/legal 
frame for the whole nanomedical product cycle? 
2. Does the (legal) frame provide for ongoing review of regulation? 
3. Are there any legal provisions that stimulate experimentation with 
hybrid regulation? 
4. Does the (legal) frame leave room/enough flexibility for (semi-) 
autonomous private regulation, soft law and regulatory activities 
with other stakeholders? 
                                                     
8  In this sector, the EU regulatory competencies are rather limited. According to Article 
168 of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU is empowered to protect human health, and more 
specifically to provide for the quality and safety of human organs, material and blood. 
Other relevant regulatory competences refer to consumer protection (Article 169) and 





5. Does the legal frame provide sanctions for low regulatory 
performance of non-governmental regulators?  
6. Does the regulatory regime provide for continual vigilance? 
7. Is the regulatory regime based on empirical insights into the 
effectiveness of governance hybridisation and earlier technological 
risk regulation?  
8. Do stakeholders participate in decision-making concerning the 
legal frame? 
9. Are promotion and protection interests comprehensively and 
unbiasedly balanced? 
10. Is public acceptance of regulation fostered and if so, by which 
regulatory means? 
11. Is transparency of regulation provided for? 
12. Is accountability of regulators provided for?  
13. Does EU regulation leave room for the political morality of the 
member states? 
14. Is the regulation coherent with its regulatory system?  
 
In the next section we will explore the prudent potential of the EU 
Advanced Therapies Medicinal Products Regulation in the context of 
the EU medical products regulation system. We start with a brief 
history and the scope of the ATMP Regulation. Then, specific attention 
will be paid to hybrid components of this regulation. 
 
4.4. Prudent Potential of the EU Advanced Therapies Medicinal 
Products Regulation9 
4.4.1. Brief History and Scope 
The ATMP regulation is part of the EU medical products regulation 
system, which includes the regulatory regimes of medicinal products, 
medical devices and biologic products. The EU pharmaceuticals 
regulation was established in the 1960s, while the European medical 
devices regulation was laid down thirty years later. EU biologics 
legislation emerged ten years later than the medical devices legislation. 
In 2001, specific regulation of blood and blood products was 
established (2001/83/EC). In 2004, Directive 2004/23/EC set standards 
of quality and safety for the donation, procurement, testing, processing, 
preservation, storage and distribution of human tissue and cells. These 
activities were followed by Regulation 1394/2007/EC on advanced 
therapies medicinal products.  
                                                     
9  This case study is based on policy and legislative documents, the relevant literature 
and the empirical studies of Kent et al. 2006. 




The EU ATMP Regulation is a lex specialis which introduces additional 
provisions to those laid down in Directive 2001/83/EC on medicinal 
products. This means that the general provisions of the EU 
pharmaceuticals legislation apply to ATMPs,10 as far as there is no 
specific regulation. Regulation 1394/2007/EC supplements Directive 
2004/23/EC on medicinal products with additional standards of quality 
and safety, where appropriate. Combined advanced therapy medicinal 
products (‘borderline products’) are always regulated under the ATMP 
regime.  
 
4.4.2. Hybrid Regulation? 
The ATMP Regulation follows the regulatory approach of the EU’s 
pharmaceuticals regulation. In all stages of the regulatory product cycle 
(pre-marketing, approval/rejection/withdrawal, manufacturing, marke-
ting, post-marketing), ATMPs are primarily governed by mandatory 
legislation, which is accompanied by soft law including standardisation, 
codes of conduct and principles of good practices. ATMP regulation, 
however, also entails some components of the medical devices 
approach, including the certification of quality. In the pre-marketing 
stage, Regulation 1394/2007/EC allows small and medium-sized 
enterprises developing an ATMP to apply to the EMeA for scientific 
evaluation and certification of studies necessary to demonstrate the 
quality and non-clinical safety of ATMPs (Article 8).  
The approval of ATMPs is governed by the centralised procedure of 
drugs authorisation. This mandatory procedure is based on 
standardisation of the ICH (International Conference on Harmo-
nisation of Technical Requirements for the Registration of Pharma-
ceuticals for Human Use, see Dorbeck-Jung, 2008), which is a joint 
activity of the pharmaceutical industry and the drugs agencies. What is 
new is the establishment of the EMeA’s Committee for Advanced 
Therapies. This Committee of high level experts is consulted in the 
authorisation process. Hybrid products are controlled by hybrid 
regulation. ATMPs that incorporate medical devices or active 
implantable medical devices must meet the essential requirements laid 
down in the Medical Devices Directives (Articles 6-9, Regulation 
1394/2007/EC).  
Post-marketing regulation focuses on the information system on 
suspected adverse effects and events of drugs (pharmacovigilance). 
                                                     
10  According to article 1 Regulation 1394/2007/EC, an advanced therapy medicinal 
product covers a gene therapy medicinal product, a somatic cell therapy medicinal 
product, as well as a tissue-engineered product. Particular ATMPs prepared on a non-
routine basis and used in a hospital for an individual patient are excluded from the 





Pharmacovigilance information is based on standards that have been 
set up in the Community. Further standardisation is sought in 
collaboration with the World Health Organisation. The information 
system is a collaborative activity of the EU and its member states. It is 
coordinated by the EMeA. Additionally, the ATMP Regulation has laid 
down specific provisions regarding post-authorisation risk 
management and the follow-up of efficacy and adverse reactions 
(Article 14). These provisions include additional reports and 
evaluations. Furthermore, the traceability of advanced therapies 
medicinal products is regulated within post-marketing controls.  
We can conclude that the ATMP regulation (including general 
pharmaceutical regulation) provides for regulatory hybridisation in 
terms of using various modes, methods and instruments. Although 
there are some less hierarchical elements in the ATMP regulation, the 
whole regime seems to be hierarchical rather than non-hierarchical. 
This is also the case with borderline products with ATMP and medical 
devices modes of action. For these products the ATMP regulation 
integrates less hierarchic components of the medical devices 
notification procedure within the hierarchic centralised pharma-
ceuticals authorisation procedure. Co-regulation is taking place with 
regard to standard-setting activities in the pre-marketing and approval 
stages of the regulatory product cycle. In the stages of manufacturing 
and marketing, joint regulatory activities of manufacturers, ATMP 
industry, patients and the EMeA are provided. Post-marketing 
surveillance and the enforcement of the ATMP regulation are entirely 
based on public regulation. In addition to the tight legal controls a wide 
range of soft law has emerged in the general pharmaceutical regime. 
Obviously, the EU has taken a regulatory stance of sophisticated 
hybridisation, which integrates advantageous components of private 
regulation and soft law into a dominant hierarchic central approach.  
In the next section we explore the prudent potential of the ATMP 
regulations, trying to answer the 14 questions we formulated above. 
 
4.4.3. Questions 1 to 5 on the Legal Frame  
 
1. Legal frame.  
The general EU drugs regulation and the specific ATMP Regulation 
provide a legal frame for the whole product cycle. Standards on clinical 
trials and on approval requirements that have been set up by the ICH 
have been codified in EU regulation.  
 
  




2. Ongoing regulatory reforms.  
In the pharmaceutical regime the legal frame has stimulated ongoing 
regulatory review and regulatory reforms. During the forty years of EU 
medicinal products regulation, a number of major reforms have taken 
place. According to the ATMP Regulation, the European Commission is 
obliged to publish a general report on the application of the Regulation 
by 30 December 2012. In this report special attention must be paid to 
the impact of technical progress. Regulatory reforms are also required 
in relation to the adaptation of the Regulation’s Annexes according to 
scientific and technical evolution. 
 
3. Experimentation with hybrid regulation.  
This is not regulated. 
 
4. Room for private regulation and flexibility.  
The legal frame does not leave much room for self-regulation of 
manufacturers, ATMP industry and other stakeholders. It is striking 
that this room was broader in the past. It has been reduced in the last 
reforms of the general pharmaceuticals regime by legislative 
specification of the legal requirements for private codes of conducts, 
risk assessment and quality management systems. Although the ATMP 
Regulation emphasises the need of regulatory procedures that provide 
for sufficient flexibility,11 so as to easily accommodate the rapid 
evolution of science and technology, the overall flexibility of the 
regulatory regime does not seem to be high.  
 
5. Sanctions.  
According to the general EU pharmaceuticals regulations, member 
states are obliged to provide for sanctions for low regulatory 
performance of applicants, manufacturers, etc. 
 
4.4.4. Question 6 on the Vigilance Regulations 
6. Vigilance.  
Surveillance of medicinal products is provided during the whole 
regulatory product cycle. In the pre-marketing stage, pharmacovigilance 
procedures are used to ensure the immediate cessation of any clinical 
trial where there is an unacceptable level of risk. Investigators and 
sponsors are legally obliged to monitor and to report all serious 
suspected adverse events and reactions. Post-marketing surveillance 
seems to be continual and comprehensive. In the 2004 regulatory 
reform of the pharmaceuticals regulation, pharmacovigilance was 
                                                     





enhanced according to new communication techniques. The 
collaboration with the World Health Organisation has been intensified. 
Effective vigilance is supported by a wide range of legal obligations 
related to information communication. Penalties are provided for non-
compliance. According to a study on the transparency of the EU 
medicinal products regulatory system, however, doubts arise whether 
the vigilance information provided is up-to-date and understandable 
(Van Lessen Kloeke and Artz, 2006). 
 
4.4.5. Questions 7 to 14 on the Quality of Regulation 
7. Based on empirical insights.  
The ATMP Regulation has not been based on an evaluation on the 
effectiveness of the existing EU medical products regulation system. 
The 2005 Consulting Paper of the European Commission refers only to 
a study by its Institute for Prospective Technological Studies on the 
markets and future prospects of human tissue-engineered products 
(EC 2005). The empirical investigations of Kent et al. (2006; funded by 
United Kingdom organisations) and Heinonen et al. (2005; funded by 
Finish organisations) have not been mentioned in the relevant EU 
policy papers. 
 
8. Stakeholder participation.  
According to influential accounts, the ATMP Regulation is a good 
example of the emerging ‘participative ethos’ within EU medical 
products regulation (Kent et al., 2006; Salter and Jones, 2002). This 
means that there is increasing attention for the role of the consumer-
citizen within the regulatory process. While the participation of 
consumers in the 2004 EU Human Tissues and Cells Directive was 
marginal and limited to specific patient groups, consumer participation 
seems to have been broader and more substantial in the ATMP’s 
regulatory process. In 2002 stakeholders were consulted via internet on 
the need for a community legal framework on ‘human tissue 
engineered products’. After the last reforms of the EU drugs regulation, 
two representatives of a European patient organisation were included 
into the EMeA’s Management Board.  
 
9. Balancing of recognised interests.  
In the evolution of the medicinal products regulatory regime, we 
observe a tendency of providing increasing incentives for quick 
marketing and product innovation. The ATMP Regulation has laid 
down specific incentives for (bio-)medical industry, such as minimum 
level fees and specific support for small and medium sized enterprises. 
On the other hand, safety, quality and efficacy requirements have been 




specified in the last reforms of the drugs regulatory system and within 
the new ATMP Regulation. Without further empirical research it is not 
possible to conclude whether this increased attention for promotion 
concerns is proportional in relation to regulatory measures on ATMPs' 
safety and efficacy.  
 
10. Support for public acceptance.  
Public acceptance is supported by the emerging ‘participative ethos’ 
within EU medical products regulation. It is also fostered by increasing 
transparency of the EMeA’s decision-making and the Agency’s soft law, 
as well as by pharmacovigilance information about suspected adverse 
effects of drugs. Exceptions are made for the sake of commercial 
secrecy. The 2006 investigation of Van Lessen Kloeke and Artz 
indicates, however, that there may be problems with regard to effective 
transparency in terms of understandable and up-to-date information.  
 
11-12. Transparency and accountability measures. 
In the last reforms of the EU’s pharmaceutical regulation, accounta-
bility provisions were enhanced. The new provisions refer to the 
specification of the tasks and obligations of the members of the 
EMeA’s Management Board and Scientific Committee, as well as job 
rotation, interest declaration and the acceptance of gifts. Information 
about interests is accessible to the public. Regulation 726/2004 
requires that the database on medicinal products is managed 
independently of pharmaceutical companies. In addition to the general 
drugs regulation, the ATMP Regulation requires members and 
alternates of the EMeA’s Committee for Advanced Therapies to have no 
financial or other interests in the biotechnology sector or medical 
device sector that could affect their impartiality (Article 22). 
 
13. Subsidiarity.  
By focusing mainly on technical issues, the ATMP Regulation basically 
sidesteps different views of the member states on certain ethical issues 
with the ‘subsidiarity’ principle (Sanzenbacher et al., 2007).12 This 
means that the ATMP Regulation will not interfere with national ethical 
decisions on accepting the use of specific cell types, such as human 
embryonic or fetal cells, primordial cell types or therapies derived from 
those cells. Member states seem to remain free to enact their own 
legislation that forbids the use of some cell types or therapies on their 
national territories. 
                                                     







14. Coherence.  
The regulatory approach of the ATMP Regulation seems to fit nicely 
within the pharmaceutical regulation regime. With its focus on a 
centralised authorisation procedure, the Regulation provides for the 
continuity of the drugs regime. By integrating some components of the 
medical devices regime into the medicinal products approach in case 
of hybrid ATMP’s which also have a mechanical mode of action, the 
Regulation enhances the coherence of the EU medical products 
regulatory system.  
 
4.5. Conclusions: Lessons to be Learned 
In this paper, we have explored the lessons for nanomedical product 
regulation that can be learned from the recently established EU ATMP 
regulations. The focus of our exploration lies on the successes and 
problems of regulatory hybridisation. 
 
Lessons for nanomedicinal products to which the ATMP regime applies 
1. Nanomedicinal products to which the ATMP regime (including the 
general drugs regulations) applies will be governed by a mainly 
compulsory regime which allows for little regulatory hybridisation 
and little flexibility. This does not stimulate experimentation with 
hybrid modes and methods of regulation, but it does provide for 
high safety and efficacy standards, as well as for a rather effective 
vigilance system and regulatory continuity. 
 
Lessons for nanomedical products to which the existing EU medical 
products regulation system does not apply 
2. The regulatory process of the ATMP Regulation indicates that 
harmonised regulation is advantageous for all stakeholders involved 
(Kent et al., 2006). The evaluation of the situation before the 
establishment of this Regulation shows that the different 
authorisation standards of the member states were detrimental for 
consumers (availability and safety problems), but also for industry 
and the EU itself (problems with regard to creating strong integrated 
markets). 
 
3. To benefit from potential advantages of regulatory hybridisation, the 
case study shows that there is room for co-regulatory activities with 
regard to standardisation and implementation activities, which new 
nanomedical regulation can use according to the lines set out and 
modified in more than forty years of EU drugs regulation.  





4. With regard to new nanomedical borderline products, the ATMP 
regulations indicate a tendency to use the pharmaceuticals 
regulatory approach generally and independently from the product’s 
principal mode of action and to integrate components of other 
relevant regulatory approaches (such as the medical devices 
approach). 
 
A final conclusion is that our case study also provides a general lesson 
for nanotechnological products regulation. Although the characteristics 
of nanoproducts and industries, as well as the consumers’ product 
reception and ethical problems, are different in other application fields, 
our case study indicates that the centralisation of knowledge on 
product safety, quality and efficacy and the coordination of vigilance 
information are essential to cope with the uncertainty, complexity and 
ambiguity of nanoproducts risk problems. Centralisation of knowledge 
and regulatory power, however, call for more democratic controls. It 
remains to be seen how effective the accountability and transparency 
measures of the EU ATMP regulations are in practice. Learning from 
the experiences with pharmacovigilance, as well as from the drug 
system central risk management and its accountability problems, could 
support the sense of ‘getting it right this time, and from the very 
beginning’ that has been observed by influential commentators in 
nanotechnological governance (Macnaghten et al., 2005; Krupp and 
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Chapter 5. Access to New Technology. In Defense of the Liberal Regime 
of Innovation 




Modern societies should not fall back behind the level of reflexivity they 
have reached through applying the precautionary principle and 
engaging in comprehensive technology assessment. But they should 
beware that the increase of reflexivity does not automatically trigger the 
increase of restrictions. In view of what new technologies can contribute 
to the viability and sustainability of society, some of the existing 
regulations seem counterproductive. A proper balance between control 
and release of innovations would include a return to precautionary 
policies that are based on principle and rule, a commitment to 
experimentation within and with society, and a containment of moral 
fundamentalism in dealing with human nature. Innovation is bound to 
be contested and politicized. We should, however, adopt a modest (and 
realistic) vision of what the state can do to manage the evolution of 
technology, and leave some space for a private right to innovate that 
grants individuals and minorities a license to expose society to some 
degree of ‘creative destruction’ ” even without informed consent. 
 
5.1. Introduction: Resistance against New Technology then and now 
In the year 1403, the Council of the City of Nuremberg issued a ban on 
a new machine for producing steel file and took an oath from the 
inventors that they would demolish the machine and ‘not practice this 
art again and also not teach it to any person, as long as they live’.1 The 
Council suppressed the machine because it was a threat to the existing 
social order, in this case the medieval guild system of craft production. 
They considered technological innovation as a subversive activity and 
accordingly sanctioned it as socially and politically deviant. One would 
expect that nothing of this sort could happen today. The textbook 
interpretation is that innovation is a key feature of modern culture and 
‘adaptive upgrading’ (Parsons 1966) and the growth of ‘material 
culture’ (Ogburn 1922) are built-in trends and legitimate goals in 
society. But read Section 63 of the Austrian Gene Technology Act of 
1994, according to which genetically modified products must be 
forbidden if they ‘lead to a burden on the society or on social groups 
(…) which seems unacceptable for macro-economic, social or ethical 
                                                     
1  ‘(…) dieselbe kunst iemer ueben und auch das nyemant leren, die weil sie leben’ 
(Wissel 1974, 313). 




reasons’. The signal this law sends seems not far removed from what 
the Council of Nuremberg decreed five hundred years ago. The 
difference is, of course, that in 1403 the resistance to new technology 
was part of the long political and cultural battle to preempt the rise of a 
liberal regime of innovation, whereas in 1994 it was part of a growing 
disenchantment with the implementation of such a regime. 
 
5.2. The Liberal Regime of Innovation 
Policies to suppress new technology have rarely been a lasting success 
” even in the Middle Ages. In the 16th century the Council of 
Nuremberg struggled again with unwanted new water mills built by the 
inventor Hans Speichel. This time the Council stopped the use of the 
mills by paying the inventor an annual pension in return for his 
obligation to refrain from his art and for the rest of his life make no 
other design or prototype of a mill.2 From the 17th century on the dams 
broke down in Western Europe. The emerging modern societies 
implanted a bias in favor of innovation through three structural 
changes.  
1. They institutionalized objective science, which sets the inquiry of 
nature culturally apart from religious, moral, and political 
commitments, and thus paves the way for the intellectual pursuit of 
the growth of knowledge for its own sake. Objective science 
considers correct experimental prognosis as truth criterion and thus 
accumulates knowledge that can easily be converted into technology.  
 
2. They turned to capitalist market economies, which are based on 
imperatives of growth and hence imbue the society with an 
insatiable thirst for innovation. Since then, the economy provides a 
permanent opportunity structure for translating new technological 
options into social practice ” in addition to the military and civil 
engineering demands of the nation states and the chronic need of 
the medical profession to improve its performance. 
 
3. They established the rule of law and a legal system of basic rights, 
which imply a right to introduce new technology and to have access 
to it, on the level of both institutions and individuals.  
These structural changes ‘disenchained’ the productive forces of 
technology (to borrow the phrase from Karl Marx) and limited the 
power of the state to regulate innovation. Above all, the growth of 
options slipped completely from state control. New technologies spring 
                                                     
2  ‘(…) seins handwergs zu warten (...) und sein lebenlang kein handwergs oder anderer 





from knowledge systems that function on the level of the world society. 
Knowledge travels easily across national borders; local inventions 
become globally available as information. States can still regulate the 
use of options, but they must balance such regulation with guaranteed 
freedoms. Innovation is not a privilege that can be granted or withheld 
at will by political authorities; it is a civil right that can only be restricted 
for reasons of compelling public interests. Evidently, risks to important 
private and public goods, such as health and environmental safety, or 
violations of the accepted moral order constitute sound reasons for 
restricting the use of new technology. However, the burden of proof is 
with the regulatory agencies. Reasons must be substantiated by those 
who want to block access to options, not by those who claim access.3  
Modern societies install a liberal regime of innovation. They set 
some boundary conditions for the use of new technology but leave the 
evolution of the technostructure to a large extent to social forces ” to 
markets, professions, entrepreneurs, consumers and clients. 
 
5.3. A License to Expose the Society to ‘Creative Destruction’? 
Technological determinism is an ill-conceived philosophy because the 
rise of a technology is no doubt a social process. It may nevertheless be 
a good description of what actually happens. The liberal regime places 
innovation beyond political control. It amounts to a license to expose 
the society to ‘creative destruction’.4 This destruction may be far-
reaching: industries collapse, job qualifications and social competences 
of people become obsolete, cultural values are challenged. It is an 
underlying rationale of the liberal regime that the benefits from 
innovation are worth the price of creative destruction, and that society 
is better off by addressing the task of coping with the consequences 
than by suppressing the innovation in the first place. 
The liberal regime of innovation has never gone uncontested. 
Resistance against new technology has been endemic throughout the 
history of liberal societies. It mostly failed. In 1986, trade unions in 
London mobilized 5300 printers in a strike against the introduction of 
electronic printing and desktop publishing by journalists in their 
newspaper company. The only thing they achieved was that old printing 
houses were shut down by the owner, who then opened an electronic 
                                                     
3  Under German constitutional law, a ‘principle of proportionality’ applies that forces 
authorities to prove that regulatory measures are suitable for the public purpose, are the 
least restrictive alternative available, and do not put excessive burden on citizens.  
4  This is how Joseph Schumpeter characterized ‘the process of industrial mutation (…) 
that incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly 
destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one (…) the perennial gale of creative 
destruction’ (1975: 82-83). 




business next door with only 1300 personnel.5 In the end, all parties 
somehow managed to accommodate themselves to the innovation. In 
some cases, however, particularly with genetically modified crops and 
food, the introduction of new technology has effectively been blocked in 
Europe by political regulation in response to popular unease and 
protest. Whether these cases are an exception or a model remains to be 
seen. The liberal regime of innovation is acknowledged in the rhetoric 
of politics and law. In public opinion it is less clear that private freedom 
to operate should indeed be considered a sufficient and legitimate 
ground to expose society to the ‘creative destruction’ of technological 
change.  
The very concept of freedom implies that beyond the evident limits 
of respect for the moral order and the duty of doing no harm, one can 
impose consequences on others without being held responsible. 
Freedom to reproduce means that individuals who choose not to have 
children cannot be held responsible for the problems of demographic 
change to which they contribute and with which society then must 
struggle. People do not, however, readily accept that such limits of 
responsibility should also apply when multinational corporations place 
genetically modified crops or products of nanotechnology on the 
market, when medical professionals apply drugs to dope the 
intellectual or sexual capacities of their clients, or when scientists 
produce tissue for human transplantation from embryonic stem cells. 
In these cases, there is growing support for policies that relegate the 
freedom to innovate from the catalogue of guaranteed civil liberties and 
turn access to new technology back into a public concession rather 
than a private right. A tendency to retreat from the liberal regime of 
innovation manifests itself in certain interpretations of the 
precautionary principle, in demands for sustainability and social 
responsibility of innovation, and in moral verdicts against intervening 
in human life and the body. 
 
5.4. Precaution without a Principle 
The liberal regime of innovation operates with a presumption of ‘in 
dubio pro libertate’. However, in recent conflicts the precautionary 
principle has become a means to dismantle this presumption. Under 
the precautionary principle, regulatory authorities may impose 
preventive restrictions if there is still ‘lack of full scientific certainty’ 
                                                     
5  A similar failure was the effort in the 1980s to ban the use of personal computers in 
university offices in Bremen to ensure that it remained the domain of secretaries to write 
scientific manuscripts ” on typewriting machines. After a short while, the secretaries 





about the existence of suspected risks.6 Critics of new technology have 
read this as implying that uncertainty about the existence of risks 
should be taken as indicating the possibility of risk. And they have 
successfully used tactics of escalating such uncertainty to postpone the 
authorization of new technology indefinitely, for example, in the case of 
genetically modified (GM) crop varieties. 
Part of the tactic is the de-construction of the knowledge claims of 
scientific risk assessments. Such assessments derive statements about 
the likelihood of adverse effects on human health or the environment 
from the results of toxicological, ecological or clinical testing. They 
reflect the given state of knowledge about what possible risks might be 
and about the causal mechanisms through which they might lead to 
harm. They rely on testing procedures that investigate a limited number 
of parameters in model systems and make projections which are, in 
principle, falsifiable. Such assessments have obvious limits. They 
cannot exclude the possibility of false negatives, i.e., wrongly finding 
that no harm is to be expected. And they cannot address hidden or 
unknown risks which we may have never seen and cannot anticipate in 
testable hypotheses. These limits confront us with uncertainties that 
‘encircle the science rather than being encircled by it’ (Wynne and 
Mayer, 1993: 33). Critics expose these limits to denounce regulations 
that authorize new technology if it passes the tests of scientific risk 
assessment as ‘uncertainty blind’ and insufficient under the 
precautionary principle (Van Asselt and Vos, 2008: 290). In addition, 
they occasionally invoke an epistemology of social construction of 
knowledge to undermine the trustworthiness of scientific risk analysis 
further.7 
If the uncertainties that ‘encircle science’ constitute sufficient 
reason to suspect the existence of risk, then scientific analysis is 
effectively removed from the agenda of risk regulation under the 
                                                     
6  The precautionary principle is, e.g., expressed in principle 15 of the Rio Declaration 
on Environment and Development (1992) as follows: ‘Where there are threats of serious 
or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for 
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation’ (UNCED, 
1992: 10). Another version has been implied as a binding rule under international law in 
the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (2000): ‘Lack of scientific certainty due to 
insufficient relevant scientific information and knowledge regarding the extent of the 
potential adverse effects of a living modified organism on the conservation and 
sustainable use of biological diversity in the Party of import, taking also into account the 
risks to human health, shall not prevent that Party from taking a decision, as 
appropriate, with regard to the import of the living modified organism (…) in order to 
avoid or minimize such potential adverse effects.’ 
7  ‘The reality in science, as in nearly any other field of knowledge, with the possible 
exception of some branches of the natural sciences is socially constructed’ 
(Christoforou, 2003: 208). 




precautionary principle.8 At the same time, the cautious reversal of the 
burden of proof imposed by regulations that authorize new technology 
only if no adverse effects are to be expected is turned into an 
insurmountable obstacle for those who seek authorization. While 
testable hypotheses about possible adverse effects can eventually be 
refuted, it is impossible to refute suspicion of risk based on uncertainty 
alone.9  
This interpretation leaves no space for a right to innovate. The same 
follows from claims that in the case of uncertainty about the effects of 
new technology, worst case scenarios should be accepted as plausible 
hypotheses. Such claims remove the constraints that the principle of 
proportionality can impose on the regulation of uncertain or unknown 
risks. If one must assume ‘that the unexplored risks could be far 
greater than risks for which we have empirical evidence’,10 one cannot 
possibly ignore such risks under a de minimis clause or balance them 
with expected benefits; rather they have to be excluded under all 
circumstances. 
Radical interpretations of the precautionary principle shift the basis 
of regulation from the scientific assessment of risk to the public 
perception of risk. Theofanis Christoforou openly advocates that ‘risk 
managers instead of trying to patronize consumers with positivist 
views on science should take into account their legitimate concerns 
and the public perceptions of risk’ (2003: 208). The European 
Commission has occasionally followed such ‘advice’. In the case of the 
ban on beef from cattle treated with growth hormones, it dismissed 
pending scientific assessments and, according to Advocate General 
Lenz, gave ‘reference to the interests of consumers, because it could be 
seen that meat from animals treated with hormones was widely 
rejected’ (Joerges, 1997:309). If regulation relies not on the existence of 
risk but on the perception of risk, it is besides the point to require risk 
comparison in order to ensure consistent rule-making. Risk perception 
is selective and it is contingent upon factors such as familiarity, 
institutional trust and feelings of injustice. These conditions fluctuate 
in cycles of protest and attention. People fear crops from GMOs, but 
                                                     
8  Proof of uncertainty is all what is needed. This point is made by Theofanis 
Christoforou, a legal expert to the European Commission, who claims that the 
precautionary principle is still ‘firmly based on science, because its application is 
warranted only when uncertainty is scientifically established’ (2003: 210). 
9  Van Asselt and Vos cite the uncertain risks of GMOs as a case in point: ‘scientific or 
historical evidence of harmful consequences are lacking, but suspicions cannot fully be 
refuted either’ (2008: 281). 
10   An assumption held by Murswiek 1985, 214, and some other renowned legal 
professionals in Germany in the 1990s (discussed in Van den Daele 1999, 267). See also 
Peterson, 2007: 308: ‘The consequence of falsely believing [a new substance] to be safe 





they do not fear crops from conventional breeding techniques ” 
notwithstanding that the latter may equally be encircled by irresolvable 
uncertainties about long-term or synergistic adverse effects which are 
yet unexplored and unknown and which may even be unknowable in 
principle. When risk perception is enough to warrant precautionary 
restrictions, regulatory agencies enjoy maximum discretion to grant or 
refuse access to new technology in an ad-hocracy of decision-making 
that follows political expediency or opportunity. Then, indeed, ‘all the 
substantive and procedural constraints on regulatory arbitrariness are 
relaxed to the point of becoming non-binding’ (Majone, 2002: 101). 
Under such interpretations of the precautionary principle, innovation is 
a public concession, not a private right.  
 
5.5. Protecting the Status Quo: Social Sustainability as a Criterion  
The politicization of innovation is further strengthened by the tendency 
to conflate the management of risk with concerns of technology 
assessment. Technology assessments consider a broad spectrum of 
gains and losses which might be ensuing from an innovation, including 
impacts on human health and environmental safety as well as on 
social, economic, political and cultural domains. They indicate the rise 
of a more reflexive attitude towards technological growth in the last 
decades. And they often strike a sceptical note because they give 
particular voice to critical concerns that would not be put on the 
agenda by the proponents of new technology. The incorporation of 
such concerns into the risk regime is bound to lead to more 
restrictions.  
Thus, in a report prepared by the European Science and Technology 
Observatory network for the European Commission, it is argued that 
the appraisal of the technological risks of genetically modified crops 
should take into account socio-economic impacts and social needs 
such as the welfare of small farmers, exports of developing countries, 
employment, and quality of life (ESTO, 1999: 10). Precautionary risk 
regulation should consider whether we need the proposed innovations 
or have alternative (better) options. The comparison should include 
aspects of fairness: ‘To what extent do the distribution of burdens 
imposed by different options act to alleviate or compound pre-existing 
patterns of privilege or social disadvantage?’ (ESTO, 1999: 11).11  
Such claims have occasionally been enacted in regulations. A case 
in point is the above-mentioned Section 63 of the Austrian Gene 
Technology Act of 1994, which forbids products of genetic engineering 
which can ‘lead to a burden on society or social groups which cannot 
                                                     
11  Notions of justice play a role in risk perception, see Rayner and Cantor, 1987. 




be compensated, and if the burden on the society appears 
unacceptable for economic, social or ethical reasons’. Section 10 of the 
Norwegian Gene Technology Act of 1993 similarly requires ‘that in 
deciding whether or not to grant the application significant emphasis 
shall be placed on whether the deliberate release represents a benefit to 
the community and a contribution to sustainable development’. The 
Danish government has promised an effort to include ethical criteria 
into European and international regulation that would make the 
authorization of GMOs contingent upon the equal distribution of 
burdens and benefits in the society.12 The Commission of the European 
Communities has officially distanced itself from the application of 
socio-economic need as a criterion for the authorization of new 
technology.13 However, it has tacitly adopted the criterion in its 
regulation of beef from animals injected with human growth hormones. 
And it has opened the door further in recent regulations on food safety 
by declaring that risk management decisions can legitimately be based 
on economic, societal and traditional factors.14  
This regulatory philosophy dismantles the liberal regime of 
innovation. Innovation becomes a matter of democratic rule and public 
planning rather than of private choice and market forces. The 
underlying assumption is that the state has the mandate and task to 
decide whether an innovation is welcome and that the legitimacy of 
new technology is contingent upon broad public acceptance ” or at 
least majority approval. This approach is biased towards the protection 
of the status quo. The fact that an innovation may trigger resistance 
and conflict becomes an argument against it. Ortwin Renn argues that 
in the case of complex, uncertain or ambiguous risks, the risk appraisal 
should be based on an assessment of social consequences, such as 
concerns of people, the escalation of risk perceptions and the rise of 
mistrust in regulatory agencies (2008: 67-74).The ESTO Report even 
                                                     
12  ‘Genetic engineering must be used in such a manner that it does not conflict with 
our efforts to create a society where benefits and burdens are distributed equitably. This 
consideration applies both within the individual society as well as with regard to 
fostering sustainable development in relation to other countries, including developing 
countries, and in relation to future generations’ (Danish Ministry of Trade and Industry, 
2000: 11). 
13  ‘By their nature, socioeconomic aspects need to be considered in a different way. It is 
not intended to have included another systematic assessment in addition to the three 
criteria [of safety, efficacy and quality]’ (EC 1991, conclusion). 
14  Recital 19 Regulation (EC) No 178/2002: ‘It is recognised that scientific risk 
assessment alone cannot, in some cases, provide all the information on which a risk 
management decision should be based, and that other factors relevant to the matter 
under consideration should legitimately be taken into account including societal, 
economic, traditional, ethical and environmental factors and the feasibility of controls.’ 





requires that ‘disruptive changes to normal routines and attitudes’ 
involved in new technological options must be taken into account 
(1999: 11). Under such criteria, conventional technologies to which 
people and institutions have already become accustomed are likely to 
fare better than innovation. 
 
5.6. The Return of the ‘sacred’ in the Regulation of Technology: Human 
Nature as a Holy Order  
The liberal regime of innovation has not only come under pressure 
from rising expectations of risk avoidance and quests for democratic 
control of technological change. It is also challenged by claims of moral 
respect for nature. Human nature, in particular, is invoked as a moral 
order that must not be undermined through technical intervention. 
Within the framework of modern science and technology, the 
natural world is conceived as devoid of intrinsic moral qualities. Nature 
is not a meaningfully ordered cosmos to be treated with humble 
respect but rather, as Francis Bacon put it in the early 17th century, a 
‘storehause of matters’ open to serve human purposes (1620: 225). 
Bacon, accordingly, dismissed the suggestion ‘that the inquisition of 
nature is in any part interdicted or forbidden’ as superstition (20). René 
Descartes similarly anticipated that we will make ourselves the ‘masters 
and possessors of nature’ (1637: 51). At the same time he exempted 
the essence of human being from such mastery and possession by 
placing the subject as a mindful and moral agent (res cogitans) 
categorically apart from the natural (res extensa). This dualism has 
always raised doubts. It seems untenable today in view of the fact that 
modern biology and biotechnology are deeply affecting our notions and 
images of what it means to be human by creating options for genetic 
manipulation, organ transplantation, combinations of the body with 
machines, new modes of reproduction, pharmacological modulation of 
emotions, and interventions in the brain. We are heading towards a 
situation in which it becomes literally true that ‘Man makes himself’; 
but in contrast to what Gordon Childe (1958) had in mind, this occurs 
not by shaping the cultural environment but by reconstructing human 
nature through technical interventions. 
This perspective provokes strong moral reactions that not only (and 
not primarily) aim at the protection of basic rights and avoiding 
possible social harm, but that claim respect for the naturalness of 
human beings. Deviations from the course of nature, from natural ways 
of giving birth and of dying, from natural genomic recombination, from 
natural processes of aging are considered violations of the moral order, 
because they are dehumanizing practices and incompatible with 
human dignity.  




Reproductive cloning is widely considered to be a prime example of a 
‘dehumanizing practice’.15 Other techniques that raise a moral verdict 
are surrogate motherhood, sex selection of offspring, sperm or egg 
donation for artificial insemination, prenatal genetic diagnosis, 
immunological matching of a prospective child for lifesaving treatment 
of a sibling, germline intervention, animal organs for transplantation in 
human patients, research with human embryonic stem cells, 
enhancement of mental, emotional or sexual capacities through 
neurophysiological or pharmacological modulation, or the implantation 
of electronic devices in the brain. 
Some of these verdicts are contested and their social and political 
impact is uncertain. They may give way if they have to be balanced with 
legitimate interests and goods. Medical purposes, in particular, have 
often overcome arguments that the naturalness of human nature is a 
taboo not to be touched. However, various of these objections have 
already found their way into restrictive legislation in a number of 
countries.16 The battle over moral limits to the technical intervention in 
human nature is ongoing.17 What is at stake in these battles is not only 
the freedom to operate of companies and professions, but also the self-
determination of patients and clients who claim that they can choose 
how to deal with their own life and body. To refute these claims the 
moral objections are often raised to the highest possible rank of the 
moral order (Sittengesetz) and classified as imperatives of human 
dignity which by definition must not be compromised by balancing 
them with concurrent concerns or rights, and which cannot be 
overruled even by democratic majority rule.18 
 
                                                     
15  This phrase is used in the Report of the U.S. President’s Council on Bioethics which 
compared reproductive cloning with incest and ” surprisingly ” also with polygamy 
(2002: 86/112). 
16  The list of prohibitions in the German Embryo Protection Act of 1990 includes 
surrogate motherhood, donation of egg cells or embryos for IVF (in-vitro fertilizilation), 
IVF after the death of the sperm donor, sex selection in IVF (except in cases of X-linked 
diseases), prenatal genetic diagnostic, the use of human embryos for research or for 
creating stem cells, cloning of embryos, changing germ cells that are to be used for 
reproduction, creating hybrid (man/man) or chimeric (man/animal) embryos or 
transferring them for reproduction to an animal or a women. For a similar list in the 
Belgian Law on Research into Embryos in Vitro of 2002  
see http://www.biopolicywiki.org/index.php?title=Belgium (accessed 26 February 2010). 
17  In 2003 the European Parliament voted in favor of a complete ban of embryonic stem 
cell research in Europe. The vote was overturned by the European Commission on 
formal grounds: regulation of research was not at issue in the legislation to which the 
vote was added. See http://www.futurepundit.com/archives/001130.html (accessed 4 
March 2010) 
18  Evidence for such tendency can be taken from scholarly debates in German 





5.7. Political and Moral Controls of Innovation: Towards a Proper 
Balance 
The politics of precaution and the quest for democratic control of 
technological change can be hailed as a retreat from the naïve and 
optimistic ‘laissez innover’ beliefs of the past and as a transition to a 
more reflexive, sceptical ” and, for that matter, more enlightened ” 
attitude towards the dynamics of technology. Modern societies should 
certainly not fall back behind the level of reflexivity they have reached 
through applying the precautionary principle and engaging in 
comprehensive technology assessment. But they should beware that 
the increase in reflexivity does not automatically trigger an increase in 
restrictions. In view of what new technologies can contribute to the 
viability and sustainability of society, some of the emerging restrictions 
seem counterproductive. A proper balance between the control and the 
release of innovations would include a return to precautionary policies 
which are based on principle and rule, a commitment to some extent of 
experimentation within and with society, and a containment of moral 
fundamentalism in dealing with human nature. Reflexivity breeds 
politicization and conflict. The quest for ‘responsible innovation’ is now 
firmly on the political agenda. The challenge is to demarcate and 
calibrate this responsibility. Restrictive policies are one part of the 
answer, compensation of unwanted consequences and constructive 
policies to shape technological change are another part. A modest (and 
more realistic) vision of what the state can do to manage the evolution 
of technology suggests, however, that space should be left for a private 
right to innovate which grants individuals and minorities a license to 
expose society to some degree of ‘creative destruction’ ” even without 
informed consent. 
 
5.7.1. Precaution with a Principle: Rules of Law for Administrative 
Agencies 
The expectation that the precautionary principle will grant political 
discretion to regulatory agencies to authorize or ban a new technology 
because of perceived risks, public discontent, or the evaluation of social 
need, has already been dashed by the courts. National jurisdictions and 
the European courts insist that precautionary restrictions must be 
based on risk assessment and not on risk perception alone. Risk 
assessment must use the best available scientific expertise. In case of 
uncertainty, reasonable concern about possible risks is required; 
unfounded suspicion of harm or speculative risks which can neither be 
substantiated nor excluded are not enough, neither is the mere 
reference to limits of knowledge or epistemic ignorance. The courts 
have also ruled that proponents of new technology must not be 




confronted with burdens of proof that amount to the proof of zero risk 
or of absence of unknown risks.19 Court decisions thus restore the role 
of institutionalized science and objective knowledge as a frame of 
reference for dealing with claims of risk, and they preempt concessions 
to relativist epistemologies or social constructivism.20 They also restore 
formal rationality by turning the precautionary principle back into a 
‘rule’ of law which provides some legal certainty by committing 
regulatory authorities to transparent and consistent decision-making, 
and which precludes unforeseeable and arbitrary ad hoc precautions 
that reflect political opportunism rather than legal rule. The 
requirements of consistency and non-discrimination have been 
explicitly acknowledged in the European Commission’s Communi-
cation on the Precautionary Principle (1999, no. 6.3.2 and 6.3.3). If they 
were actually adhered to, a precautionary ban on the use of GM crops 
in agriculture could no longer be based upon unresolved uncertainties 
about their long-term or hidden potential for harmful consequences, 
since the same uncertainties hold for new conventionally bred crops as 
well, and these continue to be allowed. In many countries, administra-
tive discretion is further narrowed by a principle of proportionality 
which obliges regulatory agencies to lay down that precautionary 
measures are effective and necessary, i.e., that they are suitable to 
reduce suspected risks and that no less restrictive alternatives are 
feasible. The constraints imposed by the courts leave ample space for 
preventive controls of the potential risks of new technology. But they 
define conditions under which the proponents are entitled to the 
authorization of new technology and thus confirm the freedom to 
operate, in principle. Under such jurisdiction the precautionary 
principle is an amendment to the liberal regime of innovation rather 
than a substitute for it. 
 
5.7.2. Non-discrimination and Risk Comparison in Precautionary Law-
making 
The constraints that limit the discretion of regulatory agencies in 
applying the law do not necessarily hold for making the law. 
Administrators who apply the precautionary principle as a legal rule in 
authorization procedures or standard setting cannot freely choose 
                                                     
19  For the European courts, see Stokes, 2008; Van den Daele, 2008a. 
20  See also Joerges, 1997: 320. Consequently, there is no space for a democratization of 
risk assessment through the participation of stakeholders and lay people. The 
establishment of knowledge claims, including claims of what is uncertain and what is 
unknown remains the prerogative of expert communities. Public participation can raise 
questions, but not determine the answers; the proper domain for it is management of 





precautionary restrictions of new technology. Legislators can.21 
Parliaments can restrict even in the case of unfounded suspicion of 
risk, and they can do so selectively responding to cycles of risk 
perceptions and protest in the public opinion. The question is: should 
they? A well-reasoned approach to precaution would not only take into 
account that fear and mistrust of the public can be fabricated and 
hence responsive policies may in fact be captured by protest 
movements (see also Charnley and Elliot, 2002: 10366). It would also 
consider the costs of restricting new technology just because there 
remains uncertainty about its possible risks. There is no reason to 
embrace the romance of the zero option and believe that we are likely 
to be safe rather than sorry if we renounce innovation. The ban on GM 
crops promises protection against possible environmental or health 
risks which we have not yet seen and which may or may not exist. It 
does not preserve an idyllic natural state; it rather keeps us stuck with 
familiar technologies which are likewise laden with uncertainties about 
possible future impacts and in fact may already have caused problems 
in the past. It is irony and political pathology that in the movement 
against GM crops, conventional agriculture comes out as the ‘good 
guy’ that has to be protected, in coalition with organic farming. That 
deflects from the severe environmental problems caused by this type of 
agriculture and from the fact that it urgently needs innovation. Properly 
balanced precautionary policies must consider the gains and losses of 
restricting innovation. That includes comparison of the risks (and 
uncertainties) of new and old technologies.22 The REACH approach 
adopted by the European Union in the control of chemicals meets this 
requirement by comparing new substances with the ones already on 
the market which they could replace. The GM regulations fail this test.  
They also fail the test of consistent rule-making. Regulations ban 
GM crops on grounds which, when applied as a general rule, would 
exclude conventionally bred crops as well. However, with new 
conventional crops the limited testing applied by breeders to identify 
unwanted or harmful effects is accepted as sufficient ground to 
consider such crops as safe for being marketed, although the testing 
                                                     
21  German Courts have affirmed the power of parliament to restrict the private right to 
keep certain dogs for the reason that they are widely perceived as being particularly 
dangerous and lack acceptance, see Bundesverwaltungsgericht, Entscheidungen 110, 
265 (Judgement of 19 January 2000). Hood et al., 2006 cite the British Dangerous Dog 
Act as a case where media agitation and responses to tragedy have induced ad-hoc 
regulation which can be criticized as ‘knee-jerk’ policy on the hand, but must also be 
acknowledged as opinion responsiveness in democratic government on the other (182-
183). 
22  They must also recognize trade-offs between risks avoided by restricting new 
technology and risks caused by the restrictions; see the recent debate over such trade-
offs in the Journal of Risk Research: Hansen et al., 2008; Graham and Wiener, 2008. 




clearly cannot resolve all uncertainties which ‘encircle’ such crops. With 
GM crops, in contrast, no amount of testing is considered sufficient.23 
Inconsistent law-making also prevails in initiatives to deny the 
authorization of GM crops if they negatively impact the biodiversity in 
agriculture, the social conditions of small farmers, or the exports of 
developing countries. The impacts GM crops could possibly have in 
these respects appear marginal compared to the devastation caused by 
the modern system of industrialized agriculture anyhow. Conven-
tionally bred high yield and hybrid crops play a major part here, but it 
was never envisaged to ban them for that reason. Rather, in their case, 
it is accepted that such problems must be dealt with through regulation 
of good agricultural practice, programmes for rural development, or 
antitrust law. Sheer hypocrisy prevails when European governments 
advocate the exclusion of GM crops because they violate social justice 
in jeopardizing the prospects of developing countries to sell their 
agricultural products on the world market, while they at the same time 
uphold protectionist policies that keep such products out of Europe. 
 
5.7.3. New Technology and the Common Good 
Precautionary policies that ignore the requirements of proportionality, 
risk comparison and consistent rule-making and respond instead ad 
hoc and selectively to cycles of public fear and mistrust are bound to 
operate against innovation and to affirm the technological status quo 
of society. This would be nothing to deplore if there was reason to 
believe that we can solve our problems with the technologies we 
already have. Unfortunately, that is not the case. 
Modern societies depend on technological innovation, not only to 
keep pace in economic competition, but also to achieve broader goals 
of the common good and solve major environmental and social 
problems like climate change, water and energy supply, health care, 
and food production. While, in theory, many problems could also be 
solved through radical social and political reform, in practice such 
reforms are often not feasible, and technological fixes which are 
compatible with existing socio-political structures may be the only 
solution. With regard to food supply it should also be considered that 
rigorous redistribution of available resources (which is, however, 
                                                     
23  The standard justification for the discrimination against GM crops is that the 
techniques of genetic modification are new whereas we are familiar with conventional 
breeding. However, smart breeding is also new, but does not meet the same resistance 
as GM crops. In Germany, it has even been welcomed by representatives of the Green 
Party as an alternative to GM crops. Since smart breeding relies on mobilizing plant 
genes which may never have been functional in the plant, it seems that the true reason 
for the resistance against GM crops is the fact that it introduces ‘foreign’ genes into the 






unlikely to happen) might suffice to feed the world today. In a few 
decades, with the world population having increased by two billion, it 
will be impossible to avert mass starvation without dramatic increases 
of crop productivity. While nobody can assure us that GM crops will in 
fact make a significant contribution, it is neither possible to promise 
that the breeding techniques we applied in the past to increase crop 
productivity will also do the job in the future. Given these uncertainties, 
it seems unreasonable to forego any of the available technological 
options (unless one has grounds to assume that they are really 
harmful). 
Rational policy would promote technological pluralism and support 
the introduction of new options rather than homogenize society’s 
resources by building protective belts around established techniques to 
which we have already adapted. Complex systems preserve their 
viability not only through the continuity of their basic structures but 
also through the introduction of structural variants which prepare them 
for adaptation and make them ‘resilient’ to fluctuating environments. 
This holds for natural ecosystems; it also holds for societies.24 
 
5.7.4. Proceed with Caution, but Proceed! 
‘Look before you leap!’ (ESTO 1999, 22) is sound advice. Policy-makers 
should be aware that new technologies are fraught with uncertainties 
about possible or hidden risks. But they should think twice before 
seeking safety by prohibiting the technology for that reason. We may 
lose more than we gain. There is truth in the warning of Aaron 
Wildavsky (1979) that no risk may be the highest risk. To a certain 
extent the introduction of new technology amounts indeed to an 
experiment with society, the outcome of which is not and cannot be 
known in advance. However, instead of avoiding such experiments 
altogether it seems more advisable to design them properly and use 
some of the learning mechanisms that apply in controlled experiments 
in the laboratory. Such ‘experimental implementation’ requires, for 
example, that new technologies are introduced step by step, with 
documentation and monitoring to warrant early detection of 
unexpected potential for harm. 25 One could also embed innovations in 
a culture of safety by holding those who promote them liable for 
unexpected harm cause by the new technology and by obliging them to 
seek insurance. These measures should not be used as tactics to make 
the technology unfeasible. They should strike a balance of optimizing 
protection against undetected risks while at the same time preserving 
                                                     
24  See Holling 1973 for the distinction between ‘stability’ and ‘resilience’ in ecosystems. 
25  See Van den Daele and Krohn 1998, for the notion of ‘experimental implementation’; 
technological innovation is conceived as ‘Realexperiment’ (real-world experiment). 




the space for innovation. The keeping of such a balance is in line with 
the legal principle that proportionality is required when rights are 
restricted. 
 
5.7.5. Compensating for Unwanted Consequences as a Policy Option 
In designing ‘responsible innovation’, policy-makers must take the 
lessons of technology assessment into account that innovations are a 
mixed blessing, in the sense that they will have unwanted 
consequences and that they produce losers in society. They should, 
however, also consider that except in the cases circumscribed by a 
properly defined precautionary principle and the accepted rules of the 
moral law, compensatory rather than restrictive policies may be in 
order to address the problems. In fact, most existing regulations of 
second-order consequences of new technology do not try to prevent 
such consequences in the first place but provide some compensation 
for them. Thus, labor market policies and educational training 
programmes try to compensate for the losses of jobs and qualifications 
caused by competition from new products or new modes of 
production. Information and counseling services are offered to help 
people to retain their autonomy in view of the disturbing choices 
presented by new options to intervene into the human body and life.26 
 
5.7.6. Dealing with Human Nature: Moral Rigor vs. Trust in People  
The furor occasionally displayed in debates over the moral boundaries 
of intervening in human nature seems rather misplaced. To be sure, 
legitimate innovation must comply with the basic moral order that is 
reflected in the broad consensus of the people and, as a rule, embodied 
in the books or traditions of constitutional law. However, most of the 
moral claims invoked against applying modern biotechnology to 
humans lack consensus. People do not agree whether it is morally 
admissible to do research on human embryos or to perform tests on 
them before implantation or to allow manipulation of germ cells. Such 
disagreement is rational dissent, because it exists despite endless 
efforts to resolve the disputes through moral analysis and 
argumentation. The common ground of reasons which all parties find 
                                                     
26  In Germany, Hoffmann-Riem, then a judge at the Supreme Court (Bundes-
verfassungsgericht), argues that responsibility for innovation implies that tests of 
‘orientation towards the common good’ and ‘social compatibility’ are met (2006: 267). 
He also derives basic requirements of these tests from constitutional norms of 
distributive justice (equality of chances and provision of factual conditions under which 
people can actually make use of guaranteed freedoms). Such notions of responsibility 
will amount to severe restrictions of innovation ” unless it is emphasized that 
innovation is itself a common good and that there is a broad political discretion to opt 






convincing is insufficient to decide the issues. We have moral pluralism 
in society. People are split regarding the moral rules, just as they are 
split regarding religious beliefs.  
Awareness of the moral pluralism that exists in society should 
operate against self-righteousness and fundamentalism in moral 
debate. One cannot credibly separate the good from the bad in these 
debates and excommunicate, so to speak, dissenters from the moral 
community by labeling them as insane, criminal or incompetent.27 As a 
consequence, collectively binding regulations of the contested issues 
must be shifted from the moral to the political domain. They cannot 
and should not be based on the affirmation of the moral order, but only 
on the legitimacy of democratic majority rule.  
We are still far from generally accepting that many of the moral 
issues surrounding human nature are political questions that can 
legitimately be decided one way or the other. It is often tried to make 
restrictive positions morally compelling by projecting that a less 
restrictive standard would have serious negative consequences for 
society. Such arguments relate to the common moral ground of doing 
no harm, but they rarely proceed to the test of whether such 
consequences are in fact to be expected. This is ritualism in moral 
argument, which should be overcome.28 
In view of moral pluralism, regulations that invoke absolute limits 
by associating the integrity of human nature with the dignity of man 
and placing it beyond compromise with other values are unacceptable. 
They ignore the costs of moral rigorism. Respect for human nature is a 
legitimate concern; it should, however, be balanced with the prospects 
of patients who hope that new and more technical interventions in the 
body will relieve them from suffering or save their lives. And it should 
also be balanced with the right of the people to decide themselves how 
they want to deal with their own body, according to their own vision of 
the pursuit of happiness. Moral rules that protect human nature 
against technical interventions reflect a deep mistrust in self-
determination. People are suspected of being irrational, superficial, and 
easily seducible, or to be in the grip of subtle but irresistible external 
influences (‘biopower’ in Michel Foucault’s term) that deflect them 
from an authentic human life. However, the value system of modern 
societies provides no cogent reasons to restrict human rights in order 
                                                     
27  Comparative legal analysis should have the same effect; see, e.g., for embryo 
research in Europe, Solter et al., 2003. For rational dissent and moral pluralism in the 
German National Ethics Council, see Van den Daele, 2008b. 
28  For example, in the case of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide for patients 
with incurable diseases, projections of a disastrous decline in the valuation and 
protection of human life are quite common, but their proper investigation is avoided, 
see Van den Daele, 2008c. 




to protect notions of what it means to be really or authentically human. 
Regulations that pursue such protection tend to be paternalistic ” 
either exerted by the majority over minorities in society or by cultural 
elites over the allegedly uneducated masses.29 It seems more 
appropriate to empower people by helping them to make their own 
decisions rather than disenfranchise them by depriving them of the 
right to choose. Then we must, by implication, accept that the future of 
the human nature and the notion of what it means to be really human 
will evolve with the choices people make. 
 
5.8. The Private Right to Innovate in a Reflexive Society 
The quest for ‘responsible innovation’ turns the decision whether or 
not to introduce new technology into a matter of state policy and public 
choice rather than of private freedom to operate. Who should decide 
which innovation is welcome? Is there a role left for a right to innovate? 
Many observers advocate stakeholder participation to cope with 
conflicts over new technology (Renn, 2008: 273). This can hardly be the 
solution. Deliberative procedures, such as consensus conferences, 
citizen juries, focus groups, and deliberative polls (ESTO, 1999: 36) 
may build public trust by giving voice to the opinions and beliefs of the 
people. And they may somehow ease conflicts with stakeholders ” as 
long as they postpone decision-making to resolve the conflict. But they 
amount to inconclusive or empty proceduralism if they serve as mere 
sounding boards for diverging views and beliefs which are left to stand 
as they are. On the other hand, it is seems impossible to empower 
stakeholder participation with a mandate to negotiate collectively 
binding conflict resolutions. Such corporatism lacks not only 
democratic legitimacy; it also leads to blockades, since it is likely to be 
captured by veto players who want to postpone the decision 
indefinitely. The demarcation of responsibility for innovation must 
reside with the state. This does not imply, however, that the state can 
or should be entrusted with a mandate for comprehensive planning of 
innovation.  
Modern states reach beyond restrictive or compensatory policies 
and involve themselves actively in constructing and shaping the 
frontiers of technology. One should, however, be realistic about what 
they can achieve in this respect. States can provide opportunity 
structures for technological options, for example, by supporting certain 
lines of research and development, by subsidizing market entrance or 
                                                     
29  Euthanasia is a case in point for the latter. While up to 70% of the people in liberal 
societies believe that it should be allowed, parliaments, courts, representative 





by granting tax incentives. But in most constructive policies, states are 
co-players in the game of innovation, not masters of it. Apart from the 
cases where they have a monopoly for demand or supply, as in military 
or public infrastructure networks, they cannot and should not exert 
total control over the social drama of innovation. From a normative 
perspective it is not the mandate of the state and of majority rule under 
a liberal legal constitution to determine how people should conduct 
their lives. Whether a new technology is meaningful or worthwhile to 
pursue and whether ‘we want to live with it’ remains a matter of private 
freedom. It is not for parliaments to decide whether we need 
computers or mobile phones or in-vitro-fertilization or cosmetic 
surgery, or have better alternatives ” just as they cannot decide whether 
we should marry or have children or get divorced. From the perspective 
of efficacy, there is no reason to believe that states can mobilize the 
imagination and flexibility needed to create the pool of innovations that 
will satisfy the aspirations of the people and sustain the resilience of 
society in fluctuating environments.  
Political planning can be a supplement to the societal forces of 
innovation, not a substitute for them. Increasing reflexivity and 
politicization of the dynamics of technology have induced profound 
changes in the liberal regime of innovation. But they have not rendered 
the right to innovate obsolete. We still need the challenges of the status 
quo that come from the freedom of scientists and engineers or 
professionals and clients and entrepreneurs and consumers who 
expose society to creative destruction through new technology from a 
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Chapter 6. Patenting Nanotechnology: Are We on the Right Track? 
Maurice Schellekens 




Nanotechnology ” the technology that brings the atom-by-atom 
manipulation of matter within reach ” holds out the promise of many 
societal benefits, such as dramatic progress in healthcare, 
environmental benefits and further advances in computing. Patents will 
be of crucial importance if innovation in nanotechnology is to live up to 
the expectations. However, the large number of patents granted for 
nanotechnology and the basic character of some of these patents may 
also hinder the realisation of this potential. Impenetrable patent 
thickets or patents with great blocking power may be created. This 
chapter investigates whether patent law is being appropriately applied 
with a view to realising the full innovative potential of nanotechnology 
and its societal benefits. It will not deal with the question of whether 
nanotechnology is patentable per se, but will focus on the way in which 
patents are currently being granted. 
 
6.1. Introduction 
Nanotechnology is the technology of the smallest objects. It holds the 
promise of manipulation on an atom-by-atom basis and represents the 
ultimate control over matter. The European Patent Office (hereinafter: 
EPO) defines nanotechnology as follows (Kallinger, 2007):  
‚The term nanotechnology covers entities with a controlled geometrical 
size of at least one functional component below 100 nanometres in one 
or more dimensions susceptible of making physical, chemical or 
biological effects available which are intrinsic to that size. It covers 
equipment and methods for controlled analysis, manipulation, 
processing, fabrication or measurement with a precision below 100 
nanometres.‛  
Potentially significant societal benefits are in the offing. In healthcare, 
nanotechnology could bring about advances such as the selected 
targeting of cancer cells or the creation of clean drinking water from 
contaminated supplies in developing countries. For the environment, 
nanotechnology could bring benefits in relation to fuel saving additives, 
more efficient production of solar cells, cleaner generation of hydrogen, 
faster charging rechargeable batteries and better insulation of buildings 
(Walsh, 2007). In computing, nanotechnology promises even smaller 






products will be developed on the basis of nanotechnology and that the 
quality of existing products may be vastly improved (Pen, 2009). 
However, the benefits of nanotechnology will only materialise if 
laboratory results can be adequately translated into innovations leading 
to new products and services on the market.  
Patents traditionally play an important role in stimulating 
innovation. There is no doubt that inventions in the field of 
nanotechnology can be protected by patents (Bowman, 2007; 
Newberger, 2003). However, certain developments indicate that patent 
law is not being used in a manner that extracts the most from the 
innovative potential that nanotechnology offers. Concerns have already 
been voiced that patents are being granted on the building blocks of 
the technology, such as relatively simple molecules (Lemley, 2005; 
Zekos, 2006b). If these concerns are justified, some patents in 
nanotechnology would be very valuable but they would also have an 
enormous potential to block the research of others. The same holds for 
patents on the underlying principles of nanotechnology. They too 
would afford too much power to pioneering innovators and upstream 
researchers. The eagerness to patent nanotechnology also raises 
concerns about the number of patents. Using its wide definition of 
nanotechnology, the EPO has identified about 108,000 patent 
documents relating to inventions in the field of nanotechnology 
(Kallinger, 2007). The existence of so many patents in the field of 
nanotechnology could also serve to hamper downstream innovation. 
These concerns are not as yet empirically validated. This chapter will 
show, however, that nanotechnology itself possesses a number of 
characteristics that give credence to the concerns raised. Although this 
does not amount to proof of a problem, it will be argued it amounts to 
sufficient reasons for concern. This chapter further argues that the risk 
is serious enough to consider the taking of certain intra-systemic steps 
to ensure the appropriate functioning of the patent system so that 
society is better placed to reap the fruits of nanotechnology. Where 
possible, analogies with biotechnology are drawn. Biotechnology has 
seen a relatively recent scientific and technological growth, and it has 
experienced very similar problems with respect to patents that 
nanotechnology currently faces. 
  The outline of the chapter is as follows. The second section shows in 
what respects nanotechnology differs from previous technologies and 
what adverse implications this may have for innovation. In the third 
section, a number of avenues for addressing the issues mentioned in 







6.2. The Uneasy Relationship between Nanotechnology and the Patent 
System 
The patent system is designed to spur innovation. Nanotechnology 
has, however, some characteristics that hinder the patent system in 
stimulating innovation. I will consider here three characteristics in 
particular. In the first place, nanotechnology is science based. 
Secondly, it is interdisciplinary; and, finally, it crosses the borders of 
industries. I will first deal with the scientific nature of nanotechnology.  
 
6.2.1. The Scientific Nature of Nanotechnology 
The scientific character of nanotechnology has a number of 
implications for the application of patent law. Nanotechnology shares 
some of these implications with biotechnology that was, and is, also 
very much science based. The reasoning runs as follows: universities 
are relatively over represented amongst patentees; what is patented is 
closely connected to results stemming from fundamental research; the 
patents that ensue have such research have the serious potential to 
block further research in the field. Yet, the transfer of such fundamental 
into marketable products often still requires non-obvious steps as the 
patentability of inventions can only be adequately ascertained by those 
who are strongly acquainted with the academic literature in the field of 
nanotechnology. I will elaborate on these implications.  
Nanotechnology is still very much the subject of fundamental 
research, much of which is performed by universities and research-
institutes. In Europe, two-thirds of research into nanotechnology is 
publicly funded, compared to only 45% in the US (Hullmann, 2006: 
15), where private investment is much more prevalent. Nonetheless, 
public investment in nanotech is still significant in both the US and 
Europe. Universities appear to be particularly avid patentees. They are 
also in a relatively strong position when negotiating licenses in their 
patent portfolio: since they are not in the business of manufacturing 
goods, they seldom need to obtain licenses from other patentees. This 
makes them much less vulnerable to accusations of patent 
infringement and that in turn gives them leeway when negotiating the 
conditions for licenses in their own patent portfolio (Lemley, 2008). In 
reality, things are of course somewhat more complicated than 
described here (Shrestha, 2010; Zvoko, 2006). Universities may feel 
that it is their moral duty to make sure that their research results find 
wide application in society and this may permeate their licensing 
policies. Universities may also be dependent upon commercial 
companies for other than patent reasons. They will want to maintain 
good relations with commercial companies for purposes such as 






for a more balanced situation in negotiation room. Nevertheless, there 
will be great differences between the licensing policies of universities, 
and universities may treat companies differently on the basis of their 
ties. These multifaceted situations will translate into a wide variety of 
constellations for license negotiations. The basic point nonetheless 
remains that licenses on patents held by universities may not always be 
as easy to obtain as those held by profit-making entities. 
Since research in the field of nanotechnology is to a large extent 
performed by universities, much of it is of a fundamental nature. 
Universities develop basic ideas, substances, and processes. In the 
development of biotechnology, upstream research results, such as 
DNA sequences, were patented while far removed from a product or 
service that could readily be offered on the market (Rai, 1999a; 1999b). 
Such patents frequently act to hinder further research (Kane, 2006) and 
work simply to reserve a certain research field for a patentee. According 
to US patent law expert Lemley, it is likely that similar risks are present 
in the field of nanotechnology (Lemley, 2005). In other technical fields, 
such as computers, software, the internet, and ” surprisingly ” 
biotechnology, Lemley observes that patenting started only after 
development of the technology was in full swing. In nanotechnology, 
patents were granted immediately from the outset of scientific 
development. As a consequence, patents on the basic ideas of 
nanotechnology ” the building blocks of the technology ” are much 
more prevalent. This is likely to burden downstream innovators as it is 
practically impossible to invent around the basic ideas and elements of 
a discipline where licenses are not forthcoming.  
It is hard to assess exactly the extent to which the problem as 
described above materialises in nanotechnology. Such assessment is 
further hampered by the fact that nanotechnology is not one 
homogeneous technology but rather a collection of different sciences 
and technologies that have in common the size of operation. The 
situation of the various nanomaterial platforms ” basic molecules ” can 
be very different. Examples of nanomaterial platforms are, inter alia, 
carbon nanotubes (hereinafter: CNTs), buckyballs or fullerenes, and 
quantum dots. From platform to platform, there are differences 
between the density of the patent landscape and the degree in which 
patents are entangled. This becomes all too evident when comparing 
the patent landscapes for buckyballs and carbon nanotubes. There are 
no broad patents claiming buckyballs per se (Lemley, 2005: 614). A 
reason may be that buckyballs spontaneously occur in nature (Gerhardt 
et. al., 1987) and therefore may be unpatentable discoveries. At the 
same time, carbon nanotubes are claimed in a number of patents. 
Three patents are often mentioned because of their broad scope: 






US6683783, a patent of Carbon Nanotechnologies (Lemley, 2005 and 
Harris & Bawa, 2007). A fourth patent should be mentioned in this 
respect as well: US4663230, a patent of Hyperion. The latter patent 
concerns a composition of matter using carbon nanotubes. Its first 
claim reads:  
An essentially cylindrical discrete carbon fibril characterized by a 
substantially constant diameter between about 3.5 and about 70 
nanometers, length greater than about 102 times the diameter, an outer 
region of multiple essentially continuous layers of ordered carbon 
atoms and a distinct inner core region, each of the layers and core 
disposed substantially concentrically about the cylindrical axis of the 
fibril. 
This is a broad claim and applications using carbon nanotubes will 
need to be careful to ensure that they do not infringe this patent. A 
patent application for the invention has also been filed in Europe 
(EP0205556). The European patent’s first claim is however narrowed 
down by the inclusion of an extra qualification: ’said fibril is substan-
tially free from pyrolytically deposited thermal carbon’. In Europe, a 
purer form is claimed but it nonetheless remains a rather broad patent. 
In conclusion, when considering carbon nanotubes and buckyballs as 
building blocks, it appears that the former are the object of broad 
patent claims, whereas the latter are not, or at least much less so. 
It could be asked whether these differences have predictive value for 
the level of innovation. Starting from traditional concerns about the 
effects of patents on building blocks, one would expect that innovation 
in carbon nanotubes would suffer. However the opposite seems to be 
the case. When looking at the number of patent applications, it appears 
that there are five times as many applications for CNTs than there are 
for buckyballs (Michalitsch et. al., 2008: 86). The buckyball patent 
landscape also shows many abandoned patents (Lux Research, 2005). 
These patent based indications are in accordance with the trend 
signalled in literature: expectations for carbon nanotubes are high 
(Harris & Bawa, 2007), whereas Buckyballs have disappointed in not 
living up to the high expectations placed upon them when they were 
first discovered (Michalitsch et. al., 2008: 86, Ball, 2005).  
So, perhaps the potential for technical and commercial success is a 
more important indicator for innovation than the existence of patents 
on building blocks. This does not however indicate the contrary: 
innovation might still have been more extensive had building block-type 
patents not have existed in the first place. Building block patents may, 
for example, create uncertainty as it may well be unclear to innovators 
whether their activities are covered by the patents and, if so, it may be 






disincentive to innovation. Concerns about patents on building blocks 
can therefore not easily be discarded. 
As suggested in the introduction, it is expected that nanotechnology 
will ultimately lead to concrete products and services that meet the 
great expectations of benefits. Yet, it has hitherto proven difficult to 
translate theoretical results into marketable products. Only a few 
products have appeared on the market. In this respect, Europe lags 
behind the US (European Commission, 2004: 7). This may indicate that 
patents are being granted on inventions that have no or at least a very 
thin industrial applicability. This reinforces the fear expressed above 
that patents are being granted on basic ideas in nanotechnology. 
According to research by Meyer, nano-patents tend to cite only other 
patents and to a much smaller degree scientific research papers 
(Meyer, 2001: 298). This is remarkable in view of the fact that 
nanotechnology is very much a science based discipline. This raises the 
question as to whether relevant prior art escapes the patent examiners’ 
attention. If this is the case, patents are being granted on inventions 
that are not novel or that lack inventiveness. 
 
6.2.2. The Interdisciplinary and Cross-industry Character of 
Nanotechnology 
It was suggested above that the scientific character of nanotechnology 
sits uneasily within the patent system. This section investigates how 
the patent system relates to the interdisciplinary and cross-industry 
character of nanotechnology. The former will be dealt with first. The 
manipulation of matter on the nanometer level is not the prerogative of 
one single technological discipline. Nanotechnology is thoroughly 
interdisciplinary, involving inter alia chemistry, physics, biology and 
electronics ” and its applications are often the result of a convergence 
of pre-existing technologies. This interdisciplinary character poses 
serious challenges to patent examiners; it may entail, for example, that 
nanotech patent applications sometimes end up with examiners having 
expertise X while other similar applications end up with examiners 
having expertise Y. The divisions between examiners with different 
expertises holds a certain risk for overlooking prior art.1 Moreover, the 
lack of a uniform terminology in nanotechnology may magnify the risk 
of prior art remaining undetected. Yet biotechnology has not, or at least 
to a much lesser extent, been burdened by these problems; and such a 
theoretical risk in the area of nanotechnology does not amount to 
empirical evidence supporting a claim of over-patenting. Empirical 
evidence is sparse (Featherstone and Specht, 2004). The EPO and the 
Organisation on Economic Co-operation and Development (hereinafter 
                                                     






‘OECD’) are working on monitoring instruments for nanotechnology 
patents (Hullmann & Frycek, 2007a: 11-12), and these may begin to 
enlighten us on the empirical practice of patenting in the field of 
nanotechnology. But even in the absence of empirical evidence, the 
theoretical reflections about the interdisciplinary character of 
nanotechnology point to deficiencies that may need to be addressed. 
In addition to crossing the boundaries of scientific disciplines, 
nanotechnology also crosses the boundaries of industries. The cross 
industry character is mainly important for the manufacturing stage of 
nanotechnology, but it may expose innovators to a greater risk of 
accusations of patent infringement (Khanijou, 2007). On the one hand, 
this is due to the involvement of patentees from other industrial 
sectors, who may feel less inhibited about enforcing their patents 
against innovators outside their own industrial sector; on the other, 
this problem is exacerbated by the added complexity of compliance 
checking. A company becoming active in the field of nanotechnology 
cannot limit its compliance checks to the industrial sector in which it is 
active. It will need to check patents in other industries as well since 
these patents may impinge upon its activities. As such, such a 
company may need to actively check patents across a while range of 
diverse disciplines. Given the size of patent databases, the search for 
relevant patents may amount to a gigantic task. In this respect, the 
patent landscape of nanotechnology is more complex than is the case 
with biotechnology, where all relevant prior art can be found in just one 
industry or discipline. In view of the fact that most nanotechnology 
products and services have not yet reached the market and relatively 
little money is currently being made with nanotechnology, the extent of 
the problem may not yet be visible in its entirety. 
 
6.3. Addressing the Friction between Nanotechnology and the Patent 
System 
We have seen above that there are multiple reasons that may prevent 
nanotechnology from reaching its full potential stemming from a 
potential mismatch between nanotechnology and the patent system. 
Hereinafter, a number of avenues are investigated for redressing this 
situation. 
 
6.3.1. Person Skilled in the Art 
In patent law, a fictional person skilled in the art is used as a criterion 
figure. For example, when assessing the inventiveness of an invention 
an important question is to whom the invention needs to be inventive. 
Technical teachings that a layman finds inventive may be considered 






requiring that an invention is inventive from the perspective of a person 
skilled in the art. This person skilled in the art is usually defined as a 
person working in the technological field in which the invention falls 
and s/he is considered to have average knowledge and abilities. By 
choosing the person skilled in the art as a criterion figure, the 
patentability requirement of inventiveness is made more objective. 
Apart from the requirement of inventiveness, there are other 
requirements that a patent application must meet and for which the 
criterion figure is relevant. An invention must, for example, also be 
sufficiently disclosed in the patent. This means that it must be possible 
to rework the invention based on the information provided in the 
patent. Here again, the question can be asked who should be able to 
rework the invention. Here too, the issue is resolved by choosing the 
person skilled in the art as the standard by which to measure whether 
the requirement has been met. 
The definition of the person skilled in the art is highly relevant for 
the determination of novelty, inventive step and sufficiency of 
disclosure in nanotechnology. If the person skilled in the art is taken to 
be highly qualified, it is more difficult to meet the inventive step 
requirement but the disclosure of the invention can be somewhat less 
encompassing. The person skilled in the art can be assumed to be 
more adept in applying the technical teaching of the patent. The 
opposite also holds: defining the person skilled in the art as less highly 
qualified makes it easier to meet the inventive step hurdle but makes 
necessary a more encompassing disclosure. In a new field such as 
nanotechnology, it is unclear how the person skilled in the art of 
nanotechnology is to be defined. 
For example, the interdisciplinary character of nanotechnology has a 
bearing on the definition of person skilled in the art of nanotechnology. 
The interdisciplinary character entails that they should be a master of 
many disciplines. But this leaves open the subsequent question of 
which disciplines s/he must necessarily master. The function of the 
concept points the way: with the help of the fictitious person skilled in 
the art, it must be possible to determine what activity would be 
considered normal progress in the art and what would be considered to 
be a major step in the pertinent technology. So, the person skilled in art 
should reflect the realities in the relevant industry, in this case, the 
pertinent branch in the nanotech industry. This indeed means that 
multidisciplinary talents must be attributed to the person skilled in the 
art. Apart from the abstract question of how to define the person skilled 
in the art, there is the practical issue that the concrete capabilities of 
patent examiners may rub off on their perception of the person skilled 
in the art. In other words, the monodisciplinary restrictions in the 






skilled in the art. Thus, a tendency towards a low standard may result of 
innovativeness where even the level of qualification attributed to the 
person skilled in the art may be different between patent examiners. An 
examiner may be more inclined to view aspects of an invention as 
inventive if they are in technology domains with which s/he is less 
familiar. Being less adept in reading a patent in such technology 
domains may prompt an examiner to also require a further elaborated 
disclosure. Whilst it is true that it is not the patent examiner but the 
courts that have the final say on what constitutes a man skilled in the 
art, however the determinations of a patent examiner are highly 
relevant since most patents are never litigated. Nanotechnology 
litigation is still sparse compared to litigation in other domains. It will 
probably increase when products incorporating nanotechnology are 
placed on the market on a large scale. Where patents are litigated, the 
patent examiner sets the scene for the judgements of the court. For the 
time being, in any case, there may be variation in the actual standards 
used in nanotechnology patenting. 
Patent applicants may try to use the interdisciplinary character of 
nanotechnology to their own advantage by engaging in what can be 
called ‘technology shopping’. A nanotech patent may, for instance, 
concern biological switch. The invention could be dealt with as an 
electronics invention but alternatively as a biotechnological invention. 
By adequately formulating the claims in terms of a certain 
‘participating’ discipline, the would-be patentee may try to steer the 
patent examiner away from relevant prior art. In the same way, it may 
also be possible to select the standards applicable to the determination 
of the person skilled in the art, and in its wake, novelty, inventive step 
or sufficiency of disclosure, since those differ to a larger or smaller 
extent between disciplines. For inventions in the field of biotechnology, 
research is usually done by postdoctoral researchers, whereas in most 
other disciplines the person skilled in the art is a technician of average 
capability. The person skilled in biotechnology is thus more highly 
qualified than in most other arts (Hacon & Pagenberg,  2008: 51). 
At the same time, biotechnology is apparently qualified as more 
uncertain science in which a person skilled in the art cannot as easily as 
in other sciences assume the presence of fixed patterns. This reflects 
on the definition of the person skilled in the art. The Technical Board of 
Appeal has defined the person skilled in the art of biotechnology as 
follows (T 0387/94, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft/Monsanto):  
‘His/Her attitude is considered to be conservative. "He/She would 
never go against an established prejudice, nor try to enter unpredictable 






If an invention lends itself to a choice of art, a patent attorney may be 
able to select a favourable base discipline. By framing the invention in a 
suitable way, it may thus be possible to choose the standard applicable 
to one’s invention. 
A team approach to a person skilled in the art may solve some of 
the inherent problems associated with the interdisciplinary nature of 
nanotech inventions. However, the manner of developing a team 
approach would produce different effects. One of the implementation 
decisions to be made involves the level of qualification of the team 
skilled in the art, which of course may vary. If the imaginary team is to 
be very well qualified, this may raise the bar of inventiveness for 
nanotech inventions and may make the disclosures difficult to 
comprehend for any individual trying to make sense of a 
nanotechnology patent. After all, the drafter of the patent (probably a 
real-life team) may presuppose all the knowledge available in the 
imaginary team. It may be contended that this is of limited relevance 
because any actor involved in nanotechnology works within a 
multidisciplinary team. However, with a view to openness and 
accountability to the ‘outside world’, a lower standard of readability of 
patents is desirable. This being the case, I would suggest that the 
imaginary individual partaking in the team should be envisaged as 
being somewhat less qualified than the person skilled in the art relevant 
for monodisciplinary inventions. This will force somewhat more 
elaborate disclosures in interdisciplinary inventions.  
Another way to achieve more comprehensible disclosures would be 
to decouple the inventiveness-person-skilled-in-the-art from the 
sufficient-disclosure-person-skilled-in-the-art. This would be a more 
principled intervention in patent law that would require further 
research, although for the time being at least, nanotechnology does not 
necessitate such action.2 
Defining the person skilled in the art as a team and backing this up 
by creating real life interdisciplinary teams would go quite some way to 
resolving the problem of technology shopping. A team of examiners is 
harder to fool than an individual examiner. At the same time, of course, 
a multidisciplinary team of examiners does not solve all the problems. 
For example, it is still unclear how to determine the default discipline of 
an invention, or, in other words, what standards to use when examining 
nanotech patents.  
 
6.3.2. Novelty and Inventive Step 
Nanotechnology is a new technological field and there is therefore 
relatively little prior art and even less prior art explicitly relating to 
                                                     






nanotechnology (Zekos, 2006b: 366). A small reservoir of prior art may 
have the effect of lowering the actual novelty threshold because novelty 
is easy to establish. This may give rise to broad patents because the 
formulation of claims does not have to steer around existing prior art. 
Concerns surrounding the broadness of nanotechnology patents gain 
extra weight in view of the fact that nanotechnology is in its formative 
stages of development. The progress currently being made is likely to 
yield building blocks on which many later applications will be based. 
While the width of patents now granted may adversely affect follow-on 
innovators, broad patents may be necessary in order to allow for the 
large investment needed for developing laboratory findings into 
marketable products to be recouped (Lemley, 2005: 628-629). Whether 
broad patents in nanotechnology are at the moment a good or a bad 
thing is open to discussion. Nevertheless, there can be little discussion 
that over-broad patents that should not have been granted in the first 
place must be avoided. An adequate determination of the state-of-the-
art is central to the quality of patents. Although it is the patent 
applicant that must indicate what the nearest state-of-the-art is, it is up 
to the patent office to detect any deficiencies. This may be an extra 
heavy burden in the case of nanotechnology, since it is an emergent 
technology and patent offices struggle to find qualified examiners. The 
workload of the present examiners is already very high (Barraclough, 
2007; Krempl, 2006). In order to ease their workload, patent offices 
could invest in qualified examiners and in optimising the availability of 
prior art information, such as technical information in academic 
journals and other non-patent information. Another avenue through 
which progress could be made is by working on a standard terminology 
and metrology in nanotechnology. This is of course not the task of 
patent offices but that of standard setting organisations, such as ISO 
and ASTM International.  
Early standards on nanotech terminology have already been adopted 
(ISO, 2008; ASTM Int’l, 2006) or are in the process of being developed 
(ASTM Int’l, 2009). ISO standard TS 27687:2008 on terminology and 
definitions for nano-objects was adopted in 2005 and is the first in a 
planned series of ISO standards covering terminology and definitions 
for various aspects of nanotechnology. In 2007, the OECD set up a 
Working Party on Nanotechnology. The remit of the group explicitly 
addresses the issue of standardisation in nanotechnology (OECD, 
2008). However, the work of standard setting organisations often 
progresses slowly. A technology may not be developed enough to know 
what standards concerning semantics, measurement and testing are 
needed. This seems to be the case with respect to nanotechnology. 
Terminology in nanotechnology literature is extremely dynamic 






offices to work with standards that have been set by standard setting 
organisations, especially if they are adopted globally, so as to makes 
communication with patent applicants easier. Internal communication 
between the various divisions within a patent office would also benefit. 
Further, a standard terminology would also make it easier to detect 
prior art in patent databases and other literature sources; and may 
assist in clarifying ambiguities in patent claims, making the scope of 
patents clearer, both for patentees and third parties, such as 
competitors and licensees. Given the interest that standards on 
terminology and metrology represent for the patent system, it seems to 
me that an argument could be made for the active participation of 
patent offices in standard setting procedures. Patent offices play an 
important role in the patent system as gatekeepers for the patentability 
of nanotechnology inventions. In fulfilling this role, they are highly 
dependent on a uniform terminology and metrology in nanotechnology. 
Differences in terminology and metrology can have far reaching 
implications ” ultimately that patents are granted that should not have 
been granted in the first place. Patent offices should therefore make 
sure that their standardisation needs are taken into consideration. 
Moreover, patent offices are in a unique position to see many 
applications from various nanotechnology domains and are thus in the 
position to make an important contribution to the standardisation 
process. In short, there is good reason to have patent offices 
participating in standard setting processes concerning terminology and 
metrology.  
 
6.3.3. Industrial Applicability 
In situations of technological change, such as with emerging 
technologies, there is a certain risk that broad patents are being 
granted on enabling technologies. This has possibly been the case in 
biotechnology, where patents have been granted on upstream research 
results (Heller & Eisenberg, 1998; Zekos, 2006a). Theoretically, the 
requirement of industrial applicability could be used as a brake on 
overbroad, upstream research patents that are far removed from a 
product that could be placed on the market. Given their abstract 
character, they may have no ‘practical’ application. In reality, however, 
the EPO hardly uses the industrial applicability requirement for this 
purpose (EPO, 2006: 170-171).  
In the field of biotechnology, patenting authorities have attempted 
to use industrial applicability for just that purpose. Article 5(3) of the 
European Directive on biotechnological inventions 98/44/EC indicates 
that the industrial application of a sequence or a partial sequence of a 
gene must be disclosed in the patent application. It is not quite clear 






mere repetition of the general patentability requirement of industrial 
applicability. This interpretation does at first seem less likely since it 
would be nonsensical: it does not add anything to the normal 
application of the requirement of industrial applicability. Another 
interpretation may be that the function of a gene patent should be 
mentioned in the claims as then the patent only would confer an 
exclusive right to use the gene for the specified function. The latter 
interpretation would make for specific law for gene patents. In 2005, 
the European Commission has evaluated the effect of Article 5(3) of the 
Directive.3 The Commission indicated that (European Commission, 
2005): 
‘as a specific field of technology becomes mature, the application of the 
normal patent criteria of novelty, inventive step and industrial 
applicability means that future patents are necessarily limited in scope 
because the invention claimed has to be distinguished from the vast 
array of what is already known in the field[11]. As it is now seventeen 
years since a Directive was first proposed, it may be questionable 
whether attempting to further refine the scope of protection of gene 
sequence patents in the light of divergences between national 
legislations will have any significant effect on actors in the field.’  
The Commission indicates that in a relatively short time, this piece of 
special legislation ” if at least it is to be interpreted as such ” has made 
itself superfluous. Apparently, purpose-bound patents do not give 
patentees an effective protection. Patents would become too narrow. 
What implications does this have for the desirability of specific rules for 
the industrial applicability of nanotechnology patents? It is likely that in 
the case of nanotechnology patents the issuing of overbroad patents 
will also be a problem associated with the initial stages of development 
of the technology. The lack of scientific knowledge and prior art in 
general makes it difficult to draw a line between broad and overbroad 
protection. Any attempt at a solution of what seems to be a recurring 
problem with any new technology will be handicapped by the same lack 
of scientific insight in the nascent technology and therefore be difficult 
to implement. The slowly growing scientific insight in the technology 
points in two directions: on the one hand, it points to a solution later in 
the technology life cycle when more is known about the technology and 
its underlying science. On the other hand, it points to more 
transparency right from the start. Opening up possibilities for 
revocation of an overbroad patent ‘later on’ could be an effective 
intervention. Opposition to the granting of a ‘European patent’ is 
however limited to just nine months after it has been awarded. In this 
                                                     






respect, the advent of a centralised European court system would bring 
relief. The development of the legal foundations for a European and 
Community Patent Court has been set in motion (European 
Commission, 2009). Lack of industrial applicability can be a ground for 
invalidating patents later on in a patent’s life cycle, especially if no 
concrete applications of the patented invention appear. It may however 
not always be easy to determine whether that is the case. For instance, 
where patented upstream research results can function as research 
tools, they still may be said to amount to practical applications. This is 
an argument often raised in biotechnology cases. Furthermore, 
invalidating a patent later in its lifecycle runs the risk of lessening legal 
certainty with respect to the validity of granted patents and must 
therefore be used with care. The other option ” working on 
transparency ” may therefore be more fruitful. As indicated above, 
ensuring that nanotech patents are sufficiently disclosed is important. 
It is something the courts and the patent office can work towards, even 
without special regulation (Burk & Lemley, 2003). A change in the 
definition of the person skilled in the art can lead to more 
encompassing disclosure. Further, a change in the standard of 
industrial application ” as used by the courts - may result in more 
exacting indications of the industrial application of the invention in the 
patent.   
 
6.4. Conclusion 
According to the European Commission, Europe is not good at 
transforming nanotechnology research into marketable applications 
(European Commission, 2004: 7). Thus, while the numbers show that 
nanotechnology based patents have not reached the high volumes 
some would have hoped for, patent law is not to blame (Kinsler, 2006). 
The patent system offers enough room to patent nanotechnological 
inventions. The possibilities for patenting nanotech inventions should 
therefore be considered positive.  
At the same time, nanotechnology has a number of characteristics 
that raise the risk of over-patenting, such as patents on building blocks 
of the technology and overlapping patents through inconsistent use of 
terminology. This chapter has argued that such concerns need to be 
addressed. A number of avenues have been identified for improving the 
application of patent law, specifically as it relates to the inherent 
characteristics of nanotechnology inventions. For instance, the 
standard of a person skilled in the art of nanotechnology should be set 
at the level of a team of not too highly qualified researchers in the 
relevant technologies so that disclosures of inventions become more 






being done towards the standardisation of terminology and metrology 
in nanotechnology, and, if possible, they should participate in standard 
setting processes in order to lessen ambiguities that complicate the 
process of patenting. This alone would result in a much higher level of 
quality of granted patents. At a later stage, when applications of 
nanotechnology are being developed and appear on the market, ways of 
facilitating the licensing of nanotechnology will also become a relevant 
instrument for dealing with innovation in the field of nanotechnology. 
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Abstract 
When it comes to calling for the regulation of nanotechnology, 
expectations of regulatory tools that offer assurance that all marketed 
products are safe will be disappointed. In the face of non-knowledge, 
classical regulation, but also voluntary schemes of soft law, fail to do 
justice to the heterogeneity of all the various technologies, processes, 
or products that are labeled ‘nanotechnology’. This paper will provide 
an overview of the basic structure and operating procedures of a 
proposed model institution called Scanning Probe Agency, that would 
be charged with rendering desired scientific developments compatible 
with social well-being, while maintaining a commitment to the 
principles of classical regulation such as public oversight, political 
transparency and the possibility of participation. 
 
7.1. Introduction 
Research regarding the safety of nanotechnology has to contend with 
profound gaps in knowledge regarding the toxicity of nanomaterials. Its 
provisional aim, therefore, is to structure the field in a rather 
elementary way, including attempting to develop test procedures, 
standards and norms. A formally instituted means of regulation, such 
as setting legal thresholds, appears unachievable for systematic 
reasons (cf. Führ et al., 2006). However, the sustained focus on the 
toxicity of nanomaterials fails to do justice to the complexity and 
multiplicity of nanotechnologies and the associated demand for a 
comprehensive approach to ensure that nanotechnological 
developments are compatible with human, environmental and social 
health. 
In this paper we want to outline1 an institutional model that meets 
the safety and security demands of human health, the environment and 
society ” an institutional model (we provisionally call Scanning Probe 
Agency) that conducts a reflexive adjudication process. It employs the 
methods of document analysis, expert interviews and a workshop with 
                                                     
1 In a project carried out for the German Federal Ministry for Education and Research 
the nano-office at TU Darmstadt presented a report (Lösch et al., 2008) consisting of an 
overview and an analysis of existing regulatory and soft regulatory efforts concerning 
nanotechnologies (both national and international). Further, the report proposed the 
creation of an institution for the regulation of nanotechological developments. 
 




invited experts. Philosophical and sociological considerations of the 
problems of non-knowledge, transparency, responsibility and social 
robustness are the starting point and the frame in which the 
deliberations are embedded. 
The results include the following points. The place of classical 
regulation has been taken by precautionary measures such as 
observatories, voluntary codes of conduct and stakeholder dialogues. 
By themselves, these cannot meet the challenges posed by 
nanotechnologies, nor do they satisfy the need for regulation. These 
soft measures of an expanded notion of regulation and precaution do 
not provide what classical regulation has to offer, namely public 
oversight, political transparency and legal certainty ” guaranteed by a 
publicly accountable institution. A generalized precautionary approach 
thus also signifies a surrender of the political option of intervention. 
However, the option of influencing processes of innovation is 
indispensable for responsible, circumspect and socially robust action 
with regard to the uncertainties associated with emerging 
nanotechnologies. 
These considerations call for a reflexive adjudication procedure as a 
collective learning process and as a means of earning public trust. This 
reflexive adjudication consists in an evaluation and contextualization of 
existing regulatory approaches that is politically transparent and open 
to public scrutiny. The way in which existing institutions and regulatory 
procedures deal with nanotechnologies is judged as more or less 
adequate with regard to public demands for knowledge, communi-
cation and effective action. A ‘scanning probe agency’ (SPA) is 
recommended as a suitable institution to organize such procedures of 
reflexive adjudication. It should be established under the auspices of a 
nationally and internationally respected academy of science. 
 
7.2. Nanotechnology and Existing Regulation 
‘Nanotechnology’ is an extremely multifaceted and complex 
phenomenon. Both the amorphous boundaries of ‘nanotechnology’ as 
an entity and the correspondingly varied safety requirements of 
products and production processes make it virtually impossible to 
adapt existing regulatory mechanisms such as REACH, although 
REACH is seen by some as the first step towards a ‘hybrid governance’ 
(cf. Hey et al., 2007).2 The limits to and gaps in knowledge are plentiful 
                                                     
2 Hey et al. (2007) conclude that REACH (reform of chemicals policies) is not so much 
an example of bureaucratic regulation: A ‚closer look shows that there are many new 
forms of governance in REACH. This mixture or old and new may open a more realistic 





” including a lack of standards, characterization and testing procedures 
etc. ” and pose a special challenge to safety research and regulatory 
measures (cf. Krug and Wörle-Knirsch, 2007). Attempts exist to make 
up for the systematic deficiencies in the legal regulatory system by 
means of ‘soft’ measures, such as continual observation of 
developments, industry self-regulation via codes of conduct, and multi-
stakeholder dialogues intended to establish legitimation (cf. Lahl, 2006; 
Nentwich, 2007; Wilson, 2006; Schomberg, 2006). However, such 
measures ” guided as they are by a vague notion of precaution ” are 
not capable on their own of meeting the challenges posed by 
‘nanotechnology’ in any appropriate way. They are an attempt to 
transform ignorance into a kind of certainty. The phenomenon of 
‘nanotechnology’ also confronts us with systematic limits to knowledge 
(cf. Dupuy, 2004; Böschen and Wehling, 2004; Nowotny et al., 2001) 
that cannot be overcome in a preventative manner. Many of the 
opportunities and risks associated with nanotechnologies will become 
manifest and quantifiable only in retrospect ” in the course of product 
use. 
The ‘soft’ measures associated with an ‘extended’ concept of 
regulation represent a departure from the principles of classical legal 
regulation. The latter include public oversight, political transparency 
and legal certainty and are guaranteed by a publicly accountable and 
responsive institution, permitting effective intervention. The ‘soft’ 
measures alluded to above, however, constitute a retreat from these 
principles, whereas the option of intervening in, and influencing 
innovation processes is indispensable for dealing in a responsible and 
socially robust way with the uncertainties encountered in this new field 
of technology. 
Given these considerations, a reflexive adjudication procedure 
seems both necessary and appropriate as a collective learning process 
and a means of generating public trust. This procedure would provide a 
means of contextualizing and assessing regulatory practice in a way 
that is both open to public scrutiny and politically transparent; its focus 
would be on what is required in terms of knowledge, communication 
and action, as well as on the scope and suitability of measures taken 
thus far in the context of an ‘extended’ concept of regulation. The 
outcomes of observations from the special observatories, ‘code of good 
practice’ procedures and stakeholder dialogues would all be integrated 
into such a reflexive adjudication procedure. Its guiding question would 
be: ‘Is nanotechnology in good hands?’ 
In short, the need for an SPA arises from the following diagnosis of 
relevant problems: 
“ The term ‘nanotechnology’ is used to refer to a large number of 
products ” cosmetics, antibacterial surfaces, sensors, nano-
 




semiconductors, food additives, as well as misleadingly termed 
‘nano-products’. ‘Nanotechnology’ (in the singular) does not refer to 
a particular technology, but is a term that absorbs a whole range of 
societal visions regarding new technologies ” as such, it is a 
communication phenomenon or discursive artefact. A reflexive 
adjudication procedure is therefore required that deals with 
everything that gets referred to as ‘nanotechnology’ and that requires 
differing forms of official authorization, observation or monitoring. 
“ Reliable product safety can not be guaranteed solely through the 
use of standardized and tested component materials (e.g., 
nanoparticles), given that small production-related deviations at 
various stages of the manufacturing process in themselves can 
introduce new uncertainties. The levels of fault tolerance 
established for products and their use can represent a spectrum of 
potential risks that can only be judged by means of greater 
vigilance applied throughout the life cycle of a product (cf. 
Pfautsch, 2007; Führ et al., 2006; Nordmann, 2010). A reflexive 
adjudication must make this circumstance publicly transparent. 
“ Problems that arise in relation to a specific product labeled as 
‘nanotechnology’ may have an impact on the way society perceives 
‘nanotechnology’ as a whole and everything associated with it. 
This is why an assessment open to public scrutiny is required that 
‘disentangles’ the different dimensions of selected products and 
simultaneously takes into account the way they are linked to the 
overall phenomenon. 
“ Since consumers encounter ‘nanotechnology’ only in product-
integrated form, uncertainties arise in a variety of areas ” e.g., the 
interaction between different kinds of nanomaterials and solid 
bodies in the product concerned, interaction with the product 
environment, variations in individual usage. Only a reflexive 
adjudication procedure is capable of learning from a synoptic 
presentation of all the various required forms of knowledge ” from 
scientific knowledge to the knowledge implicit in user habits and 
knowledge of relevant ethical dimensions. This can form the basis 
for a socially robust adjudication in each instance. 
“ The perspectives from which a nanotechnological product is 
viewed ” for instance, chemical-toxicological, materials science, 
epidemiological or occupational health views ” influence 
perceptions of potential regulatory requirements. What is needed 
here is a reflexive mediation between various forms of expertise 
and regulatory responsibility. The generous promises and 
expectations associated with ‘nanotechnology’ by its visionary 





for an integrated examination of nanotechnology’s compatibility 
with human, environmental and social well-being. 
 
7.3. Outline of a Model Institution  
The scanning probe agency (SPA) is conceived as a learning 
community consisting of experts from all the relevant spheres of 
society ” academia, industry, the unions, churches, NGOs and 
consumers, and so forth. The task of this community is to formulate 
judgments on selected nanotechnological products, processes and 
discursive phenomena and to present these judgments in public, while 
also giving a clear indication of where the limits to existing knowledge 
lie. This form of adjudication ” one open to public scrutiny ” is 
designed to render desired nanotechnological innovation processes 
compatible with social well-being while maintaining a commitment to 
the principles of classical regulation, such as public oversight, political 
transparency, and the possibility of intervention. This would be 
guaranteed by the framework provided by a publicly accountable and 
responsive institution that enjoys broad social acceptance. The latter 
would elaborate recommendations that have undergone a process of 
social negotiation. Such recommendations might include, say, research 
support for desired innovations, or regulatory precautionary measures 
in the case of products deemed to give cause for concern. 
 
7.3.1. Three Basic Functions 
The SPA is characterized by three basic functions: 
“ a scanning function for broadly surveying the field of scientific-
technical developments and identifying those innovations, products 
and discourses that require clarification; 
“ a probing function for selecting specific issues and conducting 
communication about their various dimensions within a ‘learning 
community of experts’; sample probings will be conducted by means 
of testimonial hearings (involving witnesses from research, official 
authorities, industry, etc.); 
“ an agency function for conducting public, court-like adjudication 
procedures, for intervening in debates and for devising socially 
robust recommendations that specify, for example, the need for 
action on the part of other regulatory authorities as well as 
deficiencies in research and communication. 
The three functions can be summed up in terms of surveying the 
terrain, conducting hearings on selected issues and elaborating 
recommendations in a collective and publicly transparent manner. The 
problem in question is thereby placed within an overall context of the 
health-related, environmental and social implications of 
 




nanotechnologies. These are the functions that mark out the SPA’s 
reflexive adjudication procedure from the models of observation, self-
regulation and public engagement that are inappropriate, inadequate, 
or simply too weak for ‘nanotechnology’. 
The SPA itself fulfils no regulatory functions and conducts no 
research of its own; its aim instead is to derive new insights on the 
basis of selected case studies. Because of this, it is able to function 
with a slimmed-down level of staffing: a small full-time service team 
and a learning community in the form of a panel of honorary experts. 
Given the demands posed by integrating the required forms of 
expertise in a suitable way ” using the format of the ‘learning 
community’ ” and by adjudication procedures open to public scrutiny, 
it appears most appropriate to affiliate the SPA with a scientific 
academy of both national and international renown, ideally (in the case 
of Germany), for instance, the new German National Academy of 
Sciences. The integration of expertise and the intended effectiveness of 
its recommendations demand that the SPA be situated within a 
national and international network consisting of institutions and 
organisations that possess the knowledge needed for the learning 
process and from which experts can be recruited for the adjudication 
process. The way the model institution is conceived in this paper, is 
operating on a national level, while it also could be adapted to work on 
an international level. 
 
7.3.2. Two Modes of Working 
In practice, SPA is distinguished by two modes of working: 
1. a normal case mode in which learning processes and public 
adjudication procedures (including recommendations) are initiated 
and conducted ” either in response to requests coming from society 
or according to the interests expressed by the participating experts ” 
in relation to selected nanotechnological innovations, products or 
discursive phenomena (the period for working on a particular issue 
is about 12 months); 
2. an incident mode in which the SPA is able to respond in a flexible 
and ad hoc manner to unforeseen externalities ” such as 
controversial products, scientific disagreements or political protests. 
Here, the SPA assesses, for example, the effectiveness and 
appropriateness of measures implemented by the regulating 
authorities in cases of crisis (e.g., removing a harmful product from 
the market in response to cases of illness) and elaborates 
recommendations aimed at improving measures that might be taken 
in similar cases (the period for working on a particular issue is 






7.3.3. The Point of Reference 
The SPA model is intended as a response to the Zukunftsforum 
Nanotechnologie (‘Nanotechnology Forum for the Future’) envisaged 
by the German Federal government for considered, interdisciplinary 
dialogue, and sees itself as a contribution towards identifying 
appropriate funding initiatives. The establishment of an SPA would 
create an official institution in the position of mediator that is both 
responsive to public concerns and politically transparent, and which, by 
means of its reflexive adjudication procedure, would be able to provide 
ongoing support for and critical assessment of, among others, the 
projects that are part of the Nano-Initiative-Aktionsplan 2010, such as 
the Nano-Dialog initiated by the Federal Ministry for the Environment, 
Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU), the Federal Ministry of 
Education and Research (BMBF) project NanoCare, the working groups 
of the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (BMAS), the 
consumer protection measures instituted by the Federal Institute for 
Risk Assessment (BfR), as well as the public information activities of 
BMBF campaigns such as Nanotruck. The findings from these would 
be integrated into adjudication procedures and recommendations that 
are open to public scrutiny. This would meet the need for public 
monitoring and the possibility of intervention in innovations and 
regulation. Thus the origin and the primary operating level of the SPA 
model are on the national level. To implement such an institution in 
other countries, or on an international level, the different structures of 
the respective regulatory and institutional landscapes would have to be 
taken into account; the SPA, as it is described in this paper, is 
conceived as a model that is based upon general regulatory issues and 
thoughts from the philosophy of technoscience (cf. Nordmann, 2010); 
the question of a concrete implementation is not covered in this paper.  
 
7.4. Requirements and Objectives of the Model Institution 
The large number of systematic limits to knowledge and corresponding 
wide-ranging demands for safety and security on the part of society 
pose a challenge to regulatory measures for ‘nanotechnology.’ These 
cannot be tackled solely by observatories, codes of conduct, 
stakeholder dialogues or other measures of an expanded and softened 
conception of regulation. These are some of the dimensions we have 
identified with regard to systematic limits of knowledge: 
“ the multi-layered nature and variability of what is meant by 
‘nanotechnology’ as a socio-communicative phenomenon; 
“ limits of standardization due to nanoscale sensitivities to even slight 
variabilities in the context of production; 
 




“ the entanglement of societal perceptions of specific cases (e.g., 
harmful products) with the phenomenon of ‘nanotechnology’ as a 
whole; 
“ limits to knowledge arising from complex interactions as 
nanotechnological components are integrated into products and 
products into user environments; 
“ dependence of regulatory authorities on particular perspectives, such 
as chemical safety, technical function, industrial standards and 
norms. 
All these dimensions present the legal regulatory authorities with 
difficulties they can not resolve. In addition, the measures associated 
with an expanded conception of regulation (observatories, codes of 
conduct, stakeholder dialogues) are overburdened by such 
fundamental forms of non-knowledge and systematic limits to 
knowledge. This is because these measures ” guided as they are by a 
notion of precaution ” are grounded in the assumption that knowledge 
gaps are temporary and merely epistemic, that is, that they can be 
overcome as science progresses and that positive, quantifiable and 
therefore certain knowledge will be generated. 
The idea of observatories, mechanisms of self-monitoring and 
dialogue is to institute a form of permanent and ongoing vigilance that 
buys time for the acquisition of more comprehensive knowledge to 
which legal regulatory mechanisms can be adapted flexibly (e.g., 
incrementally as Berger, 2007 and Franco et al., 2007 discuss). The 
expectation is that this comprehensive knowledge will encompass not 
only scientific, technical and industrial facts but also economic 
interests, user behaviour, ethical concerns and so on. Given the 
existence of systematic limits to knowledge, observatories and the like 
function as open-ended measures based on permanent vigilance and 
are aimed at integrating ever new forms of knowledge. On the one 
hand, these measures continuously produce new knowledge that is 
able to feed into the actions of regulatory institutions. This knowledge 
is acquired, for example, in the course of efforts at standardization, 
through data collection required for the implementation of ‘codes of 
conduct’, or as the outcome of conversations between stakeholders in 
the dialogue processes. On the other hand, however, new gaps in and 
limits to knowledge also continuously become apparent in these 
projects, which in turn call into question the producers’ claims to 
safety, security and certainty. This observation is not new and does not 
apply exclusively to ‘nanotechnology’. Nonetheless, in a field of 
technology that unites so many different production technologies 
within a single overarching concept, the systematic constraints of 





If nanotechnologies are to be dealt with in a way that is socially 
acceptable and, as such, conducive to innovation, it is necessary to 
integrate the findings of the observatories, codes of conduct and 
stakeholder dialogues in the form of a collective, public and transparent 
adjudication procedure based on selected cases. The objective is to 
elaborate socially robust recommendations for regulation, research and 
communication by identifying what is required in terms of knowledge, 
communication and action. These requirements can be fulfilled only by 
a visible authority responsive to public concerns that brings together 
the necessary areas of expertise, suitable forms of reflexive-learning 
dialogue, political transparency, public assessment and effective 
intervention in a single institution. 
For this purpose, we propose the establishment of a Scanning 
Probe Agency (SPA). This model consists of a learning community 
made up of experts from a diverse array of social spheres (including 
science, industry, unions, churches, NGOs and consumers). The 
experts have to be chosen (and invited) on the basis of their expertise 
and their reputation by an independent board. The objective of this 
community is to reach judgments about selected nanotechnology 
products, processes or discursive phenomena and, in doing so, to lay 
bare the criteria and difficulties associated with the formation of such 
judgments. This process of public deliberation can orient 
nanotechnological innovation processes towards conditions of societal 
acceptability and social well-being. The measures associated with 
‘expanded regulation’ will be integrated into the reflexive adjudication 
procedure. They benefit from the procedure by being tied back into a 
stronger regulatory concept that holds onto the ideals of classical 
regulation, despite the deficiencies of legal regulatory mechanisms. 
It has become clear that the SPA is designed to especially meet the 
regulatory challenges that arise in the context of nanotechnologies, 
since it has become important to find a middle ground between 
classical regulation and the various voluntary schemes of soft law. This 
” in principle ” makes it also useful for any other new or emerging 
technology that (for the same or similar reasons) escapes the 
traditional categories of regulation. 
 
7.5. Type and Designation 
The institution developed here is provisionally described as a ‘Scanning 
Probe Agency’. Whether the choice of name is a happy one or not is an 
open question. That the designation is apt is beyond doubt, though ” 
not least because it refers to an instrument that embodies 
nanotechnology as no other does, namely the scanning probe 
microscope, which not only observes but actively intervenes in the 
 




nanoworld. However, the designation is especially apt because it 




Figure 7.1. The three basic functions of the Scanning Probe Agency 
 
 
7.6. Functions of the SPA 
 
In its scanning function, the SPA surveys the current nanotechnological 
landscape. This includes research trends, the marketing of new 
nanotechnology products and the state of debate within society as well 
as within the social and human sciences on the subject of 
‘nanotechnology’. In carrying out this task, the SPA makes use of the 
data and findings that originate within scientific specialties, or are 
collected by observatories or generated in the course of implementing 
codes of conduct (e.g., regarding the opportunities and risks 
associated with particular production processes). Its synoptic view of 
the field of ‘nanotechnology’ also includes media research and the 
reports emerging from dialogue processes. One aim of this scanning 
exercise is to reveal emerging issues and trends, characteristic or 
problematic case studies or potential problem zones. These might then 
deserve a closer look that can offer new insights or suggest novel ways 
of dealing appropriately with certain issues. The scanning function can 





establish connections in order to trace latent developments and create 
the necessary level of vigilance in a timely fashion. 
The aim of the SPA’s scanning activities, therefore, is not to create a 
complete and systematic collection of the widest range of knowledge 
possible, but rather to provide an overall picture of trends that require 
clarification and are significant in relation to different areas of society ” 
such as the representation of nanotechnology in the media, demands 
for regulation by policy makers, risk analysis and safety research, 
product management and consumer protection, and concerns raised 
by unions, environmental organisations or churches. There are two 
complementary ways of carrying out the work of identifying specific 
cases, problem areas or developmental patterns that require deeper 
understanding and sustained engagement. One is via the scientific 
staff of the SPA (‘scanners’), and the other consists of issues being 
brought to the attention of the SPA by way of specific inquiries from 
social actors ” be they members of parliament, ministries or 
authorities, companies, advocacy groups or individual citizens. 
When it then takes a closer look at the issues in question, the work 
of the SPA shifts to its probing function. Here, the SPA's broadly 
interdisciplinary expert panel turns to selected case studies and 
thematic areas for which there is a greater need for clarification and 
particular demand from within society. The experts form a learning 
community in which highly diverse forms of knowledge come together, 
including natural and social-scientific knowledge, knowledge of 
production processes, knowledge about economic and investment 
issues, theological and ethical expertise, knowledge about work and 
safety issues and innovation processes, consumers’ knowledge of 
usage patterns. The learning process is characterized by collective 
knowledge acquisition in the form of informative exchanges among the 
members of the group but also in the course of court-like hearings. At 
these hearings, invited witnesses will be questioned about their 
experience in research laboratories, consumer protection work, 
regulatory processes or commercial enterprise and in their involvement 
in particular situations or events. This collective learning process feeds 
into the formation of a judgment by the expert panel. 
Finally, in its agency function, the expert panel takes its findings into 
the public sphere and thereby intervenes in ongoing debates. It does so 
by presenting in a public forum not only the judgment reached by the 
learning community. It also shares with the public the various 
considerations and difficulties that were encountered in the course of 
the adjudication procedure. It will also present a dissenting opinion, 
should such exist. In this way, the knowledge and the questions that 
contributed to the deliberation of each specific case are rendered open 
to scrutiny, and a high degree of transparency is achieved. The 
 




judgment reached in each case may involve recommendations for 
scientific and social scientific research, policy, regulation and 
communication strategies. These recommendations from the SPA have 
no legal or otherwise binding status and do not overlap with the work 
of agencies that are already implementing existing regulations. As such, 
the SPA has a clearly delineated area of responsibility that 
encompasses everything associated with ‘nanotechnology’. The SPA 
has no formal powers, however. Its authority is based on the balanced 
composition of the panel of experts, on its publicly transparent 
judgment and its orientation towards relevant questions, and thus its 
ability to focus on critical concerns regarding opportunities and risks of 
nanotechnologies. In this respect, the SPA is comparable with the 
German government’s National Ethics Council. 
 
7.7. Operational Modes 
7.7.1. Normal Case Mode 
The members of the expert panel or the three ‘scanners’ on the service 
staff propose themes or issues in relation to which they perceive a need 
for greater clarity and which they believe are of particular importance to 
society. These themes may emerge either from their observations of 
nanotechnological developments and discourses, such as those made 
at the observatories or at stakeholder dialogues, or from experiences in 
their own area of work ” or simply out of their own personal interests 
and expertise. These may be practical problems with regard to workers' 
health and safety, issues to do with the toxicity of certain substances, 
research programmes and visions, or statements concerning the role of 
precautionary measures etc. However, queries may also be put forward 
by parliamentarians, citizens or manufacturers. Where necessary, 
research on selected issues will be conducted by the service staff. Once 
these scanning activities are completed, the probers, together with the 
administrators on the service staff, will prepare the first annual meeting 
of the expert panel, at which suggested themes will be considered and 
one of them selected. The informed opinions offered by the members 
of the expert panel based on their various fields of work, along with 
their assessments of the importance of the issues in question, play an 
important role in this decision. The learning process thus begins with 
judgments regarding the salience of this or that technology trend, 
ethical concern, regulatory decision, funding initiative or media 
representation. 
Once they have agreed upon the issue to be discussed, the 
members of the expert panel first exchange information with one 
another concerning the current state of knowledge, or gaps in 





staff propose ‘witnesses’ to be invited to the hearing, e.g., university 
researchers, representatives from industry, officials at government 
agencies etc. The hearing takes place in conjunction with a closed 
expert workshop at which a collective judgment is formulated that is 
subsequently presented to a larger public. These judgments contain 
assessments and proposals for research, regulation and 
communication. 
Illustrations of the scope of possible judgments are: 
“ Assessments of the preparedness of regulatory agencies for dealing 
with the emerging aspects of particular innovations; judgments 
about the extent of their capacity to act, including suggestions for 
improvements in the implementation of regulatory guidelines. 
“ Recommendations to companies regarding appropriate measures 
(such as product labelling), in order to satisfy consumers’ real 
informational needs, that is, without producing a surplus of useless 
information that is available for any nanoproduct. 
“ Judgments about the extent to which certain promises or fears in an 
area of nanotechnology are justified or misleading, and establishing 
accountability for any visionary claims made on behalf of 
nanotechnology. 
The judgments of the expert panel need not involve a consensus. 
Ideally, they should include a majority and a minority opinion, in order 
to underscore the force of any particular judgment and to accentuate 
unresolved differences that are due to gaps in unequivocal evidence. A 
record of the judgment and the process leading up to it will be 
prepared by the 'probers' on the service staff and presented in 
appropriate form for subsequent public debate.  
Immediately after the closed expert workshop, its findings, 
conclusions and the judgment itself will be presented in the context of 
a public event and opened up for discussion. The public forum, or 
conference, can be attended free of charge by interested groups. The 
chairperson of the expert panel will provide an informal account of the 
workshop and its adjudication process. The individual experts on the 
panel will present their (various) assessments that led to the judgment 
(majority and minority opinion). This serves to illustrate the difficulties 
and learning impacts encountered along the way. In this way they 
render the adjudication process transparent. They respond to questions 
and objections by participants in the public forum. This provides a last 
opportunity for the expert panel to examine its judgment in light of 
possibly novel considerations that emerged during the public 








7.7.2. Incident Mode 
The aim of the SPA is to facilitate learning processes between different 
kinds of knowledge and expertise on the expert panel. This should 
occur not only in relation to the panel's own interests or inquiries from 
outside; rather, the SPA’s reflexive adjudication procedure must also be 
able to deal in a flexible and ad hoc manner with the contingency of 
unintended and unforeseeable incidents. Cases such as the illnesses 
brought on by ‘MagicNano’ (Magic Nano Glass Sealer and Magic Nano 
Ceramic Sealer in spray doses with a propellant caused respiratory 
disorders) both constitute an ‘incident’ and trigger a ‘regulatory crisis’ 
among existing regulatory agencies. In such cases, the SPA and the 
regulatory agencies can learn from each other's responses and 
recommended measures. However, the way in which an incident is 
addressed by the SPA is completely different from the way a crisis is 
managed by a regulatory agency. Measures taken by official authorities 
to avert danger and measures recommended in the course of the SPA’s 
reflexive adjudication procedure should prove complementary with 
respect to particular incidents. For example, a case such as 
‘MagicNano’ is a good opportunity for the expert panel to examine 
subsequently what worked and what did not work as public agencies, 
the media and society at large dealt with this case.  
It is possible to imagine various examples of incidents with which 
the SPA would concern itself. What they have in common is their ability 
to cause perplexity among both experts and the broader public, given 
the way in which fact and fiction are hopelessly entangled in 
nanotechnological development, as are knowledge and ignorance, 
issues of safety, security, certainty as well as more general socio-
political topics, expectations of nanotechnology and actual experiences 
with nanotechnological products. Relevant incidents may thus have 
quite diverse triggers, as demonstrated by the following examples. 
 
Example 1: Harmful Product 
In a case such as ‘Magic Nano’, the harmful product would be the 
externality that prompts the SPA to initiate its incident case mode. The 
SPA would analyse and assess the communication difficulties that exist 
between the various actors involved in the case. The SPA would have to 
bear in mind, for example, that although ‘Magic Nano’ is not a product 
that contains nanoparticles, it still counts as a ‘nanoproduct’ because 
‘nanotechnology’ is a heterogeneous field of ill-defined product 
developments that include merely attributed characteristics. 
As is well known, ‘Magic Nano’ contains no nanoparticles, but the 
thickness of the protective film produced by the cleaning spray lay in 
the nanometer domain. Clearly even the manufacturers were not aware 





how difficult it is to explore and control the world of nanoparticles and 
nanoproducts by means of routine technical or legal monitoring. 
In such a case, the SPA’s adjudication might point out that the 
responses of agencies and/or industry were highly effective and 
appropriate, but that a number of crucial questions were not 
addressed, such as those regarding the lack of transparency in the 
production and marketing chain ” why, for example, was it so difficult 
for the various actors involved to determine the nanodimensions of the 
product? How could such a product obtain a ‘TÜV’ label (confirmation 
that the product has been officially tested and approved)? Why are 
there no suitable testing procedures in place for the purpose of 
awarding such a label? 
 
Example 2: Scientific Controversy 
An incident could also be triggered by scientific controversies, 
contrary expert opinions or scientific promises communicated widely in 
the media. 
It is conceivable, for example, that a new debate about nano-
assemblers or irresponsible science could be opened up by a 
sensational media presentation that presents current research as a 
preliminary stage towards the creation of self-replicating nano-
machines. The SPA’s work here would consist in putting one-sided 
attributions into context, disentangling them and probing them for 
their serious and substantial content, in order to render visible the 
genuine problems that are articulated in such visions of out-of-control 
technology. It might be possible, via a reconstruction of the incident, to 
identify as the original trigger for such a controversy the propagation of 
a highly visionary cost-intensive medical procedure that makes use of 
nanoparticles. Research institutes, industrial companies and the media 
propagate the promise that this procedure will heal previously 
incurable diseases. Funding agencies and research policy makers 
subsequently provide generous grants for basic research on this 
procedure, even though the scientific methods and technical 
procedures remain extremely controversial. Scientific journalism then 
amalgamates the vision of self-replicating nanomachines and the fact 
of generous public funding, which may then lead to a blanket critique of 
both nanotechnology and national research policy. 
In such cases the adjudication of the SPA could consist in 
disentangling the scientific, political, economic and other factors 
involved in the controversy. Also, the SPA's expert panel would judge 
who ” including the scientists and journalists involved ” might be held 
accountable for the statements that encouraged the discourse about 
the limitless possibilities of nanotechnology. In this instance, the 
adjudication could also contain recommendations for better ways of 
 




monitoring and communicating the criteria of national research 
funding. 
 
Example 3: Political Protest 
A third trigger for an incident could be a political protest movement. 
Such a case could be similar to the protest of the Grenoble Opposition 
to Necrotechnologies (GON, 2006), which justified its demonstrations 
against the opening of MINATEC in June 2006 by reference to the 
expansion of a global-capitalist surveillance society. Nanotechnology 
was equated, for example, with the spread of ‘intelligent cameras’ 
throughout society in ‘subcutaneous implants’ and ‘biometric 
systems’, and was described as a ‘blitzkrieg against life’. 
The aim of an SPA adjudication in such a case would be at once to 
establish differentiations within ‘nanotechnology’ and to put the 
protest into context. For example, it would be necessary to identify 
where there are genuine data protection concerns arising from the 
nanotechnological refinement of sensors. It would be necessary to 
make the point that this innovation represents only a small part of 
nanotechnologies and that other applications could be more closely 
aligned with the goals of the protest movement. A differentiation would 
also need to be made as to whether such a protest should not be 
addressed elsewhere ” not so much to the institution that came up 
with the scientific-technical innovation as to political institutions which 
may well define the situation that is the target of the protest. To put it 
succinctly: the SPA adjudication would have to take the protest itself 
seriously, in order to determine which of its aspects ought to be taken 
seriously with regard to ‘nanotechnology’. This would enable such 
protests to be understood rather than simply being dismissed as 
irrational from the start. 
 
7.8. Conclusion 
The three functions of the SPA (scanning, probing, and intervening) 
come together in the learning impacts that emerge from the reflexive 
adjudication procedure. They orient the SPA towards the indispensable 
ideals of public oversight, political transparency and the possibility of 
intervention by an open and responsive agency that provides the 
greatest possible legal certainty. In this respect, to institute an 
independent learning community is also a means of drawing the 
amorphous, heterogeneous and vision-laden phenomenon of 
‘nanotechnology’ into the sphere of governance and thereby to 
establish trust among citizens in processes of innovation and in the 





1. By encountering the perspectives of their peers in the course of their 
adjudication procedure, the experts come to know the various 
assessments, approaches and experiences that exist in the various 
spheres of society, such as scientific disciplines, industry, 
governmental agencies, consumer protection, environmental 
organisations, unions, and churches. This encounter with different 
forms of knowledge feeds into the joint adjudication process. Thus, 
the adjudication is not only a matter of assessing scientific-technical 
background information but also a matter of appreciating its social 
and cultural significance. Citizens’ representatives learn from 
scientists and engineers, while researchers and developers for their 
part learn something about society’s traditional values and concerns. 
Accordingly, the reality represented by the adjudication is rendered 
multidimensional. 
2. The openness of the adjudication procedure to public scrutiny 
renders the individual steps transparent, facilitating understanding 
and critical assessment. This distinguishes the work of the SPA 
fundamentally from the mere provision of information by 
observatories and other measures of expanded regulation. The 
interface between expert knowledge and public interest should not 
consist in a database, an information event or an expert report, but 
rather in a process of adjudication that is rendered transparent. Any 
interested citizen can find out how difficult it is in a situation of 
fundamental uncertainty and a proliferation of public statements to 
find a responsible way of dealing with the opportunities and 
difficulties that arise in the emerging field of nanotechnology. 
These learning impacts can engender public trust, although such trust 
entails far more than a set of consumer protection measures. Trust 
includes confidence in political processes and the governability of the 
emerging technology. This means that the concerns of the general 
public need to be taken seriously first of all ” a fixation on health and 
environmental risks is not sufficient. Matters of civic concern include 
more generally the compatibility of a new technology with human 
health, the environment and social welfare. These are related to issues 
of justice and solidarity as well as national and international security, 
but also to a fair and responsible expenditure of state funds. Citizens’ 
concerns should be taken seriously by doing more than merely 
informing various publics and eliciting their opinions. Beyond this, the 
SPA invites citizens to participate in the difficult process of adjudicating 
an issue. 
By generating both learning impacts and public trust, the SPA can 
contribute to a culture of ‘risk preparedness’. This consists in the 
willingness to accept unknowns for the sake of real benefits, and 
involves a circumspect attitude towards knowledge gaps that cannot be 
 




closed. Without the ability of our societies to distribute the burdens of 
ignorance and vigilance equally among their citizens, 
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Abstract 
The observation that so-called ‘genesis questions’ ” about the creation 
of lives ab initio ” raise unique philosophical problems is in danger of 
becoming trite. In the quarter century since the publication of Derek 
Parfit’s seminal Reasons and Persons, much attention has been 
dedicated to the obligations we might owe to the future people that we 
choose to create, and about the thorny question of how our choices 
might impact on the identities of those people. To what extent, though, 
have these discussions impacted on how artificial reproductive 
technologies are actually regulated in practice? In the United Kingdom, 
at least, recent legislative developments give little encouragement that 
the insights of academic lawyers and ethicists are guiding policy in this 
area. The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 came into 
effect in autumn 2009. This paper proposes firstly that parts of the Act 
fail to answer ” or even acknowledge ” questions of identity and 
obligations to future contingent people. Secondly, it asks what an 
approach grounded in a consistent approach to identity questions 
might look like. As well as the Parfitian ‘non-identity’ model, I briefly 
consider some alternative ways of looking at genesis questions. 
Ultimately, I conclude that, while the Act certainly does not represent a 
Parfitian approach to such questions, it is not clear that it does justice 
to these alternatives; indeed, it displays scant awareness of the wide-
ranging and rich philosophical debates that have surrounded these 




The UK’s new Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act received Royal 
Assent1 on 13 November 2008, and the majority of its provisions came 
into effect on 1 October 2009. This long-awaited2 updating of the rules 
governing assisted reproduction treatment and embryo research 
                                                     
1 This is the final stage in the UK’s legislative process, after which draft legislation 
(referred to as Bills) becomes part of the law (referred to as Acts) ” although in practice, 
some time may elapse before an Act takes effect.  
2 The UK Government announced a review of the existing legislation in January 2004. 
There then followed a lengthy consultation process, at the end of which a Bill was 
produced, which was in turn the subject of intensive scrutiny and debate in Parliament. 




amends and supplements the previous legislation3, as well as placing 
certain decisions of the courts and the regulatory authority4 on a 
statutory footing.  
The Act has elicited a predictably polarised response. ‘Dignitarian’ 
(Brownsword, 2008: 39-43) and ‘bioconservative’ (Hughes, 2004) 
opponents of reproductive and genetic technologies, such as 
preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) and embryo research, 
bemoaned a triumph for amoral, technocratic priorities, and a defeat 
for democracy and respect for life. Josephine Quintavalle, of the 
pressure group Comment on Reproductive Ethics, opposed the Bill on 
the grounds that, if enacted, it would ‘simply liberalise everything even 
further',5 while the organisation’s website responded to the Bill’s 
eventual success with an article beginning ‘Ruthless scientific 
imperative trumps morality yet again in the United Kingdom.’6  
Though the Act certainly does contain ‘liberalising’ elements, it 
would be something of a stretch to characterise its overall tone as 
liberal. On the one hand, it dispenses with what many considered to be 
a gratuitously reactionary and divisive requirement that, in determining 
whether a woman should be assisted to become pregnant, attention 
should be paid to the need of the future child for a father,7 substituting 
a reference to the ‘need for a supporting parent’.8 Other elements, 
however, merely formalise previous practice; the provision for the use 
of PGD to create what have become known as ‘saviour siblings’9 adds 
legislative force to what was already permitted under common law.10 A 
third category of reforms move the law in a more restrictive direction; 
social sex selection is, for the first time, legally prohibited (the use of 
the technique for this purpose having previously been ruled out by the 
licensing authority, the HFEA,11 but not by the 1990 Act.) 
The 2008 Act is, then, a political compromise, containing both 
liberalising and restrictive elements. In Roger Brownsword’s terms, the 
‘regulatory tilt’ (2008: 21) in the United Kingdom is to be neither 
straightforwardly permissive nor prohibitive. Insofar as this ‘mixed’ 
                                                     
3  Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990. 
4  The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA). 
5  ‘New human fertilisation and embryology bill ”- dark days ahead for democracy and 
the ordre public’, 10 November 2007, available at http://www.corethics.org/index2.php? 
d=press&item=20 (accessed 26 February 2010). 
6  ‘Scientific imperative trumps morality’ (4 November, 2008), available at 
http://www.corethics.org/index2.php?d=news&item=15 (accessed 26 February 2010). 
7  Previously contained in Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, section 13(5). 
8  Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, section 14(2)(b). 
9  Schedule 2, paragraph 3(d). 
10  R (Quintavalle) v HFEA [2005] 2 All ER 555. 





approach reflects a plurality of approaches to a complex subject, it is, 
perhaps, to be welcomed. However, while legislation relating to such a 
complex area cannot satisfy all ethical perspectives, it is not, perhaps, 
unreasonable to expect that it at least engages with the most influential 
critiques and arguments. It is my contention that the 2008 Act is fatally 
undermined by a failure on the part of its drafters and supporters to 
confront certain fundamental questions of principle, a failure that risks 
rendering aspects of the new legislation as ethically incoherent as the 
previous regulatory regime.  
I have previously argued (Gavaghan, 2007) that the pre-2008 
regulatory framework, whereby the broad principles of the 1990 Act 
were interpreted and applied by the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority, routinely failed to consider the ‘welfare of the 
child’12 in the light of what is now a widely (though not universally) 
accepted understanding that determinations as to the future child’s 
welfare cannot be disentangled from decisions about its identity. This 
perspective has at its core an insight that is both simple and, 
frequently, highly counterintuitive: that a decision to implant one 
embryo rather than another will result in the birth of one child rather 
than another. From here, it is but a short logical step to a related 
position that has particular significance to the regulation of assisted 
reproductive technologies (ARTs): in all but the rarest of cases, a child 
will not be harmed by its own creation. Or, to put it another way, it 
would not have been better off had a different child been born in its 
place, even where that other child would have had a healthier, longer, 
or happier life.  
Yet, despite the growing body of commentary making this very 
point,13 the 2008 Act shows a marked failure to engage with this 
concern. In particular, Section 14 (4) (9), which requires that embryos 
known to have a significant risk of ‘serious physical or mental disability’ 
or ‘serious illness (…) must not be preferred to those that are not 
known to have such an abnormality’, seems to fly in the face of the 
non-identity conclusion.  
In this paper, I propose firstly that this clause displays a philosophical 
muddle on the part of the Act’s supporters ” a muddle that is, 
incidentally, likely to cause considerable offence to many disabled 
                                                     
12  Section 13(5) of the 1990 Act stipulated that ‘A woman shall not be provided with 
treatment services unless account has been taken of the welfare of any child who may be 
born as a result of the treatment (including the need of that child for a father), and of 
any other child who may be affected by the birth.’. 
13  See, for example, Glannon (2001) and Scott (2007). 




people.14 Next, I will engage with some recent attempts to answer the 
‘non-identity conclusion’, attempts that ” if successful ” may render 
Section 14(4)(9) more ethically explicable. In particular, I will consider: 
“ the putative ‘duty of procreative beneficence’; 
“ the suggestion that ‘the future child I have’ could be thought of as a 
single entity, which can be benefited or harmed by identity-defining 
choices; 
“ the various species of Non-Person Affecting Harms, which argue for 
an impersonal utilitarian obligation to bring about the best 
aggregate outcome, regardless of whether any identifiable individual 
would have been harmed by the alternative course. 
My suggestion, however, is that the Act no more does justice to these 
alternatives than to the non-identity conclusion; indeed, it displays 
scant awareness of the wide-ranging and rich philosophical debates 
that have surrounded these questions since before the first attempt to 
legislate on reproductive choices. 
 
8.2. Background and Context 
The notion that prospective parents should be prohibited from 
choosing to have disabled children may give rise to one of several 
responses. We may, for example, regard it as ethically correct that 
parents ought to refrain from such choices; such is the view expressed 
by Julian Savulescu in his argument for a duty of ‘procreative 
beneficence’ (2001), and by David Shaw (2008) in a recent article in 
Bioethics. I will return to this notion later, but the other reaction that 
may be provoked by Section 14(4)(9) is to wonder why it might ever be 
necessary. After all, surely we can, as Francis Fukuyama (2002: 92) has 
suggested, ‘presume that parents will not seek to deliberately harm 
their children, but rather will try to maximise their happiness.  
The concern that lay behind this particular prohibition was set forth 
in the Explanatory Notes to an earlier version of the Bill: ‘This would 
prevent similar situations to cases, outside the UK, where positive 
selection of deaf donors in order deliberately to result in a deaf child 
have been reported.’15 The situation referred to was presumably that 
concerning Sharon Duchesneau and Candy McCulloch, a couple in the 
                                                     
14  For a recent example, see Rebecca Atkinson, ‘I wouldn’t have minded if my baby had 
been born deaf, but the embryology bill suggests I should’, The Guardian, 10 October 
2008. 
15  Explanatory notes on the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill as introduced in 
the House of Lords on 8 November 2007, para. 109, available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200708/ldbills/006/en/2008006en.pdf. 





USA who selected a sperm-donor who would maximise the chances 
that their future offspring would share their deafness.16 
As a wave of controversy broke around the new Bill, the British 
media turned its attention to a UK equivalent of Duchesneau and 
McCulloch. Paula Garfield and Tomato Lichy are also Deaf, and also 
either want actively to choose, or at least not to be forced to reject (the 
media coverage is unfortunately ambiguous as to this vital point), a 
similarly affected child. That the Bill, and the Act it became, would 
appear to preclude them from doing so has led to it being described by 
some commentators as eugenic both in intent and in purpose. Indeed, 
a campaign was formed under the name StopEugenics, specifically to 
oppose Clause 14(4)(9).17 This maintained that the Clause:  
is clearly a form of EUGENICS. Forcing parents to reject some embryos 
over others has no place in a democratic society. Clause 14(4)(9) 
creates a situation whereby, in law, the life of a Deaf person becomes of 
lesser worth than that of a hearing person, despite the Government’s 
aim for a more equal society, through the new Commission for Equality 
and Human Rights.18 
Although StopEugenics makes occasional reference to other conditions 
that the Bill may impact upon, such as those of ‘restricted growth’, 
their principal focus has been upon deafness. Indeed, it may be 
thought that, in selecting this example, the Government made a tactical 
error. Deafness is not unambiguously within the category of ‘serious 
physical or mental disability’. Indeed, it is not unambiguously a 
disability at all; many within the Deaf community consider it a minority 
culture with, for example, its own language(s); as Tomato Lichy has 
argued, ‘Being deaf is not about being disabled, or medically 
incomplete ” it’s about being part of a linguistic minority’.19 
Furthermore, the Deaf community has a strong tradition of political 
activism, with strong ties to academia and the media. 
The ensuing backlash against the Clause may account for the 
removal of any reference to deafness in the Explanatory Notes to the 
final version20 ” though in terms of loss of trust from the Deaf 
                                                     
16  See Spriggs (2002). 
17  StopEugenics’s website http://stopeugenics.org appears to be no longer accessible 
by non-members. The same provision is referred to as a Clause in the draft legislation, 
but a Section in the final Act. 
18 See http://www.grumpyoldeafies.com/2008/05/petition_against_1449_human_fe. 
html. (accessed 26 February 2010) 
19  See The Guardian, 21 March 2006. 
20  Paragraph 114 of the final Explanatory Notes reads: ‘embryos that are known to have 
an abnormality (including a gender-related abnormality) are not to be preferred to 
embryos not known to have such an abnormality. The same restriction is also applied to 
the selection of persons as gamete or embryo donors. This would prevent assisted 




community, the damage may already be done. Nonetheless, the general 
principle looks set to remain; where a choice is known to exist, 
prospective parents will not be allowed to choose to have a seriously 
disabled child instead of a ‘healthy’ child.  
It should perhaps be made clear at this point that the Clause does 
not make it compulsory for those who know they are at risk of passing 
on a genetic disability to take steps to avoid so doing. A couple able to 
have children without technological assistance will not be subject to 
legal scrutiny. Furthermore, it seems that a couple having IVF or other 
reproductive assistance will be subject to no compulsion to have their 
embryos screened at all. Finally, agreeing to have embryos screened for 
one condition ” say, cystic fibrosis ” will not require a couple to agree 
to screening for another, like deafness or restricted height.  
These limitations, however, do not insulate Section 14(4)(9) from 
criticism; indeed, as I will argue, it may be that the failure to require any 
of these positive steps further undermines the ethical basis of the 
Section. 
 
8.3. The Nature of the Problem 
Section 14(4)(9), then, serves only to prevent the creation or selection 
of a disabled embryo when an unaffected embryo could be chosen 
instead. It does not force couples to use techniques like 
preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) ” those who prefer to take 
their chances with what are referred to in Andrew Niccol’s film Gattaca 
as ‘faith babies’ will still be free to do so. And it does not present an 
obstacle to couples who are faced only with a choice between ‘disabled 
embryos’.21 It is my contention, however, that it is still ethically 
problematic. 
The problem derives from a series of observations about the 
relationship between reproductive choices and identity. Derek Parfit’s 
(1984: 358) thought experiment (now near-legendary in bioethics 
circles) invited the reader to consider two situations. In one, a 14-year-
old girl decides to become pregnant.  
Because she is so young, she gives her child a bad start in life. Though 
this will have bad effects throughout the child’s life, his life will, 
predictably, be worth living. If this girl had waited for several years, she 
                                                                                                                  
reproduction technology being used to select an embryo with a view to increasing the 
chance of giving birth to a child that had or would develop a serious medical condition, 
or to select a donor to increase the chance of a child having a serious medical 
condition.’ Hence, no specific examples of what might be regarded as a ‘serious medical 
condition’ are identified.  
21  Of course, it is not the embryos that are disabled, but the children they may become. 





would have had a different child, to whom she would have given a 
better start in life.  
At first glance, it may seem as though the girl would do better to delay 
pregnancy; to do otherwise, after all, would be to deny her future child 
‘a better start in life’, and to do this, we might think, is to harm the 
child.  
Perhaps an even starker example is presented in the imagined case 
of a woman who is, for a short period of time, taking a course of 
medication that would cause disability in any child with whom she 
became pregnant. If she delays pregnancy until the course of 
medication is complete, she will be able to conceive a healthy child. 
Again, our first intuition will probably be that she would be acting 
unethically if she does not delay pregnancy; what is a short delay when 
weighed against the prospect of inflicting disability on a child? 
The problem with both intuitive responses is that they ignore a 
vitally important question: if either the girl or the woman decides to 
become pregnant now, who precisely will be made worse off? Delaying 
conception ” for years or for months ” may result in the birth of a 
healthier, even a happier child. But it would be a different child, a child 
created by the fusion of a different egg and a different sperm.22 What 
both the girl and the woman would be doing, then, is not improving the 
life of a particular child, but in effect replacing that child with another ” 
albeit healthier ” child. 
The success of this argument relies on acceptance of what Bernard 
Williams (1990: 169) has referred to as the ‘zygotic principle’. This 
maintains that 
the identity of human beings, as of other sexually reproducing 
creatures, lies in the union of two given gametes: if either the sperm or 
the ovum or both had been different, a different human being would 
have been formed and born. 
Identity, of course, is a complex and controversial subject, in 
philosophy, psychology and a range of other disciplines. In claiming 
that a different combination of gametes would lead to a different child, 
it need not be asserted that genetic origins are the most important, still 
less the only, factor on which personal identity depends. Nonetheless, 
the (I think, plausible) contention on which this approach rests is that 
                                                     
22  Of course, different questions would arise if the choice was to delay implantation of a 
cryo-preserved embryo. In that case, whether the pregnancy was commenced earlier or 
later, the resulting child would be genetically identical. The question of whether the child 
brought up by a 14- or 15-year-old mother would develop into ‘the same person’ as in 
the situation where s/he were brought up by an older mother, while intriguing, will not 
be addressed here, as this issue does not arise in the context of statutory provision 
under discussion. 




replacing one or more of the gametes23 from which an embryo is 
created is one way of altering the identity of the child which results.24  
Parfit referred to this apparent paradox as The Non-Identity Problem; I 
will opt instead for the more neutral Non-Identity Conclusion, as this 
does not beg the question as to whether Parfit’s conclusion should in 
fact be regarded as ethically or logically problematic. What seems 
undeniable, however, is that his conclusion is problematic for Section 
14(4)(9) of the 2008 Act. Parfit’s approach would mean that the choice 
envisioned in Section 14(4)(9) is not simply between disability and 
‘normal’ health, but between two distinct children that could result. If 
the couple elect to implant an embryo affected by genetic deafness, that 
will (if it develops into anything at all) develop into a deaf child. But for 
that child, the option of a life with hearing was never an option. Quite 
simply, the only alternative to deaf life was no life at all. 
Garfield and Lichy, then, wish to make a deaf child, not make a child 
deaf. Unless we can, with some confidence, predict that the deaf child’s 
life will be so blighted as to allow us to say it would have been better 
never born, it cannot be said that their decision is in any sense contrary 
to the resulting child’s interests.25 
Similar responses can be offered even in the face of more 
unambiguously disabling conditions, such as muscular dystrophy or 
cystic fibrosis; unless it is likely that these conditions will impact so 
strongly on the child as to inflict upon it a ‘life worse than death’,26 it is 
impossible to argue that this child has been harmed by not being 
replaced with a healthier alternative. The consequences of this 
realisation are both profound and counter-intuitive. Parfit himself 
found the conclusion hard to accept. Philip G. Peters, Jr. (1999: 384-
385) has asserted that the Non-Identity Conclusion ‘assaults our 
common sense’ and ‘simply do[es] not pass a moral gut test’, while 
                                                     
23  Parfit, in fact, seems to have believed that both gametes must be different before we 
can speak of a wholly different person. This is implicit in his statement that ‘[i]f any 
particular person had not been conceived within a month of the time when he was in 
fact conceived, he would in fact never have existed’ (1984: 372), the implication being 
that both sperm and ovum must be different. This seems to beg the question as to how 
much genetic difference is required before we can speak of a ‘different person’. Would a 
child conceived of the same ovum but a different sperm be sufficiently similar to 
constitute, in some sense, the same person as the child that would have been conceived 
a few hours or days earlier?  
24  But for a very different approach to the subject of personal identity, see Gillett (2008). 
25  The alternative, hearing child, of course, cannot have been harmed, as it never 
became more than a possibility. 
26  This paper will not consider the question of whether any life could be said to be 
worse than death, but at most we would be talking about a very few, extremely severe 
conditions. Jonathan Glover’s (2001: 431) description of Dystrophic Epidermolysis 





Margot Brazier has claimed that it ‘sounds very good’ but ‘means very 
little’.27 
With respect to Professor Brazier, the conclusion may be mistaken, 
for if it is intellectually sound, it must surely mean a very great deal. But 
are we in fact forced to accept this conclusion? Since Parfit posed the 
problem a quarter of a century ago, numerous attempts have been 
made to offer alternative approaches to the identity issue. Could it be 
that the drafters and supporters of Section 14(4)(9) were persuaded by 
one or more of those attempted rebuttals? 
My suggestion is that, although often thought-provoking and 
interesting, none of the alternatives to the non-identity conclusion have 
been wholly successful in offering a more plausible account of our 
reproductive responsibilities. In the next section, I will attempt to 
explain why I believe they have failed, before concluding by showing 
that, even if they offer a compelling response to Parfit, they do not 
account for the specific direction UK law seems to have taken. 
 
8.4. Person-affecting Arguments 
This species of reply is characterised by a shared belief that an 
obligation to make particular choices derives from a concern for the 
welfare of the resulting child. There are several versions of the person-
affecting claim, but broadly they can be generalised under what Julian 
Savulescu (2001) has called a duty of procreative beneficence. Thus, as 
Nicholas DeLacy-Brown has averred, ‘the future child is owed a duty by 
which the most positive outcome is chosen by its parents.’28 A some-
what more limited version of the putative duty is espoused in a recent 
article by David Shaw (2008: 412-413): ‘When a choice is available 
concerning our future children (...) although we do not have an 
obligation to ‘perfect’ them as in the superhuman example, we do have 
an obligation to avoid harm. And deafness is a harm.’  
Indeed, the version of the principle espoused by Savulescu (2001: 
415) would seem to go some way beyond the remit of s.14(4)(9), 
requiring that 
Couples (or single reproducers) should select the child, of the possible 
children they could have, who is expected to have the best life, or at 
least as good a life as the others, based on the relevant, available 
information. 
As he makes clear in the article, Savulescu (2001: 414) would not 
restrict the principle to what are conventionally regarded as disease 
                                                     
27  Oral evidence to the House of Commons Select Committee on Science and 
Technology, Q880. 
28  DeLacy-Brown, N., BioNews, 27 July 2007. 




states; rather, he specifically argues for ‘a moral obligation to test for 
genetic contribution to non-disease states such as intelligence and to 
use this information in reproductive decision-making.’ 
How, though, do proponents of such a duty answer the non-identity 
Conclusion? How do they explain which child is owed the beneficent 
duty? Neither Savulescu nor DeLacy-Brown offer such an answer, at 
least in the articles cited here. Other writers, however, have attempted 
some fairly ingenious arguments. The ‘generic child’ view, for example, 
relies on thinking not about the array of possible children that could 
result from a ‘genesis decision’, but thinking instead in terms of what 
will be best for ‘the child I will have’. 
Robert M. Green is one writer who has sought to attribute interests 
to a ‘generic’ child, a sort of composite of all the possible children our 
hypothetical prospective parent might have had (1997: 8):29  
before conception (for most people) and even following conception 
during early pregnancy (for many others), lives are in a sense ‘fungible’; 
they are interchangeable generic units, rather than identifiable and 
unique. Parents intending to have a child do not imagine the 
identifiable child ‘Mary’ who they come to know in the years following 
her birth, but a ‘generic’ child with qualities like those of most other 
children being born in its cohort. It is this imagined child whom they 
usually have in mind in choosing to have a child in the first place, and 
against whom they and others measure the actual condition of the real 
child when it is born. 
If it is intelligible to speak of a single ‘generic child’, then it is perhaps 
intelligible to attribute to that child a unitary set of interests; and it may 
be intelligible to include among those interests something like an 
‘interest in being born in the best possible genetic health’, or perhaps 
an ‘interest in being born with a minimum standard of genetic health’. 
Such a view certainly has an intuitive appeal. Though Green offers 
no evidence for his claim, it is not implausible that many prospective 
parents do in fact think in such generic terms, and make certain 
decisions on that basis; I can decide to buy a house with a large garden, 
or in an area with a good school, because that will probably be best for 
my future child, regardless of who that future child will be. 
Procreative decisions are somewhat more difficult. The decisions 
about gardens and schools make sense because I can predict that, 
whatever child I may have, it will probably have interests that are 
advanced by having these facilities to hand. But they are not decisions 
about the identity of that child. In the same way, my department may 
advertise for a new professor. Knowing that the role will, some day, be 
filled, it may refurbish the office he or she is to occupy; whatever 
                                                     





candidate is successful, s/he will probably prefer a draft-proof window 
and a roof that doesn’t leak. This decision, though, is obviously 
distinguishable from the decision as to who gets the job.  
In the former context, it is sensible to group together the interests of 
the various candidates into one, notional entity, the eventual professor, 
and to make decisions that will predictably benefit that person. But can 
the choice of who is appointed really be made in the interests of that 
notional entity? 
Another difficulty with the generic child approach lies with 
ascertaining which interests precisely can be attributed to that entity. 
Decisions about which embryo to implant directly affect not only what 
child, but what kind of child will be born. And as genetic knowledge 
grows, it may be possible to determine certain character traits, 
temperamental dispositions, even tastes that the future child will 
possess. Thus, one embryo may be disposed to develop into a lively, 
energetic child with a low attention span, while another will be 
withdrawn and studious. A third candidate may be affected by a 
significant cognitive impairment whereby his interests will be very 
different again.  
Is it possible, we might wonder, to make a decision based on ‘the 
interests of the future child’ when the content of that decision will 
determine not just whether those interests are satisfied, but what those 
interests will be?  
A further possible objection to the ‘generic child’ view is illustrated 
by the following scenario. A couple who are both genetically deaf elect 
to use PGD in an attempt to avoid a deaf child. They create a number of 
embryos, but PGD reveal that all are homozygous for the gene, and 
therefore all will become deaf children. The couple are determined to 
have a child, and are on the point of telling the clinic to proceed 
anyway, when they are offered an alternative. Another (non-deaf) couple 
being treated at the same clinic were successful with their first attempt 
at IVF. As they do not want any more children, they have donated their 
remaining in vitro embryos to be donated to other infertile couples. 
Should the deaf couple accept the non-deaf donated embryos? A 
concern for the ‘generic child’ that they may have would seem to 
suggest that they are ethically duty-bound to do so. If Shaw is right, and 
deafness is a harm, it is a harm that can be avoided by accepting the 
donated embryo instead. If the couple insist that they would rather 
implant an embryo created from their own gametes, they are electing to 
harm their future child. Furthermore, the future, deaf child would seem 
to have a legitimate complaint against his parents, a justifiable protest 




that ‘he’ need never have been deaf had they only chosen the donated 
embryo instead.30 
Of course, the generic child approach could potentially be salvaged 
by adding some clause such as ‘Couples (or single reproducers) should 
select the child, of the possible children they could have from their own 
gametes, who is expected to have the best life’. This would mean that 
the deaf couple who elect to implant their own, deaf embryo would not 
have acted wrongly, if the only alternative was to implant someone 
else’s non-deaf embryo. But such a caveat seems to involve the belief 
that the parents’ interest in creating their own genetic offspring is 
sufficiently compelling as to outweigh their duty of beneficence to the 
resulting child. Elevating their own interests in a child of a particular 
kind above the interests of that child is precisely what has led to 
criticism of Duchesneau and McCulloch, or Garfield and Lichy. If it is 
ethically wrong to create a harmed child in pursuit of their own 
preferences, then presumably it is wrong regardless of what those 
preferences might be; that a preference for genetically related offspring 
is (plausibly) more common than a preference for deaf offspring is 
surely insufficient to distinguish the two cases. 
The ‘generic child’ approach, then, might be thought artificial in that 
it seems to involve conflating the interests and the identities of several 
different potential future children; and it might be thought to be unduly 
burdensome, in that it seems to involve an imperative to implant a 
donated embryo (or using donated gametes) where that embryo seems 
likely to have a better quality of life than any genetically related 
alternative.31 
 
8.5. Non-person Affecting Approaches 
Not all responses to the Non-Identity Problem have stayed within the 
person-affecting paradigm. Indeed, Parfit himself considered another 
class of ethical concerns that may avoid the counter-intuitive claim that 
choosing a disabled child harms no-one. As distinct from the 
arguments considered in the previous section, these focus not on the 
interests and rights of particular people, but on a putative impersonal 
                                                     
30  If the possibility exists that a future child would sustain more harm from the 
knowledge that the people who raised him were not genetically related than from the 
fact of deafness, the point can be salvaged by substituting a more serious genetic 
condition in place of deafness. Could the knowledge of being ‘adopted’ really be more 
detrimental to a child’s interests than having a condition like cystic fibrosis? 
31  For Shaw, the duty of procreative beneficence merely requires that disability is 
avoided, but for Savulescu, as we have seen, the duty encompasses any choice that may 
improve the resulting child’s quality of life. This would seem to require accepting not 
only a non-disabled donor embryo, but any embryo that is likely to become a more 





duty to maximise good consequences. Jonathan Glover (2006) and 
John Harris (2007) have both recently espoused versions of such non-
person-affecting approaches to such questions. These are varieties of 
what are sometimes called maximising consequentialist approaches, 
according to which we should make choices that make the world a 
better rather than a worse place, even if no particular people would 
have been harmed by the alternative choices.  
Arguably, a distinction may be thought to exist between positive and 
negative versions of this duty. Hallvard Lillehammer (2005: 26) refers 
to an impersonal variation on the ‘beneficence principle’, according to 
which ‘where we can choose between producing more benefit rather 
than less, we should produce more. Thus, in preconception cases, 
prospective parents should act so as to produce as much benefit for 
any prospective children as possible.’ Joel Feinberg, on the other hand, 
has written in terms of ‘wantonly introducing a certain evil into the 
world, not for inflicting harm on a person’ (1194: 103). The terms 
employed by Feinberg seem to point to a duty of non-maleficence 
rather than one of beneficence, according to which there is a wrong in 
causing suffering even if no person loses out on balance.  
Every (sentient) life, though, involves a degree of suffering; surely 
the duty cannot be to avoid all suffering, as this would seem to imply 
that no-one should have any children at all.32 Feinberg, of course, talks 
about needless suffering. But when, we must ask, is suffering really 
‘needless’? In procreative choices, a degree of suffering is a pre-
requisite for the existence of the children who are actually born. If he 
means ‘needless’ in the sense of ‘avoidable for this child’, then 
suffering in such cases is not needless. If, on the other hand, he means 
‘needless’ in the sense of being ‘avoidable at all’, then we are back to 
the earlier point, that all suffering could be avoided if ” but only if ” we 
refrained from having children at all. 
More plausible accounts of a non-person-affecting duty involve 
balancing harms and benefits. On this account, we discharge our duty 
when we act so as to maximise the balance of benefit over harm; 
having a child with a handicapped life would, therefore, be ethically 
acceptable provided that (a) its life still contained a balance of 
satisfaction over suffering, and (b) there was no alternative course of 
action open to us that would have produced a greater net gain in 
utilitarian terms. So, if Garfield and Lichy could only have deaf children, 
they would do nothing wrong if they had a deaf child; as Harris (2007: 
108) has written, ‘for those who can only have children with disabilities, 
                                                     
32  Precisely this argument has been made by David Benatar in Better Never to Have 
Been (2006). 




having such children may well be morally better, for the parents and for 
the children, than having no children at all.’  
One possible difficulty with this view is that is that it still seems to 
require the acceptance of a donor embryo, where that embryo will 
predictably lead to a better life than one that is genetically related. Of 
course, the parents loss of happiness in not being able to have their 
own genetic offspring would also have to factored into the felicific 
calculus, but we could readily imagine this being outweighed, on 
balance, where the disability avoided was fairly serious.  
A second difficulty with this view is that it seems to impose far 
greater obligations than those envisaged by its proponents. If we are 
obliged to contribute to the collective pot of human happiness by 
having the ‘best possible children’, what does this say about those of 
us who choose to have no children at all? Surely, we have failed in our 
duty to a greater extent than someone who merely has a less-than-
optimally happy child, which nonetheless makes a positive contribution 
to the collective utility pool. To say otherwise seems analogous to 
saying that, while we have no obligation to give anything to charity, 
those who contribute a bit are duty-bound to contribute as much as 
possible.  
And the duty would not merely be to reproduce, but presumably to 
reproduce until such point that an additional child would actually 
detract from, rather than contribute to, the balance of happiness-over-
misery in the world, perhaps because of overcrowding or competition 
for scarce resources.33 Neither of these conclusions, it must be 
acknowledged, is inherently illogical; nor, perhaps, are they obviously 
repugnant. Impersonal duties to ‘the world’ may not be ethically 
incoherent. However, insofar as they lead to obligations to reproduce, 
or to accept donor embryos or gametes instead of producing one’s own 
genetic offspring, non-person affecting approaches seem likely to take 
us to places that are at least as intuitively unappealing as the non-




My suggestion, then, is that what Parfit referred to as the Non-Identity 
Problem may not be such a problem at all. At least, it is no more 
problematic than the alternatives that have been proposed. The 
‘generic child’ view seems to rely on the artificial aggregation of 
                                                     
33  Christian Munthe (1996) has argued that the act of procreation in fact constitutes an 
inefficient use of resources which could, from a maximising consequentialist view, be 





disparate interests around a merely notional being. The non-person 
affecting approach, while coherent on its own terms, seems to impose 
duties to create new lives ab initio. And both seem to require that a 
donor embryo or gamete should be accepted where the result will 
predictably be a child with a better quality of life.  
My preference, as I have argued elsewhere, is for an approach 
guided by the Non-Identity Principle, whereby the law would concern 
itself only with choices likely to result in ‘worse than nothing’ lives ” i.e. 
lives that could plausibly cause a harm on balance to the resulting 
child. Neither of the alternative approaches, though, is entirely without 
merit, and while I may have succeeded in demonstrating some of their 
less palatable consequences, I do not pretend that I have in any way 
proved the superiority of the non-identity conclusion. It is perhaps 
interesting, then, to consider what the new Act would look like if UK 
legislators had been guided by either of these alternative principles.  
Both ‘generic child’ and maximising consequentialist approaches 
would certainly take a dim view of a conscious decision to implant an 
embryo with a significant risk of a ‘serious physical or mental disability’ 
or ‘serious illness’, at least where the option exists to implant an 
alternative embryo ‘not known to have such an abnormality’. But would 
they stop there? The Act, it should be remembered, does not impose 
any duty to have embryos tested prior to implantation at all. It does not 
even require that an embryo being tested for one condition should be 
tested for others of which the couple are known to be carriers. 
This seems to imply that what s.14(4)(9) is primarily concerned with 
is preventing the deliberate creation of disabled children. A regulatory 
framework predicated upon duties to generic future children, though, 
might be expected to go further, requiring prospective parents to take 
positive steps to avoid significant impairment. At the very least, when 
PGD is being carried out anyway, it would require embryos to be tested 
for significant disabilities or illnesses of which there is a significant risk, 
with the additional requirement that those free from such impairment 
must be preferred for implantation. Parental choice, after all, is rarely 
accepted in law as a justifiable reason for denying remedial treatment 
to born children. If the future child is to be thought of in terms of a 
unitary entity with a singular identity, then why should the law permit 
its parents to deny it beneficial ‘treatment’, any more than it would 
allow them to deny it to any other child?  
What of the non-person affecting approach? Again, it seems that if 
the Act’s drafters and supporters were motivated by such maximising 
consequentialist concerns, they would not stop at prohibiting the 
conscious decision to select an impaired embryo, but would actively 
require embryo testing prior to implantation, allowing only those with 
the best chance at the happiest life to be implanted.  




Furthermore, in line with Savulescu’s approach, this would seem to 
imply that selection decisions should be informed not only 
considerations of disability and illness, but by whatever is known about 
traits that will predictably lead to a happier life. Savulescu gives the 
example of a good memory, but we might consider athletic prowess, 
musical ability and even conventional attractiveness as plausible 
candidates for selection criteria. The Act, however, does not only stop 
short of requiring such factors to be considered, it actually prohibits 
testing for such non-disease traits. Schedule 2 limits the uses of 
embryo testing to the following circumstances: 
(a) establishing whether the embryo has a gene, chromosome or 
mitochondrion abnormality that may affect its capacity to result in a 
live birth, 
(b) in a case where there is a particular risk that the embryo may have 
any gene, chromosome or mitochondrion abnormality, establishing 
whether it has that abnormality or any other gene, chromosome or 
mitochondrion abnormality, 
(c) in a case where there is a particular risk that any resulting child will 
have or develop„ 
1. a gender-related serious physical or mental disability, 
2. a gender-related serious illness, or  
3. any other gender-related serious medical condition, 
establishing the sex of the embryo.34 
This restriction certainly does not derive from the non-identity position, 
but neither the generic child nor the non-person affecting approaches 
seem to fit easily with it either. If there are other ways of benefiting the 
future child, or of adding to the aggregate happiness in the world, apart 
from avoiding disease traits, why should these not be, at very least, 
permitted? 
A recent argument from Katrien Devolder and Thomas Douglas 
contends that reproductive decisions should be guided by a principle of 
Wide Procreative Beneficence, whereby the choices of prospective 
parents should be guided by considerations of benefit to third parties, 
and to society, as well as ‘individualistic’ concern for the resulting child. 
They provided examples of disinclination towards violent aggression, or 
eating red meat, as traits that would predictably benefit society. While 
not unproblematic, this suggestion at least seems to be consistent with 
a utilitarian concern with maximising good outcomes, rather than a 
                                                     
34  A couple of additional exceptions are permitted for identifying an embryo that will be 
a tissue match for an existing child ” the so-called ‘saviour sibling’ scenario ” and for 
resolving situations of uncertainty as to which embryo belongs to which gamete donors. 





somewhat arbitrary principle of avoiding certain sub-optimal 
outcomes.35 
Shaw has (2008: 409) argued that ‘from the point of view of the 
beneficence principle ” we should try to create more benefit rather than 
less ” this is true. But we do not have an obligation to enhance our 
children beyond the norm, and an impartial perspective can easily 
accommodate an obligation to avoid harm (the nonmaleficence 
principle) without an accompanying obligation to provide benefit 
beyond the norm.’ There may be other reasons why enhancement is 
more problematic than avoiding illness or disability (though as Harris 
has argued (2007), this distinction is far from easy to draw or 
straightforwardly relevant), but it is not obvious why a maximising 
consequentialist would regard increasing the pot of human happiness 
by avoiding harm to be more worthwhile than achieving the same 
outcome by promoting benefit. 
In trying to find a ‘middle way’ between those who believe PGD to 
be morally mandatory (though it should be noted that neither 
Savulescu nor Harris believe it should be legally compulsory) and those 
who would prohibit it outright, the UK Government seems to have 
alighted on an approach that avoids any of the profound ethical 
questions asked of genesis decisions, and of the previous legislation. 
The new legislation appears not to be informed by the Parfitian non-
identity conclusion, but neither does it do justice to either of the 
alternative models I have considered. Instead of promoting a ‘best 
outcome’ approach ” for the future child, or the world in general ” the 
legislation focuses on normal functioning. Yet it stops short even of 
requiring steps to achieve this, outside of the particular ” and thus far 
very rare ” scenario of a couple who wish deliberately to create a 
disabled child.  
The non-identity conclusion ” my own preferred approach ” 
maintains that there is no ethical problem with choosing for or against 
disability, or for that matter refusing to make any choice at all. The 
‘generic child’ and the non-person-affecting approaches, in contrast, 
would seem to regard the avoidable creation of disability/ harm as 
wrong, whether that was by a positive choice of a ‘disabled embryo’ or 
a refusal to use technologies like PGD or (as a last resort) donor 
gametes or embryos. Whichever approach is preferred, however, it is 
difficult to understand the ethical basis for the particular limitations 
placed on reproductive choice by the 2008 Act. 
 
                                                     
35  Paper presented by Katrien Devolder, Ethics After Harm conference, University of 
Otago, January 2010. 
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Abstract 
Control at a distance (cybernetics) has been one of the achievements of 
modern law. Since the advent of the printing press, written law has 
been instrumental for those in power to rule over a large jurisdiction 
with a great many subjects: enabling sovereign power to rule by law. 
Moving from absolutism to the rule of law basically meant that law 
gained a measure of autonomy between ruler and subjects, still 
providing the means to govern but also providing individual citizens 
with legal instruments to resist those in charge. This chapter argues 
that both the rule by law and the rule of law have been an affordance of 
the printing press, extending the distantiations in time and space 
already inherent in the script, thus exponentially reinforcing the need for 
interpretation and the related delays and hesitations that precede the 
application of law in court. Looking into the novel communication 
infrastructures we can observe a shift from the linear sequential 
thought processes particular to the age of the printing press to the 
parallel processing typical for the era of real time computing. We argue 
that this shift enlarges the scope for virtualisation (computer mediated 
real time modeling and simulation), but simultaneously collapses the 
distantiations implied in the logic of the script, washing away the need 
for reflection that is preconditional for critical reasoning as well as for a 
fair trial. Speed and instantaneity are replacing delay and distance as 
pertinent features of communication. We then argue that lawyers must 
urgently align with computer scientists to advise the legislator on how 
to redesign the emerging socio-technical infrastructure in a way that 
affords the central tenets of constitutional democracy. Building on the 
concept of Ambient Law this means that the democratic legislator must 
become involved in articulating the necessary safeguards into the socio-
technical infrastructure these safeguards aim to protect against. 
 
9.1. Introduction 
The question I want to raise in this chapter ” and to which I have only 
the beginnings of an answer ” is how we can sustain the legal 
protections based on the technologies of the script and the printing 
press, in the face of an epistemic shift towards a digital age. This shift 
threatens to collapse the distance needed for the contestation of the 
way we are being profiled and treated.  




Some of the crucial protections provided by modern law, notably 
privacy, non-discrimination and due process, may be an affordance of 
the socio-technical infrastructure of the printing press. This can be 
explained by the fourfold distantiation inherent in the script as 
described by philosopher Paul Ricoeur (section 2). The reinforcement 
of this distantiation, brought about by the printing press, evoked the 
need for interpretation, which in turn generated the built-in hesitation 
and delay of the fair trial, thus creating a space and time for the 
contestation of dominant frames of interpretation (section 3). The shift 
from the script and the printing press to the digital era provokes an 
epistemic shift that magnifies what cyberphilosopher Pierre Lévy has 
called the virtualisation that was already enabled by the printing press, 
while ” with the advent of web 2.0 and web 3.0 ” this virtualisation 
paradoxically threatens to collapse the distantiations afforded by the 
script and the printing press (section 4). The reason for this paradox 
seems to be that though the world wide web exponentially increases 
geographical distantiations, it moves towards a continuous real time 
synchronization that collapses the distance in time. 
The collapse of distance is triggered by the increasing usage of Web 
2.0 technologies (or Social Networking Sites, SNSs in short), and a 
simultaneous explosion of multitasking, especially in the generation 
that has grown up with web 1.0 and 2.0. The mind of what Palfrey and 
Gasser (2008) call ‘digital natives’ is no longer equivalent with the 
linear-sequential mind of what I would call the ‘bookish digital 
immigrant’: authors like Tapscott (2009) actually speak of a cognitive 
structure geared to instant parallel processing and multitasking, 
favouring speed and pertinence rather than the hesitation and delay of 
the printing press era. It seems that though digital natives’ capacity for 
‘scrutiny’ is impressive, it is based on parallel processing and is wary of 
cumbersome linear thought processes. It does not seem to equate with 
the critical thinking typical for the bookish mind.  
The collapse of distance, described in section 4, is further 
elaborated in section 5, and related to the emergence of a new sense of 
time-space, often called ‘real time’, conflating distance in time and 
space to a new kind of synchronisation, afforded by the new 
technological infrastructure (global communication and mobility across 
different time zones, immediate access to unprecedented amounts of 
machine readable content). The problem is that the condensation of 
space-time inherent in real time communications and interactions 
renders invisible that communication and interaction is always a matter 
of interpretation, a fact that is apparent when using ‘slow’ technologies 
like the script or the printing press. As interpretation becomes less 





diminished if not annulled, thus favouring the dominant or customised 
frames of interpretation supplied by the digital environment.  
 
9.2. The Law and the Script: Control at a Distance 
If we follow Lawrence Lessig (1999: 3) in defining cybernetics as 
‘control at a distance by devices’ the most interesting device for control 
until the advent of computers has been the script, especially since it 
aligned itself with the law.1 In fact, politically speaking, control at a 
distance has been one of the achievements of modern law. Harold 
Berman’s encompassing history of The Western Legal Tradition (1983) 
demonstrates how the use of written legal texts that were imposed as 
law by the popes and later by the kings, enabled them to rule over a 
vast congregation, people or territory, especially in combination with 
the peace of God that stood for the beginnings of a monopoly of 
violence. Berman traces the epistemic shift from a predominantly oral 
legal tradition that is grounded in adjudication to a written legal 
tradition that is based on the competence to legislate. Whereas oral 
traditions depend on a mediative trial (Salas, 1992; Glenn, 2006; 
Berman, 1983; Collins and Skover, 1992) in which the judge has to win 
the cooperation of the parties because there is no state authority to 
back the verdict, written traditions usually coincide with the beginnings 
of statehood, developing codes that can be used in courts even if they 
initially only claim to summarize the unwritten oral law of the people 
whose legal habits they depict (for instance the leges barbarorum). By 
assigning scribes to the task of codifying the oral laws of their people, 
and subsequently requiring judges to apply these codes, the kings got a 
grip on the life of their subjects, even if the ‘control’ they intended was 
moderate and depended on a subtle balance of power between 
subjects, lords and overlord.2 
Building on anthropology, history and media studies (Goody and 
Watt, 1963; Ong, 1982; Berman, 1983; McLuhan, 1994 (1964); 
Eisenstein, 2005 (second edition)), several legal scholars have 
described the impact of the transition from orality to the scribal age to 
the printing press on legal institutions (Berman, 1983; Katsh, 1995b; 
Katsh, 1995; Hildebrandt, 2002; Glenn, 2004; Hildebrandt, 2008), 
extending their analyses to the potential impacts of the transition to the 
digital era (Collins and Skover, 1992; Katsh, 1995b; Katsh, 1995a; 
                                                     
1 Lessig may be wrong, because Norbert Wiener (1965), who coined the term in 1948, 
was perhaps more involved in how systems monitor and control themselves.  
2 The overlord or suzereign initially did not have any jurisdiction over the subjects of his 
vassals (the lords of the land). 




Glenn, 2004; Hildebrandt and Koops, 2007; Hildebrandt, 2008).3 Some 
of the authors offer detailed analyses of the institutional transitions 
within Anglo-American law, based on well known insights of media 
studies, discussing the implications of hypertexting and the changing 
speed of communication and information exchange across vast 
distances, for instance pointing out the way this may affect the role of 
precedent as typical for the age of the printing press (Katsh, 1995b).4 
My own interest is more focused on the epistemic implications of novel 
technological infrastructures, building on philosophers of technology, 
like Ihde (1990; 2002) and cyberspace philosophers like (Lévy, 1990) 
and (De Mul, 2003), steering free from the Scylla of technological 
determinism as well as from the Charibdis of social determinist 
constructivisms.  
One of the most salient analyses of the epistemic shift from orality 
to the script, has been made by Paul Ricoeur (1986), who has written 
extensively on time, narrative and human identity. Ricoeur (1986) 
depicts a fourfold distantiation (Geisler 1985).5 
First, the script literally inscribes into matter what was in the mind; 
it fixates what was ephemeral on clay tablets, into stone, and later on 
paper and screen (though we may wonder to what extent this is still 
fixed). In externalising and fixing thought, the volatility of the spoken 
word is suspended. Paradoxically the attempt to fixate a calculation or a 
story leads to a distantiation of the meaning of what is written, because 
the text can change hands and be read beyond the presence of the 
author. This distantiation of meaning generates a need for 
interpretation, because in the absence of the author the reader can 
never be sure what the author meant. 
  Second, the script liberates what is written down from the custody of 
the author, because even after his death and beyond his reach the text 
can be read and acted upon. This entails the distantiation of the author 
that initiates the need for interpretation and creates a situation in 
which the context of the reader co-determines the meaning of the text. 
This does not imply that the meaning of the text is now determined by 
the reader’s response only, as the reader will communicate with others 
                                                     
3 I thank Dan Burk for referring me to several US authors on this subject: in particular 
Collins and Skover (1992), Katsh (1995a) and Katsh (1995b).  
4 For a skeptical review of the US authors see Ross (2002), who criticizes what he calls 
high-level generalizations and a lack of attention to the social and political embodiment 
of such technologies, which can mute or reinforce whatever ‘logic’ seems to inhere in a 
particular technology. For relevant insights into the way technologies mediate human 
perception and behaviours see Ihde (1990; 2002) and Bijker and Law (1994), stressing 
what some call the social shaping of technologies. I would refer to Ihde (2008) in saying 
that while we are busy inventing technologies, our technologies also invent us. 





and be constrained by their interpretation, especially by the constraints 
produced by the network of texts that cross reference each other. 
Third, the script enables a shift from ostensive to non-ostensive 
reference. A reference is ostensive if it refers to a shared Umwelt, 
presuming that whoever speaks and whoever listens are both present 
during the conversation and thus capable of pointing directly to things 
in their environment. Words like ‘that’, ‘here’, ‘now’, ‘those people’, 
‘you’ are deictic terms that presume simultaneous presence of a 
speaker and whom she addresses. The script affords a distantiation of 
ostensive reference, opening a space and time not present, creating a 
Welt that is distinct from the Umwelt, allowing for a virtualisation from 
the actual in which we are implicated. Again, this generates a need for 
interpretation, precisely because we are reading about what is not 
present, what cannot be touched, pointed at, smelled or seen. 
Fourth, the script enables a virtually unlimited audience to be 
addressed, thus creating a virtual ” invisible, undetermined ” public 
that is extended geographically (in space) and historically (in time). 
This depicts the distantiation of the audience, again producing a need 
for interpretation, because the con-text of the text changes as it travels 
to other interpretive communities. 
This fourfold distantiation can be connected with a similar process 
of distantiation in the constitution and application of the law. As the 
law is written down, fixated, externalised and objectified its meaning 
becomes more fragile, open to discussion; as the author of the written 
law (the legislator and the judge) has less control over how his words 
are being read, those who read and speak the law need to develop 
techniques to stabilise the meaning in the face of the many ways it can 
be read; as the written law is no longer tied to a shared Umwelt it can 
become cross-contextual and more abstract; as the audience of the law 
extends it becomes possible to enlarge the scope of a jurisdiction, 
allowing for a much larger scope of control (at a distance).  
In the next section we will see how this fourfold distantiation is 
reinforced by the invention of the printing press, which multiplies the 
distantiation in both time and space, creating a host of new 
possibilities for control and a host of new problems inherent in control 
at a distance. Moreover, as I will argue, the fragility of the written text 
that is inherent in the distantiation it encompasses, creates a 
vulnerability for those who rule by law, as they can never be sure how 
their law will ” at the end of the day ” be interpreted and applied. 
 




9.3. The Law and the Printing Press – Authority and Contestation 
Since the advent of the printing press, written law has been 
instrumental for those in power to rule over a large jurisdiction with a 
great many subjects: enabling sovereign power to rule by law. The 
germs of this sovereign power can be traced in the distantiation in time 
and space made possible by the script, but the printing press 
multiplied the effects of this distantiation in an exponential way. This 
afforded the shift from suzereignty to sovereignty, which entails a 
transition from a fragile reciprocity between feudal lords and their 
overlord to a firm grip by the overlord on his vassals and their subjects, 
eventually ruling out the difference between them ” as they all ended up 
as subjects of the sovereign. The printing press allows the sovereign to 
construct a layer of loyal administrative servants who can be instructed 
on the basis of copies of the same text, thus affording the growth of a 
bureaucracy capable of ruling all those that fall within the jurisdiction of 
the administration, all based on the multiplication of printed text. The 
absolute king thus rules by law, using the law as an instrument of 
control at a distance, keeping tight control over its application by the 
emerging administration, but also keeping the lid on the royal courts 
that adjudicate on the meaning of the law in the name of the king (rex 
lex loquens, the king speaks the law). This rule by law is basically a rule 
by man, not to be confused with the rule of law. Rule by law continues 
as long as the king is the ultimate arbiter of what the law means in 
individual cases, due to his power to intervene in case law, casting 
aside a judge who contest the King’s desired interpretation of the law.  
While the sovereign rule by law is an affordance of the printing 
press, this technology also contains the affordances for a rule of law to 
come about. The sheer volume of texts that can be published, read and 
discussed produces an unprecedented amount of what we would now 
call legal information: laws, decrees, case law, restatements, doctrinal 
treatises, handbooks, scholarly explorations that all refer to each other, 
trying to accomplish the task of safeguarding legal certainty. This then 
produces a class of professional lawyers who appropriate this task of 
reconstructing the vast body of law in order to sustain its coherence, 
legitimacy and effectiveness. This class practices indexing, 
systemisation, rationalisation and coherent intertextual reference, 
resisting the influence of those not skilled in the workings of the law, 
whether they are kings, clergy, nobility or merely subjects. In caring for 
the coherence, legitimacy and effectiveness of the law, the lawyers end 
up giving birth to the law as an autonomous socio-technical construct, 
woven out of the body of interrelated legal texts whose meaning can no 





not present us with an absolute but a relative and not an introvert but a 
relational autonomy, distinguishing as well as connecting law, politics 
and ethics. The autonomy of the law is the product of the fourfold 
distantiation triggered by the script and its exponential expansion by 
the printing press. In putting it this way, I don’t mean to suggest that 
there is a causal or deterministic connection between the printing press 
and the autonomy of law. Technologies have certain affordances 
(Gibson, 1986), they trigger certain behaviours (Lévy, 1990), they make 
possible what was not possible before and/or rule out previous habits 
of thought and action. I would say that they are constitutive or 
regulative of our behaviour patterns rather than arguing that they cause 
them (Hildebrandt, 2008). The language of cause and effect claims too 
much and clarifies too little.   
The most salient demonstration of the birth of the autonomy of the 
law is Chief Justice Coke’s remonstrance against absolutist King James 
I’s attempt to interfere in the application of the law: 
Then the King said that he thought the law was founded upon reason, 
and that he and others had reason as well as the Judges: to which it was 
answered by me, that true it was, that God had endowed His Majesty 
with excellent science, and great endeowments of nature; but His 
Majesty was not learned in the laws of his realm of England, and causes 
which concern the life, or inheritance, or goods or fortunes of his 
subjects, are not to be decided by natural reason but by artificial reason 
and judgement of law, which law is an art which requires long study and 
experience, before that a man can attain to the cognizance of it.6 
The printed script thus enabled royal absolutism, based on a rule by 
law (rex lex loquens), but in the end the proliferation of printed text 
provided the tools to resist absolute rule, creating the preconditions for 
the rule of law (iudex lex loquens ” le juge comme bouche de la loi).7 
Moving from absolutism to a legally framed moderate government 
basically meant that law gained a measure of autonomy between ruler 
and subjects, providing the means to govern but also providing 
individual citizens with legal instruments to resist those in charge. 
Positive law attributes powers, turning them into legal competences 
and thus limiting their scope and exercise. This, again, is an affordance 
of the printed law, as it provides the room for interpretation and the 
                                                     
6 Sir Edward Coke, conference between King James I and the Judges of England in 1608, 
12 Coke's Reports 63, 65, 77 English Reports 1342, 1343 (King's Bench, 1608). Quoted 
by Posner (1990: 762). 
7 Montesquieu’s famous adage is often understood as a reference to mechanical 
interpretation, but his point is more probably that the judge and not the king should 
interpret (speak) the law (cf. Schönfeld, 2008). 




need for precise articulation of the protective as well as the 
instrumental dimensions of the law. 
 
9.4. Law in a Smart World – The Collapse of Distance 
9.4.1. Distantiation? 
In acknowledging that modern law is a product of a particular 
epistemic shift made possible by a specific socio-technical 
infrastructure the question is raised what this means for law in a ‘smart 
world’. How does the continuous availability of seemingly unlimited 
amounts of information and the subsequent need for scrutinizing, 
filtering and selecting affect your capability to seriously digest and 
analyze the knowledge it may contain? How does multitasking (like the 
combination of watching television, emailing, searching the web and 
checking social networking sites) affect your ability to reflect on the 
knowledge that is presented? How does hyperlinking from text to text 
affect the ability to sustain a carefully constructed line of thought? How 
do interactive websites where you click to get into the slots that raise 
your interest affect your attention span and your ability to focus? 
Evidently these questions can be addressed from a variety of 
perspectives but in this paper I am going to opt for one only. The 
question we face here is how digitalisation affects the fourfold 
distantiation described above. 
 
9.4.2. The New Brain: Digital Natives, Immigrants; Net Geners and 
Boomers 
To explore the effects of digitalisation on the distantiation that is typical 
for the era of the printing press, I will now present some of the findings 
of neuropsychologists and others who have investigated the cognitive 
styles of the generation that has grown up with the web. If the effects of 
the digitalisation are to be traced, this seems to be the right place to 
look for them. The idea that our current digitally mediated information 
and communication practices have an impact on the brain, has been 
put forward by neuropsychologists like, for instance, Gary Small. In his 
iBrain. Surviving the technological alteration of the mind he writes 
(Small and Vorgan, 2008: 77):  
Hyperactivity, inattention, depression, and multitasking mania are just 
a few of the behavioral consequences of the new techno-brain, though 
admitting that the science behind the way technology affects behavior 
and mental state is only in its infancy.  
Small is especially worried about the lack of face to face 
communication that he thinks threatens the brains of those who 





(Small and Vorgan, 2008: 115-148). He warns that (Small and Vorgan, 
2008: 73): 
with the digital age evolving our brains, some experts argue that our 
society in general is becoming more autistic. 
Small even correlates this with an underdevelopment of the amygdala 
(an almond shaped part of the brain that integrates complex 
information from different parts of the brain, and that is found to be 
smaller in cases of autism). This is interesting as other researchers 
already found that the rate of people with mild forms of autism in the 
vicinity of Silicon Valley is extraordinary high, finding a correlation 
between autism, (computer) nerds and excellence in functions located 
in the right side of the brain (Raitey and Johnson, 1998). American 
scientist and industrial designer Temple Grandin (2000), wrote about 
her own autism under the title ‘My Mind is a Web Browser: How 
People with Autism Think’. She writes  
I seem to lack a higher consciousness composed of abstract verbal 
thoughts that are merged with emotion.  
Grandin’s type of autism means that she basically thinks in pictures, 
not in words. She explains how the language part of her brain and the 
"thinking in pictures" part seem to interact:  
My mind works just like an Internet Web browser. A Web browser finds 
specific words; by analogy, my mind looks for picture memories that are 
associated with a word. It can also go off on a tangent in the same way 
as a Web browser, because visual thinking is non-linear, associative 
thinking. 
Autism connects to difficulties with abstract thought, as well as 
emotion. Abstract thinking requires a distantiation from ostensive 
reference, reaching out beyond the here and now, but still relating the 
abstract concepts to the concrete things they denote across different 
contexts. It is, however, one thing to find that autists have a problem 
with abstraction and are therefore attracted to working with computers, 
and quite another to suggest that working with computers could also 
lead to non-autist persons developing brains similar to those of autists. 
More research is needed to figure out to what extent and under what 
circumstances this can be confirmed (or falsified).   
Whereas Small seems to focus on negative impacts others can 
hardly conceal their enthusiasm. Tapscott (2009) discusses a number 
of research findings about what he calls the Net Geners (Net 
Generation) or Digital Natives (cf. Prensky, 2001; Palfrey and Gasser, 
2008). To give the reader a quick survey of the direction this research 
takes, I will provide some salient quotes. Tapscott notes (2009: 104) 
that  




boomers [the Baby Boom generation, or Digital Immigrants, MH] 
typically go from beginning to end ” whether it’s writing an essay, 
watching The Ed Sullivan Show, or reading the instructions before 
working the remote control. (…) The Net Gener doesn’t operate in this 
sequential way. Using tools like keywords in Google, hypertext, and 
‘clicking, cutting, and pasting,’ today’s young person can search for and 
organize information containing links to other information.  
He observes (2009: 105):  
It’s as though their cognitive structures were parallel, not sequential 8 
referring to Marc Prensky’s argument that  
‘this is one way that digital immersion has literally rewired brains under 
40’.  
Tapscott (2009: 108-9) cites Jordan Grafman, head of the cognitive 
neuroscience section at the National Institute of Neurological 
Disorders and Stroke (NINDS) as saying that  
the more you multitask, the less deliberative you become; the less 
you’re able to think and reason out a problem and the more you’re 
willing to rely on stereotypical solutions.  
Tapscott nevertheless concludes that Net Geners are ‘mentally agile’ 
(2009: 118), and he describes the ‘norms’ (distinctive attitudinal and 
behavioural characteristics) that differentiate the Net Geners from their 
elders as freedom, customization, scrutiny, integrity, collaboration, 
entertainment, speed and innovation (Tapscott, 2009: 74).9 
I don’t think that it makes sense to discuss these distinctive 
characteristics in terms of good and bad compared with the ‘norms’ 
generated by the printing press. However, as these environments may 
introduce radical epistemic discontinuities that dissolve some of the 
affordances of the socio-technical infrastructure of the printing press, 
we should anticipate how this affects the legal framework of 
constitutional democracy. This framework presumes and produces 
citizens with a critical mind, capable of taking in lots of information 
without taking for granted anything that is written in print. The type of 
critical thought characteristically associated with printing press type of 
assessing information is based on a linear-sequential of reading 
information (starting on page 1 at the left top, moving from left to 
rights en from top down ” sentence by sentence ” and from page to 
page until the end of the book), and thrives on distancing oneself from 
                                                     
8 Tapscott is citing William D. Winn, Director of the Learning Center at the University of 
Washington’s Human Interface Technology Laboratory, from Prensky (2001). 





whatever is presented while still following the line of thought 
throughout an entire article or book. Critical assessment is also a 
matter of taking distance in time, by incorporating delays and 
hesitations that allow time for chewing on the information provided, 
suspending one’s judgement instead of assuming that one’s first 
intuitions are generally right.10 There is a healthy scepticism that seems 
to come naturally to the reading mind, having been confronted with 
opposite claims in print too often to be surprised. One may guess that 
Net Geners develop their own ” different ” form of scepticism. What 
Tapscott calls the ‘scrutiny’ of the Net Geners stands for their capacity 
to quickly detect unreliable information (spam, phishers, inaccuracies, 
hoaxes, scams, and misrepresentations) amidst the flood of bites that 
are competing for their attention (2009: 81). As they move ahead from 
click to click in search of interesting, entertaining or pertinent 
information, the overdose of noise does not merely make them 
sceptical but rather forces them to be alert, speedy and hungry for the 
right answer even before the question has crystallized ” recognizing it 
when they bump into it, without going through the neat sequential 
process typical for the bookish mind.  
We may conclude that there is a kind of parallel processing that 
seems intrinsic to the mind of frequent web-users, differing radically 
from the linear-sequential mind of those immersed in the culture of the 
book. At the level of the brain there seems a shift from left to right 
hemisphere thinking. How must we understand this epistemic of 
parallel processing in relation to the distance inherent in the epistemic 
of linear, narrative or argumentative discourse? 
 
9.4.3. Distantiation and Virtualisation 
In his magnificent description of what he calls ‘technologies of 
intelligence’ cyberphilosopher Pierre Levy (1990) traces the epistemic 
shifts from orality through script and printing press to the present era 
of the digital. Instead of speaking of distantiations he discusses the 
process of disentanglement of the text from its intended meaning, from 
the author, from its ostensive reference, and from a restricted audience 
in terms of virtualisation. He thereby integrates a vocabulary 
introduced by Deleuze, who differentiated between the possible and the 
real on the one hand and the virtual and the actual on the other. The 
possible is not real but it does not leave any room for creative 
application: becoming real is a matter of mechanical application. A 
computer program that executes itself renders manifest what was 
                                                     
10  About hesitation as a crucial characteristic of the ‘régime de veridiction’ of the law, 
see Latour (2004). See the English translation of chapter 5 at http://www.bruno-
latour.fr/articles/article/088.html. (accessed 26 February 2010). 




possible, its application is real but does not bring anything new that 
was not determined in its design. The virtual, however, is already real, 
only not manifest: becoming actual is a process informed by 
constraints but not fully determined, requiring the invention of creative 
solutions to intervening problems. The seed of an oak tree may start 
growing if the circumstances are favourable, and though we can be 
sure that it will not become manifest as a birch or a chimpanzee we 
cannot predict what kind of oak tree it will become. This will depend on 
the interplay between the seed and affordances of the environment at a 
specific point in time and space.  
Curiously, Lévy is more interested in the reverse process: moving 
from actualisation back to the virtual, which he defines as articulating 
the question to which an actualisation was an answer, or, situating the 
problem to which an actualisation was a solution. By reverting back to 
the question, room is created for other answers and by locating the 
problem, the scope for other solutions becomes visible. Understood in 
this sense, virtualisation is a matter of distantiation from the actual: 
from the actual meaning of the text as it was intended, from the actual 
author of a text, from the ostensive reference to an actual Umwelt, from 
an actual audience. As Lévy claims in other work (1998), language, 
money and contracts are all examples of virtualisation, broadening the 
scope for new and different actualisations by those who engage in or 
with them.   
At first sight digitalisation simply explodes the distantiation or 
virtualisation described so far. This explains Lévy’s enthusiasm for the 
digital age: it affords an unprecedented acceleration of the process of 
virtualisation, providing the possibility to break down reality into bits 
and pieces that can be stored as digital data, mined and recombined to 
form new information and unexpected knowledge constructs which can 
be actualised as new answers and different solutions to whatever 
problems we face. A perpetual process of de-contextualisation and de-
territorialisation is followed by re-contextualisation and re-
territorialisation, which ” in the flux of a moment ” can be 
deconstructed all over again into novel machine-readable bits and 
pieces. The result of all these instantaneous permutations and 
combinations (Kallinnikos, 2006) is a transition from a linear sense of 
time to segments and points, from accumulation of texts to instant 
access to texts, images and sounds (sampled and recombined), from 
delay and duration to real time and immediacy, from universalisation 
inherent in the printed script to recurring contextualisation, from theory 





syntax and pragmatics, from truth to effectiveness and from stability to 
change (Lévy, 1990).11 
What strikes me here, however, is that at some point the discourse 
moves away from distantiation to a kind of instantaneous integration of 
what was, is and is predicted to be as well as of the here with any kind 
of out there. It seems as if synchrony and diachrony collapse into each 
other due to an implosion rather than an explosion of distance. The 
virtual seems to become the first modality of the real, taking the place 
of the actual, or somehow conflating with it. It is tempting to celebrate 
this virtualisation-run-amok as an ultimate freedom from the 
constraints of the actual, but there are some drawbacks here.   
 
9.4.4. Implosion of Distantiation 
In an as yet unpublished paper, philosopher of technology Don Ihde 
saliently refers to this implosion when he describes the experience of 
what he calls ‘Einsteinian time’ ‘where space-time displays both its 
spatially distant, temporally located structure’.12 His description 
concerns his email communications with a Japanese host at a time 
difference of 12 hours, confronting him with a sense of ‘the materiality 
of temporality’. Interestingly he adds that 
 clearly such a space-time is neither linear nor universally uniform time. 
It is hard to articulate what differentiates this sense of space-time from 
our common sense experience of space and time as separate ‘Formen 
der Anschauung’ (Kant) that have a linear structure supposedly 
hardwired into the brains. The difficulty of articulating space-time may 
reside in this hardwiring, making it hard to escape the linearity of 
reasoning. It could be, however, that the difficulty is connected to the 
specific cognitive capacities developed in the era of the printing press. 
Writing down one’s argument induces (if not enforces) linear thinking. 
If the left hemisphere is where pattern recognition is sedimented 
                                                     
11  On the idea that modern law is basically geared to the conservation of continuity, see 
Katsh (1995a); less conventional, see Glenn (2004) on the profound insight that modern 
law has incorporated the idea and the possibility of explicit change, precisely because 
changes can be recorded in writing and print. Interestingly both authors discuss law in 
terms of information, though coming from very different angles. Lévy’s (1992) analysis 
goes much further than that of a mere acceleration of change. He seems to have 
grasped the partial conflation of time and space generated by web 2.0 technologies and 
the move from what Manovich (1998) called a shifting emphasis from narrative to 
database, well in advance of the widespread use of groupware and smart technologies.  
12  The paper ‘IT: Clouds and Cyberspace-Time’ was presented at the colloquium on 
‘The Impact of Autonomic Computing on Human Identity and Legal Subjectivity’ held 
on 16 January 2009 in Brussels, as part of the Conference on Computer, Privacy and 
Data Protection 2009 (CPDP2009). To be published as a chapter in Ihde (forthcoming 
2010). 




(Goldberg, 2006) we may guess that the practice of reading and writing 
hardwires us for linear thinking. This would entail a potential 
transformation of our perception of time-space due to the affordances 
of digital infrastructures. Increased virtualisation seems to coincide 
here with reduced distantiation. The culmination of the virtual, coupled 
with the implosion of distance allows one the experience of both 
oneself and the world in an extended here-there and now-then, which 
become entangled into an extended here-there-now-then. One comes 
to ride a wave of speed, scrutiny and simultaneity that could radically 
alters one’s perception of self and other, let alone one’s conception of 
‘things’ like privacy, fairness, non-discrimination, due process, equal 
treatment and the like. Concepts like privacy, due process and fair 
treatment all depend on a practice of distantiation, which sounds like 
an anachronism in the conflated virtual-actual worlds that we are on 
the verge of entering. Indeed such conflation is already visible in the 
interpenetration of the private and the public.   
The loss of distantiation could in fact trigger the end of law as we 
take it for granted today, generating other cybernetic technologies, 
geared more adequately to an offline world turned online (web 3.0). 
 
9.5. Regaining Control – Distantiation in the Era of Real Time Profiling 
9.5.1. Real Time Profiling and the Loss of Interpretation 
If written (printed) law was an important cybernetic technique that 
afforded (made possible) not only an extended sovereign rule by law, 
but also the moderate government constraint by the rule of law, we 
need to urgently assess how new cybernetic techniques interfere with, 
complement or reinforce the rule of law. Modern law has enabled 
citizens to contest dominant frames of interpretation imposed by 
governmental agencies, commercial enterprise or public opinion. This 
has afforded citizens a relative control over how their behaviours are 
categorized and qualified. Rights like that to privacy and data 
protection, as well as non-discrimination and due process restrict the 
extent to which citizens are determined by the interpretations of others, 
allowing them to resist stereotyping and normalisation.13 Law has a 
subversive dimension that crucially depends on the fact that any 
interpretation can ” at some point ” be contested, due to the ambiguity 
produced by the distantiation that is inherent in language, reinforced by 
the script and the printing press. Can the law provide citizens with 
novel legal instruments to regain such relative control against the 
                                                     
13  See also Stalder (2002), who discusses privacy as an affordance of the printing press, 
emphasizing the advent of silent ” private ” reading as a consequence of the 





statistically inferred interpretations of profiling machines operating in 
search machines (Amazon.com), social networks (Facebook), online 
gaming (World of Warcraft) or virtual worlds (Second Life)? Could it be 
that the introduction of novel cybernetic techniques, based on real time 
autonomic proactive computing implode the distance between author, 
text and reader to such an extent that interpretation becomes invisible 
and indistinguishable from perception and action? In the heading of 
this section I refer to this as a loss of interpretation. The reader may 
counter that what I intend to discuss is the loss of conscious 
awareness of the fact that interpretations are being made. This fits the 
linear-sequential logic of the era of the book: it presumes the 
distantiations that provoked the need for interpretation. From the 
perspective of parallel processing the concept of interpretation needs 
clarification. Concepts like simulation and dynamic modelling fit better 
with the synchronisation of events that take place at different places 
and at different points in time. It may be that what is loss of the 
conscious awareness of interpretation from a hermeneutical, textually 
saturated perspective, is simply a loss of interpretation from the 
perspective of real time parallel processing.14 
 
9.5.2. The Contestation of Real Time Interceptions 
The implosion of the distantiations discussed above creates what I 
would like to call ‘real time interception’. In technical terms ‘real time’ 
is defined as referring to ‘sensing and responding to external events 
nearly simultaneously (e.g., within milliseconds or microseconds) with 
their occurrence. It is employed mostly in systems in which the results 
of the computation are used to influence a process while it is 
occurring’.15 In much discourse about the internet, social networking, 
autonomic computing and AmI, ‘real time’ stands for the fact that 
communications originating from events that are dispersed in time 
and/or space coincide on the computer screen where they are also 
continuously updated. This update not only concerns events the user 
might be interested in, but also the profile of the ‘user’ who is 
assessing the screen. Based on machine profiling that involves real 
time matching between ‘available machine readable events’ and the 
inferred preferences of the user, every single user is confronted with a 
different screen (Sunstein, 2001). The online environment is not only 
                                                     
14  The implosion of distance and the related move from linear sequential thinking to 
parallel processing can be connected with a shift from narrative coherence to ‘database’ 
coherence, see Manovich (1998). 
15  Cf. the Linux website at http://www.linfo.org/real_time.html. (accessed 26 February 
2010). They contrast with: ‘time shifting, which is the situation in which a system 
responds to external events at its convenience or in batches.’ 




interactive, but tries to stay one step ahead of the user, proactively 
catering to her inferred informational needs and personal desires. Since 
amazon.com, we realise that the inference of our needs and desires are 
not based merely on our own past behaviour but on statistical 
correlations with a mass of other data. Real time updating of your 
amazon.com profile is not restricted to updates in relation to your own 
shopping behaviour, but consists of a continuous update of inferred 
group profiles (based on the shopping behaviour of the mass of 
amazon.com users) and may also relate to your clicking behaviours 
(checking which books you ‘visit’ without buying them). With 
‘interception’, I refer to the fact that one is continuously ‘leaking’ 
information that is intercepted, stored, aggregated and mined by 
profiling machines. This seamless, invisible interception of seemingly 
trivial behaviour, like biometric (e.g., keystroke), surfing (which types of 
websites do you visit) or transactional (online buying) behaviours, 
allows for real time application of profiles. In a way your own 
behaviours ” correlated with those of others ” are fed back to you, 
qualifying you as ‘that kind of person’, who ‘prefers this kind of 
furniture’, has ‘that type of friends’, reading ‘a specific range of journals 
of newspapers’, correlating with ‘such an earning capacity’ or with ‘this 
particular credit-risk’. 
The simultaneity that is implied in real time interception generates a 
continuity of synchronised machine interpretations. Due to the flux of 
the real time interception these interpretations are adapted even before 
we had time to consider them as interpretations. As Tapscott contends, 
the scrutiny of the digital native allows her to ride the wave of real time 
interceptions, providing her with an acute sense of control. One could 
counter, however, that she is the floating object of highly sophisticated 
machine manipulations that have no author in the traditional sense of 
the word, but that still direct her behaviours in a powerful way that can 
best be described as subliminal.   
 
9.5.3. Regaining Control? 
Now, let’s get back to the question of how the law can help this floating 
object to regain some form of control. How can a person contest or 
resist the way she is being profiled if the process of profiling is both 
invisible and in such flux that by the time you have access to a profile 
that concerns you has already been replaced ten times by newly attuned 
profiles? In other work I have looked into the issue of transparency, or 
rather the lack of it (Hildebrandt and Meints, 2006; Hildebrandt and 
Koops, 2007; Hildebrandt, 2008; 2009). Here I will try to assess the 
challenge of the speed inherent in real time interceptions for the 





distantiation, hesitation and delay that is typical for the bookish mind, 
it may fail to provide solace for those whose brains nourish on parallel 
processing. They may be merely irritated with the hesitation and delay 
afforded by the distantiations of the (printed) script, and opt for a 
default that skips such irritations. As noted above, the increased 
capacity of digital natives to process different types of information at 
the same time (multitasking) while instantly detecting what is reliable 
information amidst the noise (scrutiny) does not correlate with an 
increased capacity for critical thinking. The scepticism of the bookish 
mind is not equivalent with the scepticism of the online interconnected 
hyperlinked mind of the digital native. To regain the type of control that 
is based on bypassing one’s immediate reflexes in order to critically 
assess the content one is presented with and in order to critically 
assess the profiles that determine how one is treated we may need to 
design some delays into the socio-technical infrastructures.  
In other work, focusing on transparency issues, we have discussed 
the need for Ambient Law (AmLaw). The idea is that using written law 
to regulate the digitally interconnected environments (presently online, 
if AmI manifests itself also in the offline world turned online), is an 
inadequate undertaking, doomed to produce more ineffective legal 
protections that can be used to legitimise further encroachment on 
privacy and non-discrimination but hardly deliver the effective remedy 
we need (Hildebrandt and Koops, 2007; Hildebrandt, 2008). AmLaw 
would articulate legal transparency tools into the technical 
infrastructure, providing citizens with a reliable hunch of how they are 
being profiled by whom and which could be the consequences 
(Hildebrandt, 2009). The idea of using technologies ” instead of legal 
rules ” as instruments to regulate human behaviour, is nothing very 
new. Lessig (1999) has argued that computer code is indeed regulative 
” if not constitutive ” of society to an extent many legal scholars do not 
acknowledge. His point is that if we want to retain our constitutional 
safeguards we need to think hard about how to design the 
communication infrastructure in ways that afford ‘fair use’ of 
copyrighted materials and provide an incentive to preserve privacy with 
regard to digital personal information.16 Similarly Thaler and Sunstein 
(2008) have recently indicated how simple default settings in our 
physical and virtual worlds can ‘nudge’ us into desirable behaviours. 
                                                     
16  Building on insights of law and economics he proposes the commodification of 
personal information, thus creating a market that should empower users by giving them 
a measure of control over their personal data. Taking Lessig’s point seriously, Schwartz 
(2000) has convincingly refuted the idea that commodification would create a fair 
market, because of the immense knowledge asymmetry between those leaking personal 
data and those mining them. Transaction costs will induce a market failure. 




Though the recognition that technologies have a normative impact on 
human behaviour is a laudable step forward (Hildebrandt, 2008), 
especially for lawyers that seem overly focused on the use of written ” 
enacted ” texts to coordinate interaction, other legal scholars 
(Brownsword, Tien, Reidenberg) have rightly warned against the pitfalls 
of what could end up as a rule of technology instead of a rule of law 
(Hildebrandt, 2009). AmLaw does not advocate the use of 
technological instead of legal instruments, which would imply an 
instrumentalist conception of both law and technology. First, AmLaw 
acknowledges that law is already technologically embodied in the 
technology of the script. Second, AmLaw suggests articulating legal 
norms into the technological infrastructure we need to protect against. 
By emphasizing that it is legal norms that must be articulated in the 
novel communication technologies, the requirements of legal 
regulation in a constitutional democracy must be heeded: the 
enactment of these norms must be initiated by the democratic 
legislator and/or the courts and their application in concrete cases 
must be made contestable in a court of law. These two constitutive 
features of democratic government and the rule of law prevent the use 
of technology instead of law: AmLaw is not merely a matter of 
implementing written law by means of effective technologies, thus 
forcing citizens into compliance. That would indeed be the end of the 
rule of law. The legislator will have to sit down with computer scientists 
and experts in constructive technology assessment (Rip, 1995) and 
human computer interfaces (Suchman, 2006) to co-design the 
affordances of the novel infrastructures, taking care that whatever 
defaults are set in place citizens must have effective means to contest 
the application of legal rules as unjust, unfair or as an invasion of their 
privacy not necessary in a democratic society (art. 8 (2) of the European 
Convention of Human Rights). 
As mentioned above, we have worked on AmLaw as a way to 
attribute technologically embodied transparency rights with regard to 
profiling technologies (Hildebrandt, 2009). This is a formidable 
challenge, because most transparency enhancing technologies (TETs) 
are focused on personal data instead of the profiles with which these 
data match. Even so, transparency will not solve the issue of speed and 
the concurrent collapse of distance that seems a more profound 
epistemic shift of which the lack of transparency may be a mere 
symptom. Indeed transparency won’t solve the problem if it means 
providing users with lengthy details about algorithms or lots of text 
explaining how they are being profiled. Digital natives will probably find 
this utterly boring content that takes attention away from what they 





for issues like privacy, due process and non-discrimination, we will 
have to figure out how this distantiation can be built into the emerging 
infrastructure without destroying the many advantages it brings. The 
point will be to retain the increased virtualisation while reinstalling the 
distantiations that allow for a deeper scrutiny. The question is whether 
this is possible: to have our cake and eat it too. 
 
9.6. Concluding Remarks 
So far, law has been articulated in the technologies of the script and the 
printing press. This has afforded an epistemic shift entailing a fourfold 
distantiation: of the meaning of a text, of its author, of ostensive 
reference and of its public. This distantiation has turned the law into an 
effective cybernetic technique, if we understand cybernetics as ‘control 
at a distance’. At the same time, it has turned the law into an 
instrument of protection, because of the need for interpretation 
generated by the distance between author and reader of the law 
(legislator and subject), thus also triggering the advent of a relative 
autonomy of the law. Legal protections like the right to privacy and 
non-discrimination as well as due process fit the epistemic of 
hesitation and delay, enabling reflection, autonomy and contestation. 
The digitally mediated mind of a new generation, called digital 
natives or net geners, is no longer geared to the linear-sequential 
cognitive style of the bookish mind. Instead of starting to read at the 
left-top part of a page and slowly and steadily moving from left to right, 
from top to bottom and from page to subsequent page, the digital 
native practices parallel processing and multitasking, keeping an eye on 
everything and clicking on whatever appears to be pertinent. The speed 
and immediate perceptive skills of digital natives contrast with the 
careful step-for-step intake of information of digital immigrants: the 
scrutiny of the net gener seems of a different kind compared to the 
critical mind of the prototype of the bookish mind: the learned scholar. 
The shift from printing press cognitive structures to real time 
parallel processing seems to involve the collapse of the distantiation 
inherent in the previous socio-technical infrastructure. Though we can 
expect both infrastructures to co-exist (the script has not entirely 
disappeared with the advent of the printing press ” though it may still 
disappear with the advance of the keyboard and the computer screen) 
the impact of real time communication and interaction between 
humans and machines will have a profound impact on how we perceive 
and interpret our environments. The problem that I have tried to 
outline in this paper is that the implosion of distance could jeopardize 
our ability to critically assess the way our environments communicate 




and interact with us. Immediacy and instant pertinence cannot replace 
reflective thinking, needed to acknowledge that and how our behaviour 
is being interpreted (for instance, by profiling machines).  
The challenge for the law is to rethink its technological articulation. 
To sustain the distantiation inherent in modern law legal protection will 
need to be rearticulated into the digital infrastructures that will soon 
regulate our daily life, our critical infrastructures, our educational and 
professional settings, healthcare, defence etc. To ensure the distance 
needed for hesitation and contestation as preconditions for the legal 
protection of privacy, non-discrimination and due process this distance 
will have to be introduced into the emerging smart, real time 
environments. To succeed, the distance will have to be a constitutive 
part of the smart infrastructure, without losing the thread between law 
and the digitally native citizens it aims to protect. As discussed in other 
work, designing legal protection into the Ambient Intelligent 
environment (Ambient Law) will require creative cooperation between 
lawyers, legislators, computer scientists and citizens. This paper is 
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Abstract 
According to Hegel, the basic assignment of philosophy is to capture 
the present in thoughts. When it comes to understanding our present, 
an assessment of the technosciences and their impact on our view on 
nature, society and ourselves must be of key importance. A prominent 
feature of contemporary technosciences resides in their pervasiveness: 
the extent to which they pervade nature, society and human bodies, 
even on a molecular level, as well as each other. On the one hand, the 
20th century is the era of the elementary particles, of identifying the 
elementary subatomic and molecular building blocks of matter and life. 
On the other hand, it is the era of complexity, of evolving systems. In 
both directions, our understanding of ourselves is challenged and 
deepened by technoscientific explorations. Increasingly, moreover, our 
technologies tend to become nature-like. This allows us to embed them 
more adequately in natural systems, but it also opens up 
unprecedented opportunities for modifying natural systems, including 
human bodies. How are we to address the bioethical and biopolitical 
prospects and concerns implied in these developments? 
 
10.1. Introduction: Assessing the Present and Exploring the Future: the 
Basic Assignment of Philosophy 
Das was ist zu begreifen, ist die Aufgabe der Philosophie (…) 
[Sie ist] ihre Zeit in Gedanken erfasst 
(Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel)1 
 
According to Hegel, the basic ‚assignment‛ of philosophy is to assess 
the present, to capture it in thoughts. When it comes to understanding 
our present (i.e. the contemporary world), science and technology, 
including their impact on contemporary knowledge societies, must 
evidently constitute a major target of reflection. Is it still possible, by 
way of a ‚Hegelian‛ effort, to capture the basic profile of the contempo-
rary sciences in a single term? Such an effort would constitute a 
starting point for a systematic exploration of the future, while such an 
exploration in its turn would provide us with input on how to address 
the bioethical and biopolitical challenges of the present. In the 
                                                     





following section, I will outline the idea that a rather prominent feature 
of the contemporary technosciences resides in their pervasiveness, the 
extent to which they are effectively pervading, and being pervaded by, 
each other, as well as by their scientific and social environments in 
various ways. They not only deepen and broaden our understanding of 
the world and of ourselves (section 3), but also produce new 
‚biomimetic‛ technologies that allow us to interact with natural 
systems, both ‚internally‛ (inside our bodies) and ‚externally‛ (outside 
our bodies), in more intimate and effective ways, opening up prospects 
for modification that are as fascinating as they are uncanny. 
 
10.2. Pervasive Science 
We are surrounded and embraced by her: powerless to separate 
ourselves from her, and powerless to penetrate beyond her (…). She is 
ever shaping new forms: what is, has never yet been, everything is new, 
and yet nought but the old. We live in her midst but know her not. She 
is incessantly speaking to us, but betrays not her secret. We constantly 
act upon her, and yet have no power over her (…). 
These are the opening lines of the first issue of the journal Nature, 
published in 1869 and written by Thomas Huxley. Actually, these lines 
were borrowed from Goethe’s famous fragment Die Natur. The basic 
idea of this paper is that what Goethe has written so eloquently about 
nature can now be written about the contemporary technosciences 
using the very same terms: we are surrounded by them, powerless to 
separate ourselves from them, we constantly act upon them, yet have 
no power over them.   
Thus, I take pervasiveness to be a key feature of the emerging 
technosciences. They pervade natural systems in various dimensions, 
from the immensities of the galaxy down to the nanoworld of 
elementary particles and the basic molecular structures of biomaterials 
and living systems. Moreover, technosciences are pervading the bio-
worlds of ecosystems and ecological networks, opening up unexplored 
realms of microbial life. But they also pervade us: our bodies and 
minds. Building on techniques ranging from genomics to brain 
imaging, they are analysing the dynamics of cognitive and emotional 
functions in a much more detailed way than ever before. Techno-
sciences (ICT, genomics, nanoscience) are permeating everyday life, 
becoming ubiquitous, embedded and highly adaptive. 
Technosciences also pervade each other. Disciplinary compartmen-
talisations give way to emerging supra-disciplinary fields, involving 
experts from a broad range of disciplines in large-scale research 





mental vs. applied research, nature vs. technology, subject vs. object) 
are increasingly difficult to uphold. Finally, emerging technosciences 
pervade and are pervaded by society in far-researching ways. They 
permeate the ways in which we communicate and interact with one 
another, significantly affecting social change in knowledge societies. At 
the same time, societal dynamics have a profound impact on the ways 
in which research is organised and research agendas evolve. 
Pervasiveness inspires both fascination and concern. 
Although the societal import of pervasiveness will eventually present 
itself in terms of concrete and acute bioethical issues, the assessment 
of these issues must build on a thorough analysis of the manner in 
which new scientific insights and approaches actually ‚inform‛ society, 
notably by affecting the way we see ourselves, i.e. the way in which we 
assess our contemporary being-in-the-world. This is done in two 
directions: firstly by deepening (on the molecular level) the molecular 
and genetic basis of our functioning as human beings; and secondly, by 
broadening (on the ecological level) our self-awareness of our 
embedding within complex and dynamical external networks. Thus, 
novel scientific approaches significantly influence the manner in which 
we assess our own functioning. Rather than expanding our knowledge 
of ourselves as human beings in an anthropocentric fashion, in isolat-
ion from the rest of the biosphere, our functioning is now explored and 
assessed against the backdrop of the internal and external networks 
that allow us to exist and are affected by our policies and behaviours, as 
individuals and as societies. Self-knowledge as such is not the end-
point of our desire to know. On the contrary, as has been articulated by 
Nietzsche, Foucault and others, the will to know (ourselves) is inspired 
by a will to transform, to control and to improve (ourselves). In terms 
of our ecological functioning, new scientific insights may provide 
opportunities for more sustainable forms of interaction and co-
development, but also for strengthening our technological sway of 
nature in more sophisticated and effective ways. In terms of physical 
and cognitive functioning, new scientific insights may provide 
opportunities for performance enhancement. Yet, in order to realize 
these opportunities, natural systems (including our own bodies) will be 
permeated by our probing and our modifications, and this process is 
bound to entail a plethora of (often unprecedented) bio-ethical 
quandaries. Although on the conceptual level the distinction between 
‚Self‛ versus ‚nature‛ and between understanding nature (or our-
selves) and manipulating nature (or ourselves) may be clear, in actual 
practice, in the context of emerging technosciences, these processes 
are often implicated in one another, so that manipulation enables us to 





may allow us to manipulate natural systems or human bodies in more 
effective ways. How should we assess these newly emerging avenues 
and opportunities for modification and self-modification? Before 
addressing the quandaries involved in bioethical and biopolitical terms, 
a thorough analysis of the type of knowledge involved is called for. 
Regardless of whether this analysis is directed towards the micro-
level of molecular functioning or towards the macro-level of ecological 
functioning, in both cases our will to know is inspired by the idea that 
novel technosciences may allow us to develop new generations of 
nature-like (bio-mimetic) technologies that may enable us to interact 
more directly and intimately with natural systems and processes, 
including ourselves. This is a perspective that provokes both 
fascination and unease. In the next sections, two core aspects of 
pervasiveness will be explored more thoroughly. On the one hand the 
relationship between pervasiveness and the Self (pervasive Self-
understanding) ” or rather: the blurring of the boundaries between 
technology and the Self ” and on the other hand the relationship 
between pervasiveness and nature ” or rather: the blurring of the 
boundaries between pervasive technologies and natural systems, 
represented by the emerging possibilities for biomimesis and 
biomimetic interventions.  
Scientific research takes place in the context of a triangular 
relationship involving three ‚poles‛ that mutually imply and affect one 
another, namely the pole of knowledge or science (the technosciences), 
the pole of nature (natural systems) and finally the human pole, the 
pole of the Self (of individuals, communities and societies). None of 
these poles can be meaningfully studied in isolation from the others. 
Nonetheless, in the context of philosophical research activities, the 
focus of attention may temporarily shift from science, to nature, to Self 
and vice versa.  
 
10.3. Pervasiveness and Self-knowledge 
‚Know then thyself, presume not God to scan, 
The proper study of mankind is man‛ 
(Alexander Pope, Essay on Man)2 
 
Having identified pervasiveness as a key feature of contemporary 
research activities, the ‚second step‛ in the argument begins from the 
observation that the ultimate target of the pervasive research under 
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study apparently resides in understanding, improving and managing 
human life itself. Thus, the outcomes of pervasive research are bound 
to significantly affect the ways in which we come to see, and 
subsequently to develop and manage ourselves. It is indeed 
astonishing that, regardless of the disciplinary backgrounds of the 
research communities involved ” (bio)physics, (bio)chemistry, 
(bio)informatics, the molecular life sciences, etc. ” they eventually are 
bound to contribute to the converging ambition of elucidating the 
functioning of ourselves as human beings. This is not to suggest that 
contemporary technosciences are anthropocentric in their basic 
orientation; rather the contrary is true. Paradoxically, although 
pervasive research entails important messages for self-understanding, 
it eventually undermines rather than strengthens an anthropocentric 
understanding of ourselves. Through pervasive research we deepen and 
broaden our self-understanding in the sense that we become 
increasingly aware of the entanglement of our functioning within the 
webs and networks of life on all levels. In order to understand 
ourselves, pervasiveness allows and incites us to focus on 
understanding our relatedness with other species as well as with a 
broad variety of natural systems. 
This ‚gathering‛ of research communities around the analysis of 
human life itself, is the outcome of a longer history. Whereas the first 
half of the 20th century is generally regarded as the Golden Age of 
modern physics, resulting in groundbreaking ‚applications‛ such as 
nuclear energy and the atomic bomb, most of which involved major 
and unprecedented ethical and biopolitical challenges, during the 
second half of the 20th century, the focus of the scientific revolution that 
began in 1900 (with the introduction of the quantum-concept, the 
mutation-concept, the rediscovery of Mendel, etc.) shifted towards the 
biofields, notably affecting the research practices that centred on 
elucidating human functioning. It is indeed astonishing that disciplines 
such as physics, chemistry, informatics etc. gradually shifted their focus 
of attention and by and large transformed themselves into biophysics, 
biochemistry, bioinformatics and the like. An important signal for this 
migration trend was the publication in 1944 by the prominent physicist 
Erwin Schrödinger of the scientific best-seller, What is life?, in which he 
urged physicists to turn attention to the elementary particles of life. The 
book coincided with the Manhattan Project and greatly influenced a 
whole cohort of physicists (Delbrück, Wilkins, Franklin, Crick, Collins, 
etc.) in migrating towards biofields ” a development that has had a 
significant impact on methodologies, technologies and mind-sets of 
life-science researchers. The discovery of the structure of DNA in 1953 





technologies and methods such as crystallography and molecular 
model-building, symbolised this trend. And physics brought with it the 
use of large equipment and, eventually, of big science. Indeed, an 
important aspect of the transformations currently evolving in research 
are the remarkable increase of pace and scale as well as the role of 
high-tech equipment, notably ICT. Eventually, these variously evolving 
disciplines will begin to address some of the unexplored domains of 
human life, notably on the molecular and ecological level, such as our 
‚internal‛ and ‚external‛ (genetic, molecular, neural, ecological, etc.) 
networks, thereby significantly challenging and affecting the way we 
look upon ourselves.  
Elsewhere (2007) I have outlines how genomics has fuelled and 
revivified fundamental debates concerning our ambition to know 
ourselves. (Bio)physics, (bio)chemistry, (bio)informatics and a plethora 
of other emerging research practices increasingly focus on elucidating 
human behaviour and human functioning on all levels (genetic, 
physiological, cognitive, behavioural) and in various dimensions. 
Firstly, by focusing on the extremely small, the study of life ‚from 
molecule to man‛. Thus, the analysis of our internal networks and 
pathways has become a converging field involving a broad range of 
experts from various scientific backgrounds (ranging from 
mathematics and physics up to the human sciences and humanities). 
Secondly, contemporary research practices are deepening our 
understanding of our embeddedness in socio-cultural and symbolical 
networks that greatly affect our cognitive functioning. Human 
intelligence is not only a result of our having a well-developed brain, 
but also the fact that our cultural and symbolical environment 
facilitates intelligent behaviour. In other words, our intelligence is the 
outcome of a complex interaction between our neural networks on the 
one hand and our symbolical systems and networks (verbal 
communication, writing, mathematics, politics, ethics, etc.) on the 
other. Thirdly, we have become increasingly aware of our intimate 
entanglement in broader networks and webs of life in various ways (the 
analysis of our external biological networks). We increasingly see 
ourselves as elements in ecological networks whose ‚health‛ and 
functioning is greatly dependent on our decisions, policies and 
behaviour. Moreover, we increasingly see ourselves as ‚super-
organisms‛, as containers hosting a plethora of microbial life forms, on 
whose ‚labour‛ the greater part of our metabolism depends. Finally, we 
increasingly see ourselves as the outcome of a history that must be 
interpreted as a narrative of evolving ecological networks rather than as 
a single-species (anthropocentric) story (Jones, 2001). Our history is 





various other species whose vicissitudes are intimately intertwined with 
ours, a story of interactions between human communities, 
domesticated animals, cultivated plants and modified environments. In 
other words, our understanding of ourselves is both deepened (on the 
molecular level) and broadened (on the socio-cultural level) and 
widened (on the ecological level). This increased Self-awareness opens 
up new challenges and possibilities for self-management (bioethics) 
and governance (biopolitics). 
Self-knowledge is not an end in itself, in terms of the cognitive 
insights it provides, but also a precondition for managing and even 
improving ourselves: our functioning as well as our societal and 
ecological embedding. And pervasive research furthers this process not 
only by enriching our understanding, but simultaneously by providing 
new tools and technologies that may allow us to use these insights for 
governance (biopolitics) and self-management (empowerment). 
Notably, pervasiveness gives rise to a plethora of bio-mimetic 
technologies that can in theory be applied to manage and improve, in a 
‚nature friendly‛ manner, both our own physiological, senso-motorial 
and cognitive functioning as well as the functioning of the ecosystems 
we inhabit. 
 
10.4. Biomimesis as a Key Aspect of Pervasiveness 
Gardeners now use DNA kits (…). People are making genetically 
modified roses all over the world (...). The technology is everywhere 
(Michael Crichton, Next) 
 
An important characteristic of emerging technosciences, and an 
important aspect of their pervasiveness, is their tendency to see 
themselves as much more ‚natural‛ (more adaptive to nature) than 
previous forms of human technology. Novel technosciences claim to be 
increasingly able not only to permeate and explore but also to mimic 
and imitate the technologies nature herself has produced in the course 
of billions of years of evolution. Ever since its introduction during the 
late 1990’s, the concept of biomimesis (or biomimetics) has become 
popular in a number of research fields, such as material science 
(Mann, 1997; Bensaude-Vincent, 2002) and has made its appearance in 
top journals such as Nature (Ball, 2001; Sanchez et al., 2005). 
According to Sanchez, for instance, biomimesis is ‚one of the most 
promising scientific and technological challenges of the coming years‛ 
(2005: 285). But what exactly is biomimesis? 
Biomimesis refers to the objective of reinserting artificial (man-





system becomes optimally embedded. The idea is that natural systems 
and materials display a high degree of sophistication and adaptability 
and that nature, in the course of evolution, has generated a plethora of 
techniques (solutions to functional problems of living systems) that 
can be studied and imitated by contemporary technoscience. The 
ultimate goal is to reintegrate the technosphere into the biosphere 
(mutual pervasiveness of technology and nature). Whereas in the past 
the focus was on using technology to improve nature, nature’s ‚pool of 
ideas‛ now increasingly becomes a source of innovation and 
improvement for molecular technology (Ball, 2001). Notably, the 
wasteful systems of human production might be replaced by the more 
cyclical and sustainable economies characteristic of natural systems. 
Indeed, the idea of biomimesis is closely linked to that of sustainability. 
Although the concept as such has a long history in aesthetics and 
architecture ” in its present form it was introduced by Warren 
McCulloch in 1962 ” it became a key term among life scientists only 
from the 1990s onwards. 
In the past, a ‚Faustian‛ view of the relationship between science 
and nature was regarded as dominant. Science and technology were 
seen by their protagonists as instruments for gaining mastery over 
nature. The Faustian will to know gradually forced its way down to the 
basic and elementary building blocks of nature, as was articulated by 
Goethe in his famous lines from Faust, cited, for instance, in the novel 
Elementary particles by Michel Houellebecq (1998): Dass ich erkenne, 
was die Welt / Im Innersten zusammenhält. Yet, notwithstanding the 
Faustian desire to intimately explore the secrets of nature, the basic 
Faustian drive has always been to use this knowledge in order to go 
beyond nature, to transcend and improve nature. This is the basic 
Faustian ambition: from creating artificial human life in the laboratory 
(the homunculus scene in Faust) up to creating an artificial manmade 
landscape as a technological ‚paradise‛ (the polder scene in Faust).  
This Faustian ideal also applies to ‚classical‛ biotechnology. Around 
1900, biologist Jacques Loeb (1859-1924) voiced the idea that nature 
must be regarded as raw material, to be modified and improved by 
bioengineers (Pauly, 1987). Biology’s core objective, Loeb said, is the 
improvement of nature. Why accept existing biological constraints as 
given? Why not use biological knowledge in order to improve life and ” 
eventually ” ourselves, much more directly and effectively than we have 
done so far? Why not prolong the human life-span or opt for artificial 
instead of sexual reproduction? Indeed, the famous first chapter of 
Aldous Huxley’s Brave new world, describing the ‚Central London 
Hatchery and Conditioning Centre‛, consciously echoes Loeb’s ideas. 





kept in vitro are systematically manipulated in order to adapt them to 
societal demands and actually contains references to Loeb’s views. 
Thus, the Faustian ambition has been to use our knowledge 
concerning the building blocks of nature in order to transcend natural 
limits and to move human life into new, ‚postnatural‛, directions. This 
is also the case in relation to the biotechnological revolution that 
emerged during the final decades of the twentieth century. Genes could 
now be deleted or inserted in order to transcend natural borders and 
boundaries (such as between species) and to produce new life forms. 
Thus, nature was the target, rather than the model, and the orientation 
of biotechnology was trans-natural. The bioengineer was the active 
agent who actively aimed at modifying nature. Through science and 
technology, landscapes could be cultivated and plants and animals 
could be adapted to human interests, either through genetic 
modification or otherwise. 
Newly emerging pervasive technosciences, however, increasingly 
claim to incorporate a different vision of nature. It has become an 
important objective and promise of pervasive science to facilitate the 
emergence of new generations of nature-friendly and environment-
respecting technologies that may allow us to interact with nature in a 
much more sustainable, fine-tuned and sensitive manner. The basic 
idea is that by permeating natural systems more intimately than ever 
before, technologies can now be designed that mimic and build on the 
‚technologies‛ developed by nature herself, in a more refined fashion, 
allowing us to use the potentials and resources of nature (described as 
‚Ali-Baba’s cave of technology‛, Sanchez et al., 2005) in more 
intelligent and considerate ways. 
Yet, of course, the new pervading technosciences may also be seen 
as pathways towards mastering and manipulating nature more 
effectively than ever before; our age is arguably becoming more 
Faustian than any previous century. An even more sophisticated will to 
power may, in a cunning manner, have appropriated the rhetoric of 
biomimesis and sustainability. Thus, in addition to a seismographic 
sensitivity for what is happening in contemporary research, 
contemporary philosophers of technology and science should maintain 
a healthy attitude of suspicion. 
Nonetheless, the concept of biomimesis deserves to be taken 
seriously. In a much-cited review article, Viola Vogel (2002) addresses 
this development under the heading of ‚reverse engineering‛: the basic 
effort to reorient the innovation process, taking molecular nature as the 
model. Her focus is on proteins: nature’s ‚workhorses‛. According to 
Vogel, a fine-grained understanding of the underlying design principles 





provide researchers with new insights into how to enhance the 
performance of synthetic artificial systems with increased 
sophistication. For example, proteins can specifically recognize other 
biomolecules with a selectivity and affinity several orders of magnitude 
superior to their synthetic counterparts, which offers prospects for 
biomimetic biodetection. Proteins can also be used as switches in 
artificial systems or as micro energy convertors or producers. A 
plethora of lessons can be learned from how nature solves the 
challenge of functional problems of living systems.  
Thus, the idea of biomimesis (or homeotechnology, or reverse 
engineering) conveys the awareness that, while, thus far, technology 
has been primarily used to modify nature, the rich sources of 
inspiration produced by almost 4 billion years of biological evolution 
have only begun to permeate technology and engineering. Biology 
supplies examples of immense sophistication, starting with the cell 
with its thousands of chemical reactions that enable it to interact, carry 
out a broad variety of functions and reproduce, and extending to the 
complexity of organs and organisms. There is also a long list of natural 
‚inventions‛, like proteins, enzymes, DNA, membranes, fluids, sensory 
mechanisms, that can become a model for human design. 
In the course of history we have used natural systems in various 
manners, as biological materials (leather, wood, bone etc.), as 
biological energy (pack animals), as biological sensors (watchdogs, 
birds etc.), and of course as micro-organisms in the context of 
fermentation and preservation. The prospects for biomimesis that are 
currently opening up are directed towards the molecular level, towards 
the building blocks, the proteins and biomaterials of living systems. As 
Ball (2001) argues, biomimetics has the potential to enrich many areas 
of technology, but requires an intimate understanding of natural 
mechanisms at the molecular scale. The idea is that in the near future it 
will become possible to imitate characteristics of living materials such 
as self-repair, self-assembly and recyclability. Indeed, the ultimate 
challenge in drawing inspiration from biological organisms is the 
creation of biomachines that can reproduce themselves.  
 
10.5. Pervasive Applications: Philosophical Reflections 
The basic profile of pervasive science is as yet highly ambiguous. On 
the one hand, novel developments seem to offer ample opportunities 
for the development of sustainable and nature-friendly technologies, for 
example through ‚ecogenomics‛ (the use of molecular and genomics 
technologies for improving our understanding of the functioning of 





us to strengthen our technological sway over nature (both inside and 
outside human bodies) by increasingly allowing us to interact and 
intervene with natural systems in intimate and tailored ways. A similar 
ambiguity emerges when we consider the bioethical and biopolitical 
implications of pervasiveness. On the bioethical level, it initially seems 
to favour empowerment by opening up new possibilities for self-
management, creating new opportunities for developing what Michel 
Foucault has called ‚practices of the Self‛. We may begin to influence 
our molecular, physiological and cognitive systems more effectively 
than ever before. At the same time, it is clear that these developments 
offer new possibilities for biopolitics, that is: for top-down initiatives 
directed at the management of populations. For example, new 
technologies may permeate the bodies of psychiatric patients, top 
athletes or Alzheimer patients in order to restore or improve their 
functioning, through biomaterials or genetically modified viruses 
designed to produce neurotransmitters or other ‚natural‛ substances 
whenever our bodies are insufficiently able to do so. Such technologies 
may enhance the opportunities for individuals to manage their own 
condition, but may also open up avenues for manipulation by various 
institutions. 
By remodelling their genomes (‚synthetic biology‛), viruses can be 
used for producing biomaterials. By adding gene segments to plant 
viruses, self-replicating, biomimetic enzymes can be generated, for 
instance for producing cellular energy (adenosine triphosphate, ATP), 
hormones (testosterone), enzymes (insulin) or muscle tissue inside 
human bodies. Viruses can be used as synthetic platforms for 
producing self-replicating compounds or for self-assembling enzymes 
and catalytic products that stimulate various cellular processes 
(Comellas-Aragones et al., 2007). Enzymes encapsulated in a virus can 
be used for biodetection inside human bodies or for setting up self-
assembling systems for producing composite materials such as bone 
tissue (Kinsella & Ivanisevic, 2007). Thus, ‚nature’s own approach‛ 
(self-assembly) is used to produce a broad variety of biomolecules 
(Carette et al., 2007). In laboratories, synthetic biology has already 
begun to pervade our bodies. In addition to therapeutic applications, 
other options come into view as well, notably in the context of special 
professions such as soldiers of the future, who may well be equipped 
with biosensors (miniaturised biomimetic sensing devices) or self-
replicating systems for wound healing or intracellular production of 
biomolecules that increase strength, endurance and resistance to 
stress or disease. A report published by the National Research Council 
(2001) highlights how ‚pervasive‛ this research is becoming. Yet, 





or life-world applications, involves therapeutic applications and 
prevention, are coming into view as well.  
Since the original demonstration in 1999 that measured electrical 
activity generated by neurons can be employed to control devices such 
as computers or protheses, research on Brain-computer-interaction 
(BCI) has evolved at a stunning pace (Lebedev, 2006; Birbaumer, 
2006). Applications focus on restoration of limb mobility in severely 
handicapped (paralysed) individuals through invasive and semi-
invasive micro-recording devices. The focus is on revalidation (recovery 
of normal functioning), notably in the context of reduced mobility by 
providing subjects with feedback signals derived from their own brain 
activity, deciphering intentions through measuring the electrical activity 
of massive neuronal populations (Scott, 2006). In the future, 
researchers envision that they will be fully implanting recording 
systems that wirelessly transmit multiple streams of electric signals 
derived from neurons.  
Although the present context of application is mainly therapeutic, 
there are no obstacles, technologically speaking, to using these same 
techniques for enhancement in healthy individuals, thus pervading the 
realm of normal functioning, notably in situations where natural 
functioning seems unable to deal with the increasing complexities of 
emerging devices. A classical example is the fighter jet pilot. These 
pilots find themselves increasingly challenged by the swiftness and 
complexity of aircraft mobility. Some of the ‚deficiencies‛ of human 
behaviour (such as misguided impulsive responses) may not be 
amendable by training or by external equipment. Biomimetic electrodes 
may then be implanted as life-saving devices to overrule and counteract 
the pilot’s ‚inadequate intentions‛. Again, our focus will be on more 
everyday scenarios involving techniques that may be employed for 
signalling and counteracting stress, depression and ADHD or other 
behavioural issues. 
A bottleneck is the development of fully implantable biocompatible 
devices for recording electrophysiological activity by brain-derived 
signals. It is precisely here that some of the trends outlined in this 
paper may converge. The primary objective would then be to develop 
electrodes that become increasingly indistinguishable from their neural 
environments, produced from viral genomes to which particular gene 
segments are added for the production of biomaterials through self-
assembly. Thus, both trajectories eventually converge in a boundary 
zone where biomaterials facilitate 'performance enhancement', giving 
rise to 'Science-fiction like scenarios'. 
Big international companies such as IBM are developing futuristic 





environments, connecting a plethora of novel devices in an apparently 
seamless computing environment. Pervasive computing is the 
technology that tries to make this possible. Islands of technologies are 
gradually converging into a comprehensive technological environment. 
In the near future, computing will no longer be an activity that is 
conducted behind desktops. Rather, an omnipresent network of devices 
is expected to facilitate all functions of life. The basic question once 
again is whether this will enhance empowerment (self-management) or 
rather discipline and control (embedding human individuals as 
‚elements‛ in digital networks). Human-computer interaction (HCI) is 
a research field involving issues of design, evaluation, adoption, and 
actual use of new information technologies. Emerging digital 
environments may come to include devices for diagnostics and 
prevention, thus enabling individuals (belonging to patient groups, 
risks groups, special professions, etc.) to monitor their health and 
condition, thereby providing tools for Self-management, but it may also 
allow Big Brother to monitor our behaviour more effectively than ever 
before. At a certain point, with the help of biomaterials (bioelectrodes, 
bioimplants, etc.) these technologies may begin to enter the bodies, 
blurring the boundaries between technology and Self.  
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Abstract 
Growing demand for new and/ or improved products has encouraged 
governments and industry to experiment with innovative technologies, 
such as nanotechnologies, across the manufacturing chain. With 
nanotechnologies destined to impact on every aspect of society, there is 
increasing concern that the very novelty which defines this platform 
technology will itself bring new and unforeseen risks. In light of this 
discourse, this paper examines the European Union’s regulatory 
frameworks for cosmetics, medical applications and food contact 
materials in order to determine their suitability for regulating 
nanotechnology-based products and their associated (potential) risks. 
While the strengths of these current regimes are noted, a number of 
important gaps within each framework are identified. Initial steps for 
addressing these gaps that take into consideration both the need to 
protect against potential risks and the broader interests associated with 
the development of the technologies are outlined. 
 
11.1. Introduction1  
The growing demand for new and/or improved products, including 
those that address urgent societal and global problems, such as 
climate change, increasing dependency on alternative energy sources, 
access to clean water, and meeting the health challenges of an aging 
population, have encouraged governments and industry to experiment 
and incorporate innovative technologies across the manufacturing 
value chain. Emerging technologies that promise to assist society 
address these and many other challenges include information and 
communication technologies (ICT), biotechnology, and cognitive 
sciences. Each of these areas of endeavour will unquestionably provide 
novel products and solutions to current and future challenges. 
However, it has been argued that one such emergent technology, 
nanotechnology or nanotechnologies, will give rise to another 
technological ‘revolution’ (see generally Sparrow, 2008). Putting aside 
                                                     
1 The authors would like to gratefully acknowledge the support of the Research Fund 
K.U. Leuven. 




the hype and hyperbole that often surrounds discussions of 
nanotechnologies, it can be reasonably foreseen that the ubiquitous 
nature of nanotechnologies and its ability to be utilised across all 
industry sectors ” from aerospace and agriculture, to electronics, 
military and medical applications ” will ensure the rapid 
commercialisation of products and applications produced by nano-
manufacturing processes or incorporating nanomaterials. Moreover, 
with leading industry commentators speculating that products 
incorporating nanotechnologies across the value chain will have an 
economic value in the vicinity of US$ 1.0-2.4 trillion by 2015 (Roco and 
Bainbridge, 2001; Lux Research, 2005), the impact of this platform 
technology appears destined to increase alongside its 
commercialisation.  
With nanotechnologies predicted to impact on every aspect of 
society, there is increasing concern that the very novelty which defines 
the technology, a consequence of the unique properties of chemical 
substances that appear at the nanoscale and the exploitation thereof 
will itself bring unforseen human and environmental health and safety 
risks (see generally Oberdörster, 2004; Maynard, et al. 2006; and 
Kandlikar, et al. 2007). While validated scientific studies remain limited, 
though such data gaps are being rapidly addressed by the research 
community, there is evidence to suggest that, for example, some 
engineered nanoparticles may be more toxic than their larger scale 
counterparts (Oberdörster,  et al., 2005) due to the nanoparticle’s 
higher surface area to volume ratio and the subsequent increase in the 
proportion of atoms on the particle’s surface (Nel, et al., 2005). 
However, size is just one of a number of potential physio-chemical 
characteristics that may influence the toxicity of nanoscale, with 
Oberdörster, et al. (2005) having suggested a number of other 
parameters that may be important in determining toxicity including, the 
nanoparticle’s shape, agglomeration state, and surface chemistry.  
As government, industry and scientists race to determine and 
evaluate the potential scientific risks posed by some aspects of 
nanotechnologies, particularly the risks posed by free engineered nano-
particles (i.e. those not embedded into a fixed matrix), there have been 
increasing calls for governments and other stakeholders to evaluate the 
adequacy of current regulatory regimes for the various current and 
future applications of the technology. In response to these calls, 
governments in several jurisdictions have initiated either in-house or 
commissioned independent regulatory reviews, each of which has been 
designed to determine the appropriateness of these regimes for 
managing the potential risks of the technology (Chaudhry et al., 2006; 





Agency, 2007; Ludlow, Bowman and Hodge, 2007; and European 
Commission, 2008a, 2008b). At the same time, a number of 
commentators have expressed their concern over perceived limitations 
and gaps within these frameworks (see, for example, Kimbrell, 2006; 
Davies, 2006; Taylor, 2006, 2008; Friends of the Earth Australia (FoEA) 
2006, 2008). In light of the increasing international discourse within 
this area, there is increasing pressure from all sectors of society to 
determine how nanotechnologies are, and will be, regulated as they 
evolve. This situation, as observed by Levi-Faur and Comaneshter 
(2007: 150), is somewhat unique, with the authors noting that, ‚unlike 
other cases where the discussion of the associated risks has followed 
the development of new technologies, the discussion on the proper 
regulatory framework for the governance of nanotechnology risks is 
accompanying the development of the technology and the associated 
products themselves‛. As such, a rare opportunity exists for 
stakeholders actively to participate in the development of a regulatory 
framework or frameworks for nanotechnologies.  
In light of this discourse and given the uncertainty as to the 
adequacy of current regulatory frameworks with respect to certain 
domains of nanotechnologies, a four year research project was initiated 
in December 2007 at K.U. Leuven Law School. The intent of this 
research project is to evaluate the suitability of existing European 
Union (EU) regulatory frameworks for regulating current and future 
nanotechnology-based products within three distinct areas ” cosmetics, 
food and food contact materials (FCMs), and medical applications. 
Where gaps and weaknesses are observed within each of these 
regulatory regimes, the project is developing a revised, workable, 
regulatory framework, which will not only adequately regulate 
nanotechnologies, but may also serve for other emerging technologies.  
This chapter reports on the findings of Years One and Two of the 
project (finalised early 2009), where the focus was the evaluation of 
existing regulatory frameworks for cosmetics, foods, and medical 
applications. These case studies are presented in Section 2 of the 
chapter. In Section 3, a number of initial steps for addressing these 
gaps that take into consideration both the need to protect against 
potential risks, and the broader interests associated with the 
development of the technologies, are outlined. In Section 4, the chapter 
briefly examines the potential role for regulatory innovation in 
addressing some of the current shortcomings of the current regimes, 
and the appropriate role of the precautionary principle in regulatory 
strategies relating to the three case studies. The paper concludes in 
Section 5 by focussing on what we consider to be the next steps to be 




initiated as part of the emerging regulatory landscape so that the 
technology can be effectively regulated as we move forward.   
 
11.2. Regulatory Challenges Posed by Nanotechnologies: A Case Study 
Approach  
11.2.1 Cosmetics  
Increasing consumer demand for cosmetic products that exhibit 
enhanced aesthetic and functional qualities has resulted in an 
escalating interest by the industry in the use of nanotechnology within 
cosmetic formulations. Current products which claim to incorporate 
engineered nanomaterials include, for instance, anti-ageing creams, 
make up, hair care products, cleansers and moisturisers. It is thought 
that these products contain an assortment of engineered 
nanomaterials ranging from metal oxides, fullerenes, quantum dots, 
liposomes, and nanospheres in order to create products that are more 
visually pleasing, have superior colouring effects or are easier to 
spread. Yet despite the reported wide-spread use of nanomaterials 
within the cosmetic industry,2 the exact nature and extent to which 
engineered nanomaterials are being used by the cosmetics industry 
remains somewhat ambiguous (Scientific Committee on Consumer 
Products (SCCP), 2007). 
While the use of engineered nanomaterials within cosmetics offers a 
range of benefits, there has been increasing debate within the scientific 
and non-scientific literature over the potential health and safety risks 
associated with their use in topically-applied formulations (see 
Therapeutics Good Administration, 2006, 2009; Nohynek et al., 2007; 
Nohynek, Dufour and Roberts, 2008; Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA), 2009; also Fleming, 2006; Kimbrell, 2006, 2007; FoEA, 2006; 
International Risk Governance Council, 2008, 2009). Such concerns are 
not unique to the cosmetics sector. However due to the direct 
application of cosmetic and personal care products onto the human 
body, and the lack of scientific certainty surrounding the potential 
toxicity, fate and effect of many nanomaterials (Maynard 2007), it 
would appear that the use of nanomaterials in cosmetics products have 
received additional attention from some organisations. This is despite 
the fact that these products are subject to regulatory controls within 
every jurisdiction in which they are sold, including the EU.  
To date, the specific concerns raised by commentators, especially in 
relation to the use of insoluble nanoscale metal oxides have focused on 
the lack of scientifically sound data on the ability of insoluble 
                                                     






nanoparticles to penetrate the stratum corneum, pass into the viable 
epidermis and enter the vascular system; and the potential 
consequence, in terms of hazards, should absorption and translocation 
occur (Hoet, Bruske-Hohlfeld and Salata, 2004; and Oberdörster, 
Oberdörster and Oberdörster, 2005). Questions have also been raised 
by a number of scientists, policy makers and members of the NGO 
community in relation to the adequacy of conventional safety 
assessment methods for cosmetic ingredients, and the 
appropriateness of these risk assessment paradigms for all, but in 
particular insoluble, nanomaterials used in cosmetics (see, for 
example, SCCP, 2005; Santamaria and Sayers, 2010; Chaudhry, 
Bouwmeester and Hertel, 2010).  
In light of these questions and concerns, an examination of the EU‘s 
regulatory framework for cosmetic products, as governed primarily by 
Council Directive 76/768 EEC (the Cosmetics Directive) and its 
subsequent amendments, was undertaken in order to determine the 
suitability of the regime for regulating cosmetics containing 
nanomaterials. Given the concerns that have been raised in relation to 
different classes of engineered nanoparticles being used in topically 
applied products, the review looked at the operation of the framework 
for two different types of nanotechnology-based cosmetic products: 
firstly, reformulated make up products containing insoluble metal oxide 
nanoparticles, such as foundations, concealers and eye-shadows, which 
are specifically designed to stay on the outer layer of the skin; and 
secondly, anti-wrinkle creams containing biodegradable polymeric 
nanoparticles, such as nanocapsules3 and  nanospheres, which are 
used to deliver active ingredients to their target site. Such particles are 
designed specifically to penetrate the stratum corneum while 
simultaneously masking or modifying the physio-chemical properties of 
the active substance(s) that they contain.  
While the Directive has since been superseded by the November 
2009 adoption of the Cosmetic Regulation by the European Parliament 
and Council (as will be discussed in more detail below), many of the 
findings of the review remain valid not only to the European Union at 
this time ” given that the Regulation will not enter into force until 2011 
” but also other jurisdictions with similar regulatory arrangements to 
that of the EU under the Cosmetic Directive. By replacing some 3500 
pages of legal text and 27 transposing pieces of national legislation 
with one Regulation, the Commission hopes to ease administrative 
problems, remove national differences that do not contribute to 
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product safety and minimise the uncertainties and inconsistencies that 
have plagued the operation of the Directive.  
As noted by the EU itself, the current regulatory regime underpinned 
by the Directive consists of a ‘patchwork of more than 45 amendments 
with no set of definitions and no coherent terminology.’4 In accordance 
with its main objective ” ‘the safeguarding of public health’ ” the 
Cosmetics Directive and its amendments set out the legal 
requirements and principles pertaining to cosmetic products within EU 
Member States, including those relating to ‘composition, labelling and 
packaging of cosmetic products’ (Preamble, at 3). As established by the 
Cosmetics Directive, any cosmetic product put onto the market within 
the European Union must not pose a risk to human health when used 
‘under normal or reasonably foreseeable conditions’ (Article 2). Failure 
to comply with this legislative requirement will result in the 
manufacturer or importer being held liable for any damage caused by 
the unsafe cosmetic product or products (see Article 4a(1) and Article 
7a(d)). For these reasons alone, it is in the industry’s best interests to 
only develop and place onto the European market products that are 
safe and conform to the requirements of the Directive.  
Despite the focus on safeguarding public health, the Cosmetic 
Directive did not establish any pre-market registration, approval or 
review requirements for determining the safety of a cosmetic product 
prior to its entry on the European market. This situation is not unique 
to the EU, with jurisdictions such as the US and Australia having 
similar limited, if any, pre-market regulatory requirements including 
safety testing, for cosmetic products (see, for example, Taylor, 2006; 
Ludlow, Bowman and Hodge, 2007). Moreover, this situation will not 
be altered under the adopted text of the Cosmetic Regulation. As set 
out in Article 7 of the Cosmetic Directive, pre-market requirements are 
instead limited to the data notification requirements and rigorous 
safety requirements and evaluations standards for the manufacturer/ 
importer/marketer. Control over certain ingredients and their use in 
cosmetics is dealt with under Article 4 of the Directive, which provides 
for the establishment of ‘positive’, ‘negative’ or ‘restricted’ lists in the 
Directive’s Annexes. Substances are listed and therefore regulated on 
the basis of their name; the lists do not, for example, differentiate 
between substances of the same chemical formula that differ in size. 
Regulation by reference to chemical identity and not size is important 
in relation to the use of nanoparticles in cosmetics formulations.  
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Prime facie it is possible to assume based on the existence, structure 
and function of the regulatory regime that all cosmetics products 
incorporating engineered nanoparticles available in the European 
market are safe and do not pose a risk to the health of the consumer 
when used for the purpose for which they were manufactured. But is it 
really that simple? 
As outlined above, many within the cosmetic industry have already 
begun to substitute microsized particles, including titanium dioxide 
(TiO2) and zinc oxide (ZnO), with their nanoscale equivalents. The 
purpose of the substitution is to improve the aesthetic and or 
functional nature of the cosmetic formulation. Within the EU the 
process by which the safety is assessed of active ingredients within a 
cosmetic product is set down in the EC’s SCCP (2006) Notes on 
Guidance for the Testing of Cosmetic Ingredients and their Safety 
Evaluation (Guidance Notes). This framework provides the evaluation 
regime for cosmetic products. While the Guidance Notes apply to all 
active ingredients contained within a cosmetic product, including 
nanoscale metal oxide particles such as TiO2 and ZnO, as noted by 
Chaudhry, Bouwmeester and Hertel (2010: xx) in relation to the risk 
assessment paradigm generally, ‚it has been pointed out that the 
current testing methodologies would need certain adaptations in view 
of the special features of [engineered nanomaterials], e.g. the insoluble 
particulate nature, possible agglomeration, binding of other moieties 
on particle surface etc‛.  
The suitability of existing risk assessment for engineered nano-
materials in cosmetics as well as other products has been considered 
by several of the European Commission’s Scientific Committee’s, 
including the SCCP (2007) and the Scientific Committee on Emerging 
and Newly Identified Health Risks (2006, 2009). In their report, the 
SCCP (2007: 38) concluded that ‘there are large data gaps in risk 
assessment methodologies with respect to nanoparticles in cosmetic 
products’. In reaching their opinion on the safety of nanomaterials in 
cosmetic products, the Committee (2007: 35) sought to differentiate 
between two different types of nanoparticles: 
1. soluble and/or biodegradable nanoparticles, such as polymeric 
nanoparticles, which are discussed in more detail below), and   
2. insoluble and/or biopersistent particles, such as nanoscale titanium 
dioxide.  
The Committee (2007: 35) concluded that, ‚[f]or the first group, 
conventional risk assessment methodologies based on mass metrics 
may be adequate, whereas for the latter other metrics such as the 
number of particles, and their surface area as well as their size 
distribution are also required‛. In light of the current uncertainties 




surrounding the suitability of existing risk assessment for the purpose 
of evaluating toxicity and therefore human safety of the nanoparticles 
as provided for in the SCCP’s  Notes on Guidance, questions over the 
adequacy and/or appropriateness for calculating potential risks ” 
especially in relation to toxicity ” for some nanoparticles remain. This 
would appear to be particularly so in relation to the use of, for example, 
nanoscale ZnO and TiO2.  It is not surprising therefore that the SCCP 
(2007: 6) concluded that, ‚it [is] necessary to review the safety of 
nanosized TiO2 in the light of recent information and to consider the 
influence of physiologically abnormal skin and the possible impact of 
mechanical action on skin penetration‛. 
Given that cosmetic products containing this type of engineered 
nanoparticle have already made their way into the European market it 
would appear that the Cosmetics Directive and the SCCP’s Notes of 
Guidance may not be adequate in their current form for regulating this 
category of nanoparticles when used as ingredients in cosmetic 
products. Accordingly, while the Cosmetics Directive requires that any 
cosmetic product put onto the market within the European Union must 
not pose a risk to human health when used ‘under normal or 
reasonably foreseeable conditions’, it appears unlikely that 
manufacturers and or importers of nano-cosmetics cannot ” when 
based on the assumption that appropriate risk assessment protocols 
have not yet been devised or carried out ” guarantee the immediate 
and longer-term human safety of their cosmetic products that contain 
insoluble and/or biopersistent nanoparticles at this time. This 
uncertainty is clearly problematic from a public health perspective. 
The current situation of insoluble mineral-based engineered nano-
particles in cosmetic products may be contrasted to that of the second 
type of nanomaterial used in cosmetics examined in the review: 
polymeric nanoparticles. As explained by the SCCP (2007: 59), 
nanocapsules ‚can be: chemical/drug targeted delivery systems that 
release the ingredient when arrived at the site in the body where it is 
required, chemical/drug timed release delivery where the nano-
encapsulated material slowly allows the ingredient to be released into 
the body, increased shelf life and stability of fragile chemicals‛. This 
enables biologically active ingredients to be transported to areas of the 
body that have been traditionally inaccessible and at quantities that 
have been conventionally unachievable (Soppimath et al., 2001; 
Honeywell-Nguyen and Bouwstra, 2005; SCCP, 2007; Guterres, Alves 
and Pohlmann, 2007). Since 1995, leading cosmetic companies such as 
L’Oreal have been using polymeric nanoparticles as carrier systems in 
existing cosmetic products, in conjunction with developing innovative 





Nanocapsules appear to offer the cosmetic industry a superior carrier 
system when compared to earlier generations of delivery systems for 
highly unstable active compounds sensitive to oxidation such as the 
vitamin A derivative retinol (Jenning et al., 2000: 211). Benefits offered 
by this newest generation of nanotechnology-based formulation 
include, for example, increased penetration rate of the active ingredient 
into the stratum corneum,  increased stability of active ingredients 
(Soppimath et al., 2001), and greater control of the release of 
substance (Guterres, Alves and Pohlmann, 2007). Publically available 
scientific information at this time suggests that nanocapsules and 
other soluble nano-sized structures are unlikely to present any new 
risks to human health when used in cosmetic products, with the SCCP 
(2007: 5) having stated that ‚it is primarily for the insoluble particles 
that health concerns related to possible uptake arise‛. This is primarily 
due to the soluble/biodegradable nature of these particles, the SCCP 
(2007: 17) noting that, ‚a series of independent studies have concluded 
that the vesicles themselves used by the cosmetic industry do not 
penetrate beyond the most superficial layers of the stratum corneum, 
but break down‛. As such, while the Cosmetics Directive and the 
testing and safety evaluation procedures set out in the Guidance Notes 
do not differentiate these structures from their chemical equivalents on 
the basis of scale, it would appear that this in itself is less problematic 
from a human health and safety point of view when compared to 
insoluble/ bio-persistent nanoparticles. However, that being said, 
questions over the appropriateness of current testing methodologies 
and the potential risks associated with the fate of the capsules still 
remain at this time (Honeywell-Nguyen and Bouwstra, 2005; SCCP, 
2007). 
In light of these concerns, the review concluded that under the 
Directive, and therefore analogous regulatory frameworks in other 
jurisdictions, the potential exists for what may be unsafe nano-based 
cosmetic products to be placed on the market. However in reaching 
this conclusion a number of important caveats must be articulated. 
First, for this conclusion to hold true, it must be first shown that the 
nanoparticles can and do penetrate the stratum corneum, pass into the 
viable epidermis and enter the vascular system, and that the particles 
are hazardous to individuals and elicit an effect when absorption and 
translocation occur. Moreover, in reaching this theoretical conclusion 
based on an academic review of the regulatory framework and 
incomplete scientific knowledge, it is important to also differentiate 
between the different categories of engineered nanoparticles being 
incorporated into cosmetic products. With respect to cosmetic 
products utilising soluble or biodegradable nanoparticles such as 




polymeric nanoparticles within, for example, anti-wrinkle creams, it 
would appear that ” based on current scientific evidence ” the Directive 
is most likely to be adequate for safeguarding consumer’s health and 
safety. In contrast the review concluded that based on the current 
scientific evidence, and the major data gaps relating to exposure, 
toxicity and risks, the Cosmetics Directive may not be sufficient to 
ensure the safety of cosmetic products incorporating insoluble or bio-
persistent nanoparticles such as nanoscale metal oxide particles, 
should update and translocation of the particles occur, and should 
these particles be proven to be hazardous.  
As noted above, in November 2009 the European Parliament and 
Council adopted the final text of the Cosmetic Regulation. From our 
perspective, one of the key components of the final text is the fact that 
the regulator sought to differentiate cosmetics containing 
nanomaterials from those that do not. Obviously such action required 
the introduction and general acceptance of what constitutes a 
‘nanomaterial’ for the purposes of the Regulation. Pursuant to Article 
2(1)(k) of the Regulation, a ‘nanomaterial’ will be defined as ‚an 
insoluble or biopersistant and intentionally manufactured material with 
one or more external dimensions, or an internal structure, on the scale 
from 1 to 100 nm‛. Upon the Regulation’s entry into force, the 
responsible person for placing a new cosmetic product containing 
nanomaterials (as defined above) onto the EU market will be required 
to ” in addition to all other requirements ” notify the Commission of 
the presence of the product and supply certain safety information to 
the Commission six months prior to its entry onto the market. 
Similarly,  manufacturers of nanoscale cosmetic products which are 
already in the market will be required to notify and submit safety data 
to the Commission (Article 16(3)). Should the Commission have 
concerns about the safety of the nanomaterial in use, they will be 
required to seek an opinion from the SCCP (Article 16(4)); and any 
such opinion must be made publically available (Article 16(4)). This, as 
eloquently stated by Gergely and Coroyannakis (2009: 30), ‚will ensure 
a case-by-case review, whereby safety will remain the number one 
priority‛.  
The Regulation also requires the Commission to create a publically 
available catalogue of ‚all nanomaterials used in cosmetic products 
placed on the market… and the reasonably foreseeable ‚exposure 
conditions‛ (Article 16(10)(a)); and to submit an annual status report 
to the Parliament and Council on the ‚developments in the use of 
nanomaterials‛ in the EU market (Article 16(10)(b)). These provisions 
are clearly aimed at addressing concerns over the lack of transparency 





requirements, any products containing nanomaterials, as defined by 
the Regulation, must indicate the presence of the nanomaterials in the 
list of ingredients. This will be done by placing the word ‘nano’ in 
brackets after the nanoscale ingredient. No threshold limits have been 
established by the Parliament and Council in relation to this labelling 
requirement. As such it would appear that even if the nanomaterial 
constitutes, for example, less than 0.5 per cent of the product, the label 
on the cosmetic product will have to indicate the presence of the 
nanomaterial by the inclusion of ‘nano’ (in brackets) following the 
chemical identity’s name. This would also appear to hold true even 
when the nanomaterial is present only in a trace amount (Bowman, van 
Calster and Friedrichs, 2010). 
 
11.2.2 Foods 
The convergence of nanotechnologies with the food and food 
processing sector is expected to revolutionise the global food supply 
from farm to fork, and be a ‚significant ingredient in the food industry‛ 
(Wolfe, 2005). With ‚virtually every major food company [already] 
involved in nanotech R&D‛ (Wolfe, 2005), it is not surprising that the 
ETC Group (2004: 3) have reported that ‚food products containing 
nano-scale additives … are already on the grocery store shelf‛. Offering 
an economically competitive benefit and unimaginable potential across 
the entire breadth of the agri-food sector, it is unsurprising that 
significant economic growth in the sector is anticipated.  
Unlike the intense debate surrounding the use of biotechnology 
within the agri-food system, foods incorporating nanotechnologies 
have largely, until recently that is, entered the commercial market under 
the media and public radars. An exception to this is the review 
undertaken by the Friends of the Earth Australia Nanotechnology 
Project (Miller and Senjen, 2008), as well as the publication of several 
more recent reports by organisations such as the UK House of Lords 
Science and Technical Committee (2010). Looking specifically at the 
FoEA review, the comprehensive report identified over one hundred 
products containing engineered nanoparticles, including food 
processing technologies, delivery systems, food contact materials, and 
agrochemicals. In highlighting the range of commercially available agri-
food products containing nanotechnologies, the report noted a range 
of human and environmental health and safety uncertainties associated 
with the use of nanotechnologies within the sector, including those 
relating to toxicity and exposure. Despite the existence of legislative 
frameworks in jurisdictions such as the EU that regulate different 
aspects of these products in order to safeguard public health, the 
authors of the report argued for a ‚moratorium on the further 




commercial release of food products, food packaging, food contact 
material an agrochemicals that contain manufactured nanomaterials 
until nanotechnology-specific safety laws are established‛ (Miller and 
Senjen, 2008: 3). Concerns raised by organisations such as FoE, in 
relation to the use of nanotechnologies in food would appear to focus 
on the ability of nanoparticles to be absorbed from the digestive system 
into the vascular system, and the potential consequences, in terms of 
hazards, should absorption and translocation occur. Unsurprisingly, 
questions have also been raised in relation to the ability of the existing 
regulatory frameworks adequately to manage any potential risks 
associated with the use of nanotechnologies across the agri-food sector 
in both the short and the medium term.  
While a number of regulatory reviews have now been initiated within 
the EU, many of which have included the agri-food sector within their 
scope (see, for example, Food Safety Authority of Ireland, 2008; Food 
Standards Agency, 2008), a number of questions remain. This is in part 
due to the dynamic nature of the European regulatory system, with a 
number of relevant regulatory instruments having been recently 
revised, and several other instruments, including Regulation (EC) No. 
258/97 (the Novel Foods Regulation) going to be recast. In light of the 
lingering questions, an examination of the EU’s regulatory framework 
for foods, novel foods, food additives, and food contact materials was 
undertaken as part of the review (see Gergely et al., 2010a, 2010b). Due 
to space limitations, this section of the chapter will only report on the 
findings of two areas of examination: regulatory aspects relating to 
foods generally and food additives.5  
One of the most relevant legislative instruments to the regulation of 
nano-foods is Food Law Regulation 178/2002, which sets down the 
general principles and requirements of food law within the Community, 
as well as providing the statutory basis for the establishment of the 
European Food Safety Authority. Pursuant to Article 14(1) of Regulation 
178/2002, food cannot be placed on the European market ‘if it is 
unsafe’; it is also ineligible for marketing if the food contains 
substances harmful to health. Failure to comply with this legislative 
responsibility will result in the seller being held liable for any damage 
done by the unsafe food article or articles. This ultimate responsibility 
provision operates regardless of whether or not the food was manu-
factured using nanotechnology-based food processing methods or 
incorporates nanoparticles. Prime facie it is possible to conclude that 
the general safety articles embodied within Regulation 178/2002 will, by 
implication, encompass foods containing nanomaterials and/or 
                                                     





manufactured using nanotechnology. However, while nano-foods will 
clearly fall within the regulatory scope of Regulation 178/2002, the 
question remains as to the adequacy of conventional protocols for 
establishing the safety of any such food prior to its entry onto the 
market.  
At the time of the review (July 2008), food additives were regulated 
by Framework Directive 89/107 (the ‘Food Additives Framework 
Directive’) and a number of pieces of subordinate legislation. Pursuant 
to the Framework Directive, nanoscale food additives were ‘assessed 
either as novel additives or, where a macro-equivalent is already 
approved, through potential amendments of the appropriate 
specifications, including purity criteria, under the Directive 96/77/EC’ 
(Gergely et al., 2010a). 
Gergely et al. (2010a) have, however, noted that from 2010 onwards 
the Framework Directive will be replaced by a common authorisation 
system for food additives, food enzymes and food flavourings (see 
Regulation (EC) No. 1332/2008, Regulation (EC) No. 1333/2008 and 
Regulation (EC) 1334/2008). The new system will bring together the 
existing food additive regulations and introduce comitology for the 
approval of the three substances (Gergely et al., 2010a, 2010b). Under 
the common authorisation system, all applications for the approval of 
each category of substance will be directed to the European Food Safety 
Authority (EFSA), which will be required to carry out the safety 
evaluations and risk assessment (Chaudhry et al., 2008). Pursuant to 
the new system, a positive-list (‘Community list’) will be established for 
each substance category. As noted by the EC (2007: 3), ‘the inclusion of 
a substance on one of these lists means that its use is authorised in 
general for all operators in the Community’.  
Importantly, under this new common authorisation system, EFSA 
will be invested with the necessary power to re-evaluate a safety 
assessment. This may have important implications for nano-scale food 
additives (Chaudhry et al., 2008; Gergely et al., 2010a, 2010b). Food 
additives ” once approved ” will be kept under continuous observation 
and re-evaluation wherever necessary. Moreover, producers or users of 
food additives that are ‘significantly different from those include in the 
risk assessment of the Authority or different from those covered by the 
specifications laid down’ will be obliged to inform the Commission of 
any new information that may affect the safety assessment of a food 
additive (Chaudhry et al., 2008; Gergely et al., 2010a, 2010b). As 
suggested by Gergely et al. (2010a: 157), ‘significant difference’ could 
mean inter alia a change in the manufacturing process or in 
specifications, changing conditions of use, any new scientific 




information, or ‘a change in particle size’.6 This definition arguably 
implies that the use of nanotechnologies will constitute a ‘significant 
difference’ for the purpose of re-evaluation by the EFSA. Gergely et al. 
(2010a, 2010b) have therefore argued that this is an important 
inclusion in the new system. Pursuant to the new Regulations, EFSA 
will also be invested with the power to re-evaluate a food additive on 
the basis of ‘new scientific information’ (Regulation 1333/2008). While 
it was unclear at the time of review whether or not ‘new scientific 
information’ would be interpreted to include development in 
nanotechnology, it is argued that the express inclusion of ‘change in 
particle size’ might be relevant for triggering re-evaluation by the EFSA 
(EC, 2008; Chaudhry et al., 2008; Gergely et al., 2010a, 2010b).  
Following its review of legislative measures for nanomaterials in 
cosmetics, the European Parliament also voted in March 2009 in favour 
of a report dealing with an update of the EU rules on novel foods, 
which also proposes special treatment for nanoparticles and 
nanomaterials (EP vote on COM(2007) 872). According to the 
proposal, nano-specific test methods should be developed as a matter 
of urgency and nanomaterials present in food packaging should be 
entered on a list of approved nanomaterials, accompanied by a limit on 
migration into or onto the food products contained in such packaging 
(meaning in practice that until such methods have been developed, no 
such materials will be allowed on the market ” in other words, a 
moratorium). The definition of a ‘novel food’ has been amended to 
include food containing or consisting of engineered nanomaterials, 
however MEPs did not support the inclusion of terminology referring to 
‘produced with the aid of nanotechnology’. All ingredients present in 
the form of nanomaterials will have to be clearly indicated in the list of 
ingredients. It is not clear at the moment whether Parliament will have 
enough support from the Council for it to push through its proposals. 
 
11.2.3 Medical Products and Devices 
Medical devices are regulated by Directive 93/42/EEC (the Medical 
Devices Directive);7 Directive 90/385/EEC (the Active Implantable 
Medical Devices Directive);8 and Directive 98/79/EC (the In Vitro 
Diagnostic Medical Devices Directive).9 Directive 2007/47/EC10 
                                                     
6 See Preamble 12 of the proposed Regulation 8/2008 in relation to food enzymes. 
7 Council Directive 93/42/EEC of 14 June 1993 concerning medical devices, OJ [1993]  
L169/1. 
8 Council Directive 90/385/EEC of 20 June 1990 on the approximation of the laws of the 
Member States relating to active implantable medical devices, OJ [1990] L189/17. 
9 Directive 98/79/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 October 1998 





amended Council Directive 90/385/EEC, Council Directive 93/42/EEC 
and the Biocidal Products Directive (98/8/EC)11 in September 2007, but 
does not make any amendments to the In vitro Diagnostic Directive. 
‘All three are also firmly based on a principle of risk analysis and risk 
management and utilise a supporting voluntary harmonised European 
Standard, EN ISO 14971’ (Moore, 2009).12 To date, the two main types 
of nanomedicinal products that are being commercialised are 
diagnostics and biomaterials. As such, the review focused on the 
operation of the relevant regulatory framework when faced with these 
two types of nanotechnology-based medicinal products: CellTracks and 
AcryMed’s SilvaGard Antimicrobial Surface Treatment. CellTracks is an 
in vitro diagnostics technology developed to capture rare cells 
efficiently and reproducibly to enable accurate counting and molecular 
research, which has been incorporated into diagnostic equipment. 
AcryMed’s SilvaGard Antimicrobial Surface Treatment is a silver 
nanoparticle technology created and applied in solution, which claims 
to provide an easy, cost-effective method of applying a surface 
treatment of ionic silver to a device.  
As advances in nanomedicine and nanomedical devices are made, 
there are increasing concerns over the potential health and safety risks 
associated with their use, application, insertion and contact with the 
human body. The medical sector has traditionally been one of the most 
regulated, however nanomedicine raises unique challenges due to the 
lack of scientific data pertaining to toxicity and potential health effects, 
as well as concerns on the adequacy of existing regulation and 
standards in regulating nanomedicine. 
CellTrack technology has been incorporated into the diagnostic 
equipment, ‘The CellTracks Analyzer’, which can be described as an 
automated differential cell counter that uses laser technology to 
enumerate and characterize cells based on morphology and fluorescent 
signatures. The CellTracks Analyzer is Immunicon’s second-generation 
analyzer and is designed to be used in conjunction with the CellTracks 
AutoPrep System for sample preparation. In combination, these form a 
group of advanced diagnostic equipment using CellTrack reagent 
technology platform technologies for the selection and analysis of rare 
                                                                                                                  
10  Council Directive 2007/47/EC ” OJ [2007] L 247/21. Member States have until 21 
December 2008 to transpose the new Directive into national law, following which there 
is a transition period for manufacturers to come into compliance by 21 March 2010. 
11  Directive 98/8/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 1998 
concerning the placing of biocidal products on the market, OJ [1998] L 123/1. 
12  ISO 14971:2007 specifies a process for a manufacturer to identify the hazards 
associated with medical devices, including in vitro diagnostic (IVD) medical devices, to 
estimate and evaluate the associated risks, to control these risks, and to monitor the 
effectiveness of the controls. 




cells in blood and potentially other bodily fluids. The Immunicon 
Corporation has been certified under the Quality management systems 
for medical device manufacturers (ISO 13485:2003) and CellTracks 
Analyser received US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval as 
well as the CE mark under the In Vitro Diagnostic Medical Devices 
Directive (IVDD). It has also recently made its first commercial 
shipments of the CellTracks(R) Analyzer II to Europe.13 
The use of reagents and interrelated devices for diagnostic purposes 
in the EU is regulated by Directive 98/79/EC (IVDD).14 Under this 
framework, the diagnostic device or reagent must meet the conformity 
and quality assessments required by the Directive depending on the 
class15 before it can receive a CE Marking. After receiving a CE mark an 
in vitro diagnostic device is considered to have satisfied defined 
language, safety, quality, and performance requirements for EU 
Member States. All in vitro diagnostic devices must meet the applicable 
‘essential requirements’ on safety, performance and labelling as 
outlined in Annex I of the IVDD. These safety requirements include 
criteria to address risk posed by product leakage, contaminants and 
residues to the persons involved in the transport, storage and use of 
the devices, risks of infection to the user or other persons and if the 
device is intended for use in combination with other devices or 
equipment, the whole combination, must be safe and must not impair 
the specified performances of the devices.  
Prime facie, it would appear that such diagnostic devices are 
regulated by existing legislation. However, a closer examination of the 
regime suggests otherwise. IVDD applications are predominantly 
carried out on samples taken from the human body and analysed in 
vitro ” risks can be said to be generally limited to usage, storage, 
transport and waste disposal. On the face of it, these risks are the same 
as the use of any other reagent or chemical. However, the uncertainty 
surrounding accidental release, toxicity and contamination by 
nanoparticles heightens the requirement for care. The applicability of 
                                                     
13  Immunicon Ships First CellTracks(R) Analyzer IIs to Europe, available at: 
http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G1-136442945.html. (accessed 26 February 2010) 
14  It covers devices used in vitro for the examination of a specimen derived from the 
human body, including reagents, instruments and specimen receptacles. The Directive 
aims to supplement the Community legal framework governing the conditions for the 
placing on the market of medical devices, by extending legislation to include in vitro 
diagnostic medical devices. Directive 98/79/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 27 October 1998 on in vitro diagnostic medical devices, OJ [1998] L 331/1. 
15  In vitro diagnostic devices are classified under five classes with specific modalities to 
evaluate the conformity assessment, which, depending on the class, have to be followed 
before the device can receive a CE Marking. No in vitro diagnostic device can be placed 





existing regulations relating to safety, pollution prevention and waste 
management has limitations as they are not specifically designed to 
deal with engineered nanoparticles.16 Moreover, although the IVDD lays 
down the essential requirements for safety and risk analysis required 
for market conformance, it does not elaborate on them. Hence, these 
requirements can be complied with by means of quality systems and by 
adhering to published harmonised product standards. Most standards 
use mass concentrations to measure toxicity, and as noted above, such 
physico-chemical parameters may not be appropriate for nanoparticles, 
while conventional risk assessment paradigms may not be suitable for 
assessing the risks associated with nanoparticles. The review therefore 
concluded that the current standards and risk analysis methods being 
applied to nanodevices like CellTracks are inadequate for ensuring the 
safety of such devices. It was argued that existing safety and marketing 
standards must be reviewed and amended so as to specifically address 
the challenges posed by the use of engineered nanoparticles in such 
devices (see, for example, D’Silva and van Calster, 2009: 264).  
As noted above, the second device considered within the context of 
the review was AcryMed’s SilvaGard Antimicrobial Surface Treatment, a 
silver nanoparticle technology created and applied in solution, which 
SilvaGard claims provides an easy, cost-effective method of applying a 
surface treatment of ionic silver to a device. The devices can be treated 
to provide effective antimicrobial protection for days, weeks, or even 
months, depending upon the application requirements. Silver 
nanoparticles are generally used in the size range of 1.0-50 nm.  
Despite the limited number of validated studies, specific concerns 
have been raised in relation to the potential health and safety risks. A 
study comparing nano-particle toxicity in mammalian germline stem 
cells, for example, found silver nanoparticles to be the most toxic of 
those tested, with the nanoparticles significantly reducing 
mitochondrial function and interfering with cell metabolism leading to 
cell leakage (Braydich-Stolle et al., 2005). The authors also showed that 
under certain conditions that when silver nanoparticles are used as 
antimicrobial agents in bone cement or other implantable devices, they 
may in fact be toxic to the bone-lining cells and other tissues. Recently 
                                                     
16  The use of conventional practices for handling, safety and waste disposal of 
nanomaterials stems from a lack of information on the toxicological properties of 
nanomaterials, as well as nascent regulatory guidance regarding the proper 
environmental, health and safety practices that should be used with them. See ICON 
Report, ‚A Survey of current practices in the nanotechnology workplace‛ (2006), 
available at: http://cohesion.rice.edu/CentersAndInst/ICON/emplibrary/ICON_RNA_ 
Report_Full2_Cond.pdf. (accessed 26 February 2010). 




a silver-coated wound dressing Acticoat17 (Smith & Nephew, Inc.) was 
introduced for use in burn patients. A study conducted on its toxicity 
has indicated that silver toxicity is possible and more studies are hence 
required (Trop et al., 2006). It is also unclear at this stage what effects 
incidental ingestion of silver nanoparticles might have on the digestive 
tract.  
Antimicrobial surface treatments such as SilvaGard have a wide 
scope of application, and may therefore be incorporated into a range of 
medical devices. These devices will be regulated in accordance with 
Directive 93/42/EEC (the Medical Devices Directive or MDD). The 
MDD classifies the devices on the basis of potential risk.18 On the basis 
of this classification various conformity assessments must be 
undertaken by manufacturers before the device is conferred a CE mark. 
For example, a catheter would be classified under Class III devices as 
high risk. Routes to compliance in that case are a full quality assurance 
system and examination of the design dossier, and the examination 
and testing of the product or production quality assurance. 
Manufacturers of medical devices must also carry out risk 
assessments, demonstrate the effectiveness of the device, and meet 
the essential safety requirements set out in Annex I of the Directive.  
The existing medical device regulation appears to be stringent and 
unquestionably incorporates a wide range of safety and conformity 
requirements. But is it suitable for regulating devices incorporating 
nanoparticles? Arguable not. As illustrated by the CellTracks example, 
the concern and uncertainty lies in the usage of nanoparticles/ 
nanocoatings. SilvaGard technology may be used to treat virtually any 
medical device thus making its way across a wide spectrum of 
applications, instruments and devices. This type of universally 
applicable nanotechnology raises several concerns: firstly, that it will be 
used in medical devices that will come into direct human contact; and 
secondly, that the devices may be inserted into the human body for a 
prolonged period of time, as in the case of a SilvaGard coated catheter. 
                                                     
17  Antimicrobial barrier dressings for use over partial, full thickness and acute wounds 
using Patented Silver technology: SILCRYST Nanocrystalline, Product information 
available at  http://www.acticoat.com/ (accessed 26 February 2010).  It is a three-ply 
dressing, consisting of an inner rayon/polyester absorptive core between two layers of 
silver-coated, high-density polyethylene mesh. In a moist environment, the nanocrystals 
of silver are released and improve the microbial control in the wound. 
18  Medical devices are classified under 4 classes with specific modalities to evaluate the 
conformity. Class I ” devices with low potential risk; Class IIa ” with moderate potential 
risk; Class IIb ” Devices with high potential risk; and Class III ”- devices with critical 
potential risk. Compliance with the requirements of the Medical Devices Directive is 
declared by placing the CE Marking on the product and supplying the device with a 





This application of nanotechnology has the potential to ‘blur’ the 
distinction between the mode of action on the human body as well as 
intended purpose of such products. It is also likely to further aggravate 
issues pertaining to the borderline between medical devices and 
medicinal products and further challenge the competencies of existing 
regulatory bodies. Another key issue, as discussed above, is whether 
the existing standards for testing, safety, usage and subsequent 
disposal address novel properties and likely concerns associated with 
nanomaterials. Medical devices are not designed to assess or evaluate 
unique aspects of nanoparticles and nanomaterials like size, shape or 
toxicity. In light of the current scientific concerns regarding 
nanoparticles, it would seem prudent for existing regulations to be 
reassessed and revaluated. This should be done on the basis of new 
and emerging scientific research and data on nanotechnology, given 
the uncertainties pertaining to novel properties, hazard evaluation, 
exposure evaluation and overall risk assessment (see, for example, 
SCHENIR, 2007; CHMP, 2006; N&ET, 2007; D’Silva and Van Calster, 
2009). 
It would appear that legislators in the EU will continue to regulate 
nanomedical products and devices under the existing regulatory 
regimes rather than create a completely new regulatory regime for 
nanomedicine. This would seem to be a logical step in the short term 
as the current regimes are relatively comprehensive. However, it is 
important to remember that these instruments were crafted prior to the 
emergence of nanomedicines, and as such, may need to be revised in 
the longer-term so as to take account of specific risks and challenges 
posed by nanomedicine. This revisionary or incremental approach 
seems to be the likely one EU legislators will take. The review also 
highlighted that the advancement of nanomedicines would appear to 
be blurring the boundary between medicines, devices and therapies, 
which is likely to be problematic in the medium to longer term from a 
regulatory perspective. Combination and borderline products may not 
readily fall into one specific regulatory system, and regulators will need 
to address the fact that the number of such products will only grow. 
These borderline products appear destined to also challenge the 
current criteria for classification and evaluation. Depending on the 
classification of medical device, medical product or therapy, different 
pre-market and post-market requirements are essentially required to be 
met. This has the potential to also impact upon pharmacovigilance 
requirements, post-market surveillance and the application of general 
harmonised standards.  
While the various directives for regulating medical products and 
medical devices lay down a number of essential requirements that have 




to be fulfilled before market authorisation, these are general and non-
specific. The risk assessment, safety and quality requirements are to be 
fulfilled by conformity with established quality systems and published 
product standards that may not be suitable to address various 
concerns relating to nanomedicine. As progress in medicine and 
nanoscience accelerates in the manufacture and characterisation of 
nanoscale materials and nano-enabled products, it will become 
increasingly important for researchers, manufacturers, regulators and 
other stake holders to have agreed nanotechnology standards. Steps 
have been initiated for example in the case of the CEN/TC 352 to 
establish nano-standards, the effectiveness and adequacy of which are, 
however, yet to be ascertained. These standards will have to address 
the evaluation of the quality, safety, efficacy and risk-management of 
nanomedicinal products. Whether such standards, if introduced in the 
EU, will be in the form of broad guidelines or legally binding 
requirements, is however unclear at this time. 
 
11.3. Initial Steps to Address the Regulatory Gaps  
The reviews of the current regulatory framework for the three sectors 
highlighted a number of inadequacies in the current regulatory 
framework which need to be addressed.  
Firstly, as is widely reported, there is a lack of scientific data as to 
the mid- and long-term impact of applications based on nanosciences. 
The ‘simple’ lack of scientific data and how this feeds into the 
regulatory cycle could be remedied relatively easily by taking the 
necessary risk management steps if and when more scientifically 
robust data on risks becomes available. It is of course noteworthy that 
in a precautionary approach (as discussed in section 4 below), one may 
advocate ban-type answers to such uncertainty as just described.  
As will be apparent from the above analysis, the EU has, to date, 
opted for an incremental approach, whereby ‘nano-hooks’ have and are 
being attached to existing regulation, typically upon review of the 
regulations that had been scheduled for other reasons than that of 
addressing the nanotechnologies challenge. The advantage of having 
these hooks ready for use is evident, especially in the EU, where the 
preparation and adoption of new legislative instruments may be a slow, 
as well as hotly contested, process.  
While the EU may have appeared fairly uncommitted to amending 
its regulatory framework in relation to nanotechnologies prior to 2009, 
actions by the European Parliament (EP) in April 2009 and the 
Parliament and Council in November 2009 would suggest ” at least to 





concerned about the impact of nanotechnology on their citizens. 
Accordingly, it would appear that the EU has positioned itself at the 
forefront of policy and regulatory developments in this area, and have 
done so with a bang. The EC could have introduced provisions within 
these legislative instruments that referred to, for example, generic 
terms such as ‘particle size’ as a trigger rather than ‘nanotechnologies’ 
per se, in order to avoid attention to its actions. In the absence of 
scientific evidence, such an approach would have been fairly harmless 
and largely symbolic. The path of least resistance will, however, now be 
left to other jurisdictions with the EU now appearing intent on adopting 
concrete measures to regulate nanotechnologies.  
The inclusion or likely inclusion of the term ‘nanomaterials’ in key 
legislative instruments relating to cosmetics and food would suggest 
that the EP intend to place nanotechnologies firmly in the liability 
sphere along the lines of the recently adopted EC Regulation on the 
Registration, Evaluation and Authorisation of Chemicals (REACH), a 
primary objective of which was to reverse the burden of proof from the 
regulators to the regulated industry. This is not in itself a poor 
regulatory strategy, provided the authorities at the same time efficiently 
pursue the soundness of accompanying technical regulations, such as 
testing methods. With its response to these proposals, however, the 
European Parliament (at least in the case of cosmetics, with the 
express support of the Member States) has forced the Commission’s 
hand and would like a much faster pace of development of risk 
assessment protocols. The Cosmetics Directive is a case in point. 
While one initial step to address identified gaps could be, for example, 
to modify the current safety requirements that underpin the Directive 
and the safety assessment framework set out in the SCCP’s Guidance 
notes so as to require additional information and risk assessments to 
be undertaken on this family of nanoparticles, this in itself does not 
address the more fundamental issue ” that the current risk assessment 
methodologies may be in themselves inadequate for assessing the risks 
posed by these particles. With the SCENIHR having concluded that 
‘current risk assessment methodologies require some modification in 
order to deal with the hazards associated with nanotechnology and in 
particular that existing toxicological and ecotoxicological methods may 
not be sufficient to address all of the issues arising with nanoparticles’, 
it would appear that until validated in vivo and in vitro risk assessment 
methodologies are developed for nanomaterials, including insoluble 
and bio-persistent nanoparticles, and incorporated into the regulatory 
framework, the potential for certain commercially available nano-
cosmetic products to pose a risk to human safety will continue. The 




development of these methodologies is surely an area in which public 
authorities on a global scale carry the brunt of the responsibility.  
 
11.4. Regulatory Innovation and the Potential Role for the Precautionary 
Principle  
As highlighted by sections 1-3, governments and commentators have 
to date largely focused on evaluating existing legislative frameworks 
and their adequacy for regulating the current generation of 
nanotechnologies, with fewer commentators having focused on the 
potential role or roles that other ‘softer’ regulatory mechanisms may 
play in regulating nanotechnologies now and in the future. This is not 
surprising given the embryonic nature of the technology and the 
uncertainties that exist in relation to the technology’s developmental 
trajectories. However, as illustrated above, considerable doubt exists as 
to the extent to which state-based regulatory regimes are suitable for 
regulating different aspects of the technology and the subsequent 
ability of these regimes to protect human and environmental health 
and safety in the event that certain applications are proven to be 
hazardous. While traditional state-based, or ‘command and control,’ 
regulation, such as EU Directives and Regulations, provide certainty to 
the regulated and are often viewed by the public as being highly 
credible and more legitimate than other forms of regulation, it has for a 
while now been argued that this form of regulation also suffers from a 
number of shortcomings or weaknesses (Gunningham and Rees, 1997; 
Aalders and Wilthagen, 1997). Such formal regulation is seen, for 
example, as being too resource intensive, reactive, rigid, and lacking in 
creativity (Sinclair, 1997). Recognition that state-based regulation is 
only a part of the continuum and that other regulatory approaches, 
including co-regulation and self-regulation, exist is extremely beneficial 
when considering the different regulatory options for promoting the 
responsible development of nanotechnologies.  
The scientific and regulatory challenges posed by nanotechnologies, 
and concern over the adequacy of the current state-based regulatory 
matrix for regulating nanotechnologies would appear to have prompted 
a number of government, industry and civil society stakeholders to 
examine the range of regulatory alternatives available to them. While 
governments have generally focused on the employment of ‘voluntary 
reporting schemes’ or voluntary ‘stewardship programs’ to assist in 
addressing the current knowledge deficit, the European Commission 
has been somewhat more innovative. It has, for example, designed and 
implemented its own Code of Conduct for Responsible Nanosciences 





application. Codes of conduct have also been developed by a range of 
other actors including, for example, BASF, the Swiss Retailers 
Association, the Coalition of Non-Governmental Organisations, and 
the Royal Society in partnership with Insight Investment, the 
Nanotechnology Industries Association and the Nanotechnology 
Knowledge Transfer Network (Bowman and Hodge, 2009). Other 
promising voluntary approaches being developed and employed by 
stakeholders have included the risk governance frameworks and risk 
management systems (see, for example, Hull, 2010; Meili and Widmer, 
2010). While these innovative regulatory schemes vary in their focus, 
structure, and institutional arrangements, their broad objective is the 
same: to encourage the responsible and commercially successful 
development of the technology.  
While the effectiveness of these softer regulatory approaches will 
not be known for some time, it is important to note that these 
voluntary initiatives have not sought to replace the existing state-based 
regulatory regime in which they operate, but rather supplement them. 
Such an approach recognises that self-regulation has its own strengths 
and weaknesses, including a perceived lack of credibility, and that 
regulatory solutions, including those required for different dimensions 
of nanotechnologies, will generally require a multi-dimensional 
approach (Gunningham and Sinclair, 1999). Even at this early stage it is 
reasonable foreseeable that the challenges posed by nanotechnologies 
will promote intensive regulatory innovation, under which stakeholders 
will devise new forms of regulatory approaches to supplement 
traditional ‘command and control’ regulations.  
Inevitably, the precautionary principle rears its head when one 
discusses the scope of risk analysis (particularly, risk management), in 
the EU. It is no secret that the EU, perhaps more than other 
jurisdictions, subscribes to the precautionary principle. Indeed it is 
included as one of the core principles of the EU’s environmental policy. 
The EC Treaty itself does not define the principle, and the European 
Court of Justice typically takes guidance from international environ-
mental law, and from the Commission’s Communication on the 
precautionary principle when called upon to apply it. The 2000 
Communication (COM(2000)1) is the highest-profile exercise so far to 
try and translate the principle into specific guidelines. Importantly, the 
Communication was initially sponsored by the trade directorate-general 
at the EC. Sir (now Lord) Brittan, the then trade Commissioner, 
launched the Communication as a handbook for the use of the 
principle in EU risk analysis with a view to reassuring the Union’s trade 
partners that recourse to the principle was not haphazard, 




unpredictable and therefore, arguably, a violation of international trade 
agreements, but rather, well thought-through and systematic. 
The Commission insists in this document that the precautionary 
principle in its European context is a justified part of risk management. 
The latter, the Commission insists, is not a purely scientific exercise but 
to a considerable degree a policy process. The communication details 
that any measures taken on the basis of the principle have to be 
proportionate vis-à-vis the level of environmental protection sought; 
that they must not be discriminatory in their application (in particular 
vis-à-vis the trading partners of the EC); that they are to be consistent 
with any measures that have already been taken (consistency); that they 
are to be based on technical analysis and, where possible, economic 
cost and benefit analysis; and that they are to be subject to constant 
monitoring and evaluation, including potential review (in particular 
with a view to integrating potential new scientific developments). 
Commission (and, by extension, EU) policy on the precautionary 
principle by no means represents a ‘when in doubt, opt out’ approach. 
In other words , the principle as applied by the EU does not advocate a 
green light for technologies only where full scientific evidence either 
testifies to their safety or maps the specific precautions that need to be 
taken to contain any hazards coinciding with the technology. Hence 
complete moratoria for a technology, such as advocated by some for 
the nanotechnology sector, does not immediately fit within the 
European precautionary approach. However measured precautionary 
responses for specific applications, e.g. those that have already entered 
the market-place, would not seem completely untoward; that the 
Commission has so far not reacted to the distinct possibility of 
insoluble nanoparticles used in cosmetics penetrating the stratum 
corneum, passing into the viable epidermis and entering the vascular 
system, where its consequences are unknown but somehow not 
unimaginable is in fact testimony to the reluctance of the European 
institutions to call upon the precautionary principle in the 
nanotechnology area. With its recent moves on cosmetics, the 
European Parliament for one is keener to take the precautionary 
principle to what in all likelihood is a logical conclusion. 
 
11.5. Trust Me, I’m a Regulator 
Having analysed the existing EU regulatory frameworks in three specific 
areas, and having noted that while each framework applies uniformly to 
products containing nanomaterials as well as conventional products, 
there are nonetheless some gaps within each of the regimes when 





gaps associated with potential risks, as well as the composition of the 
regimes themselves. While this is an important finding, a theoretical 
examination of the regulatory frameworks and their applicability to 
nanotechnologies is not in itself enough to decide whether or not the 
frameworks are adequate for dealing with nanotechnologies. The next 
step of the authors’ project is to therefore to assess the precise impact 
of the most relevant benchmark criteria that arguably will decide 
whether the existing frameworks are in fact adequate for regulating 
nanotechnology-based cosmetics, food and FCMs, and medical 
applications. This in turn will feed into our development of a regulatory 
model for nanotechnologies as a whole.  
The starting point for this part of the project has been a literature 
review to determine the most relevant benchmarking criteria for 
nanotechnologies. These are, (a) the requirements imposed by modern 
environmental and consumer protection law on the regulation of new 
technologies; (b) public participation principles of international and EU 
environmental law as exemplified by the Aarhus process, public 
participation and other such exercises; (c) the integral approach to 
regulation, avoiding black holes or what the EU calls a ‘regulatory 
apartheid’;19 (d) the application of international trade law in particular 
World Trade Organisation law; and (e) the ambitions of regulatory 
innovation i.e. to devise new forms of regulation as an alternative to 
traditional ones.   
After undertaking an analysis of these principles at the international 
and European level, the research team will formulate the operational 
legal boundaries that will subsequently determine the development of a 
regulatory framework or frameworks for nanotechnologies. 
Since the commencement of this project there has been one glaring 
development. Reviews such as the one in this paper have gained extra 
relevance given the insistence of regulators worldwide that all was 
hunky-dory in the nano-regulatory world. With regulatory regimes 
containing generic duty of care provisions requiring manufacturers in 
general terms not to put anything ‘unsafe’ on the market, regulators 
had insisted for a long time that ‘all was covered’. Regulators were in 
other words requesting from consumers a high level of trust, which in 
the EU especially (see van Calster, 2008) was received sceptically by 
consumers and the European Parliament alike. It was not until the 
European Parliament, as noted above, called for the introduction of 
specific provisions for nanotechnology in the food and cosmetics 
                                                     
19 This refers to the phenomenon whereby for a variety of reasons, regulation ends up 
being lax in certain jurisdictions and strict in others, effectively making consumers in 
some countries subject to far less protective regimes than their counterparts in other 
States. 




regulations, that the European Commission changed tack and 
acknowledged that more nano-specific regulation is necessary. It is as 
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Abstract 
The UK Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (HFE Act) can be 
viewed as a good example of a piece of regulation in which the ideas of 
a communicative approach to legislation were put into practice. The 
central claim of the communicative approach is that by according 
communication processes a central position in the application of 
general legislative rules, a plurality of perspectives can be integrated 
into these processes and the rules that result from them. In this 
chapter, I counter the central claim of the communicative approach by 
showing how the integration of different perspectives on the issue of 
the creation of human animal hybrids is obstructed by the working of 
power in the communication process.  
 
12.1. Introduction1 
The issue of the creation of human animal hybrid embryos presents a 
good example for showing what happens to the different scientific and 
societal perspectives about an issue in the process of formulating 
legislative rules. In the United Kingdom, the HFE Act gives the HFE 
Authority the power to decide on a case-by-case if the use and/or 
creation of human embryos younger than 14 days are desirable and 
necessary for one or more of the purposes of the Act. In November 
2006 scientists submitted applications containing their wish to produce 
human animal hybrid embryos by using human cells and animal eggs 
in order to obtain stem cells. The isolation of embryonic stem cells is 
thought of as a technique that is very promising for the improvement of 
human health. With these stem cells, scientists expect, for example, to 
understand much more about the origin of cancer and to develop 
tissue therapies. Unlike most issues of such high technological 
character, this became an issue of public debate. Journalists, for 
instance, reported about the research plans of scientists using alarming 
headlines about ‘Frankenbunnies’, because rabbit eggs would be used. 
This paper will consider what happened to the different perspectives 
                                                     
1 The debate concerning the creation of human animal hybrid embryos has been used 
earlier as a case study in N. Zeegers, ‘Distinguishing true from other hybrids. A case 
study of the merits and pitfalls of devolved regulation in the UK’, 3(2) Legisprudence 
(2009), 299-321. 




brought forward in the debate in the course of the communication 
processes that led to the revision of the 1990 HFE Act and the 
enactment of 2008 HFE Act.  
 
12.2. Biomedical Technologies and the Communicative Approach to 
Legislation 
The regulation of biomedical technology brings with it specific 
challenges for legislators. Firstly, specialized expertise is required to 
grasp all the relevant aspects involved in technological developments. 
A second reason is the high pace at which biomedical technology 
develops and is developing, constantly opening up new possibilities. 
Thirdly, there is no widespread agreement on the fundamental ethical 
issues involved. This becomes clear by looking at the equivocal 
conceptual basis for the status of the human embryo.2 Finally, the 
interaction between the pace of scientific and technological 
development and the way in which the political community ‘chooses’ to 
interpret moral principles and ideas. Changes in technological 
possibilities provoke alterations to the underlying social acceptance.3 
A means of addressing these issues is the delegation of regulatory 
power to a committee of experts in different fields of knowledge, such 
as medicine, science, law and religion. This technique is advocated by 
the communicative approach in Legal Theory as the means to reconcile 
flexibility, needed to face the challenges, and certainty, as requirement 
for legal rules.4 A key idea of the prescriptive aspect of the 
communicative approach is that the tensions resulting from these two 
                                                     
2 In the United Kingdom, as well as in the Netherlands, the law is grounded on the idea 
of intrinsic worth because of the potentiality of the embryo to grow into a human being 
and the idea that protection should increase as the embryo develops, because of the 
growing probability that it will become a human being. Fourteen days after conception is 
considered a significant moment in legislation. Although based on biological facts of the 
development of the embryo in the womb, the decision of legislators to take this moment 
as decisive rather than other moments in the development moral relevant is not 
uncontested (Lee and Morgan, 2001: 68-72). 
3 To illustrate this, consider the successful creation of induced ‘Pluripotent Cells’ by 
researchers at the end of 2007. These cells, created from human adult somatic cells, are 
very similar to embryonic stem cells. Human embryos or human egg cells are no longer 
needed to obtain pluripotent stem cells and that is presented as a major moral 
advantage of this development. But is this consistent with the potentiality argument? If 
every somatic cell is potentially an embryo the potentiality argument would mean that 
every somatic cell has some moral status. In that case, the ethical rules for human 
embryos would also apply to somatic cells (see for a counterargument Holm, 2008).  
4 Dutch advocates of a communicative approach can be found in Witteveen and Van 
Klink (1999), Zeegers, Witteveen and Van Klink (2005) and Van der Burg (2001). Other 
advocates are the Australian legal scholar Gunningham (1998) and the British legal 





requirements and the challenges of biomedical technology mentioned 
above can be resolved by deciding on a case-by-case basis on the 
individuals circumstances in which research is to be authorised. By 
charging a committee with this task, government can provide rules that 
leave room for various interpretations and can thus anticipate future 
possibilities that cannot be foreseen at the time the Act becomes 
effective. For example, simply forbidding the use of human embryos for 
research or the creation of human animal hybrid embryos would 
preclude the technique even in a case where only one such embryo was 
to be used or created in order to save the lives of million patients. An 
alternative for legislators is to opt for a rule that allows for the creation 
of human embryos only where a devolved authority authorises such 
actions. Under the HFE Act, the HFE Authority is given the power to 
decide on a case-by-case if the use and/or creation of these embryos 
are desirable and necessary. The advantage of this rule is that it leaves 
room for flexibility.  
However, this kind of delegation of legislative tasks gives rise to 
concerns regarding the democratic legitimacy and the acceptability of 
the specific rules that result. Such rules get their final meaning thus not 
in a parliament but in a forum that lacks the electoral base of a 
parliament. Defenders of the communicative approach counter by 
claiming that as many claims and interests as possible must be 
included in these processes and in the preceding phases of policy 
formulation. Their expectation is that, in the end, communication 
processes such as those provided for in the HFE Act can integrate a 
plurality of perspectives on the issue at hand. But such integration 
requires that the legislature ensures that different perspectives are 
recognised and that no one voice dominates the others. 
In practice, however, it is inevitable that some stakeholders will not 
be (equally) included in the communication processes. Even more 
important with respect to the question of this broader research project 
is that the inclusion of different perspectives in communication 
processes does not automatically lead to the required balancing of the 
perspectives and the integration into the resulting rules. There are two 
reasons why integration of different perspectives is not expected to 
result from these processes. Firstly, the agreement made by expert 
committees like the Central Committee on Research involving Human 
Subjects or the HFE Authority is not necessarily based on consensus 
but can also be based on compromise. The second reason why 
integration is hampered is power imbalance. The role influence and 
power play in communication processes is left out in the mainstream 
of the communicative approach (Zeegers, 2003).The participants in the 
communication processes concerning the ethical boundaries of 




research with human embryos will try to convince each other that their 
categorization of techniques and their interpretation of the general 
legislative rule is the right one. In other words, they will try to exert 
influence on each other’s understanding of the facts and the meaning 
of the values involved.  
In sociologist Lukes’ (1974; 2005) taxonomy of different forms of 
power, influence is seen as a form of power whenever conflicting 
interests are involved. There are many interests involved in research 
with human embryos that can possibly conflict with each other: the 
interests of patients who hope that by means of this research a cure 
can be found for their disease can conflict with the interests of women 
whose ova are needed to create human embryos with alternative 
techniques; the commercial interest of the pharmaceutical industry in 
the cure can conflict with the interests of people that consider the 
embryo as a person from the moment of creation. One can deduce 
from this that power is clearly involved in the communication 
processes concerning the use of human embryos in research. But what 
kind of power and how can the working of power be analysed? 
 
12.3. Power in Communicative Regulation 
Socio-legal scholar Julia Black, an adherent of the communicative 
approach, is exceptional in acknowledging that the exertion of power is 
involved in communication processes that are part of regulatory 
processes on new biotechnological developments (Black, 2002; 1998). 
Black (1998) distinguishes three dimensions in the communication 
processes involved in the debates on ethical rules concerning new 
technologies that can be helpful in analyzing the working of power in 
the communication processes concerning the legal boundaries of the 
use of embryos in research: a) the structural dimension that concerns 
who has access to the decision making processes and to what extent; 
b) the cognitive dimension, consisting of the perceptions of the 
participants, their world view, rationalities and operating logics; and c) 
the communicative dimension, which is concerned with what happens 
to (cognitive) differences in conceptualizing, categorization and ways 
of justifying in the process of translation in the subsequent stages of 
the decision making process.   
The role of the structural dimension ” which actors have access to 
the process ” in the exertion of influence and power is common 
knowledge amongst the proponents of the communicative approach, 
as well as other scholars in legal theory. However, the communicative 
approach’s concern with the inclusion of a plurality of perspectives in 





communication. With the other two dimensions of communication, the 
cognitive and the communicative dimension, attention is drawn to 
aspects of exerting influence that are less well understood. In order to 
analyze the working of influence and power in the communication 
processes concerning the creation of new forms of embryo in all of its 
aspects, I will focus on the cognitive and communicative dimensions 
here.  
What perspectives does the cognitive dimension of the 
communication processes concerning the issue of the creation of 
human animal hybrid embryos consist in? This question will be 
answered in detail in section 5 and 6, in which an analysis of the 
politico-legal debate on this issue is presented. In short, the different 
cognitive perspectives include the legal perspective, referring to the 
rules in the HFE Act; the scientific perspectives, referring to the 
biological facts involved; and ethical perspectives, referring to 
boundaries to be drawn on moral grounds. A relevant ethical 
perspective is, for example, that in which the mixture of human and 
animal material is surrounded by taboos. Van Beers (2009) discerned 
this perspective, termed by her the human dignity perspective, from the 
Dutch and French legislation concerning the use of human embryos in 
research, specifically from the prohibition of reproductive cloning and 
of mixing human and animal material in embryos.5  
The key elements of this perspective are: 1) An absolute boundary 
between animal and human beings; 2) Man cannot be reduced to a 
commodity or an instrument; and 3) Man is a unique and free 
creature.6  
What purpose would be served by drawing out the communicative 
dimension of the communication processes alluded to above? 
Following Black, I will draw attention to what happens to the 
differences between these cognitive perspectives in the course of 
communication processes as part of regulation. The fact that these 
                                                     
5 In The Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine human dignity is the central 
principle. However, it is still a rather hollow and non-committal principle that is to be 
given content in positive law. This principle of human dignity is different from the 
principle of respect for the unborn human being, the latter being what guides the legal 
status of the embryo as (potential) human being (Van Beers, 2009: 223).  
6 According to Van Beers, the human being that is to be protected by the principle of 
human dignity is not the human being as absolute, factual category but as contextual, 
anthropological category (2009: 576). As the unveiling of the human genome has 
conveyed, a human being is not unique in terms of its genetic constitution as it is not 
much different from animal primates. Therefore the protection of human dignity can no 
longer be based on scientific facts but must be based on collective meanings, according 
to Van Beers. In other words, discussions about the regulation of medical biotechnology 
are not so much about human bodies, organs, embryos and corpses but about what 
their symbolic value is to us as a community. 




perspectives have different languages places a barrier on 
communication. The communicative dimension is concerned with what 
happens to these differences in the subsequent stages of the decision 
making process.  These differences can either be bridged, for instance 
by conceptual integration, or one perspective can prevail at the expense 
of the other. In the latter, the working of negative power, in the sense of 
the exclusion of perspectives from the deliberation, can be identified, 
whereas in the former, the power is positive in the sense of producing 
new forms of knowledge, meanings and practices.7  
Van Beers, for example, considers the human dignity perspective as 
being placed under ever more pressure by the possibilities that 
biomedical technologies offer or at least promise. Taking notice of the 
debate on the issue of the creation of human animal hybrid embryos in 
the UK and considering the perseverance of other taboos concerning 
birth and death, it indeed is remarkable how easy the taboo 
surrounding the mixture of human and animal genetic material was 
side-stepped and how fast legislative bans have been lifted. Although 
traces of the human dignity perspective were present in the public 
debate, this perspective seemed to be absent at the moment the HFE 
Act was enacted. In the following section, I will describe the processes 
of communication concerning the rules for the creation of new forms of 
embryo in this new Act and the differences between the human dignity 
perspective and a scientific perspective. 
 
12.4. Introduction of the Issue of the Creation of Human Animal Hybrid 
Embryos   
The issue of ‘human-animal hybrids’ was first put on the political 
agenda in the UK by the Select Science and Technology Committee in 
2005.8 This Select Committee is charged with monitoring the work and 
activities of the Office of Science and Innovation, which is part of the 
Department of Trade and Industry.9 In 2005, this committee 
recommended to Parliament making the creation of human-animal 
                                                     
7 This concept of power as productive is derived form Foucault (1976) ‘Twee typen 
macht. College van 4 januari 1976’, 25(3) Te elfder ure, 573- 585.  
8 In fact the debate was not only concerning the creation of human-animal hybrid 
embryos but also on human-animal chimeras. For reasons of clarity I will restrict the 
focus of this paper to the first category of human-animal embryos.   
9 The Select Committee Science and Technology Committee is one of 18 departmental 
select committees in the House of Commons charged with monitoring the work and 
activities of a specific Government department. The Science and Technology Committee 
is unusual in that it monitors the Office of Science and Innovation, which is part of the 
Department of Trade and Industry, rather than a department in its own right. The Select 





chimera or hybrid embryos possible.10 The Department of Health next 
brought up the issue in September 2005, when it informed the HFE 
Authority that this issue would be considered as part of the review of 
the 1990 HFE Act.   
In November 2006, the HFE Authority received two applications 
from scientific teams requesting permission to carry out research using 
human cells and animal eggs to produce stem cells.11 The HFE 
Authority is central in the framework for control of embryo research in 
the UK. The HFE Authority is a statutory body, created in 1991 under 
the Human Fertilization and Embryology Act (1990).12 The Authority is 
responsible for licensing the creation, storage and use of human 
embryos for research.13 In order to get the approval of the HFE 
Authority, researchers who wish to use spare embryos in their research 
must submit a research protocol that makes clear that the research is 
‘necessary or desirable’ for one or more of the purposes of the HFE 
Act.14 In addition to being convinced on the research being either 
                                                     
10  House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, Human Reproductive 
Technology and the Law (Eighth Special Report, March 2005). In this report the Science 
&Technology Committee recommended that new legislation was required inter alia to 
make the creation of inter-species embryos legal for research purposes subject to the 14-
day rule and the prohibition on implantation in a woman. In addition, the new 
legislation was required to define the nature of interspecies embryos. 
11  The scientists responsible for the applications wanted to produce stem cells using 
human cells and animal eggs; because the mitochondria from the donor egg are still 
present, the resulting embryo contains nuclear DNA from the human cell and 
mitochondrial DNA from the animal egg. This means that the resulting embryo would 
contain a small amount of animal DNA from the mitochondria present in the animal 
egg (less than 1%). The applicants for a license were Dr. Lyle Armstrong, Institute of 
Human Genetics, University of New Castle and Dr. Stephen Minger, Stem Cell Biology 
Laboratory, Wolfson Centre for Age-Related Diseases, King’s College London.  
12  The primary remit of the HFE Act is to license and monitor UK clinics that offer IVF 
(in vitro fertilisation) and DI (donor insemination) treatments, and all UK-based 
research into human embryos. The authority also regulates the storage of eggs, sperm 
and embryos. 
13  The HFE Act stipulates that the composition of the Authority be 21 members chosen 
to bring to their office a broad range of medical, scientific, social, legal and religious 
knowledge and experience. There are several other provisions in the HFE Act concerning 
the composition of the Authority: the Secretary of State shall make appointments and 
has to ensure that the Authority must be informed by the views of both men and 
women. At least a third but not more than half of the membership has to consist of 
persons with a background as medical practitioner, human embryo research or the 
commissioning, funding of or decision making on this research. Persons belonging to 
these categories are disqualified from being appointed as chairman or deputy chairman 
in order to ensure that the overall direction of the authority is independent of the 
medical-scientific view (Lee and Morgan, 2002: 102-103).  
14  Desirable is assessed in terms of the contribution to scientific knowledge or human 
health that can be expected from the research. Necessary means that creating such 
embryos (instead of using other sources of stem cells) is necessary for the research. 




necessary or desirable, the Authority cannot issue a license unless it is 
satisfied that the use of an embryos is necessary for the research (sch. 
2, para. 3 (2) and (6)) (Lee and Morgan, 2001: 120).  
Before the Authority was able to take the applications for research 
using human cells and animal eggs into consideration it needed to 
know whether, according to the HFE Act 1990, the embryos that would 
be created in this research would fall under their remit. The definition 
of the human embryo in this act stipulated that such embryo must have 
‘a full human genome’ and ‘be alive’. The definitions of these 
categories appeared to be contested even among scientific experts. 
This turned the question of whether the creation of human-animal 
hybrid embryos should be allowed into a ‘legal boundary conflict’ with 
respect to the HFE Act 1990. It is therefore necessary to analyse the 
politico-legal debate preceding the decision making of the Authority. 
The subsequent section, section 6, will then consider the politico-legal 
struggle over the amendment of the HFE Act 1990 in the legislative 
arena.     
 
12.5. The Decision-making Process by the HFE Authority 
The HFE Authority first had to address the question of whether the 
forms of embryo that would result from the research in the application 
would contain a ‘full human genome’ and ‘be alive’. Two committees of 
this authority had already been involved in answering questions from 
the Department of Health concerning human animal hybrids: the 
Scientific and Clinical Advances Group (SCAG)15 concerning the 
scientific aspects and the Ethics and Law Committee (ELC) in regard to 
the ethical aspects of the creation of these forms of embryo. The SCAG 
considered that any embryo with a human genome falls under the remit 
of the HFE Act. The proportion of human derived and rabbit derived 
proteins should be taken into account when deciding whether these 
hybrid embryos should be classed as human. The SCAG was asked to 
review the role that mitochondrial DNA plays in the development of the 
embryos and whether embryos containing human DNA and both 
human and animal mitochondrial DNA could be considered a human 
embryo. In May 2006 both the SCAG and ELC agreed that the hybrids 
should be regarded as an ‘embryo’ for the purposes of the Act 1990. 
They also agreed that the creation, keeping or use of such an embryo in 
principle could be regarded as necessary or desirable. The ELC 
concluded from this that a license committee of the HFE Authority 
                                                     
15  This is a group of scientific experts that advises the Authority on questions 





‘would have the discretion to authorize these activities in the case of 
application’.  
However, in the meantime, scientists had publicly stated their wish 
to create these hybrid embryos by fusing human cells with rabbit cells, 
and newspapers had written about these plans. Some public unease 
with these scientific experiments was expressed. For the Government, 
which was in the process of writing proposals for amending the HFE 
Act, this public unease was reason to make a statement about hybrid 
and chimera embryos in its White Paper: ‘The government will propose 
that the creation of hybrid and chimera embryos in vitro, should not be 
allowed’ (White Paper, December, 2006). Apparently, the Government 
at that point considered the combination of human and animal 
material in an embryo a bridge too far.16 
This statement of the government did not fail to impact on the HFE 
Authority. With the government proposal for a ban on the creation of 
hybrid embryos, the Authority was no longer certain about its case and 
sought legal advise concerning the question of whether this research 
was covered by the legal meaning of embryos under the HFE Act 1990 
and therefore fell under its remit. The HFEA’s Horizon Scanning Expert 
Panel (HHSEP) was also asked to advise.17 The respondents agreed 
that the hybrid embryo would contain a complete human genome. 
However, there was no consensus on whether a hybrid embryo would 
be capable of implantation. Legal advice subsequently informed the 
Authority that ‘if the embryo contains a complete human genome and 
it cannot be shown definitively that the embryo does not have the 
normal potential to develop, it is most likely that the court would find 
that this constitutes a live human embryo for the purposes of the Act’.18  
On 11 January 2007, the Authority ruled that, under current 
regulation, the research did indeed fall under their remit. However, it 
postponed the actual decision about the applications in order to first 
have a ‘full and proper public debate and consultation as to whether in 
                                                     
16  Although the government in the same paper proposed that the law contains the 
power to enable regulations to set out circumstances in which the creation of hybrid and 
chimera embryos in vitro may in future be allowed under license for research purposes 
only (White Paper, December 2006). 
17  The HHSEP is a worldwide panel of experts. The panel includes experts in stem cell 
technology from universities in the UK, Australia and Japan, specialists in assisted 
reproductive technologies from the US and Belgium and leading academics in cloning 
techniques, developmental genetics and cryopreservation.  
18  The legal advice was provided by a body termed the ‘Council’. Here the Council is 
referring to the purposive approach to statutory interpretation used by the House of 
Lords in the Quintavalle case of 2003 in order to interpret the 1990 Act. The Council’s 
reason for regarding the embryos as falling under the remit of the Authority was that the 
courts would be likely to see the embryo in a way that ensures that this type of research 
falls under the scope of regulation rather than not. 




principle, licenses for these sorts of research could be granted’.19 
Apparently, the Authority felt the urge to organise a public consultation 
itself, as the government had been sufficiently moved by ‘the public 
unease’ to propose banning the creation of hybrid embryos.  
In the public consultation, the HFE Authority sought the views of 
the public, interest groups and the scientific community.20 The 
consultation document distinguished between three types of human-
animal hybrid embryos and two of these three were juxtaposed as the 
true hybrid and the ‘cytoplasmic hybrid’.21 These two types were 
presented as follows:  
The category of ‘hybrid embryo’, also called ‘true hybrid’ contains 
embryos which are created by mixing human sperm and animal eggs or 
human eggs and animal sperm. This is what people think of when they 
think of hybrids: ‚they don’t think of cytoplasmic hybrid embryos 
created in stem cell research, instead they imagine the half-human, half-
animal monsters, like the minotaur that are associated with myths and 
legends‛. However the only two species that are genetically similar 
enough to produce life are mules and hinneys. True hybrid embryos 
might possibly be created in the laboratory but ‚any attempt to create a 
living hybrid from two closely related species would be extremely 
unlikely to even produce a viable pregnancy‛.22  
The document continued: ‚These embryos would be different from 
‘cytoplasmic hybrid embryos’ in that they would have an equal amount 
of DNA from the two species from which the eggs and the sperm are 
obtained‛.23 The ‘cytoplasmic hybrid embryo’ is created by combining a 
human nucleus with an enucleated animal egg and would contain less 
than 1% animal DNA. In other words, this document attempts to 
reassure concerned respondents by juxtaposing the image of the 
Minotaur to the following schematic presentation of the cell nuclear 





                                                     
19  See www.hfea.gov.uk (accessed 26 February 2010). 
20  The aim of the consultation was ‚to consider this kind of research in the broad 
context of embryonic stem cell research‛. See HFE Authority, Hybrids and Chimeras 
(April 2007: 6). 
21  The third type that fell within the category of ‘hybrids’ is the transgenic human 
embryo: forms of human embryo that have animal genes inserted into them during early 
development. Such embryos have not yet been created, although transgenic animal 
embryos have. 
22  HFE Authority, 2007, 9. 


















(Source: HFE Authority, April, 2007: 8) 
 
In addition the Authority underscored the difference between 
‘cytoplasmic hybrid embryos’ and ‘true hybrids’ by highlighting the 
amount of animal DNA the former would contain. The description of 
‘cytoplasmic hybrid embryos’ as containing maximum 1% animal DNA 
was subsequently used in an opinion poll concerning the use of 
embryos in research and 48% disagreed with the creation of such an 
embryo while over a third of those polled supported it.24  
On 5 September 2007, the HFE Authority published a statement on 
its decision regarding hybrid embryos. The statement noted: ‘public 
opinion is very finely divided with people generally opposed to this 
research unless it is tightly regulated and it is likely to lead to scientific 
or medical advancements’. By calling public opinion ‘divided’ the 
Authority refers to the outcome of the opinion poll that 48 % of the 
respondents was against the creation of ‘cytoplasmic hybrid embryos’. 
The claim that these respondents would withdraw their objection in 
cases where ‘the research would be tightly regulated’ is derived from 
the ‘public dialogue work’ that was also part of the consultation, and in 
which various public perceptions, motivations and attitudes to the 
creation of human-animal embryos were explored.25 The Authority 
combined this conclusion and the contribution of scientists to the 
consultation with the former legal advice and concluded that 
                                                     
24  In July 2007, a sample of 2073 residents of the UK was interviewed. 
25  This public dialogue work consisted in meetings and workshops in which various 
public perceptions, motivations and attitudes to the creation of human-animal embryos 
were explored (HFE Authority, 2007: Section 4). 




‘cytoplasmic hybrid embryos’ as specific form of hybrid and chimera 
research could be permitted.26  
At the point at which the HFE Authority took its decision, the 
scientific experts that had been involved in the process of decision 
making had found common ground with lay persons, at least those 
consulted, in the combination of the acceptance of the creation of 
‘cytoplasmic hybrid embryos’ with the rejection of ‘true hybrids’. The 
following quantitative criterion of scientists had proven to be successful 
in convincing part of those opposed to human-animal hybrid embryos 
in this arena: forms of human-animal hybrids with 50% or more animal 
derived DNA were held to unacceptable in contrast to forms with 1 % 
or less animal derived DNA. By making this distinction, the Authority 
appeared to acknowledge, at least to some extent, the human dignity 
perspective in which the boundary between animal and human beings 
is meaningful. This perspective had been given voice by the media; and 
the HFE Authority showed itself to be responsive to the revulsion 
generated by mixing human and animal material expressed by them.  
However, the responses the scientists of the Horizontal Scanning 
Expert Panel gave in the public consultation raises questions about the 
quantitative criterion presented above. This criterion is based on what 
kind of DNA is put together in the test tube in the initial phase of the 
process of the creation of the entity. By focusing on the ingredients that 
are initially put together, and the specific proportion of human and 
animal material in these ingredients, the essence of embryonic 
development seems to be missed. According to the scientists of the 
Horizontal Scanning Expert Panel, the mixing of the material activates 
processes that produce new material that is neither human nor animal 
to the same extent as the initial mix. Their general view was that ‘at 
some stage after embryonic genome activation all proteins produced 
(with the exception of those coded by the animal mitochondrial genes) 
would be human’.27 While the embryo relies on proteins and genetic 
messages present in the oocyte from the animal up to the fourth cell 
stage, this changes with the genome activation that takes place in cell 
stages four through to eight. After this genome activation, the stem 
cells formed would be almost entirely human. Thus, from these latter 
cell stages until the blastocyst stage (the point at which the stem cells 
are derived), the entity could be considered as human, according to the 
                                                     
26  In reference to other kinds of human hybrid and human chimera research, the 
statement provided that ‘not only did the scientific community not wish to perform such 
research at present but also (…) the prospect was so distant that they could not 
envisage what forms this research would take in future’ (HFEA Statement, 5 September 
2007).  





international scientific experts consulted by the HFE Authority.28 While 
the quantitative criterion above is based on whether genetic material is 
derived from an animal or a human being, this information makes clear 
that the degree of either human or animal material in the early embryo 
changes with the stages of development the creature goes through.  
 
12.6. The (Pre)-Legislative Process of Amending the 1990 HFE Act 
By the beginning of 2007, a lobby of scientists and Members of 
Parliament were trying to convince the members of the Authority, and 
the public more generally, that the creation of hybrid embryos should 
be permitted. For example, a number of scientists and MPs sent a letter 
to the members shortly before the Authority was expected to make a 
decision  telling them it would be wise not to listen to the government 
and to support the research. This letter was published in The Times.29 
The letter was signed by scientists involved in stem cell research, such 
as Stephen Minger, Lyle Armstrong and Ian Wilmut and several 
members of the Select Committee Science and Technology, such as 
Liberal Democrat MP Evan Harris.30 
In April 2007, the Select Committee Science and Technology 
published its inquiry into the government’s proposals for the new 
legislation for the use of embryos for research.31 This inquiry consisted, 
inter alia, in three oral evidence sessions during which the Select 
Committee Science and Technology heard stem cell scientists as well 
as government officials, ethicists, a bishop and a leader of the 
organisation Human Genetics Alert.32 According to the Select 
Committee, there was a need to allow research using human-animal 
chimera and hybrids to proceed immediately. The Committee 
conceived the proposed ban on the creation of these embryos by the 
government as at odds with their own recommendations in the last 
parliament.33 It used the specific example of ‘cytoplasmic hybrid 
                                                     
28  The blastocyst stage is preceded by the morula stage, a 16-32 cell stage. 
29  The Times, 10 January 2007. On January 11, the Authority declared it would postpone 
the actual decision. The letter in The Times was also signed by other scientists, Nobel 
laureates amongst them, as well as social scientists, legal academics, medical ethicists 
and leaders of organisations of medical professional organisations and organisations of 
bio industry and bio science. 
30  Stephen Minger and Lyle Armstrong were the applicants for the license to create 
human animal hybrids. 
31  House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, Government proposals for 
the regulation of hybrid and chimera embryos. Fifth Report, 5 April, 2007. 
32  Ibid., 7. 
33  See House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, Human Reproductive 
Technology and the Law (Eighth Special Report, 2005). 




embryos’ to argue why such research was desirable and necessary.34 
Scientific aims that would make the creation of human-animal chimera 
or hybrid embryos necessary were the pursuit of knowledge about the 
genetic basis of disease and the direction of stem cells into future cell-
based therapy. The stem cells produced would be medical useful in 
drug discovery and toxicity testing (2007: 61). The committees’ 
assessment of the use of embryos in research was thus mainly focused 
on the creation of ‘cytoplasmic hybrid embryos’. However, its 
conclusion was that the creation of all interspecies embryos should be 
allowed.  
The committee put the distinction between different subcategories 
of embryos in terms of degrees of ‘humanness’ into perspective. They 
pointed to the similarity between humans and non-human primates 
and other animals: ‘In scientific terms, how human an entity is could 
perhaps be described through determination of its percentage of 
human genetic material. Scientists have shown that humans are 96 per 
cent similar to chimpanzees, whilst genetic similarity between humans 
and rabbits (…) is around 80%’ (2007: 23). What the Select Committee 
is clearly doing with such a statement is bringing biological facts into 
position against the human dignity perspective that the HFE Authority 
in its public consultation had taken into account.   
In their inquiry, the committee started by considering what name 
should be chosen ‘for what would result from the proposals to create 
embryos through somatic cell nuclear transfer of human genetic 
material into animal ova from which the main source of genetic 
material has been previously removed’.35 Various names given by 
scientists were considered: Professor Shaw of King’s college called 
them ‘pseudo-hybrids’, Dr Lyle Armstrong of Newcastle University 
‘interspecies embryos’ and Professor Austin Smith of the University of 
Cambridge thought they would be better termed as ‘cybrids’. Professor 
Sir David King argued that the entities that the scientists wanted to 
create ‘should not be described as either chimeras or hybrids’.36 He 
proposed calling them ‘cytoplasmic hybrid embryos’, which seems not 
a little contradictory to the desire to avoid calling them hybrid. The 
Science and Technology Committee decided to use Sir David King’s 
                                                     
34  This is the form of the embryo the scientists proposed to create. The committee 
described this category as ‘what would result from the proposals to create embryos 
through somatic cell nuclear transfer of human genetic material into animal ova from 
which the main source of genetic material has been previously removed’. House of 
Commons Science and Technology Committee, Government proposals for the 
regulation of hybrid and chimera embryos (Fifth Report, 5 April 2007), 6.  
35  Ibid. 
36  Sir David King was the UK Government Chief Scientific Adviser and Head of the 





description in the remainder of the report, without giving reasons for 
this choice.  
The government followed the recommendation of the Select 
Committee to the extent that this was congruent with the line of 
reasoning of the HFE Authority: in its draft Bill, it proposed to include 
the creation of ‘cytoplasmic hybrids’ in the categories of embryo that 
may be authorised by a research license by the HFE Authority.37 
However, in contradiction to the recommendation of the Select 
Committee the government in the draft Bill proposed to forbid the 
creation of ‘true hybrids’.38 In the introduction to the draft Bill, the 
Secretary of State for Health noted concerning the list of forms of 
embryo that would be conditionally allowed: ‘This list (…) does not 
include ‘true’ hybrids created from mixing human and animal gametes 
(…) other than as currently permitted for the purpose of testing the 
fertility or normality of human sperm’.39  
In the Summer of 2007 an inquiry into the draft bill was made by the 
Joint Committee on the Human Tissue and Embryos (Draft) Bill.40 The 
Joint Committee on the Human Tissue and Embryos (Draft) Bill was 
                                                     
37  The ‘types of embryos created by combining together human and animal gametes or 
human embryos altered using animal DNA or animal cells’ were named ‘interspecies 
embryos’. In this draft bill, the interspecies embryos were to be explicitly excluded from 
the definition of an ‘embryo’. Instead these forms of embryo were to be regulated under 
a new section 4A with the title Prohibitions in connection with genetic material not of 
human origin. The ‚cytoplasmic hybrids‛ fall under the description given in (b) of the 
following forms of interspecies embryo that were distinguished in this draft bill:  
(a) an embryo created by using human gametes and the gametes of an animal, 
(b) an embryo created by replacing the nucleus of an animal egg or a cell derived from 
an animal embryo with a human cell or the nucleus of a human cell,  
(c) a human embryo that has been altered by the introduction of any sequence of 
nuclear or mitochondrial DNA of an animal,  
(d) a human embryo that has been altered by the introduction of one or more animal 
cells, or 
(e) any other embryo that contains both ”  
 (i) any haploid set of human chromosomes, and 
 (ii)any haploid set of animal chromosomes of any other sequence of nuclear or 
mitochondrial DNA of an animal. See Human Tissue and Embryos (Draft) Bill, May 
2007.  
38  A way out of this ban was built into the proposal by stating that permission could be 
made possible by regulations made by the Secretary of State, see Human Tissue and 
Embryos (Draft) Bill, May 2007, x.   
39  The Hamster test as well as the creation of (other) true hybrids would fall under the 
form of embryo as described in footnote 37 under (a) but is banned from being 
conditionally allowed by the statement of the Secretary of State. See Human Tissue and 
Embryos (Draft) Bill, May 2007, ix-x.   
40  Joint Committee on the Human Tissue and Embryos (Draft) Bill, Human Tissue and 
Embryos (Draft) Bill, vol. I: Report, HC (2006-07) 630-I, HL Paper 169-I; Joint Committee 
on the Human Tissue and Embryos (Draft) Bill, Human Tissue and Embryos (Draft) Bill, 
vol. II: Evidence, HC (2006-07), 630-II, HL Paper 169-II. 




established by the House of Parliament in order to consider the draft 
Bill presented by the government in May 2007. The Joint Committee 
was asked to report to the House by 25 July 2007.41 The report of the 
Joint Committee was informed by evidence coming from a handful of 
stem cell scientists, organisations involved in bioscience and 
government officials, but also from organisations critical of the use of 
embryos in research, from religious as well as other backgrounds.42 The 
Joint Committee also recommended the inclusion of the ‘true hybrid 
embryo’ in the categories that would conditionally be allowed, thus 
opposing the government’s proposal to exclude the category of ‘true 
hybrids’. The Joint Committee reasoned that there was no ‘sound point 
of principle’ on which the distinction between true hybrids and the 
other categories could stand, referring explicitly referred to the ethicist, 
Søren Holm, who as a witness before the committee had claimed that 
both categories of hybrid embryos were ‘equally objectionable on 
ethical grounds’. Once researchers have crossed the species barrier, no 
valid distinction is to be made between an entity that is 99% human 
and an entity that is 50% human.43 According to the Joint Committee, 
this view was supported by many others, and it referred to the 
contributions of the All Party Parliamentary Pro-Life Group, Christian 
Action Research and Education and the Christian Medical Fellowship. 
In addition, the Committee noted that Vivienne Nathanson, Director of 
Professional Activities of the British Medical Association, also saw no 
sense in the distinction.44 These organisations were against the 
creation of all subcategories of interspecies embryos and, like Holm, 
objected to allowing this creation. However, the Joint Committee, by 
giving a twist to Holm’s argument could use it to the advantage of their 
own purpose, which was to include ‘true’ hybrids in the permissible 
category. As the Joint Committee noted, whether it was or not was 
irrelevant to these organisations anyway.  
The Minister  of State for Public Health opposed their arguments 
with the pragmatic argument that there was currently no call for 
                                                     
41  The membership of the Joint Committee consisted of nine members of the House of 
Commons and nine members of the House of Lords. Five of the MPs were members of 
the Science and Society Committee or had been a member of the former Science and 
Society Committee. 
42  Joint Committee, Human Tissue and Embryos (Draft) Bill, Vol. I, supra, Appendix 2. 
The committee also conducted an online consultation on four questions via its website, 
two questions related to interspecies research. 
43  Joint Committee, Human Tissue and Embryos (Draft) Bill, Vol. I, 46. 
44  The reason she gave was that bringing the true hybrid under the remit of the HFE 
Authority would make the rules more flexible and make it easier to allow the creation of 
true hybrids at the moment that this would become essential. See Joint Committee, 





research using ‘true’ hybrids, and given that public opinion was a 
concern, discussion on this point should be postponed. The Joint 
Committee was not to be persuaded by this argument and added that 
‘true’ hybrids had already been created in the so-called ‘hamster-test’.45 
This is a well established and explicitly endorsed test in which human 
sperm is mixed with hamster eggs to test the health and motility of 
human sperm. Government officials sought to explain the difference 
between the ‘true’ hybrid resulting from this test and any other sort of 
‘true’ hybrid but their explanation appeared not to persuade the Joint 
Committee. In its report, the Committee insisted that no distinction 
should be made.  
The Joint Committee also contested the scientific facts on which the 
quantitative criterion for the distinction between the two forms of 
embryo was based. In questioning Professor Richard Gardner about the 
idea that a human genetic constitution of 50 per cent or more is a 
significant factor in determining whether an interspecies embryo 
should be defined as human he answered that it depended upon what 
you are talking about when using the concept of ‘genetic constitution of 
the interspecies embryo’: the amount of genes in the mitochondria of 
the animal cell or the amount of DNA that the mitochondria contribute 
to the (new) cell.46 He also noted that it is not possible to be certain 
about what will happen when cells from two origins are combined: ‘one 
contributed can out-compete the other’. One can conclude from this 
that the degree of humanness of the resulting entity can not really be 
established by looking at the amount of human and animal DNA put 
into it at the beginning of the process. Moreover, it could even be the 
case that the animal DNA out-competes the human DNA. This option 
was not accounted for in the reasoning about embryonic development 
that informed the quantitative criterion that was formulated by the 
scientists in the HFE Authority.  
On 13 November 2008, the 2008 HFE Bill became an Act of 
Parliament.47 The name of inter-species embryos that had been given to 
the human animal forms of embryo in the Bill was changed by an 
amendment in the House of Lords to ‘human admixed embryo’. The 
‘human admixed embryo’ refers to types of embryo that contain both 
human and animal DNA, and five subcategories of these types are 
distinguished in section 4A(6). From the Explanatory Notes it becomes 
                                                     
45  Joint Committee, Human Tissue and Embryos (Draft) Bill, Vol. I., 46. 
46  Gardner continues his argument ‘the amount of genes in the mitochondria is about 
13 genes compared to 30.000 in the human nucleus genome whereas the total mass of 
mitochondria and the amount of DNA that they contribute to a cell could be extremely 
substantial’, Joint Committee, Human Tissue and Embryos (Draft) Bill, Vol. II, 207. 
47  Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 (C22).  




clear that the cytoplasmic hybrid embryo (section 4A(6)a) as well as the 
hybrid embryo (section 4A(6)b) are included in the subcategories of 
human animal forms of embryo that are conditionally permissible.48  
 
12.7. Conclusion 
What happened to the differences between the human dignity 
perspective and the scientific perspective on the issue of the creation of 
human animal hybrid embryos in the stages preceding the enactment 
of the HFE Act 2008? The human dignity perspective was brought 
forward in the public debate, especially in the media coverage of the 
research proposals concerning the creation of embryos using rabbit 
eggs. The HFE Authority, at least to some extent, acknowledged the 
human dignity perspective. Their proposal to allow the creation of 
‘cytoplasmic hybrids’ in distinction to ‘true hybrids’ can be considered 
as a compromise in which considerations concerning scientific 
progress, the promises for human health and economic profit 
prevailed, but where the human dignity perspective was also taken into 
consideration. In the legislative arena the government tried to make 
this distinction legally relevant by proposing in its draft bill to include 
the creation of the first form of hybrid embryo and exclude the creation 
of the ‘true hybrid embryos’ from what would be permissible.  
However, it must be noted that distinguishing ‘true hybrids’ from 
other types of interspecies or human mixed embryos ” the first being 
entities with a degree of 50% or more of an animal genetic constitution 
” does not fit easily into the human dignity perspective either. From a 
human dignity perspective even the smallest amount of animal DNA in 
a human embryo would be wrong. By making such a principled 
argument, the human dignity approach was put aside as irrelevant. The 
scientific perspective put the boundary between humans and animals 
into perspective by pointing to the extent to which human and animal 
genes are the same, 80% in the case of rabbits. Such a perspective 
raises no barriers to the mixing of human and animal material and 
easily prevailed in the legislative stages of the debate on the issue of 
                                                     
48  See Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, Section 4A(6):  
(a) an embryo created by replacing the nucleus of an animal egg or of an animal cell, or 
two animal pronuclei, with ”  
 (i) two human pronuclei, or  
 (ii) one nucleus of a human gamete or of any other human cell, or 
 (iii) one human gamete or other human cell. 
(b) any other human embryo created by using ” 
 (i) human gametes and animal gametes, or  





human animal hybrid embryos at the expense of the human dignity 
perspective.   
This analysis shows that the scientific perspective is gaining power 
in matters concerning biomedical technology, even the part involving 
human embryos, as if scientific truth is ultimately the only thing that is 
relevant in such cases. However, ethical restrictions of the way in which 
human embryos are treated are not based on biological facts but on 
human conventions. Therefore, we should take moral intuitions more 
seriously than has been the case in the debate analysed here. This is 
not to say that we should not reflect on these intuitions: of course we 
should consider whether these are reasonable and not take them as 
everlasting truths that cannot change with time and context. But it is to 
say that we need to reflect on these intuitions as we need to reflect on 
scientific knowledge. The analysis above shows, for example, that 
scientific knowledge that at one stage of the decision making process 
was presented as certain, such as the proportion of human and animal 
DNA a ‘cytoplasmic hybrid embryo’ would contain, at another stage 
appeared to be contested. Both moral considerations and scientific 
considerations should be given due attention in order to decide what 
kind of research should be facilitated by law and what kind of research 
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Chapter 13. Regulating Technologies and the Uncertainty Paradox 
Marjolein van Asselt, Ellen Vos and Tessa Fox 
Maastricht University, the Netherlands 
 
Abstract 
In Van Asselt and Vos (2005; 2006), we coined the notion ‚uncertainty 
paradox‛, i.e. an umbrella term for situations in which uncertainty is 
present and acknowledged, but the role of science is framed as one of 
providing certainty. In instances of the uncertainty paradox, the public, 
policy-makers and judicial authorities resort to experts for conclusive 
evidence and definite answers, despite uncertainty precluding both 
conclusiveness and definitiveness. Hence, on the one hand, it is 
recognised that science cannot provide decisive evidence on highly 
uncertain risks while, on the other, policy-makers and judicial 
authorities increasingly turn to science for certainty. In this paper, we 
will elaborate on the role of uncertainty in regulating technology. 
Through a comparison of several case studies on European risk 
governance, it will become evident that the uncertainty paradox 
dominates current technology regulation, however, it manifests itself in 
a different way. Uncertainty intolerance turns out to be important in 
understanding various manifestations of the uncertainty paradox. This 
paper will show that in particular cases certain actors involved in risk 
and technology regulation acknowledge uncertainty, while other actors, 
the uncertainty intolerant actors, fail to do so.  
 
13.1. Introduction 
Uncertainty is a salient feature of societal debates on new technologies. 
Nowotny et al. (2001) argue convincingly that innovation always 
produces uncertainty, or even an ‚ever increasing flow of ever new 
uncertainties‛. Uncertainty is an inherent by-product, an ‚inevitable 
side-effect‛ of innovation. Especially in the early decades of new 
technology, there will always be irresolvable uncertainty because of the 
novelty of the phenomena. Research on environmental and health risks, 
and especially on long-term effects, will by definition not keep pace with 
technological developments. Harremoës (2002) emphasizes the 
problem of assessing the effects of a new technology when there is a 
long lag time between exposure and measurable impacts, the so-called 
‚latency lacuna‛: technology and the conditions in which it is used will 
have changed by the time such delayed effects become clear. 
Technology development and dissemination is a dynamic, ongoing 
process, so often new versions are introduced in rather short time 
frames. Furthermore, new technology usually evokes new practices, 




different patterns of behaviour and changing societal conditions, which 
may also alter because of other dynamics. So the context in which the 
technology is used also changes over time.  
Furthermore, in the early phases of technological innovation the 
benefits are strongly emphasized (see e.g. the work of van Lente (1993) 
and colleagues who study the role of expectations (i.e. stories about the 
benefits of innovations)). Discussions about risks usually start at a later 
stage, when the new technology is already being implemented and 
diffused throughout society. By then, there are vested interests and 
strong proponents of the technology. This is also summarized in the 
Collingridge (1980) dilemma of control of technology: attempting to 
control the technology is difficult because in its early stages, when it can 
be controlled, not enough is known about its harmful social 
consequences to warrant control, but by the time consequences are 
apparent, intervention has become expensive and drastic as the 
technology is well developed, disseminated and institutionally integrated 
in society. As technological innovation is so inexorably connected with 
uncertainty, the challenge is to look beyond traditional risk assessment 
strategies and investigate how to deal with uncertainty in the regulation 
of (new) technology.  
In Van Asselt and Vos (2005; 2006), we coined the notion of 
‚uncertainty paradox‛, i.e. an umbrella term for situations in which 
uncertainty is present and acknowledged but where the role of science 
is framed as one of providing certainty. In instances of the uncertainty 
paradox, policy-makers and/or judicial authorities resort to experts for 
conclusive evidence and definite answers, despite uncertainty 
precluding both conclusiveness and definitiveness. Hence, on the one 
hand, it is recognised that science cannot provide decisive evidence on 
highly uncertain risks, while, on the other, policy-makers and judicial 
authorities increasingly turn to science for certainty (see also Weingart, 
1999 and Rogers, 2003). It is generally agreed that uncertainty is the 
essence of the precautionary principle. The precautionary principle 
legitimates decisions and actions in situations characterised by 
uncertainty (see box 1 for an elaboration and for an overview of the 
legal literature and case law). In uncertainty paradox-type situations, a 
very high level of scepticism as to what science can deliver, goes hand 
in hand with a very optimistic level of confidence regarding what 
science should be able to deliver (Forrester, 2006).   
The uncertainty paradox raises important questions about the role 
of science, knowledge, scientists and knowledge producers when 
dealing with uncertain risks in regulating technology. Our analysis of 
actual cases of EU risk regulation (Van Asselt and Vos, 2006; Van 





such an uncertainty paradox results in unproductive and/or 
unintelligible policy-making processes. Subsequently, questions of 
responsibility will emerge (compare Mourik, 2004), possibly resulting 
in situations of what Ulrich Beck has called ‘organised irresponsibility’ 
(Beck, 1986). Beck uses the term to refer to a situation that arises for 
which society is ill-prepared and with which it is inadequately able to 
deal, such as the inevitable surprises, negative consequences and/or 
long-term impacts associated with uncertain risks, notwithstanding all 
institutions and procedures in place and the pretence of certainty and 
control (Van Asselt and Vos, 2008). Informed by this empirical research 
on risk regulation practice, we aim to look beyond the manifestation of 
the uncertainty paradox and identify and examine mechanisms that 
bring about and sustain this paradox. 
In this paper, we will elaborate on the mechanisms leading to the 
uncertainty paradox in regulating technology by revisiting four case 
studies. Firstly, the Pfizer case which related to the use of antibiotics as 
a growth promoter in the production of meat; and secondly the EU 
GMO cases, which are composed of three cases pertaining to the 
import of genetically modified organisms. These cases, in one way or 
another, deal with uncertainty in relation to regulating (new) 
technology/ the use of technological products. Through a comparison 
of these case studies on European risk governance (Van Asselt and 
Vos, 2006; 2008), it will become evident that the uncertainty paradox is 
dominant in current technology regulation; however, it manifests itself 
in different ways. The cases serve as useful material to study the 
mechanisms behind the uncertainty paradox. What do these cases 
teach us about the mechanisms that bring about and/or sustain the 
uncertainty paradox? We will show that the uncertainty paradox 
manifests itself in a different way in the Pfizer case compared to the 
three GMO cases, and uncertainty intolerance turns out to be an 
important mechanism that helps to explain this difference in 
manifestation of the uncertainty paradox.   




Box 1. The precautionary principle and the uncertainty paradox.  
 
Acknowledgement of the limits of science in providing conclusive 
evidence, i.e. the impossibility of full certainty, has led to the 
development of the precautionary principle, which is laid down as a 
principle under Article III-233 within the context of European 
environmental policy. The precautionary principle is inferred  when 
‘there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific 
certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective 
measures to prevent environmental degradation.’ (Rio Declaration, 
1992). At the same time, all legal formulations (Fischer, 2002) of the 
precautionary principle include what is called a ‘knowledge condition’ 
(Manson, 2002), i.e. the level of proof needed to trigger application 
(Petersen and van der Zwaan, 2003). Although this knowledge 
condition is often kept vague or ambiguously formulated, the point is 
that such a knowledge condition implies that lawyers and policy-makers 
appeal to scientists and experts for some kind of ‘plausibility proof’, 
namely statements by experts in which their risk judgements are cast as 
conclusive evidence on the existence or non-existence of an uncertain 
risk (Van Asselt and Vos, 2008). This request has the tendency to 
morph into demanding conclusive evidence on whether something is a 
risk. Such requested certainty about uncertain risks seems highly 
incompatible if not contradictory to uncertainty as the core of the 
precautionary principle, which implies that neither definite proof nor 
evidence is available. In Van Asselt and Vos (2009), we argued that 
through the knowledge condition, the uncertainty paradox is already 
part of the precautionary principle. In recent discussions on the 
precautionary principle its relevance has been underlined (WRR, 2008). 
Nonetheless, careful application, in the form of a ‘second nature’ is 
insisted upon (GR, 2008).  
 
13.2. Uncertain Risks 
Prominent risk scholars have made very clear that dealing with 
uncertain risks is a key challenge in current societies (e.g. Ravetz, 2001; 
Wynne, 1995; Beck, 1986; Jasanoff, 1990; Renn, 2006; Lofstedt, 2005; 
Nowotny et al., 2001; Harremoës et al., 2002; Wynne, 1982). The 
presence of uncertainty challenges, or at least complicates, risk 
management and assessment. 
The economist Knight argues that it is possible and necessary to 
distinguish sharply uncertainty from risk (Knight, 1921). In this 
‘positivistic risk paradigm’ (Van Asselt, 2000; Krayer von Kraus et al., 





2008) risks are presented as the calculable, hence controllable, islands 
in the sea of uncertainty (compare Nowotny et al., 2001). Positivists 
interpret risk as referring ‘objectively to the circumstances of the 
physical world’ (Thompson and Dean, n.d; Shrader-Frechette, 1992). 
Positivists distinguish between risk management and assessment, and 
consider expert calculation the preferred means to settle risk issues 
(compare Van Asselt, 2000; Krayer von Kraus et al, 2005). On the 
contrary, constructivism can be interpreted as a way of reasoning that 
views risk as a social construct. According to Klinke and Renn, 
constructivists view risk and risk assessments as ‘constituting mental 
constructions which can be checked at best against standards of 
consistency, cohesion and internal conventions of logical deduction‛ 
(Klinke and Renn, 2002). According to constructivists, it is only relevant 
to talk about risk in particular settings (compare Hilgartner, 1992; 
Adams, 1995). Furthermore, constructivists view risk management and 
assessment to be inseparable activities, in which value differences are 
at the core. 
This dichotomy, in line with the positivistic view, remains the 
dominant way of looking at risk (compare WRR, 2008). However, an 
increasing number of authors (see, for example, Vercelli, 1995; 
Gezondheidsraad 1995, 1996, 2008; Nowotny et al., 2001; Van Asselt 
and Vos, 2006;  Van Asselt and Vos, 2008; Renn 2006; Renn and 
Walker, 2008; WRR, 2008) argue that uncertainty and risk cannot as 
easily be distinguished as is assumed in the positivistic risk paradigm. 
Some risks are simple, in the sense of certain enough to be calculated 
as a function of probability and effect. In those cases, due to past 
experience and the associated availability of statistical data, probability 
can be estimated and a measure of effect can be derived. Simple risks 
are calculable and relatively easy to manage. Existing risk assessment 
tools and risk management approaches suffice.  
However, many risks are not that simple.1 Risk refers to potential 
events with consequences that one or more actors evaluated as 
negative. In many cases such events and/or consequences are highly 
uncertain, because they consider new hazards or involve situations with 
structural changes compared to the past. In the latter case, the 
available statistics are of limited value to estimate probability and effect 
                                                     
1 In its 2008 scientific report ‘Uncertain Safety’, the WRR calls for a paradigm shift with 
regard to the governance approach to risks. They argue that the classical risk paradigm 
(in the body text also referred to as ‘positivistic paradigm’), and its policy based on 
‘simple’ risks is outdated, but should not disappear. Rather, a paradigm shift to risk 
governance should take place, focusing policy on uncertain risks and ambiguous risks. 
Simple risks, which produce little to no uncertainty (WRR, 2008) i.e. ‘certain uncertainty’ 
(Van Asselt, 2000) should be seen as the special cases rather than the norm that they 
constitute in current policy-making in risk management and assessment practices.      




as the historical data no longer do justice to current and future 
situations. Furthermore, many risks are complex, which also creates 
uncertainty. They involve a multitude of effects, of which some may 
extend into the long term, that cannot be easily assessed and 
compared nor can measures of effect, if available, easily be added. 
Risks may also involve complex causalities, non-linear relationships as 
well as interactions between effects. Uncertainties about the relevant 
phenomena and the underlying multi-causal relationships, i.e. several 
factors and interaction between those factors that contribute to effects, 
may render it difficult, if not impossible, to determine what may 
happen. Several cases discussed by scholars (Harremoës, 2002; 
Bridges and Bridges, 2001; Ibareta and Swan, 2001; Mourik, 2004; 
Murphy, 2006) consider the problem of latent connections and the lack 
of established mono-causal relationships. Such risks are thus not, or at 
best only partly, calculable, because the probability of occurrence or the 
damage cannot be estimated, and even the potential hazard and the 
relevant causalities may not be established, although there may be 
suspicions of danger. In the absence of a causal explanation or 
evidence-based refutation, the idea of exposure can still invoke societal 
controversy.  
Adding to the debate on uncertain risks, Van Asselt and Vos (2006) 
defined ‘uncertain risks’ as risks that may be distinguished from ‘safe 
uncertainties’, because they pertain to uncertain situations that may 
result in one or more effects that are valued negatively or considered 
unacceptable by at least one, but possibly more, societal actors. 
Examples of situations that may involve such risky uncertainties as the 
introduction of a new (chemical or genetically modified) substance, the 
extensive application of a new technology or unprecedented human 
intervention in the environment. Uncertainties about the underlying 
processes and the complex multi-causal relationships between causes 
and effects may render it difficult, if not impossible, to determine what 
may happen.2 The most important reason to recognize different types 
of risk and especially to differentiate between ‘simple risks’ on the one 
hand and ‘uncertain risks’ on the other is that different types of risk 
require fundamentally different assessment, management and 
communication approaches (e.g. Wynne, 2001; Lofstedt, 2005; Renn, 
2006; WRR, 2008). 
Uncertainty is not simply the absence of knowledge (compare Van 
Asselt, 2000 with Levidow, Carr, and Wield, 2005). Experts and 
scientists quite often have informed ideas on which uncertainties may 
be important and why, what are underlying sources of uncertainty, 
                                                     






whether and how uncertainties may be reduced or at least better 
understood, which interpretations of uncertainty seem valid and which 
contradict the established state-of-the-art. The whole of answers to 
these questions can be referred to as ‘uncertainty information’. Experts 
can provide such uncertainty information, but they cannot provide 
certainty about uncertain risks. Although it is argued that addressing 
uncertainty in risk analysis is vital, it is also often noted that treatment 
of uncertainty is not a straightforward job, but a challenging activity. 
Numerous scholars agree that there cannot be a single approach in 
addressing uncertainty that will be adequate in all circumstances and 
contexts (inter alia Bailey et al. (1996); Friedman et al. (1999); 
Harremoës (2003); Heal and Kristroem (2002); Jaeger (1998); Klinke 
and Renn (2002); Morgan (2003); Morgan and Henrion (1990); 
O'Riordan and McMichael (2002); Pahl-Wostl et al. (1998); Pollack 
(2003); Ravetz (1997); Stocking (1998); Van Asselt and Petersen 
(2003); Van Asselt and Rotmans (1996, 2002); Van der Sluijs (1997); 
Walker and Marchau (2003) and Walker et al. (2003). 
 
13.3. Regulation in Situations of Uncertain Risks 
In our previous work, we have analysed various cases of risk regulation 
at the European level. The first case, the so-called Pfizer case, deals 
with the use of a certain antibiotic (virginiamycin) in feed as a growth 
promoter. We furthermore analysed three cases of EU regulation on 
GMOs. The complexities with which regulatory authorities and courts 
were faced in situations of uncertainty, as well as the uncertainty 
paradox, were clearly demonstrated within these cases. Below, we 
summarise the various cases.  
 
13.3.1. The Pfizer Case: EU Regulation of Feed Additives and the Use of 
Antibiotics in Feedstuffs 
The incorporation of additives in feedstuffs has been regulated at the 
Community level since 1970. In 1996 a Community authorisation 
system was introduced according to which only additives that had 
obtained prior Community authorisation could be used in feedstuffs. 
This regulatory regime includes the possibility for a Member State to 
temporarily suspend or restrict the use of an authorised additive after 
having shared the grounds on which it considers the additive 
dangerous with the other Member States and the Commission. In 
these cases, the Commission has to confirm the national decision or to 
decide that the Member State must lift the measure. 
In accordance with this so-called safeguard procedure (Article 11, 
Council of Ministers, 1970), Denmark notified the Commission in 




January 1998 that it had banned the use of the antibiotic virginiamycin 
as a growth promoter because of the risk that resistance to that 
antibiotic would be transferred from animals to humans. The Danish 
authorities relied on a report of their National Veterinary Laboratory. 
The Commission subsequently submitted this Danish scientific report 
to a European Committee ” the Scientific Committee on Animal 
Nutrition (SCAN) ” for advice. The SCAN concluded that the use of 
virginiamycin did not constitute an immediate risk to public health in 
Denmark.  
The Commission, however, with reference to the precautionary 
principle, was not convinced and proposed to ban the use of this 
antibiotic. It submitted its draft decision to the Standing Committee on 
Feeding-stuffs (StCFe) for approval. This Committee was however 
unable to reach an opinion. The relevant provisions require that, in 
such a situation, the Commission sends its draft decision to the 
Council, which then makes a decision according to the so-called 
regulatory committee procedure. The Council confirmed the 
Commission’s position and subsequently adopted a regulation banning 
the use of virginiamycin together with three other antibiotics as 
additives in animal feeding-stuffs. Pfizer, producer of virginiamycin, 
challenged this decision before the Court of First Instance (CFI).  
Our analysis revealed that from the outset of the regulatory process, 
i.e. the point at which the Commission approached SCAN for advice, 
the role of the experts had already been framed in terms of providing 
certainty about uncertain risks. The Commission asked SCAN to give 
an opinion on whether the conclusions in the Danish report ‘are 
scientifically justified’ and on the question of ‘whether or not’ the use of 
the virginiamycin as a growth promoter constituted a public health risk 
at present or could constitute such a risk in the future. These terms of 
reference can be interpreted as a request for a ‘plausibility proof’, 
namely statements by experts in which their risk judgements are cast as 
conclusive evidence on the existence or non-existence of an uncertain 
risk (Van Asselt and Vos, 2008). Such a request has the tendency to be 
seen as demanding conclusive evidence on whether something is a 
risk. Such requested certainty about uncertain risks seems highly 
incompatible with uncertainty as the core of the precautionary 
principle, which implies that neither definite proof nor evidence is 
available. The Commission asked SCAN for a decisive answer as to 
whether the risk is a hazard, instead of asking for uncertainty 
information. The Commission placed everyone concerned in the 
uncertainty paradox. The whole regulatory endeavour further sustained 
the uncertainty paradox, with the consequence that, in the end, the 





In our analysis of the whole regulatory chain, from the Commission’s 
request for a scientific opinion to the Court’s ruling, we observed that 
scientific experts, regulatory authorities (the Commission and the 
Council) and judges tried to worm themselves out of the uncertainty 
paradox in order to prevent stagnation of the regulatory process. The 
SCAN experts tried to provide a satisfactory plausibility proof, but 
uncertainty information crept into its considerations. Throughout its 
opinion, SCAN provided uncertainty information, as in this case 
‘science could not answer the straightforward question of whether 
there was a risk of transfer of resistance, now or in the future’ 
(Forrester and Hanekamp, 2005). Instead of following the requested 
plausibility proof, the European institutions reinterpreted pieces of 
uncertainty information in order to construct uncertainty, which was 
subsequently used as argument to apply the precautionary principle. 
Thus, the Council and Commission interpreted the uncertainty 
information provided by SCAN completely differently than experts. In 
doing so, the institutions implicitly admitted that reasoning about the 
‘plausibility’ of uncertain risk involves normative and subjective 
judgments, on which basis they implicitly considered it legitimate to 
‘re-do’ the work originally delegated to the experts. 
Although the uncertainty paradox put SCAN, the Council and the 
Commission in an uncomfortable straightjacket, it is clear that the 
Court in particular was confronted with a no-win situation. A closer 
look at the Court’s judgment reveals that the Court relentlessly repeats 
that it is only in the position to carry out a limited review (see for 
example, paragraph 393 of the judgment, European Court of First 
Instance, 2002). However, the Court was unable to stick to a limited 
review and struggled with its role in the scientific debate: 
‘the Court nevertheless finds that the parties’ arguments, supported in 
each case by the opinions of eminent scientists, show that there was 
great uncertainty, at the time of adoption of the contested regulation, 
about the link between the use of virginiamycin (…) and the 
development of (…) resistance in humans’ (Paragraph 393). 
‘the various experiments and observations (…) were not mere 
conjecture but amounted to sufficiently reliable and cogent scientific 
evidence for [the Community institutions] to conclude that there was a 
proper scientific basis for a possible link between the use of 
virginiamycin (…) and the development of (…) resistance in humans’ 
(Paragraph 389). 
Interestingly enough, the Court concluded that: 
‘the Community institutions had a scientific basis on which to reach a 
decision, since they could draw on some results of the most recent 
scientific research on the matter’ (Paragraph 369). 




This is a clear manifestation of the uncertainty paradox: while on the 
one hand great uncertainty is emphasized, at the same time, it is 
suggested that sufficiently reliable and cogent scientific evidence and a 
proper scientific basis are available.  
Our analysis of the Pfizer case reveals that the Court was faced with 
a deadlock that emerged from how the uncertainty paradox was 
visualized by the Commission and later also by the Council. The Court 
attempted to overcome this deadlock by constructing uncertainty, 
which it then used to argue in favor of the application of the 
precautionary principle, whereby it upheld the Council’s ban. Like the 
Council, the Court used uncertainty to legitimize its ruling (paragraph 
142). The irony of the case is that Pfizer facilitated the Court’s 
construction of scientific uncertainty by creating an image of an 
uncertain scientific knowledge base in order to argue that a risk had not 
been proven. All the science involved, whether brought in by SCAN or 
Pfizer, was therefore merely used to demonstrate uncertainty, which in 
its turn was used as a sufficient basis for the application of the 
precautionary principle. 
Ultimately, the Court hid behind uncertainty, a non-legal concept. 
Apparently the Court interpreted uncertainty as arising from 
contrasting scientific opinions. Where the Commission used the 
scientific knowledge contents of SCAN, the Court used these scientific 
arguments merely to conclude that there are contrasting scientific 
opinions, which it took as sufficient evidence of uncertainty. The Court 
‘saved’ itself by viewing uncertainty as something it can observe itself, 
i.e. as being constituted by contrasting opinions between experts it 
considers as being qualified. As the Court cannot balance the scientific 
arguments, it is arguably inclined to assume equal standing of opinions 
and counter-opinions. Thus, in the end, the Court managed to produce 
a ruling, but the price for the escape from the impasse may be (too) 
high. 
 
13.3.2. EU Regulation of GMOs 
In our analysis of EU decision-making on genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs) we studied three cases pertaining to the import of 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs): NK603, a genetically modified 
maize made resistant to a particular herbicide to increase farmers’ 
control of weed; GT73, a genetically modified maize made resistant to 
the same herbicide as NK603; and MON 863 X MON 810, a maize 
composed of two genetically modified maize variants containing 
insecticidal proteins. 
Inspired by Ravetz (2001), we use the following notions to refer to 





 Risk producers ” those pursuing potentially hazardous activities or 
technologies: Monsanto. 
 Risk assessors ” experts seeking to analyze risks: the GMO panel 
of the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA). 
 Risk managers ” decision-makers charged with regulating risks: 
the European Council and Commission, and the Member States. 
 Risk protesters ” those objecting to new technologies or activities 
with reference to potential risks: Greenpeace and Friends of the 
Earth. These risk protestors do not have a formal role in this 
regulatory regime, but they aim to influence the regulation process 
through lobbying, protesting and critical reports.  
We concluded that in these three cases as well, the uncertainty paradox 
was crucial. The risk regulation process began with an application by 
the risk producer Monsanto to an EU Member State to market a 
genetically modified product in that country. As the risk producer, 
Monsanto is legally required to carry out an assessment. Their 
assessment had been submitted to the relevant competent authority of 
the Member State. When the national assessment was completed, it 
was forwarded to the European Commission. The Commission then 
asked the GMO Panel of the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), 
established in 2002 as an independent body for science-based risk 
assessment, to consider the risks of the genetically modified product in 
question. The GMO Panel had to operate within strict time limits and it 
lacks the resources and facilities to test products. Our analysis 
demonstrated that this meant that EFSA’s risk assessments were de 
facto meta-reviews of Monsanto’s assessments in place of an 
independent examination. Thus the claimed independence of EFSA was 
compromised by reliance on Monsanto’s research facilities, tests, 
knowledge and its willingness to disclose information. 
The Panel’s advice was forwarded to the relevant standing 
committees comprised of representatives from each Member State. 
This panel failed to reach an opinion. This meant that the Commission 
had to refer the draft decision to the Council of Ministers of the EU. 
Similarly divided on these issues, the Council too failed to reach a 
majority stance and could not adopt a decision. As in the Pfizer case, 
this meant that the final decision was up to the Commission, which 
functions in such situations as ‘deal maker’. This regulatory procedure 
(Council decision 1999/468, Article 5) was intended to serve as a 
means for breaking occasional deadlocks. Yet, in the Pfizer case as well 
as the three GMO cases that we analysed, this turned out to be the de 
facto standard operating procedure. 
  











1. Pfizer Case 
 







   
 
SCAN 












2. EU GMO Cases 
 












   
 
Our analysis indicated that in the case of EU regulation of NK 603, GT 
73 and MON 8106 MON 863, the uncertainty paradox was sustained 
and reinforced by the interplay of four mechanisms.  
1. The first pattern is uncertainty intolerance on the part of Monsanto 
and EFSA. Our analysis suggested that Monsanto’s safety 
assessments constituted deliberate efforts to transform any 
uncertainty about risk into absolute certainty about safety. To this 
end, they avoid uncertainty in their communication, define it away in 
their reports and attempt to suppress tests that may question the 
impression of absolute certainty that they wish to create. The 
combination of these assessment behaviours ” claiming irrelevance, 
creating a smoke screen and suppression of tests ” provide further 
evidence for our evaluation of Monsanto’s stance: uncertainty 






2. We also observed uncertainty intolerance on the part of EFSA’s GMO 
panel, which is in line with the earlier observations of Levidow, Carr 
and Wield (2005). They concluded that the opinions of EFSA’s GMO 
Panel ‘generally indicate no uncertainty’ that might trigger extra risk 
management measures and they ‘have framed scientific 
uncertainties in such a way that they can be resolved by extra 
information, or can be readily manageable, or can be deemed 
irrelevant to any risk’. The risk assessor partly inherited Monsanto’s 
uncertainty intolerance, as EFSA’s risk assessments were in fact 
meta-reviews of Monsanto’s assessment, but our analysis suggests 
that the intolerance cannot be fully explained by inheritance. EFSA’s 
own uncertainty intolerance was visible in its boundary work. 
Boundary work, a notion coined by Gieryn (1983, 1999), is a strategic 
and purposeful act in which boundaries are drawn between realms, 
for example, between science and non-science and between science 
and politics. Boundary work enabled EFSA to claim irrelevance and 
to construct authority claims which served as building blocks in 
creating plausibility proofs. Our analysis demonstrates that in 
instances that could have been read as uncertainty (Member States’ 
concerns, adverse effects, open questions), the GMO panel actively 
evaded uncertainty through boundary work, in place of discussing 
these uncertainties and exploring whether and how they may be 
important. 
 
3. A further mechanism is the tendency to equate uncertainty with risk, 
which (further) confined risk producers and risk assessors to the role 
of uncertainty-intolerant producers of plausibility proofs. We 
observed that both the risk producer (Monsanto) and the risk 
protestors (Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth) tended to equate 
uncertainty with risk, notwithstanding the fact that they have 
opposite positions in the GMO debate: the risk producer tried to 
avoid uncertainty in order to demonstrate safety, while the risk 
protestors highlighted uncertainty to demonstrate risk. This 
tendency to equate uncertainty with risk sustains the uncertainty 
paradox as it hampers the production and sharing of uncertainty 
information.  
 
4. Finally, technocratic provisions resulted in an even stronger, if not 
central, de facto political role for EFSA, with the consequence that 
the role of EFSA’s uncertainty intolerance further increased. EFSA 
fails to use the windows of uncertainty. The effective message of 
EFSA’s assessment is a plausibility proof, although such a non-risk 
opinion was arguably not requested by the Commission. This 




production of plausibility proofs can be read as an uncertainty 
intolerant interpretation of the goal of the assessment. We observed 
that the technocratic provisions allow EFSA’s uncertainty intolerance 
to dominate the regulatory process. EFSA fails to provide any 
uncertainty information and all uncertainty issues that have been 
brought forward by other actors, i.e. Member States or risk 
protesters, were pushed aside.   
On the basis of our analysis, we concluded that political responsibility 
for a highly sensitive risk dossier was lost (which we term a ‘political 
deficit’)3, notwithstanding all institutions and procedures being in place 
and the pretence of certainty and control being created.  
 
13.3.3. Pfizer and GMO Cases Compared: Risk Aversion versus Risk 
Intolerance 
Both the Pfizer as well as the three GMO cases demonstrate that the 
way that the uncertainty paradox is constructed or evolves depends on 
the role of science and expertise (compare Wynne, 2001; Levidow, Carr, 
and Wield, 2005; Jasanoff, 2005; and WRR, 2008, all of whom 
emphasize the need to rethink the role of science and expertise in risk 
regulation). Of particular interest is the way in which risk assessors 
obtain a role in regulation and the way in which these roles are 
institutionalised. In the final part of this paper, we would like to 
compare the various cases in terms of the role of uncertainty 
intolerance, and to a lesser extent the role of technocratic provisions, in 
order to better understand the mechanisms that play a pivotal role in 
creating and/or sustaining the uncertainty paradox.  
The analysis of the cases has demonstrated the manifestation of the 
uncertainty paradox. However, a closer look reveals that the paradox in 
the Pfizer case is the result of a different process than that in the GMO 
cases. Some distinctions become apparent that are related to 
uncertainty intolerance.4 It could be argued that in general the 
                                                     
3 The term political deficit is partly based on the debate on the ‘democratic deficit’ and 
whether it exists within the EU regulatory framework (Majone, 2000, 2005; Folesdale and 
Hix, 2005; Moravcsik, 2004). The term was first coined by UK MEP Bill Newton Dunn in 
a pamphlet in the 1980s and refers to the argument that the ‘European Union and its 
various bodies suffer from a lack of democracy and seem inaccessible to the ordinary 
citizen because their method of operating is so complex’ (European Commission, 2009). 
According to proponents there exists a 'gap between the powers held by European 
institutions and the ability of European citizens to influence the work and decisions of 
those institutions' (McCormick, 1999). We argue that the political deficit is of a more 
fundamental nature, since it ends up being an ‘administrative’, or, more accurately, a 
very technocratic, decision on a highly political dossier. 
4 In psychology, the term uncertainty intolerance is used to refer to individuals who ‘find 
it unacceptable that something negative may happen, regardless of the chances. As a 





perception of uncertainty intolerance is conflated with what in the risk 
perception literature is usually referred to as ‘risk aversive’ (Slovic et. al, 
2006), namely considering it unacceptable that something negative 
might happen, regardless of the chances (Douglas, 1985; Adams, 
1995). Unless safety is certain, risks are perceived to be dangerous 
(compare Adams, 1995; Van Asselt, 2000). In the risk literature it is 
also recognised that: ‘The less conclusive the science, the more 
influential become the filters through which risks ... are perceived.’ 
(Adams, 2007: 2)  
However, risk aversion is only one of the possible perceptive filters 
towards risk. In this context, uncertainty intolerance refers to the 
attitude and behaviour of institutions, organisations or groups and in 
particular to situations in which uncertainties are not acknowledged, 
deemed irrelevant, or are simply evaded, instead of genuinely and 
systematically investigated. Uncertainty intolerance is associated with 
an unwillingness to demand and produce uncertainty information and 
it indicates whether or not individuals, groups and organisations show 
an openness towards the possible inconclusiveness of science.  
In our analysis, we prefer to distinguish between uncertainty 
intolerance (namely searching for certainty) and risk aversion, as, in 
view of the current state of the art, we would like to be able to consider 
the possibility that uncertainty intolerance does not necessarily imply 
risk aversion and vice versa. We discussed the Pfizer case in order to 
demonstrate how and where uncertainty intolerance can be observed in 
the process. As we showed, the Commission as risk manager posed an 
unequivocal question to SCAN, the risk assessor, about the existence of 
a risk. This question can be read as uncertainty intolerant. We observed 
in our previous analysis that SCAN’s response seems to demonstrate 
more uncertainty tolerance in their relatively uncertainty tolerant 
scientific assessment: 
‘the use of virginiamycin as a growth promoter does not constitute an 
immediate risk to public health in Denmark. The nature of resistance to 
the streptogramins is not fully understood and mechanisms other than 
those described above may operate’ (Section 3, Scientific Committee on 
Animal Nutrition, 1998; emphasis added).   
Although the Commission’s request qualified as uncertainty intolerant, 
interestingly enough the Commission (implicitly) recognised the 
uncertainty information and reinterpreted it in a risk aversive manner. 
We observe that in line with our discussion above, the Commission 
and the Council pursued a rather constructivist use of science by 
reinterpreting SCAN’s assessment.  
On the one hand, we observed that risk managers (the Commission 
and the Council) turn to scientists for certainty (‘is there a risk?’), by 




which they fail to recognise science as inconclusive due to uncertainty. 
Furthermore, by neglecting to look for uncertainty information, their 
behaviour can be identified as uncertainty intolerant, and this in turn 
could be read as a positivistic point of view. However, their subsequent 
actions, i.e. the reinterpretation of the unsystematically provided 
uncertainty information in experts advice, are more in line with a 
constructivist acknowledgement of science with its emphasis on 
interpretation. Thus, the risk manager’s behaviour seems to be 
uncertainty tolerant, but it is fair to say that its level of uncertainty 
tolerance remains rather marginal.  
In order to invoke the precautionary principle (see Box 1) one of the 
requirements stipulated in the legal formulations (Maastricht Treaty, 
Article 174 EC) is that a risk assessment needs to be carried out. After 
an uncertainty intolerant point of departure on the side of the 
Commission (risk manager) demanding a plausibility proof from 
SCAN, the Commission showed even more uncertainty intolerant 
behaviour in a second instance by its reinterpretation of a relatively 
uncertainty tolerant scientific assessment: the Commission attempted 
to extract an unequivocal answer to the question whether the feed 
additives involve a risk. So we conclude that the attitude of the 
Commission as derived from its behaviour should be characterized as 
uncertainty intolerant, notwithstanding its constructivist use of expert 
knowledge.  
However, in the next stage, the Commission attempted to invoke 
the precautionary principle. This principle stipulates that it can be 
applied in cases of uncertainty. Hence, the Commission needs to 
acknowledge uncertainty at this particular point. So it switched from an 
uncertainty intolerant stance to an uncertainty oriented approach. In 
this process of highlighting uncertainty with the purpose of invoking 
the precautionary principle, the risk manager is confronted with the 
requirement of a risk assessment. Subsequently, the Commission 
presents SCAN’s advice as the required risk assessment. Interestingly 
enough however, SCAN explicitly stated that: 
‘However it is of the opinion that a full risk assessment cannot be made 
until quantitative evidence of the extent of transfer of antimicrobial 
resistance from livestock sources is obtained and the significance of 
this within the overall use of antimicrobials for clinical and non-clinical 
purposes evaluated.’ 
Hence, the report which stipulates that a risk assessment cannot be 
carried out due to the presence of too much uncertainty is being 
presented as the required risk assessment. In sum, the uncertainty 
intolerant framing of the risk manager resulted in relatively uncertainty 





plausibility proof was set aside, and the uncertainty intolerant regulator 
even highlighted uncertainty in order to be able to invoke the 
precautionary principle. To that end, the risk manager had to present 
the advice ” which it had previously set aside ” that literally claimed 
that a risk assessment is impossible because they argued that there 
was too much uncertainty to be able to carry out a risk assessment. 
This course of behaviour demonstrates the kind of unintelligible 
decision-making which may arise in situations in which the uncertainty 
paradox is present.  
The uncertainty intolerant behaviour of the Commission (and the 
Council in the Pfizer case) is crucial in reproducing the uncertainty 
paradox, which in turn results in a pointless process. In this particular 
case, the uncertainty intolerance on the side of the risk manager 
weighed heavy on the process, pushing aside the relative uncertainty 
tolerant behaviour of the risk assessors.  
Concurrently, at first sight, the Commission, the Council and at a 
later stage, the Court, seem to be uncertainty tolerant because they take 
‘uncertainty’ as a point of departure to invoke the precautionary 
principle. At the same time, the Commission, Council and Court deal 
with experts in an uncertainty intolerant way, since they demand 
certainty on whether there is a risk or not. However, the institutions use 
the fact that the experts are unable to provide this demand for certainty 
to label the problem as ‘uncertain’. Subsequently, this labelling forms 
the basis for conducting a certain policy strategy, namely invoking the 
precautionary principle in a risk-aversive manner. Such uncertainty 
labelling should not be equated with uncertainty tolerance. The case 
can instead be understood in terms of a mechanism which is described 
in the policy science literature as the ‘problem-solution-couple’ (e.g. 
Diekman, n.d). By referring to the problem as being uncertain, a certain 
problem-solution-couple is activated, namely the uncertainty-
precautionary principle couple. 
By attempting to infer the precautionary principle and by dismissing 
the uncertainty information, the behaviour of the Commission, Council 
and the Court can be perceived to be not only uncertainty intolerant 
(the failure to systematically investigate uncertainty at first), but also 
risk averse, by trying to invoke the precautionary principle on the 
grounds that experts cannot provide certainty.          
In the GMO cases, uncertainty intolerance is also visible. However, 
the actors and the setting of this process differ from the Pfizer case. In 
this case, the Commission (also in the role of the risk manager) does 
not frame its question to the experts in an uncertainty intolerant 
manner: it does not ask whether the GMOs are a risk, but in all three 
cases, it asked EFSA’s GMO panel to ‘consider whether there is any 




scientific reason to believe’ (EFSA 2003; 2004 (a), (b)) that the placing 
on the market of the GMOs might cause adverse effects to human 
health or the environment. The particular formulation ‘whether there is 
any scientific reason to believe’ is relevant when we compare it with the 
closed question (i.e., whether or not the activity constitutes a risk) that 
the Commission asked in the Pfizer case. It can be argued that the 
terms of reference to EFSA were more uncertainty tolerant in the light 
of the following two elements: firstly, instead of asking for a decisive 
answer on and proof as to whether the risk is a hazard, the 
Commission asked for indications that hint at adverse effects; and, 
secondly, instead of referring to science as the source of absolute truth 
and certainty, with the phrasing ‘to believe’, the Commission seemed 
to accept that science cannot provide certainty about uncertain risks. 
The terms of reference could therefore have been read as an invitation 
to systematically discuss the uncertainties involved and to provide 
uncertainty information.   
Thus, what is particularly interesting here, and contrary to the Pfizer 
case, is that the process seems to have started from a more uncertainty 
tolerant framing. However, EFSA failed to use the window of 
uncertainty and answered as if the Commission had asked a closed 
question, thereby demonstrating clearly its uncertainty intolerance. 
However, in this case EFSA does not present itself as risk averse, since 
they do not consider the risk to be unacceptable, regardless of the 
probabilities.  
When taking a detailed look at the mechanism of uncertainty 
intolerance in the Pfizer case and the EU regulation of GMOs, the risk 
managers’ and assessors’ attitudes and behaviours towards uncertainty 
are reversed. This indicates that uncertainty intolerance is not so much 
an attitude or behaviour that can be ascribed to a particular actor within 
the risk regulatory process. Risk managers are not by definition 
uncertainty intolerant nor are risk assessors by definition uncertainty 
tolerant, and vice versa. Our case study material does not enable us to 
explain uncertainty intolerance, we can only observe that it is not 
affiliated with a particular role in the risk regulation process (i.e. 
otherwise the same type of actor would be in the same quadrant in 
Figure 1). Furthermore, the comparison of the various cases suggests 
that uncertainty intolerance is also relatively independent of the 
characteristics of the issue at hand. Otherwise, uncertainty intolerance 
would have had to be visible for both the risk assessors and managers 
in one case (i.e. the actors in the same case would be in the same 







If the perspective of risk assessors and managers are congruous in a 
certain case, it could be presumed that uncertainty intolerance, at least 
partly, would be nourished by the characteristics of the issue at hand.  
In both cases, the actor who turned out to be central in the actual 
risk regulation process (the risk manager in the Pfizer case and the risk 
assessor in the GMO cases) could be qualified as uncertainty 
intolerant. Throughout the various processes, actors or moments can 
be identified that expressed relative uncertainty tolerance; however, the 
dominance of the uncertainty intolerant (central) actors pushed 
uncertainty intolerance to centre stage. This seems to suggest that the 
attitude towards uncertainty of a critical actor is an important 
explanation for the manifestation of the uncertainty paradox and 
associated regulatory problems.  
This analysis provides a more subtle insight into the uncertainty 
paradox. In our earlier work, we define the uncertainty paradox as 
situations in which, although uncertainty is acknowledged, requests for 
certainty are still made by policy makers and risk managers to experts. 
However, in these particular cases it seems that although uncertainty is 
acknowledged and some actors express uncertainty tolerance, crucial 
actors demand certainty at the same time. Even when (some) 




uncertainty information is provided (implicitly or explicitly) by Member 
States, risk protesters, the risk managers (GMO) and/or the risk 
assessors (Pfizer), a dominant uncertainty intolerant actor may be able 
to push this aside and to impose uncertainty intolerance. Influential 
uncertainty intolerant actors within risk regulation, whose dominance 
might be facilitated by technocratic provisions for extraordinary 
circumstances that developed into the de facto standard operating 
procedure, are likely to invoke the uncertainty paradox or sustain it. To 
turn it the other way around, the presence of uncertainty tolerant actors 
in the process does not mean that the uncertainty paradox will not 
appear, which in turn may result in unintelligible risk regulation. 
We argued that we considered it more appropriate to distinguish 
between uncertainty intolerance and risk aversion, as we did not want 
to assume that they necessarily constitute each other. The empirically 
informed analysis of actual risk regulation suggests that this distinction 
is indeed needed. In order to better understand and denote these 
particular decision-making processes it is useful to distinguish between 
uncertainty intolerance and risk aversion. In particular, this is 
demonstrated by the finding that in the Pfizer case we can observe a 
dominant actor who is uncertainty intolerant and risk averse, whereas 
in the GMO cases, the critical actor is uncertainty intolerant, but not 
risk averse.    
 
13.4. Conclusion 
Innovation creates uncertainty and thus regulation of technology imply 
decision-making in uncertainty and about uncertain risks in particular. 
Our research shows that the uncertainty paradox is an observed pattern 
in such a decision-making structure. How is this paradox brought 
about and sustained? Empirical research suggests a number of 
mechanisms, of which uncertainty intolerance and technocratic 
provisions play a particular role, as investigated in this paper. To that 
end, we have defined uncertainty intolerance as the attitude and 
behaviour of institutions, organisations or groups applied to situations 
in which uncertainties are not acknowledged, deemed irrelevant, or are 
simply evaded, instead of genuinely and systematically investigated.  
We have argued that uncertainty intolerance should not be equated 
with risk aversion, but suggested that in entertaining the notion of 
uncertainty intolerance in the context of risk research, it is more 
appropriate to distinguish between uncertainty intolerance and risk 
aversion. Our research furthermore suggests that uncertainty 
intolerance on behalf of a dominant actor is crucial in bringing about 














(uncertainty intolerant) actor may be caused and/or reinforced by 
particular technocratic provisions. This revelation makes clear the need 
for further research on the relationship between risk aversion and 
uncertainty intolerance, whereby resort to psychology studies may be of 
help for a further elaboration and clarification of this relationship. The 
above also makes plain that the continuation of empirical research by 
means of case studies of regulatory decision-making is of great 
importance in the attempt to better understand and to formulate 
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Abstract 
New and emerging technologies, especially nanotechnologies with the 
structural uncertainties about their eventual functionalities and risks, 
are a challenge to governance. What is striking is how much actual 
governance is already occurring in and around nanotechnology without 
any particular actor being responsible for the emerging governance 
arrangements. Mapping what is happening in terms of societal agenda-
building about risks of nanotechnology, including voluntary codes of 
conduct and calls for responsible development, allows me to flesh out 
the notion of de facto governance by showing how it works in the 
domain of nanotechnologies. This then leads me to speculate about a 
further governance arrangement: the internalization of requirements of 
‚responsible development‛ of nanosciences and nanotechnologies in 
actual technological and product-development choices and strategies. 
 
14.1. Introduction 
New and emerging technologies, especially nanotechnologies, with the 
structural uncertainties about their eventual functionalities and risks, 
are a challenge to governance. Regulatory agencies in Europe and the 
US review existing regulation and consider voluntary reporting as a 
transitional measure. Risk governance is opened up to include public 
dialogues and deliberative processes. What is striking is how much 
actual governance is already occurring in and around nanotechnology, 
without any particular actor being responsible for the emerging 
governance arrangements.  
Thus, the first aim of this paper is to map what is happening: the 
actions and interactions and how these add up to outcomes at the 
collective level that function as governance arrangements. In that way, 
the paper is explorative: it is an attempt to understand what is 
occurring and is partly based on the author ‚moving about‛ as a self-
styled anthropologist in the world of nanotechnologies. What is clear is 
that the emerging governance arrangements have a distributed 
character. This is captured by using the notion of governance, which, in 
contrast to government, is distributed almost by definition. The 
additional point, however, is that bottom-up actions, strategies and 
interactions are constitutive for these arrangements rather than that 
they are the result of an opening up of an earlier centralized 
arrangement to make it more distributed ” a common way to introduce 




the notion of governance (Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden, 2004). To 
emphasize the strong bottom-up character of what is happening, I 
introduce the notion of de facto governance. 
This leads to the second aim of this paper: to flesh out the notion of 
de facto governance by showing how it works in the domain of 
nanotechnologies. The recognition of the importance of de facto 
governance implies that attempts at regulation can be located as 
interventions in emerging de facto governance, and will depend on it 
for their effectiveness.1 This is similar to the way in which Henry 
Mintzberg (1994) viewed intentional (and often top-down) strategy in 
firms and other organisations, noting that the latter’s effects will 
depend on the interaction with de facto, or in his words ‘pattern’ and 
‘emergent’, strategies, that are out there already. While society should 
not be seen as an organisation writ large, the dual dynamics outlined 
by Mintzberg occur all the time. And they can add-up to what one could 
call a societal agenda. 
This chapter has a third aim, linked to what I see as an intriguing 
potential de facto governance pattern: the internalization of 
requirements of ‚responsible development‛ of nanosciences and 
nanotechnologies in the actual technological and product-development 
choices and strategies. Something of the sort is happening, as I will 
show, and the question then is what this implies for the governance of 
nanotechnologies. The further question is whether internalization of 
such considerations might occur for other emerging technologies as 
well. If this occurs, or is expected to occur, it will create a new regime 
for shaping technology development within society. 
After fleshing out the notion of de facto governance, I will present 
and discuss two recent developments. Firstly, how a socio-technical 
agenda about promises and concerns over nanotechnology emerged, in 
which risks, and in particular risks of nano-particles, became dominant. 
And secondly, how ‚responsible development‛ has become an integral 
part of the discourse and, to some extent, of the practice, of 
nanotechnology. This then allows me to inquire into the possible 
internalization of societal considerations in ongoing development of 
nanosciences and nanotechnologies. In the concluding comments, I 
will come back to governance issues. 
 
                                                     
1 This point has been made in implementation studies, starting with Presmann and 
Wildavsky (1984) and becoming almost a movement (of the ‚bottom-uppers‛) in the 
1980s (see Hanf and Toonen, 1985). There is a tendency, however, to push to this 
background in actual policy making and implementation, because policy makers must 





14.2. The Notion of De Facto Governance 
In the broadest sense of the concept of governance, all structuring of 
action and interaction that has some authority and/or legitimacy 
counts as governance.  Authors such as Van Kersbergen and Van 
Waarden (2004) and Kooiman (2003) recognize this, even if they do not 
thematise it. Governance arrangements may be designed to serve a 
purpose, but can also emerge and become forceful when 
institutionalized. The same move is visible in Voß et al. (2006: 8) where 
they argue that governance refers to ‚the characteristic processes by 
which society defines and handles its problems. In this general sense, 
governance is about the self-steering of society.‛ They then develop this 
further: 
governance is understood as the result of interaction of many actors 
who have their own particular problems, define goals and follow 
strategies to achieve them. Governance therefore also involves 
conflicting interests and struggle for dominance. From these 
interactions, however, certain patterns emerge, including national 
policy styles, regulatory arrangements, forms of organisational 
management and the structures of sectoral networks. These patterns 
display the specific ways in which social entities are governed. They 
comprise processes by which collective processes are defined and 
analysed, processes by which goals and assessments of solutions are 
formulated and processes in which action strategies are coordinated. 
(…) As such, governance takes place in coupled and overlapping arenas 
of interaction: in research and science, public discourse, companies, 
policy making and other venues. 
This view has been offered before, notably by Elinor Ostrom. As Scharpf 
(1997: 204) phrases it: ‚much effective policy is produced not in the 
standard constitutional mode of hierarchical state power, legitimated 
by majoritarian accountability, but rather in associations and through 
collective negotiations with or among organisations that are formally 
part of the self-organisation of civil society rather than of the policy-
making system of the state (Ostrom, 1990).‛ A specific aspect is 
highlighted by Braithwaite and Drahos (2000: 10), where they note: 
‚The global perspective on regulation we promote not only reframes 
individuals as subjects and objects of regulation (as in the drug case) 
and states as subject and object of regulation (by Moody’s, the IMF, 
the Rothschilds and Greenpeace). Understanding modernity, we find, 
demands the study of plural webs of many kinds of actors which 
regulate while being regulated themselves.‛2 
                                                     
2 Cited in Voß (2007: 34). 




In such an encompassing view of governance, explicit attempts at 
steering intentional government arrangements will be seen as part and 
parcel of the overall process, not outside it. In economics, one can 
speak of endogenizing a factor (like new technology) that had been 
considered as external to economic analysis. Similarly, one can now say 
that government and design of governance arrangements must be 
endogenized to capture what is happening (Rip, 2006; cf. also Voβ, 
2007). 
Where governance of technology is discussed, it appears to be 
reduced to either innovation stimulation or regulation of actual and 
possible side-effects. The focus on performance of technologies 
(positive and/or negative) seems obvious, but it pushes to the 
background any broader consideration of governance. Science and 
Technology Studies (STS) have offered case studies and analysis 
showing that there is actually a lot of broader governance going on, but 
a lot of work is required to overcome the myopia of the prevalent view 
of technology being technically driven and/or naturalized. Moreover, as 
it is a prevalent view, the simple distinction between innovation 
stimulation and regulation is itself an example of a governance pattern 
in the broad sense. 
This governance pattern derives from the gap between development 
and promotion of technology, and the responses of a society that 
emerged in the industrial revolution and stabilized in the 19th and early 
20th century (Rip et al., 1995). A  version of the gap is visible in the 
institutional separation between promotion and control of new science 
and technology, for example the difference in outlook and activities 
between government departments for trade and industry on the one 
hand and for social, health and environmental affairs on the other 
hand. To some extent this is a productive division of labour. But the 
separation of technology development (in firms, in public research 
institutes, in technical universities) from wider society implies that 
society has to respond, somehow, and is at a disadvantage because 
there have been investments in development already.3 This ‘gap’ has 
led to an understanding of there being these two separate worlds, of 
‚enactors‛ of new technology vs. (civil) society, as well as an 
understanding that with regard to new technology, civil society is 
‚forced‛ into one or another of three reactions: to welcome it (this 
appears to occur for large parts of information and communication 
technology), to be fatalistic (for example about new infrastructural 
technologies), or to oppose it (as happened with agricultural 
                                                     
3 At an early stage, however, it will be unclear what sort of performance and side-effects 
might be realized. This adds up to a dilemma of knowledge and control (Collingridge, 





biotechnology). The recent interest of technology ‚enactors‛ in 
engaging civil society and having public dialogues on new technologies 
can be seen as an attempt to improve the possibility that society will 
respond in a welcoming rather than oppositional mode.  
Another example of de facto governance arrangements, and one 
which has been highlighted by STS studies, are sociotechnical systems 
and infrastructures that together form the sociotechnical landscapes in 
which we live and move about. Roads and motorways serving 
automobile transportation, and the structures linked to them, are a 
clear example of how these ‚arrangements‛ shape what we do and 
cannot do, and with the authority that comes with their being invisible 
because self-evidently ‚given‛.4 Systems and infrastructures can have 
political effects, for example the material unification of a country like 
the Netherlands (Schot et al., 2003); see also Anderson (1991) for the 
role of sociotechnical regimes and the idea of a national community. 
The socio-technical landscapes in/of our societies are like a 
constitution, even if not drawn up by a constitutional assembly. This 
includes the disciplining (of actors) necessary to maintain them and 
have them develop in certain ways. Systems like mobile telephony, 
including infrastructure as well as evolving customs and rules of use, 
are further examples of emerging socio-technical regimes which 
function as a de facto constitution.5  
For emerging sciences and technologies it is not yet clear what their 
possible sociotechnical constitutional effects might be, but one can 
anticipate them based on an understanding of dynamics of 
technological change and its embedding in society (Rip and Te Kulve, 
2008). This requires what one might call non-linear thinking, especially 
for technologies like nanotechnology that are enabling technologies. 
That is, nanotechnology delivers new materials and components to 
help create better devices and systems, and it is the latter which deliver 
the desired functionalities, and thus shows sociotechnical agency. 
Thus, nanotechnology is said to just improve performance, and 
sometimes allow new functionalities (e.g. dirt-repellent surfaces), and 
                                                     
4 An example the ‚given‛ character of sociotechnical governance arrangements, often 
quoted in the STS literature, are the overpasses on Long Island, which continue to 
‚govern‛ what is possible and what is not possible even after Robert Moses’ original 
intentions became irrelevant (Winner, 1980). Their designer, New York city architect 
Robert Moses, created them to keep New York’s black and poor whites (who had to use 
buses at the time, the 1920s and 1930s) away from the beaches and parks he had 
created on Long Island. He tried to create a material constitution for his preferred social 
order, and while it may have worked for a time, this particular constraint on behaviour 
has become irrelevant now that every American can use a motor car. 
5 This is an Actor-Network Theory notion, cf. how Latour (1991), for similar reasons, 
speaks of a ‚Parliament of Things‛. See also Verbeek (2006) on the morality of artifacts. 




should therefore not be an object of concern qua its societal effects. 
Still, nanotechnology could lead to major changes where certain 
thresholds are passed. For example, when RFID (Radio Frequency 
Identification Devices) become cheaper and smaller thanks to 
nanotechnology, and thus more widely available as well as better 
implantable, all products can be traced individually and an ‚Internet of 
Things‛ becomes possible, as well as implants becoming easy and 
almost natural, leading to a view of the implantable and thus 
‚readable‛ human. All this is still to come, but it is being discussed 
already and may lead to governance measures and arrangements. One 
could call this anticipatory governance (Barben et al., 2007). In fact, 
there is an anticipatory component to all governance (Rip, 2006). 
The role of technology in governance is one of solidifying 
arrangements by embodying them in material form, or as Pels et al. 
(2002: 2) phrase it, ‚the performative and integrative capacity of 
‘things’ to help make what we call society.‛ In the case of the 
overpasses on Long Island (see note 4), certain governance modes 
were delegated to the things, which then did their governing job 
without being recognised as such. Since actual nano ‘things’ are still 
(mostly) in the future, such delegation is not possible. But there are 
expectations, and these can solidify into a forceful societal agenda that 
will govern strategic choices. One might call this ‚delegation to the 
future‛, and one can definitely see such ‚delegations‛ occurring in the 
domain of nanotechnology. 
 
14.3. De Facto Risk Governance in the Domain of Nanotechnology 
Before tracing the emergence of a risk governance agenda, it is 
important to note that ‘nanotechnology’ is an umbrella term, covering 
quite different scientific and technological developments that are 
similar only in that they work at the nano scale. In policy making, and 
to some extent in media coverage and public perception, it is the 
umbrella term that is used, so that differences are black-boxed even 
where they would be relevant.6 In the risk debates, the reference is often 
just to nanotechnology, while the actual concerns, as well as present 
studies, are about nano-particles (and engineered free nano-particles at 
that). A reconstruction of the emergence of a forceful agenda will have 
to take this into account and maybe explain the focus on nano-
particles. 
For a reconstruction of the evolving risk governance debate and the 
resulting de facto agenda, I build on a study by Van Amerom and Rip, 
                                                     
6 There is a de facto governance element involved in such processes: some terms 





based on a comprehensive study of documents (up till 2006) and on 
interviews and participant observation in relevant meetings, and partly 
reported in Rip and Van Amerom (2009). This study focused on 
societal and de facto agenda-building as the key phenomenon rather 
than the traditional focus in agenda-building studies on one single 
arena and what happens inside that arena. Societal agenda-building is a 
multi-arena process, without there being a clear authority deciding on 
the agenda. Kingdon (1984) provided the starting point for this analysis 
with his discussion of policy entrepreneurs and their skills, their 
networks, as well as how they can act on policy windows and other 
opportunities to forge a new, or change the existing, agenda. This 
converges with a point made in sociology: ‚Arenas and fora, and the 
various issues discussed and addressed there, [which] thus involve 
political activity but not necessarily legislative bodies and courts of law‛ 
(Strauss, 1978: 124). Such (always partial) entanglements can become 
locked-in into a forceful agenda, and then lead to path dependencies 
(Rip et al., 2007). 
Figure 14.1, reproduced from Rip and Van Amerom (2009), maps the 
emerging paths in the evolution of the debate and activities and 
strategies. Time is on the horizontal axis, and the visualisation of the 
developments begins with promises about application of nanoparticles 
as voiced around 2000 and taken up by researchers and firms. The 
vertical axis comprises ongoing practices of production and use of 
nanoparticles, then meso-level activities of collective organisations 
(and of research and regulation), and macro-level societal debate. 
While there was already a general idea about the promises of 
nanotechnology, linked to the establishment of the USA National 
Nanotechnology Initiative in 2000, and some concerns were voiced 
based on speculative scenarios about run-away nano-robots, macro-
level debate proper only started with a Canadian-based NGO (ETC 
group) issuing an early warning about risks of nanoparticles and calling 
for a moratorium on their development. This was resisted by nano-
enactors, but was listened to during 2003 by governance actors such as 
the European Parliament and the UK government (see for details Rip 
and Van Amerom, 2009).  
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Figure 14.1. Evolving paths in the ‘landscape’ of nanoparticles and their 
risk  
 
For my analysis of de facto governance, I highlight two points visible in 
the further developments. The first is that arenas overlap, and that 
actors, in practice, are not limited to their formal roles. Government 
actors with regulatory responsibility (especially those who are pro-
active) attend meetings and generally take part in a variety of arenas 
where informal societal agendas are built. Industrial actors mingle with 
other kinds of actors, especially if a somewhat neutral space is 
provided. After the intervention in the debate, in 2004, by one of the 
main re-insurance companies Swiss Re, with a report arguing that 
carbon nanotubes might create risks similar to those of asbestos, risks 
of nanoparticles became a legitimate topic. A subsequent meeting 
organized by Swiss Re and the International Risk Governance Council 
(IRGC) in Zürich in July 2006 was an occasion for informal 
interactions.7 The meeting discussed a (potentially authoritative) report 
on risk governance of nanotechnology authored by Renn (a risk and 
public deliberation scholar) and Roco (of the USA National 
                                                     
7 The IRGC is a private not-for-profit foundation based in Geneva, ‚to support 
governments, industry, NGOs and other organisations in their efforts to understand 
and deal with major and global risks facing society and to foster public confidence in 
risk governance‛ (cited in Renn and Roco, 2006: 5). A conference report is available 





Nanotechnology Initiative). Governmental and industry actors from 
across the world attended, as well as NGOs and scientists and scholars 
studying nanotechnology in society. Dedicated workshops and 
mingling in the corridors allowed interaction and the recognition of 
positions of other actors (and thus some learning). What was very 
visible was the recurrent anticipation of (a) public reaction(s) (in co-
evolutionary terms, this can be described as possibly leading to 
selection before-the-fact). Clearly, the traditional distinction between 
formal agenda-building by authoritative (policy) actors and informal 
societal de facto agenda-building becomes blurred. While one can 
nonetheless recognize, with Shibuya (1997), that for a risk issue to rise 
on the formal agenda it needs to be taken up in both formal and 
informal agenda-building processes, articulation and prioritization 
processes are clearly not separate.  
The second point is how actual soft law, as with the recent voluntary 
reporting schemes of UK Defra and US EPA (cf. Kearnes and Rip, 
2009), is not just a matter of a new government initiative. It is prepared 
through actors moving in new directions. As is visualized in Figure 14, 
such actors can be firms that realise they need to proceed cautiously 
and possibly assure credibility by being more transparent. Or regulatory 
actors recognising that there are openings for regulatory action but do 
not know exactly how to proceed. It is the combination of the two that 
creates a situation where soft law can be envisaged. And even then, 
there may not be much receptivity. Firms are reluctant to start 
reporting if they do not know what will be done with such data.8 As 
Djelic and Andersson (2006: 378) note for transnational governance, 
‚soft rules are generally associated with complex procedures of self-
presentation, self-reporting and self-monitoring,‛ and may thus lead to 
more organisation rather than less. 
Interestingly, some companies do take the initiative. Codes of 
conduct are formulated (see further section 4), and a Risk Framework 
for Nanotechnology has been put forward by the unusual alliance of a 
big chemical firm (DuPont) and a non-profit group (Environmental 
Defense). The alliance was announced in June 2005.9 Their eventual 
                                                     
8 By July 2008, only nine companies had registered with the Defra scheme and EPA had 
received four submissions under the basic program (and commitments from 12 more 
companies), whilst no company has agreed to participate in the in-depth program. 
Interestingly, some branch organisations, recognizing the importance of the scheme for 
the credibility of the nanotechnology sector, tried to push their members to participate 
(see Kearnes and Rip, 2009). 
9 The two partners had a sense of the historical importance of their attempt when they 
announced it in an article in Wall Street Journal, 14 June 2005, under the title ‘Let’s Get 
NanoTech Right’. This echoes an earlier claim about how to handle nanotechnology: 
‚Let’s get it right the first time!‛ (Cf. Roco and Bainbridge, 2001).  




risk framework, published in June 2007 following wide consultation is a 
substantial contribution, even if the alliance has come in for criticism 
from (other) NGOs and trade unions.10 In the Executive Summary (7), 
the authors actually note the link with government regulation: 
‚We believe that the adoption of this Framework can promote 
responsible development of nanotechnology products, facilitate public 
acceptance, and support the development of a practical model for 
reasonable governmental policy on nanotechnology safety.‛ 
In other words, actors now contribute to evolving governance 
arrangements in a reflexive manner.  
The implications of this discussion of risk governance agenda 
building are two-fold. Firstly, that risk assessment in the real world and 
risk management and regulation are part of larger dynamics, are 
shaped by it, and their effects (their ‚success‛) are partly determined by 
these broader dynamics. One reason for the dominance of broader 
dynamics is the uncertainty about toxicity and exposure of 
nanotechnology materials (cf. Bowman and Hodge, 2006; Dorbeck-
Jung, 2007). The point is general, however. The fate of risk assessments 
(i.e., their uptake and their ‚translation‛) is not determined by their 
own ‚internal‛ quality, but by their evolving contexts, which are 
influenced by other/earlier risk assessments and debates, in this case 
on genetically modified organisms, and earlier, on nuclear energy. 
Interestingly, in both earlier cases a storyline of the escape of modified 
micro-organisms and a run-away nuclear reactor occurred, horror 
stories which returned in the shape of nano-robots getting out of hand. 
Similarly, regulation is only one element in a range of governance 
activities and arrangements, which all operate at the interface between 
nanotechnology and policy/society and add up to a governance 
‚landscape‛ (Kearnes and Rip, 2009). A key element of this landscape, 
and in a sense a precondition for regulation, is the process by which a 
de facto risk agenda emerged and shaped responses and interactions. 
Secondly, the actions and reactions that build up to a socio-
technical agenda, which solidifies and then shapes further actions and 
choices, create patchwork governance arrangements rather than a 
coherent system. This is clear in the way voluntary reporting and other 
soft law approaches are progressing (haltingly), as well as in the 
potential uptake of the DuPont & Environmental Defense Risk 
                                                     
10  Partly in response, an ‚international coalition of [seven] consumer, public health, 
environmental, labor and civil society organisations spanning six continents called for 
strong, comprehensive oversight‛ of nanotechnology and nanomaterials. Their text has 
a strong precautionary thrust; ‚voluntary initiatives are not sufficient‛. Quoted from the 
press release, 1 August 2007 (www.nanowerk.com/news/newsid=2306.php). (accessed 





Framework and the critical reactions to it. Such patchwork 
arrangements may well allow nanotechnological innovations to 
continue, and in that sense be seen as productive. They may turn out to 
be inadequate, however, when something untoward happens, for 
example when an unusual toxic effect surfaces. The only politically 
viable response then is to clamp down on nanotechnology in general 
and introduce harsh precautionary measures.11 This is not an argument 
against patchwork governance arrangements, but an indication of 
inevitable trade-offs. 
 
14.4. Discourse and Practice of Responsible Development of 
Nanotechnology 
Whereas the reference to risk, and thus to possible regulation, created 
some coherence in the evolving patchwork, there is also more open-
ended de facto governance occurring around nanotechnology, linked to 
phrases like ‚responsible development‛ and ‚responsible innovation‛, 
and in the USA, ‚responsible stewardship‛.12 The implications are 
rarely spelled out systematically, but the thrust can be captured in this 
quote from the US National Research Council: 
Responsible development of nanotechnology can be characterized as 
the balancing of efforts to maximize the technology’s positive 
contributions and minimize its negative consequences. Thus, 
responsible development involves an examination both of applications 
and of potential implications. It implies a commitment to develop and 
use technology to help meet the most pressing human and societal 
needs, while making every reasonable effort to anticipate and mitigate 
adverse implications or unintended consequences. (National Research 
Council, 2006: 73) 
Clearly further development of nanotechnology is the main goal, but 
openings are created for considering ‚adverse implications or 
unintended consequences‛ and perhaps for doing something about 
them. This may invite nano-promoters to consider broader issues at an 
                                                     
11 This is actually one of the three scenarios developed by Douglas Robinson for a 
Constructive Technology Assessment workshop on responsible innovation in 
nanotechnology, December 2007. See, for the methodology, Robinson (2009). 
12  See for example the proposal, in California, for a Nanotechnology and Advancement 
of New Opportunities (NANO) Act by Rep. Honda (D- San José): ‚The NANO Act 
requires the development of a nanotechnology research strategy that establishes 
research priorities for the federal government and industry that will ensure the 
development and responsible stewardship of nanotechnology.‛ 
Compare http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/ca15_honda/NanoAct2008.html 
(accessed 26 February 2010). 




early stage, and allow other actors to raise questions about the present 
direction of development.  
European Commission documents on nanotechnology often refer to 
responsible innovation and, recently, a further step was taken by 
preparing and publishing a code of conduct for nanoscience and 
nanotechnology (N&N) research.13 The restriction of the code to 
‚research‛ was necessary, because of the limited remit of the European 
Commission in this respect, but the code is broader, and refers also to 
public understanding and the importance of precaution. There are 
explicit links to governance:  the guidelines ‚are meant to give guidance 
on how to achieve good governance‛. As the Commission further 
specifies:  
[good governance of N&N research should take into account the need 
and desire of all stakeholders to be aware of the specific challenges and 
opportunities raised by N&N. A general culture of responsibility should 
be created in view of challenges and opportunities that may be raised in 
the future and that we cannot at present foresee. 
A ‚general culture of responsibility‛ cannot be created by the European 
Commission, of course, but they clearly see themselves as contributing 
to such de facto governance. 
USA and European government actors are not alone in pushing 
‚responsible development‛. There are now also codes of conduct 
(specifically for nanotechnology) formulated by firms like BASF 
addressing the corporation’s responsibilities to ‚our employees, 
customers, suppliers and society but also towards future 
generations‛,14 and similar statements, for example by Degussa (now 
Evonik).15 Recently, the Swiss retail industry went through the exercise 
of formulating a code.16 Then there is also the recent initiative toward a 
‚Responsible Nanotechnologies Code‛ led by a group consisting of the 
UK Royal Society, an NGO (Insight Investment), the Nanotechnology 
Industries Association, and supported by a network organised by the 
UK Department of Trade and Industry.17 The proposed code goes much 
                                                     
13  COM(2008)424 final, 7 February 2008: Commission Recommendation on a code of 
conduct for responsible nanosciences and nanotechnologies research. 
14  Code of Conduct Nanotechnology, http://www.basf.com/group/corporate/en/ 
sustainability/dialogue/in-dialogue-with-politics/nanotechnology/code-of-conduct 
(accessed 26 February 2010). 
15  Degussa’s website on nanotechnology has an item to this extent on responsibility 
(www.degussa-nano.com/nano). (accessed 26 February 2010). 
16  http://www.igdhs.ch/m/mandanten/175/download/CoC_Nanotechnologien_final_ 
16_01_09_e.pdf (accessed 1 March 2010). 
17  See the May 2008 update at http://www.nanotechia.org/content/activities2/respon 





further than merely the safe handling of nanotechnology, but it is not 
clear if and how it will be taken up. Negotiations about a final text that 
can be made public are still on-going. 
There has been criticism of codes of conduct as being bland 
(though not all of them are) and as not specifying sanctions. Even so, 
they create openings for accountability. This does imply that it depends 
on others willing to call nano-enactors to account for whether the codes 
will have a real effect. While the discourse of responsible development 
will have implications for practices, broader issues referred to in the 
discourse will often be pushed to the background. The actual 
operationalisation of ‚responsible innovation‛ tends to focus on risk 
issues, transparency and some public dialogue; and in the case of 
industry, also as a responsibility for the safe handling of nano-
production and nano-products.  
While the recent emergence of Codes of Conduct (actual and pro-
posed) already indicates distributed governance, they should be seen 
as the tip of an iceberg of anticipatory and reflexive actions and 
interactions that fill the gap between further the development of 
nanotechnologies and the actual and possible responses by society. 
There is a plethora of activities and gatherings in the nano-world with 
governance elements and/or implications, with explicit or implicit 
reference to responsible development. One can see them as emerging 
practices of discussion, deliberation, negotiation and participation.  
In some cases, responsible development is a secondary effect. 
Definitions and standards for nanotechnology are of immediate 
importance for co-ordination among firms, but they will also be used to 
indicate the scope of regulation and of soft law like voluntary reporting. 
The International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) has 
established working parties, and its standards are sometimes called 
‚soft governance‛.18 They are voluntary, but recognised as important 
and authoritative because of the process leading to them (expert 
working parties and wide consultation). Actors/stakeholders refer all 
the time to ISO standards and the working parties because they expect 
them to resolve uncertainty. The OECD has also become involved, and 
also looks at risks and public engagement; its working parties have a 
certain status and are expected to come up with authoritative 
conclusions. UNESCO has invested in a report on ethics of 
nanotechnology (UNESCO 2006). Further, dedicated groups or 
associations have been established, for example the International 
Council On Nanotechnology (ICON) has collected many stakeholders 
(but almost no NGOs). A web of activities and interactions results, and 
                                                     
18 See presentation by Peter Hatto (ISO) at the International Dialogue meeting, 
Brussels, March 2008. (Tomellini and Giordani, 2008). 




actors in the nano-world can refer to it to show that responsible 
development is being taken seriously. 
Policy actors and nanotechnology spokespersons from industry try 
to keep abreast of what is happening and thus monitor the evolution of 
the discourse and the positioning of the various actors and groups. The 
director of the nanotechnology R&D programme in the European 
Commission’s 6th and 7th Framework Programmes (until September 
2008), Renzo Tomellini, often showed a slide with an overview (Figure 
14.2). The fact that he shows it, and updates it, is just as important as 
the content of the slide.19 The link with responsible development is 
clear in his mind. When (in meetings in 2007) presenting data on 
public opinion about nanotechnology, he was happy to note that the 
European public is more positive than the North-American public. ‚So 
we have done a good job. But this trust in us also creates a 
responsibility to make sure that nanotechnology is developed in the 
right way.‛ 
Main International Fora and Initiatives on 
Nanotechnology
ISO, Int.Comm. Weights & Measures
standardisation, metrology




proposed WP on nanotechnology
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Figure 14.2. Tomellini’s overview of activities in the nano-world (version 
Summer 2007) 
 
                                                     
19  There is now an official version (without the clouds in the middle), published on 
Cordis.  ftp://ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/nanotechnology/docs/a-interactions-global.pdf 





Another action that is particularly interesting for what it might do 
(rather than what it does at the moment) is the International Dialogue 
on Responsible Development of Nanoscience and Nanotechnology, set 
in motion by Mike Roco (US National Nanotechnology Initiative) and 
Renzo Tomellini (European Commission’s Nanotechnology Program) 
in 2004, and perhaps now gathering a momentum of its own. The idea 
was and is to have informal interactions between government officials 
and other actors in the nano-world, with reference to responsible 
development as one reason why coordination is important. After the 
first meeting in Alexandria, Virginia (Meridian Institute 2004), there 
was a delay because of political difficulties, but then meetings were 
held in Tokyo (2006) and Brussels (2008), with a next meeting planned 
in Russia. Such meetings offer reporting on developments, including 
ethical, legal and social aspects (ELSA) and experiences with public 
dialogues, but are also space for interaction. Their advantage is that 
they can be inclusive: there is no official mandate or link to an 
authority, so no actual or symbolic barriers to participation. 
The key point to draw out of this mapping of activities is how a variety 
of actors begin discussing responsible development of nano-
technology, refer to it, and develop relevant activities, and how the 
discourse shows some convergence. This may be the beginning of a 
shift in governance, driven by prudence and some good intentions, as 
well as the need to maintain legitimacy. Policy actors may be involved, 
but often interactively rather than stipulating a governance 
arrangement, and they build on receptivity to the discourse on 
responsible development that is clearly out there. Thus, there is some 
de facto governance of nanotechnologies. A subsequent question then 
is whether this is specific to the nature and situation of 
nanotechnologies, or whether it reflects a general shift in governance, 
in the direction of reflexive modernization (Beck, 1992; Beck et al., 
2003)? The latter will be the case, definitely, but nanotechnologies offer 
a ‚lead‛ domain where the shift is visible, and is, in a sense, 
experimented with. 
 
14.5. An Overarching Pattern? 
There are more activities and emerging structures to be mapped, not 
necessarily specific to nanotechnologies, but taken up in earnest there. 
Upstream public engagement, including citizen conferences after the 
Danish model, is one example (Kearnes et al., 2006), the interest in 
having ELSA (Ethical, Legal and Social Aspects) included in the big 




nano-research funding programs in the USA and Europe another.20 
Together with codes of conduct of varying status, and emerging soft 
law with a precautionary flavour, these fill the gap between promotion 
and control of nanotechnologies. Thus, the traditional governance 
arrangement of new technologies is shifting. The new activities and 
interactions are expected, and this will orient (enable and constrain) 
strategies, actions and interactions, and will be seen as legitimate.  
We see an emerging overarching pattern, but its strength and 
eventual shape are still unclear. A key component of the pattern is 
anticipatory governance, and in particular, the consideration, at an early 
stage, of eventual societal embedding, including an acceptance of 
some responsibility. Will what is still mainly discourse become a 
practice, and a practice of de facto governance at that? To explore this 
question further, I will mobilize insights from STS and economics of 
innovation, because there is a structural similarity with patterns that 
have emerged in technological development per se. 
Evolutionary economics and sociology of technological 
development have identified (and theorized) so-called ‚trajectories‛ of 
development at two levels. There are paths of successive specific 
designs and products, related to what Dosi (1982) called the 
‚technological paradigm‛, which shapes expectations about productive 
directions of development and thus defines requirements. Nelson and 
Winter (1977: 56) refer to technicians’ beliefs about what is feasible or 
at least worth attempting.  
When such beliefs and corresponding design and development 
practices are entrenched, one can speak of a ‚technological regime‛ 
determining technological decisions. An example is how the advent of 
the DC3 aircraft in the 1930's defined a particular technological regime: 
metal skin, low wing, piston powered planes. Engineers had some 
strong notions regarding the potential of this regime. For more than 
two decades innovation in aircraft design essentially involved better 
exploitation of this potential; improving the engines, enlarging the 
planes, making them more efficient.  
Then, there are broad design heuristics or guidelines like 
mechanisation (since the 19th century), and automation (from the 
1950s onwards), what Nelson & Winter (1977) called a ‚natural 
trajectory‛ and I will call a second-order trajectory to bring out the 
relation to technology-specific and thus first-order trajectories. 
In specific developments in biotechnology, genomics, stem cells, 
and nanotechnologies, one can find first-order trajectories, some still 
                                                     
20  The USA National Nanotechnology Initiative has funded two big Centers for 
Nanotechnology in Society, and some smaller units. See NanoNed (www.nanoned.nl). 





emerging, others already established. For micro- and 
nanotechnologies, there is a second-order trajectory of miniaturization. 
Such overall requirements on the development of new technologies 
constitute a governance pattern. My additional point now is that the 
requirements need not be limited to those that specify technical 
performance.21  
At present, for all newly emerging technologies, one sees attempts 
to include societal aspects and to anticipate on embedding in society. 
Already due to credibility pressures, such anticipation functions as a 
soft limit on specific developments. Thus, one can hypothesize that a 
further second-order trajectory may emerge, which could be labelled 
‚working towards the adequate societal embedding‛ of technology. 
There is no guarantee that it will indeed become a trajectory of 
technological development even if policy actors are keen on it, as is 
visible in the discourse of ‚responsible innovation‛. Just as with 
mechanization and automation, the second-order trajectory of 
‚working towards adequate societal embedding‛ need not be taken up 
in all concrete developments for it to function as a governance 
arrangement. But there must be sufficient actual uptake, and broad 
reference to anticipation on societal embedding to make it a second-
order trajectory. This emerging second-order trajectory is not specific 
for nanotechnology, but it is in this area that the indicators are 
strongest ” it is the lead technological domain for the trajectory.  
Part of such a second-order trajectory seems to be in place already: 
the inclusion of EHS (Environmental, Health, and Safety) aspects in 
technological developments at an early stage. This actually builds on 
what one could call an earlier internalization of requirements from the 
selection environment: the chemical industry’s Responsible Care 
programme in the 1990s (King and Lenox, 2000). It is significant that 
firms presenting a code of conduct (or similar) for nanotechnology are 
chemical companies. The focus on EHS may create a lock-in: in 
nanotechnology, as well as for other new technologies like GMO, 
adequate societal embedding will quickly be reduced to EHS aspects. 
Some actors, however, like Degussa (a chemical company) do 
emphasize the importance of responsibility and dialogue, and attempt 
to interact with new actors like critical NGOs. It is uncertain whether 
such operationalisations of broader anticipation will be successfully 
internalised. 
An indirect indicator of internalisation is that funding agencies start 
creating special programs on ELSA and societally responsible 
                                                     
21  While used in another context, the notion of meta-rules of the game (Djelic and 
Andersson, 2006: 385, 391) indicates a similar phenomenon. 




innovation.22 In a sense, funding agencies are ‚third parties‛: they do 
not develop (nano)technology themselves, but influence developments 
through their actions.23 Capital providers like banks and pension funds 
(and perhaps even venture capitalists looking further than an 
immediate return on investment) might play such a third-party role as 
well, where they were to introduce requirements of responsible 
development. When funding agencies and other sponsors of research 
and development actually require anticipation on adequate societal 
embedding, nano-enactors have to develop relevant competencies, and 
this will contribute to a solidification of the arrangement.  
 
14.6. In Conclusion 
Broadening the notion of governance has enabled me to discuss de 
facto governance, both in general and how it occurs in the domain of 
nanotechnology. There were attempts at intentional governance, 
addressing uncertainties around an emerging technology, but their fate 
had to be understood against the backdrop of evolving de facto 
governance. The importance of societal agenda building through the 
interactions of actors and their strategies was clear. For risk 
governance, our understanding of such emerging patterns might be 
used to create scenarios of possible futures, to improve anticipatory 
governance, or at least to increase reflexivity. The discourse of 
responsible development also showed a mixture of efforts towards 
intentional governing (as in the case of the European Commission’s 
Code of Conduct for N&N research), actors’ initiatives and emerging 
patterns in a web of interactions creating orderings in the world of 
nanotechnologies. These are general features of de facto governance. 
What was striking in the emerging de facto governance of 
nanotechnologies was the role of anticipation. Actors anticipate both 
possible futures as well as the reactions of other actors. This is more 
                                                     
22  In the Netherlands, such a program has just started; it focuses on (a) advanced 
(emerging) technologies and (b) sociotechnical system transitions (www.nwo.nl/mvi). 
(accessed 26 February 2010). In Norway, the theme is ELSA of biotech, nanotech and 
neurotech (www.forskningsradet.no). (accessed 26 February 2010).  In both cases, 
interaction between social science and humanities on the one hand and science and 
engineering on the other is an important requirement. In the UK, the Engineering and 
Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) established a Societal Issues Panel in 2006 
and experimented with dialogue. In the words of a participant observer: ‚an emergent 
sociotechnical imaginary that takes ‘societal issues’ not as an obstacle but as an active 
contributor to framing the work of the research councils‛ (Doubleday, 2008). 
23  Analytically, the importance of such ‚third parties‛ taking initiatives is that they can 
break through waiting games and other impasses that occur often in two-party games 
(Scharpf, 1997). An example of such a breakthrough is the intervention of re-insurance 





than prudence: newly emerging technologies like nanotechnologies 
create openings (opportunities as well as some concerns) that are 
uncertain by definition. The future becomes a reference point, even if it 
is unknown. One can speak of the ‚shadow of the future‛, in the same 
vein as Scharpf (1997) talks of the ‚shadow of hierarchy‛. Scharpf uses 
the metaphor of ‚shadows‛ more widely than simply in reference to 
hierarchy, e.g. ‚in the shadow‛ of the majority vote (191) or ‚in the 
shadow‛ of a statute (202), without being explicit about the actual 
mechanisms and dynamics at play (other than his reference to 
anticipated reactions when discussing decision making in 
bureaucracies (200)). For Scharpf, a key notion is ‚authority structure‛ 
and how this can be referred to and thus have effects in an indirect way. 
Thus, for new and emerging technologies like nanotechnologies, ‚the 
future‛, when articulated in more or less forceful societal agendas and 
expectations about responsible development, functions as an authority 
structure and thus casts its shadow on choices and actions in the here 
and now. 
De facto governance is distributed, almost by definition, and cannot 
be easily shaped from a central point. This introduces ambivalence in 
the role of governance actors like governments. They have to give up on 
the assurance of governability as lots of things are outside their power 
and influence. At the same time, there is de facto governability: social 
orders are there and are (somewhat) effective, even if the direction may 
not be ideal. Moreover, one can see intentional and de facto 
governance co-evolving, and governance actors might then see their 
role as one of modulating this co-evolution (Rip, 2006).24 Where UK 
Defra and US EPA opted for voluntary reporting, they hoped to draw on 
a sense of responsibility of firms, but clearly they were too early to 
effectively modulate: the evolution on the other side had not 
progressed sufficiently (the situation might be different in continental 
Europe). The International Dialogue discussed in section 4 began 
instead from the other side: while government actors were involved, 
they do not govern, but create instead a space in which de facto 
governance might be stimulated. Modulation of co-evolution also 
occurs in the public dialogues, in the creation of voluntary codes and 
responses by civil-society actors, and in technology assessment 
interactions visible in the world of nanotechnologies. It is explicitly 
mentioned in the recent calls for ‚midstream modulation‛ (Fisher et 
                                                     
24  This is similar to what Andrew Dunsire (1996) has called ‚collibration‛ ” an 
intervention to shift the pre-existing balance between countervailing forces. Institutional 
arrangements that have the effect of strengthening one or weakening the other of these 
forces will require much less energy than institutions that would have to stop an 
unopposed force. (Taken from Scharpf, 1997: 182). 




al., 2006) and in midstream public engagement (Joly and Rip, 2007). 
The work of governing is distributed, and may become partially 
internalized when regimes stabilize. The possibility of a second-order 
trajectory where working towards adequate societal embedding as a 
requirement of ongoing technological developments is a particular, and 
particularly interesting, case. 
Even without a fully fledged second-order trajectory, nano-enactors 
already take initiatives by themselves or stimulated by third parties. 
This works out differently in the various domains under the umbrella 
term ‚nanotechnology‛. For new materials, chemical companies have 
relevant competencies because of the earlier (and continuing) 
Responsible Care Programme, and they feel credibility pressures. It is 
in this sector that firms have come up with nanotechnology codes of 
conduct. Micro-electronics firms, on the other hand, which do a lot of 
work at the nano-scale, are far removed from end users (even if they try 
to create some visibility, as with labels ‚Intel inside‛ on laptops). There 
are discussions, for example about RFID and about ambient intelligent 
systems enabled by nanotechnology, but there other firms take the 
lead.25 Big incumbents have the resources to be pro-active, but do not 
always rise to the occasion. In bio-nanotechnology, the third main 
domain of nanotechnology, the big pharmaceutical companies are 
interested, but tend to wait for small firms to come up with nano-
enabled innovations like diagnostic devices and drug delivery. For small 
firms, their first concern is survival, and broader anticipation is a 
luxury. Third parties like insurance companies may be able to 
(sometimes inadvertently) modulate productively. Other input in the de 
facto governance of nanotechnologies is likely to come from 
interactions across the product-value chains. The first signs of this are 
linked to health and environmental issues. 
Thus, de facto governance is not blind. It is shot through with 
attempts at shaping, and by their residues, somewhat stabilized 
regimes around nanotechnologies, and newly emerging technologies 
more generally. The question of the quality of such governance, e.g. 
governability, legitimacy and the directions that are pushed, is 
important but remains difficult to consider since no one actor is 
specifically responsible. However, as soon as regimes and second-
order trajectories appear, these offer entrance points for critical 
evaluation and perhaps attempts at changing them ” by modulation.  
 
 
                                                     
25  Firms like Philips and Siemens, who used to cover both sectors, have now divested 
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Chapter 15. Ten dimensions of technology regulation. Finding your 
bearings in the research space of an emerging discipline 
Bert-Jaap Koops 




We are at the start of what may be emerging as a new discipline of 
academic study: technology regulation, the study of how technologies 
are or should be regulated. With a broad definition of technology ” the 
wide range of tools and crafts that people use to change or adapt to 
their environment ” and of regulation ” the intentional influencing of 
someone’s or something’s behaviour ” this is a wide-ranging and 
complex field indeed. To get a grip on this emerging field, we need 
theoretical grounding. So far, few attempts have been made to map the 
space in which regulators and researchers who deal with technology 
regulation move. This chapter provides a first, essayistic attempt at 
comprehensively mapping the space of the emerging field of technology 
regulation by distinguishing and describing the ten dimensions that 
together span up this space. Starting with technology-related 
dimensions (type of technology, degree of innovation, place, and time), 
it moves on via regulation-related dimensions (type of regulation, 
normative outlook, and knowledge) to research-related dimensions 
(discipline, problem definition, and frame). The articulation of 
technology regulation as a ten-dimensional space is an analytic tool that 
may help us to understand what this emerging discipline is about, how 
it approaches its research, which known unknowns need to be 
researched, and to get an intuition of the unknown unknowns that await 




When I studied mathematics, I was always fascinated by multi-
dimensional spaces. For a mathematical problem, it doesn’t 
fundamentally matter whether you’re dealing with two, four, or sixty-
three dimensions (granted, calculating problems in 63-dimensional 
space is perhaps somewhat more complex than solving a two-
dimensional equation). Unlike some mathematicians and all 
computers, most people ” myself included ” have difficulty in 
visualising and dealing with a problem in a space with more than three 
or four dimensions.  
The difficulty of handling more than three or four dimensions stems 
of course from the fact that our universe is spanned up by three spatial 
dimensions and one temporal dimension. Or rather, we humans 




perceive the universe as being spanned up by these four dimensions. If 
we are to believe fundamental scientists in quest of the Theory of 
Everything, timespace is actually spanned up by ten or eleven 
dimensions. We only perceive four of them ” the others are compacted 
away beyond human perception (unless your brain happens to have the 
perceptive and imaginative qualities of the likes of Albert Einstein or 
Stephen Hawking).  
Perhaps a similar mechanism occurs in technology regulation. 
When we define, attack, and solve problems in technology regulation, 
we have difficulty in dealing with more than three or four dimensions. 
The problem as we perceive it may well be addressed in this manner ” 
we are only human, after all ” but the underlying mechanisms are often 
infinitely more complex and multi-faceted, leading to a limited 
understanding of the real problem (whatever that may be) or of the full 
thrust of a solution we come up with.  
Technology regulation certainly is a multi-dimensional space. 
Academics and regulators have realised this for many years, and the 
papers in this volume again show ample evidence of the complexities 
of technology regulation. But do we actually understand how complex it 
is, and how many different perspectives are involved? To do so, we 
should at least bring together insights from various legal fields, legal 
theory, governance studies, ethics, policy studies, public 
administration, political science, media and communications theory, 
science & technology studies, and philosophy of technology, to name 
the most obviously relevant fields, along with different fields of science 
and technology itself. One of the aims of the conference that lay at the 
basis of this volume was to bring together scholars from these different 
disciplines, to discuss together topical problems in the field of 
technology regulation. As the contributions to this volume 
demonstrate, the topics and issues we are dealing with bear some 
close resemblances and interrelations, but they are also quite varying 
and divergent, as they move along different lines of research. 
Nevertheless, they are all moving around in the same space ” the space 
of technology regulation research.  
As I perceive it, we are at the start of what may be emerging as a 
new discipline of academic study: technology regulation. ‘Technology 
regulation’ here indicates the study of how technologies are or should 
be regulated, technologies being the broad range of tools and crafts 
that people use to change or adapt to their environment, and 
regulation being the intentional influencing of someone’s or 
something’s behaviour.  
It is actually too early to speak of an emerging discipline yet, but the 
contours are certainly appearing on the map: all around the world, 





technology regulation. Not all of these cover the full range of issues 
that fall within the broad scope of my working definition of technology 
regulation, which ranges from bio-ethics to innovation theory and from 
intellectual property to cybercrime, but increasing ties between the 
diverse researchers and research centres facilitate an exchange of ideas 
and insights across the board.  
Let us assume that at some point, technology regulation will indeed 
emerge as a new discipline, or at the very least as a broadly studied 
field of trans-disciplinary research. To get a grip on this multi-
dimensional field of technology regulation, we need theoretical 
grounding. Unsurprisingly for an emerging field, technology regulation 
is rather under-theorised so far, and few attempts having been made to 
map the space. To be sure, attempts at theorising have been made 
that, even if they do no fulfil the promise of their comprehensive titles, 
provide relevant insights into technology regulation (Cockfield and 
Pridmore, 2007; Mandel, 2007), but these do not aim to 
comprehensively describe all relevant factors that are at issue in 
technology regulation. For space mapping, perhaps Roger Brownsword 
(2008) comes closest in the introductory chapter to his Rights, 
Regulation, and the Technological Revolution, in which he succinctly 
lists key regulatory aspects for the technologies of the 21st century, 
including regulatory styles, modes, pitch, phasing, and range. Roger 
Brownsword and Han Somsen (2009) have also sketched major 
contours of technology regulation in their introductory article to the 
new journal Law, Innovation and Technology.  
Perhaps technology regulation need not go as far as developing a 
superstring theory or M-theory of fundamental physics, let alone a 
Theory of Everything, at this stage of its development. But it certainly is 
useful to attempt to further map the space in which the researchers of 
technology regulation travel, for two reasons. Firstly, determining the 
axes of the multi-dimensional space that constitutes technology 
regulation research will help us to get a grip on where we are, to find 
our bearings by seeing the co-ordinates of our point in space, and to 
become more aware of those other dimensions that influence our state 
of being beyond the three or four visible ones. Secondly, once we see 
more clearly where we are and what space surrounds us, we can look 
ahead to those areas of the universe that are as yet unexplored. 
Knowing the dimensions of technology regulation research can help us 
to define future research agendas and to set our course accordingly, 
taking on board new disciplines and insights along the way as we come 
to understand better what we need for solving the known and unknown 
problems that await us ‘out there’.  
In this chapter, I provide an attempt at comprehensively mapping 
the dimensions of the emerging field of technology regulation research. 




Within the limitations of this book, this can only be done in a sketchy 
and provisional way, and this chapter should be read as an essay 
proposing one way in which the universe of technology regulation can 
be perceived. If this essayistic map helps researchers or regulators to 
some extent to find their bearings or to see interesting paths for future 
research, my aim will be more than fulfilled.  
 
15.2. Ten Dimensions 
To see where you are, or where you want to go, in technology regulation 
(TR) research space, all you have to do is determine the coordinates 
along ten different dimensions. Starting with technology-related 
dimensions, we move on via regulation-related dimensions to research-
related dimensions. Just step on board and travel along. 
 
15.2.1. Technology Type 
The first and most obvious dimension to begin with is the type of 
technology at issue. Since ‘technology’ refers to the broad range of 
tools and crafts that people use to change or adapt to their 
environment, many different types of technologies can be the focus of 
research, and obviously, the questions raised by a certain development 
in technology depend very much on the character and level of 
abstraction of the technology at issue.  
In terms of character of technology, we can look at seemingly simple 
material applications, for example bicycles, bakelite, and (light) bulbs, 
in the attractively alliterative analysis of Wiebe Bijker (1995), or at 
modern-day innovations in materials such as nano-products 
(Schellekens*; Gammel et al.*) and chemical substances (Versluis et 
al.*). Information and communication technologies (ICT) have 
different characteristics from material technologies, in that the 
concerns raised by ICT often reside not only in their physical aspect ” 
hardware, electrons, quantum bits ” but also, and often more 
pertinently, in their immaterial, virtual aspect ” cyberspace (wherever 
that space may be), information, and knowledge (Hildebrandt*; Hendry 
and Goodall*). And while these technologies can be characterised as 
‘thing-related’ technologies, yet other issues are raised by ‘life-related’ 
technologies, meaning technologies that impact or use organic or 
living bodies, such as plants through GMOs (Van Asselt et al.*) or 
humans through embryo-affecting technologies (Gavaghan*; 
Zeegers*), or other applications of human biotechnology, genetics, or 
neuro-technologies. And as we travel along the axis of technology, we 
                                                     
* An asterisk denotes that the paper referred to is included in this volume. It is therefore 





will observe that, increasingly, these different types of technologies are 
being combined in what is usually termed ‘converging technologies’ or 
NBIC (nano-bio-info-cogno technologies), for example in nano-
medicine (Dorbeck-Jung*), bio-computing, or synthetic biology. This 
alone is a sufficient reason to bring together scholars from different 
fields to jointly study technology regulation, since insights from 
different technology fields must be combined as technologies 
converge. 
The level of abstraction is also a feature of the technology 
dimension. We can look at very concrete applications of a certain 
technology, such as Facebook (Hendry and Goodall*) or the creation of 
hybrid human-animal embryos (Zeegers*). At the other end of the 
spectrum, ‘technology’ can be studied as a phenomenon in itself, for 
example how people interrelate with pervasive ‘technoscience’ today 
and tomorrow (Zwart*). Most research is situated somewhere in 
between the very concrete application and the very concept of 
technology; this ranges from the somewhat concrete ” web 2.0, nano-
medicine, or psycho-pharmaceuticals ” to a more abstract category like 
ICT or neuro-technologies.  
 
15.2.2. Innovation 
Some technologies seem plain and well-known; we are so used to them 
in everyday life that our brain hiccups for a fraction of a second when 
you refer to a ballpoint, a brick, or a pair of glasses as ‘a technology’. At 
one point in time, however, these were radical innovations. Other 
technologies seem completely new today; brain-controlled bionic limbs 
or colour-changing nano-coatings sound like science fiction rather than 
Science facts to most people, even though they have featured on the 
research agenda for several years, and at some point in time they may 
become as plain as a plane. The degree of innovation clearly is a 
relevant dimension in technology regulation research. Well-known, 
‘more-of-the-same’ technology applications will usually fall within the 
scope of existing legislation or other regulatory instruments, in contrast 
to radically new technologies.  
This is a different dimension from the first, since the type of 
technology is, in principle, independent from how innovative it is. 
Although we talk easily of ‘new technologies’ or ‘emerging 
technologies’, often with the implicit or explicit understanding that we 
refer to nano-technologies, neuro-technologies or converging tech-
nologies, the applications in these fields need not always be ‘new’ or 
‘emerging’, but may simply be an improved version of existing tools. 
And conversely, ‘old technologies’ can also deliver innovative 
applications; some of the most exciting developments today take place 
in, for example, synthetic materials, robotics, and cars. Admittedly, 




most of these developments involve some form of ICT or 
biotechnology, underlining the increasing interwovenness of the 
branches of science and technology. But in principle, any type of 
technology can yield both more-of-the-same and very innovative tools 
and crafts.  
The degree of innovation is relevant for regulatory research, not 
because innovative technologies raise more questions than non-
innovative ones, but because the type of questions at issue differ. With 
‘large’ innovations, research will tend to be exploratory in nature and 
focus on the core effects of the innovation at issue. ‘Small’ innovations 
can lead to more analytic questions of compliance or the exact 
formulation of rules, and often, regulatory implications of unforeseen 
side-effects will be the object of scrutiny ” sometimes, a small step for 
a technology (such as embedding a text message option in mobile 
phones) turns out to constitute a giant leap for society (changing 
patterns of language and communication). It is also important to 
realise that the degree of innovation need not always lie in the quality of 
a technology, but that quantity is equally important. It is far from rare 
that a change in the scale of a technology gives rise to significant 
regulatory questions, for example with cryptography (becoming almost 
impossible to crack when based on mathematical algorithms instead of 
traditional ciphers) or with biobanks for medical research (yielding new 
types of information when interconnected on a massive scale). Here, 




An obvious dimension, if only because it is the one most associated 
with our understanding of space, is place. Where a technology is 
developed or used, in which environment, in what kind of organisation 
” these are all relevant factors for appreciating the implications of a 
given technology. Even though globalisation and the increasingly 
international organisation of science and technology imply that 
technological innovations travel far and fast nowadays, this by no 
means implies that technologies evolve in a global ‘technospace’ 
without local, national, or regional geographical components. This 
applies a fortiori to regulation, which retains a strong geographical 
component however much international law, global governance, and 
international standardisation have gained ground over the past 
decades. Questions of technology regulation always have to take into 
account the location of both the technology and regulatory attempts, so 
that relevant socio-cultural, legal, economic, and institutional factors 





This applies as much to physical space as to virtual space, if we 
understand cyberspace or a virtual world to be a ‘place’ that exists in 
another realm than the computers, software, cables, and wireless 
waves that make this virtual space come into being. Virtual worlds also 
have socio-cultural, regulatory, economic, and institutional elements 
associated with their geography, which, depending on the perspective 
from which they are considered, will to a greater or lesser extent be 
connected with those of the physical locations where virtual space and 
real space intersect and interact.   
 
15.2.4. Time 
As it is the fourth dimension in timespace, so is time the fourth 
dimension in TR research space. Time is essential for technology and 
for regulation. This dimension to a large extent corresponds with the 
temporal development cycle of technology: from fundamental science 
to applied science, and from research & development via product 
development to product marketing and product use. The various stages 
of technology development involve different regulatory issues, although 
some elements ” such as distribution of responsibility and the social 
shaping of technology ” feature in each stage. Regulatory issues in the 
earliest stages of fundamental research may focus on long-term, large-
impact effects and scenario forecasting of a technology in abstracto, 
while the latter stages of technology marketing and use can focus on 
short-term effects of concrete applications. But of course the reverse is 
also possible: one can ask concrete questions about health and safety 
regulations for fundamental research of nanotubes, and study the long-
term effects on identity of social-network sites.  
Many issues along the time dimension relate to the question of 
when regulators can or should intervene if they want or ought to 
regulate. Collingridge’s dilemma is perhaps the most pertinent 
formulation of the challenges of time: controlling a technology is 
difficult in its early stages because not enough is known of its possible 
or probable effects, and it is also difficult once the technology is well-
developed because by then intervention is expensive and drastic (see 
Van Asselt et al.*). A major challenge for research is therefore to find 
ways to regulate in early stages when it is still possible ” albeit in the 
dark ” to regulate, which calls for innovative approaches (Rip*; Mandel, 
2009).  
Challenging as the dilemma was in 1980 when Collingridge 
formulated it, it has become only more acute in light of ‘technological 
turbulence’, with short innovation cycles in, for example, the ICT sector. 
The Internet is a good example of another time-related phenomenon: 
namely, Gartner’s hype cycle, which observes how technologies start 
with a trigger, rise to the peak of inflated expectations, only to plummet 




in the trough of disillusionment, from which it can slowly climb the 
slope of enlightenment to finally reach the plateau of productivity 
(Fenn, 1995). Researchers of technology regulation may observe that 
regulation frequently follows a similar hype cycle in itself. Although the 
regulatory cycle can follow the technology cycle with a time lag, at other 
times it intervenes in the technology cycle by inflating expectations 
(regulating electronic signatures in the mid-1990s), pushing the 
technology into the abyss of disgrace (prohibiting embryonic stem-cell 
research in the US), or giving the technology a leg-up in its ascent of 
the slope of enlightenment (liberally handing out patents in 
biotechnology) (cf. Van den Daele*).  
 
15.2.5. Regulation Type 
With place and time, we have already come close to the more 
regulation-related dimensions of TR research space, where we have 
now arrived. The primary dimension in this region is the type of 
regulation at issue. As I use a broad notion of regulation ” the 
intentional influencing of someone’s or something’s behaviour ” this is 
a very rich dimension indeed. It comprises, for example, the regulatory 
‘toolbox’, in which we find ” depending on who crafted the toolbox ” 
Lessig’s (1999) four modalities of regulation (law, social norms, 
market, and architecture) or Hood’s tools of government (nodality, 
authority, treasure, and organisation) (see the reappraisal of Hood by 
Raab and De Hert, 2008). Equally important are the actors wielding 
these instruments, the regulators (governments at different levels; 
NGOs; standardisation bodies; public-private partnerships, etc.), and 
the actors targeted by them, the regulatees, not to mention popular 
hybrids of these in the form of self-regulation and participatory 
governance. Moreover, these actors act within regulatory institutions, 
such as the EU regulatory framework, UN bureaucracy, or cybercultural 
Internet governance networks, which shapes the tools and actors as 
much as it is shaped by them. There is thus a significant 
interdependence between tools, actors, and institutions, which is why I 
have stretched them together along one axis of regulation type.  
Further refinements can be made of different aspects of regulation 
type. Brownsword (2008: 16) has introduced regulatory ‘pitch’ as a 
relevant factor, i.e., in what tone of voice regulators speak to regulatees. 
They can use for example a paternalistic, command-and-control voice 
(‘thou shalt not copy’) or a soft-sisterly, caring voice (‘do protect your 
e-banking password’), but also a practical voice (‘introductory offer: 
biometric passports now with 20% discount!’). He also mentions 
regulatory range (Brownsword, 2008: 19-21): behaviour can be 
influenced by negative (stick) or positive (carrot) or neutral means. And 





to discourage undesirable behaviour can take the form of criminal, 
administrative, or civil sanctions. Many other aspects can be 
distinguished of regulation types that can help us to better understand 
this dimension. It is therefore highly relevant for technology regulation 
research to engage with scholars from legal theory, political science, 
policy studies, law & economics, and business administration.  
 
15.2.6. Normative Outlook 
Technology regulation does not take place in a neutral vacuum. On the 
contrary, since it focuses on influencing behaviour, normative elements 
enter the picture as a matter of course. The substantive goal of the 
regulation ” which will of course always be normative in nature to a 
greater or lesser extent ” is included in the previous dimension, since 
that is part and parcel of the regulation type. There is more to norms 
than the goal of regulation, however, and that is the normative outlook 
that underlies or implicitly feeds technology regulation. This can be a 
certain ethical paradigm, such as utilitarianism or communitarianism, 
a religious belief, or widely-shared values that are almost taken for 
granted in a certain community, such as individual autonomy in 
Western liberal democracies, kinship bonds in the South Pacific, or 
originality in the global academic research community.  
Normative outlooks do not necessarily involve the most obvious 
normative paradigms such as ethics or religion. There are also more 
subtly normative assumptions that underlie regulatory decisions. For 
example, one’s risk attitude or tolerance of risk is a hugely important 
factor in risk governance processes; risk-averse regulators will reach for 
precaution where risk-tolerant regulators may sooner adopt a wait-and-
see or early-warning approach. This can be seen as an instance of what 
Brownsword (2008: 21) has termed ‘regulatory tilt’, i.e., the default 
position set by regulators, which can lean towards the permissive or the 
prohibitory side, and which is influenced by all kinds of underlying 
assumptions or attitudes. Uncertainty attitude could also be included 
here, which refers to the level of uncertainty that regulators can or want 
to cope with (Van Asselt et al.*).   
Such normative outlooks are the substrata on which technology 
regulation is cultivated, and therefore significantly affect how concrete 
cases of technology regulation grow and flourish (or not). They are, 
however, rarely made explicit, and it is a primary task for TR research to 
expose how the implicit normative outlooks influence the process and 
outcome of technology regulation. For this reason, the normative 
outlook is an important dimension in its own right. 
 





Uncertainty attitudes, and the associated ‘uncertainty paradox’ (Van 
Asselt et al.*), have much to do with the level of knowledge that is 
available. Here we encounter the dimension of knowledge, which 
should be seen as a separate dimension from normative outlooks; the 
latter focuses on knowledge on a meta-level (how we deal with 
knowledge), whereas the dimension of knowledge itself deals with its 
substance. It comprises what we know and how much (or how little) 
about a technology and its effects, about certain regulatory aspects, or 
about some instance of technology regulation. The major factors here 
are, in the well-known distinction from risk regulation, knowns and 
unknowns, with the useful distinction that there are known unknowns 
(we don’t know how psycho-pharmaceuticals affect the brain in the 
long term) as well as unknown unknowns (we are not yet able to 
imagine all possible effects that nanomaterials may have on life, the 
universe, and everything). Particularly the unknown unknowns make 
technology regulation tricky, because we do not know exactly what 
types of ignorance or uncertainty we should focus our efforts on. 
Fortunately, unknown knowns may come to the rescue, i.e., things that 
we know but are unaware of as being relevant to the case at hand, for 
example, because they are common knowledge in a different field but 
unknown in the primary discipline from which a problem is 
approached. Unknown knowns are a category that is somewhat 
underappreciated in technology regulation. Bringing together different 
disciplines, which is one of the key aspects of TR research, may well 
bring to light unexpected insights that help to identify the relevant 
knowns and unknowns or to turn an unknown into a known. 
Technology regulatory challenges that we suspect of involving 
significant unknown unknowns can clearly benefit from structural 




Knowledge has brought us closer towards the end of our journey 
through TR research space, as we enter the region of research-related 
dimensions. The discipline or field of research itself is the primary 
dimension here. Along this axis the disciplines of academic research 
are spread out. Technology regulation can be researched from all kinds 
of disciplinary perspectives, including law and its subdisciplines, 
governance studies, ethics, policy studies, public administration, 
political science, economics, media studies, communications theory, 
psychology, sociology of technology, philosophy of technology, 
cybernetics, information theory, systems theory, robotics, genetics, 





others are very young, emerging on the map after years of 
multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary research to become a discipline 
in their own right. We need not go into the semantics of multi-, inter-, 
cross-, trans-, neo-, or post-disciplines here; for the purposes of this 
chapter, it suffices to note that the dimension of discipline is rich, 
diverse, and dynamic. What you research, and how you research it, is to 
a large extent defined by the research discipline you use. But it also 
works the other way around, since research disciplines evolve and are 




Technology regulation research is not random, but aims at addressing 
a certain issue, usually a problem in theory or practice. A crucial 
dimension of TR research space is therefore the problem definition. Is 
it the aim to understand how a certain mechanism works, in 
technology, in regulation, or in technology regulation? Is it to elucidate 
an emerging phenomenon, such as de facto regulation in early-stage 
nanotechnology development (Rip*)? Does the research focus on 
solving a problem in theory, such as how to overcome Parfit’s dilemma 
(Gavaghan*) or how to reinvent the legal system after the advent of 
Ambient Intelligence (Hildebrandt*)? Or does it aim to solve a problem 
in regulation practice, for example, to consider what are the most 
satisfactory current regulatory regimes for regulating nanotechnologies 
(Bowman et al.*); or whether patent law is being applied adequately to 
stimulate innovation (Schellekens*)?  
Problem definitions thus range from understanding something to 
solving something, and the consequent research involves approaches 
ranging from the purely descriptive through the analytical to the 
normative. Often, the type of problem and the type of approach go 
hand in hand, a descriptive approach usually being applied for 
enhancing understanding, a normative approach being applied for 
solving an actual problem. This is not necessarily the case, however: 
part of a solution to a regulatory problem may be to describe the known 
or possible consequences of various solutions, without taking a stance 
on which solution ‘best’ solves the problem; and a problem definition 
aimed at better understanding a certain mechanism, such as how 
regulatory interventions affect fundamental rights, can well be 
normative in character. This shows that researchers face a range of 
choices in the problem definition of what they want to address: what 
problem exactly do they target, what kind of problem is this, what is a 
suitable approach to addressing this problem, and what  methods can 
or should be used for that?  




Note that this dimension does not exclusively apply to researchers. 
Regulators also have to think about how they define the problem when 
they regulate. To address a regulatory problem, the same questions of 
problem definition and approach apply. Some such questions fall 
within the dimension of regulation type, but several questions are more 
preliminary than that, as regulators have to define the problem before 
they can go on to choosing regulatory instruments, involve actors, etc.  
 
15.2.10. Frame 
Whereas the ‘problem’ dimension deals with framing research 
questions, many other factors are also involved in ‘framing’ technology 
regulation research, in the sense of constraints that define the ‘window’ 
through which you view the world. It is useful to distinguish between 
these two kinds of framing: a) actively framing the problem in a certain 
way for research purposes and setting the parameters that you can play 
with (such as the type or scope of the problem), which is dimension 
no. 9, and b) finding oneself in a frame of reference that constrains the 
room for action. This constitutes a separate dimension, because many 
factors function as relevant research constraints. For example, the 
system bias of the organisation of research (which influences whether 
research is conducted in private or public institutions or public-private 
partnerships, in commercial or not-for-profit settings, with certain 
levels or types of researchers) affects the types of research that can be 
or are being done. Obviously, the available amount of money ” and the 
ways in which it can be spent ” also influences the research. Moreover, 
social norms (what is ‘accepted’ or ‘acceptable’ research) and ethical or 
legal research guidelines constrain the scope for research, for example 
to what extent experiments can be done with animals or humans. And 
all kinds of other biases ” such as gender, cultural, or beliefs bias, for 
example when the world is perceived from the perspective of a WASP ” 
affect the research. In short, similar to the way in which normative 
outlooks constrain the regulation region of TR space, the frame 
constrains the research region of TR space, often ‘under the skin’ and 
beyond the awareness of researchers or regulators. It is important to 
become aware of these constraints if the results of research are to be 
appreciated on their merit and limitations.  
 
15.3. Finding Your Bearings in Research Space 
So, what have we gained by having travelled through this ten-
dimensional space? Hopefully, journeying, albeit briefly, along each 
consecutive dimension has elucidated the multi-faceted nature of 
technology regulation and has shown how complex it is to research 





but others were possibly less so. Becoming aware of all ten dimensions 
can help researchers as well as regulators to find their bearings in TR 
research space. To find out where we stand (or float, if we do not have 
ground to stand on), all we have to do is determine the ten co-
ordinates in space of our current position. Although it remains 
impossible to graphically represent ten dimensions on two-dimensional 
paper, the following graph may help to represent the ten dimensions, 
grouped together by the three constitutive elements of technology 
regulation research.  
 
Figure 15.1. The ten dimensions of technology regulation research 
space 
 
An assumption underlying this map of TR research space is that the 
dimensions are orthogonal, i.e., that they are independent from each 
other. This is a serious simplification, since in real life, no neat 
distinctions apply, and most things are related in some way or another. 
Certain dimensions are no doubt interrelated to some degree, such as 
the normative outlook that feeds regulation and the framing 
constraints of an associated research problem, or the type of techno-
logy and the discipline that studies its regulation. I am sure, too, that 
my own frame of reference has affected my drawing the map in this 
way, being influenced, for example, by a Western liberal-democratic 
background, working in a law faculty, and a mathematician’s predilec-
tion for dimensions. Other researchers may distinguish certain other 
dimensions, or in fact group all the aspects of TR research in a 




somewhat different way based on other metaphors than multi-
dimensional space. The map drawn here does not pretend to be, 
literally, a map of ‘real’ space. It is a map that may help travellers in 
technology regulation research to determine their coordinates by 
providing a checklist to look around and take into account all possibly 
relevant aspects. 
To illustrate how the map could be used, take a look at, for example, 
the chapter in this volume by Bärbel Dorbeck-Jung*. We can situate her 
contribution in the upper regions of the map: the dimensions most 
visible in her analysis are regulation type, knowledge, and innovation. 
The paper is a quest for prudent types of regulation for a technology ” 
nanomedicine ” that raises problems because its innovativeness (nano-
structures calling into question the distinction between medicinal 
products, medical devices, and biologic products) causes gaps in 
knowledge, not only in terms of uncertain risks associated with 
nanomedicine but also in terms of the applicability of existing 
regulatory regimes. Interestingly, the dimensions of innovation and 
knowledge are not only active in the problem definition, but also in the 
search for solutions: knowledge gained in the regulation of adjacent 
technologies (medical products, in particular advanced therapy 
medicinal products) may show good practices that can help to regulate 
nanomedicine, applying an innovative approach to regulation of 
‘prudent regulatory hybridisation’.  
Albeit less visible in the main argument of Dorbeck-Jung’s chapter, 
other dimensions nevertheless also play a role. The problem at hand is 
triggered partly by nanomedicine being a hybrid type of technology ” 
nanotechnology applied in the life sciences ” in a temporal state of 
rapid development that calls for continual vigilance throughout the 
entire regulatory product cycle. The place of action is Europe, which 
brings along a normative outlook of democratic values of, inter alia, 
openness and participation that influence the direction of regulatory 
solutions. It would be interesting to conduct a comparable analysis for 
other places, such as South-East Asia or the United States, and see 
whether their regulatory traditions and attitudes to risk and uncertainty 
lead to similar preferences for hybrid forms of soft-law and hard-law 
regulation, and whether in their regulatory contexts, nanomedicine is 
also seen as problematic for the way in which it blurs the distinction 
between medicine, device, and biologic product that underlies health 
regulation. Moreover, the analysis is grounded in the discipline of 
governance studies, but also draws upon valuable insights from legal 
theory and Science & Technology Studies. It might be further enriched 
by scholars who could incorporate insights from other fields, such as 
systems theory, with knowledge of how hybridisation processes of 





to analyse how the problem definition ” ‚what lessons can the 
regulation of nanomedical products learn from the European Union’s 
medical product regulation?‛ ” is framed by the presentation of the 
latter as an example of ‘prudent’ regulation, with the epithet subtly 
leading the reader to have an uncritically favourable attitude to 
hybridisation of regulation: surely, no-one would advocate ‘imprudent’ 
regulation that sticks to monolithic forms of regulation? The underlying 
assumption is that hybridisation of regulation ” merging soft-law and 
hard-law elements ” will combine the best of both worlds rather than 
lead to a lose-lose situation; this may not be an unwise assumption, 
but it could do no harm to test it explicitly, perhaps in ex-ante 
evaluation of proposed regulatory solutions, or in continual vigilance of 
the regulatory cycle of emerging nanomedicine regulation.  
The map of dimensions of technology regulation space can be used 
in this way as a heuristic tool to position research ” ex post, as I have 
done here, but also ex ante by researchers embarking on writing a 
paper ” and therewith show the major directions in its argument. 
Perhaps more importantly, it also elucidates its less-developed 
elements, which can point the way to relevant questions for further 
research. It would be a great exercise to do a similar mapping of the 
other chapters in this volume, in order to come up with a 
comprehensive agenda for future research, but I am running out of 
space here and will leave this exercise to the imagination of the reader 
in her role of armchair traveller.  
 
15.4. To Boldly Go 
As I indicated in the introduction, I have presented here an essayistic 
attempt to comprehensively map the dimensions of the technology 
regulation research. I am open to other maps, as well as to other 
metaphorical representations of the field we operate in. What is 
important, I think, is to support the emerging discipline to gain some 
foothold in terms of analytic tools that help us understand what this 
discipline is about, how it approaches its research, what it can 
contribute to the body of knowledge, which known unknowns need to 
be researched, and, most excitingly, to get an intuition of the unknown 
unknowns that await us out there when we travel further in TR research 
space.  
As the contributions to this volume attest, technology regulation 
can be fruitfully studied from many different perspectives and 
disciplines. But ultimately, it is the combination and integration of the 
many perspectives and research backgrounds that moves the field 
forward onto another level of understanding of how technology 
interacts with society, how regulation responds to and intervenes in 




this interaction, and how regulation at the same time is shaped by the 
interaction of technological and social developments.  
Bringing together various researchers and their insights into a single 
volume is more than an act of book-binding ” it is an act of research-
binding and discipline-building as well. Technology regulation makes 
up a most complex multi-dimensional space, but with joined forces, we 
are well equipped to embark on the journey to explore unknown parts 
of the universe. To ask questions that no-one has asked before. To 
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